m  INTERN  A 


otters  and  Essays 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

/v —  / 

cf(eceitved .       \^J..Jt~tr*i  ,  iSqCj 

^Accessions  No.for~03o.  Class  No. 

Main  Lib. 


INTERNATIONAL  SERIES 

EDITED   BY 

CAPTAIN  ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER, 

Sixth  Infantry  U.  S.  Army,  Instructor  in  Art  of  War  at  th  U.  S.  Infa  ntry 
and  Cavalry  School. 


MILITARY  LETTERS  AND  ESSAYS 


BY 


CAPTAIN  F.  N.  MAUDE,  R.E. 

AUTHOR   OF 

"Letters  on  Tactics  and  Organization,"  etc. 


No.  i. 
. 


KANSAS  CITY,  Mo. 

HUDSON-KlMBERLY  PUBLISHING  Co. 
1014-1016  WYANDOTTE  ST. 


A/f 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  l,S9.r>,  by 

HUDSON-KIMBERLY  PUBLISHING  CO., 
In  t*he  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington,  D.  C. 


PREFACE. 

The  following  letters  appeared  (for  the  most  part)  originally  in  the 
columns  of  the  Civil  and  Military  Gazette  of  Lahore,  and  their  pur- 
pose was  to  keep  my  brother  officers  in  Bengal  informed  of  the  direc- 
tion current  military  thought  was  taking  in  the  principal  armies  of 
Europe,  in  all  branches  of  the  art  of  war,  strategy,  tactics,  organization, 
and  the  training  of  troops  for  war.  It  has  always  been  my  conviction  that 
the  essential  principles  underlying  the  employment  of  troops  in  war 
never  change;  invention  may  modify  for  a  time  the  balance  between 
the  three  arms,  and  an  exceptional  weapon  in  the  hands  of  one  army 
only  may  temporarily  bring  about  a  startling  change' in  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  battle-field,  as  in  1866  and  1870,  but  once  the  equality  of  con- 
ditions is  restored,  matters  revert  to  their  former  aspect  with  effective 
ranges  and  distances  only  increased. 

Thus  Leuthen,  Rossbach  and  Austerlitz  remain,  and  will  remain  for 
all  time,  typ'es  of  consummate  battle-leading,  and  a  diagram  of  any  one 
of  these  battles,  with  the  scale  omitted,  will  serve  for  any  period  since 
the  fire-arm  supplanted  the  bayonet  as  essentially  the  decision-com- 
pelling arm. 

To  bring  this  point  out  it  was  necessary  to  have  frequent  recourse 
to  forgotten  histories  and  biographies,  and  thus  I  account  for  the  pres- 
ence of  the  several  reviews  embodied  in  this  collection. 

Moreover,  armament  and  skill  on  the  part  of  the  leaders  being 
equal,  victory,  under  all  conditions  of  improvements  conceivable  in 
weapons,  will  ultimately  remain  with  the  best  disciplined  troops,  and 
by  "discipline"  I  understand  that  quality  which  is  measured  by  the 
endurance  of  loss  by  troops  under  fire,  having  due  regard,  of  course,  to 
the  circumstances  of  time,  ground,  and  employment  under  which  the 
losses  were  inflicted. 

No  training  in  which  this  ultimate  end  of  "discipline"  is  lost  sight 
of  is  worth  the  time  wasted  on  it,  and,  reading  between  the  lines,  it  will 
be  very  evident  that  I  am  far  from  considering  that  all  the  time  spent 
in  military  training  in  England  is  employed  to  the  best  advantage. 
This  accounts  for  the  descriptions  of  field  days,  etc.,  which  may  appear 
to  many  to  possess  but  ephemeral  interest. 

Finally,  my  chief  object  in  republishing  these  papers  has  been  to 
supply  a  want  that  from  my  own  experience  I  know  to  exist;  viz.,  some 
contemporary  estimate  made  in  peace-time  of  the  spirit  of  different 
armies,  the  method  of  training  ,  n  use  in  each,  and  the  degree  of  effi- 
ciency they  may  be  expected  to  develop  on  active  service.  Anyone  who 
has  attempted  to  unravel  the  causes  which  led  to  the  defeat  of  the 
French  in  1870,  or  the  defeat  of  the  Prussians  in  1806,  will,  I  think, 
readily  admit  of  what  great  value  half  a  dozen  independent  contempo- 
rary works,  based  on  the  above  lines  and  written  before  the  event,  would 
have  been  to  him. 

In  conclusion,  I  should  like  to  record  my  special  sense  of  gratitude 
to  Captain  Arthur  L.  Wagner,  of  the  United  States  Army,  for  his  kindness 
in  rescuing  my  manuscript  from  the  series  of  misfortunes  which  have 
overtaken  it  since  it  left  my  hands  for  the  mail  steamer  and  which 
have  entailed  a  long  delay  in  publication. 

F.  N.  MAUDE,  Captain, 

Royal  United  Service  Institution,  Late  R.  E. 

Whitehall,  October  26,  1895. 


CONTENTS. 

Page 

I.  Statistics  of  the  Franco-German  War 5 

II.  Smokeless  Powder 13 

III.  Conditions  of  Modern  Warfare 22 

IV.  Cost  of  Modern  War 28 

V.  German  Cavalry  Maneuvers :>> 

VI.    Independent  Patrols 40 

VII.    A  Modern  Battle r>2 

VIII.    A  Study  of  a  Modern  Battle 60 

IX.    Attack  or  Defence 68 

X.    The  Origin  of  Extended-Order  Fighting 7.~> 

XI.    The  Legend  of  St.  Privat 85 

XXII.    Von  Wedell's  Cavalry  Brigade  at  Mars-la -Tour.  .101 

XIII.  Present  Tactical  Tendencies  in  the  German  Army.  1  24 

XIV.  The  Physique  of  European  Armies 131 

XV.    The  Weapon  or  the  Man 133 

XVI.    The  Minor  Tactical  Day  at  Aldershot 140 

XVII.    The  Volunteer  Field  Day  at  Aldershot ir>3 

XVIII.    Field  Day  at  Aldershot 102 

XIX.   Notes  on  the  French  Maneuvers 169 

XX.    The  German  Army 1 78 

XXI.    Marching  through  Thuringia 230 

XXII.   The  Panics  at  Gravelotte 239 

XXIII.  Von  Moltke's  Work 260 

XXIV.  The  Spirit  of  the  New  German  Infantry  Regula- 

tions  270 

XXV.   Notes  in  Germany  in  1889 291 

XXVI.    Blank  vs.  Ball  Cartridge  Tactfcs. .  . 296 


THE  STATISTICS  OF  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

Some  months  ago  I  called  attention  to  the  publications 
issuing  from  the  German  general  staff,  dealing  with  the  ques- 
tion of  the  absolute  numerical  strength  of  the  troops  engaged 
on  £ach  side  during  the  last  Franco-German  War.  The  last 
number  completes  the  investigation  up  to  the  battle  of  Sedan, 
beyond  which,  in  the  absence  of  all  reliable  returns,  and  with 
reference  to  the  well-known  superiority  of  numbers  on 
the  French  side,  it  is  considered  not  worth  while  to  proceed. 
The  importance  of  these  figures,  for  a  due  appreciation  of  sev- 
eral great  questions  as  to  organization  and  tactics,  is  so  great 
that  I  propose  to  deal  with  them  again  at  greater  length  than 
before;  for  I  confess  that  before  they  came  into  my  hands  I 
had  no  adequate  idea  of  the  amount  of  evidence  in  favor  of 
the  favorite  German  idea  of  the  superiority  of  the  attack  to 
the  defence,  or  as  to  the  full  advantages  of  the  German  sys- 
tem of  territorial  localization.  Taking  the  subject  by  and 
large,  I  had  shared  the  opinion  pretty  generally  held,  that  at 
the  commencement  of  the  war,  with  the  sole  exception  of 
Vionville,  the  large  numerical  superiority  at  the  command  of 
the  Prussians  had  been  reason  enough  to  account  for  their 
victories;  and  that  therefore  these  victories  proved  nothing 
at  all  in  favor  of  the  German  short-service  army  as  opposed 
to  the  Imperial  long-service  one,  or  as  to  the  individual  supe- 
riority of  a  French  soldier  to  a  German  one. 

The  former  point  is  not  considered  in  my  authority,  for 
the  reason,  I  suppose,  that  the  "general  staff"  thought  that 
matter  settled  beyond  dispute  on  the  field  of  Jena,  more  than 
sixty  years  before;  and  those  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
history  of  Prussian  army  reorganization  in  those  days  will 
understand  why  they  should  take  this  view,  for  it  cannot  too 
often  be  repeated  nowadays  that  during  the  years  of  the 
Napoleonic  regime  in  Prussia,  every  one  of  the  questions  with 
regard  to  organization,  which  still  trouble  us,  were  threshed 


6  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

out  with  a  thoroughness  which  leaves  no  room  for  doubt  as  to 
the  wisdom  of  the  steps  then  taken,  but  which,  unfortunately 
for  us,  the  peculiar  conditions  under  which  our  army  serves 
prevent  us  from  accepting. 

The  study  of  this  epoch  is  one  not  usually  undertaken  bv 
Englishmen,  and  therefore  a  more  recent  and  striking  proof 
is  required  to  show  that  our  military  system,  though  a  neces- 
sity of  our  surroundings,  is,  nevertheless,  but  a  compromise 
on  which  it  does  not  do  to  rely  too  much,  though  I  firmly 
believe  thai  till  existing  conditions  are  modified,  it  is  prob- 
ably the  best  we  can  arrive  at  under  the  circumstances. 

Putting  Jena  on  one  side,  and  till  the  issue  of  these  sta- 
tistics, I  think  it  quite  open  to  question  whether  anything 
really  was  proved  against  theprinciple  of  long-service  armies. 
In  1866  a  short-service  peace-trained  army  defeated  utterly 
and  hopelessly  a  long-service  war-experienced  one;  but  the 
immense  superiority  of  the  tactical  handling  of  the  forme;-. 
and  Hie  breech-loader,  rendered  all  useful  comparison  of  the 
two  out  of  the  question.  But  in  1870  the  figures  I  am  about  to 
quote  show  that,  even  in  spite  of  an  inferior  armament  as 
regards  the  infantry,  and  a  tactical  handling  but  little  supe- 
rior, the  long-service  army,  also  war-seasoned,  proved  unab'»' 
to  hold  its  own  against  even  an  inferior  weight  of  the  enenn  : 
and  that,  too,  although  the  latter  had  almost  always  the  sup- 
posed advantage  of  the  ground,  a  defensive  attitude,  and  field 
fortifications  in  their  favor. 

T  will  now  come  to  the  figures.  The  affair  at  Weiszen- 
berg  was  altogether  one-sided,  for  is. (MM)  ritles.  3.000  sabers, 
and  144  gnns  were  brought  up  by  the  (Jerman  stall'  to  crush 
4.050  French  infantry  with  050  cavalry  and  3  batteries.  Only 
half  of  the  Germans  were,  however,  engaged.  The  real  r«-  i- 
son  why  this  steam  hammer  was  employed  to  crack  such  a  nut, 
was  that,  the  proper  use  of  the  cavalry  division  not. having  as 
yet  been  understood,  the  Germans  were  almost  as  badly  in- 
formed of  the  whereabouts  of  their  enemy  as  the  latter  were 
of  theirs.  It  is  not  generally  known  that  the  formation  of 
cavalry  divisions  was  only  decreed  by  the  King  on  the  29th  c  f 
'Tuly,  and  on  the  ch'v  of  the  battle,  the  4th  of  August,  the  4th 
Tavalry  Division  attached  to  this  Army  (the  Third)  was  only 
just  completed  and  moving  up  try  the  front — a  mistake  which. 


Military  Letters  and  Essay  s.  7 

however,  will  never.be  made  by  the  Germans  again.  It  was  a 
consequence  of  this  delay  in  forming  the  cavalry  divisions 
that  the  battle  of  Woerth,  which  took  place  two  days  after- 
wards, was  fought  entirely  against  the  wish  of  the  army  com- 
mander; nevertheless,  the  latter  succeeded  ultimately  in 
bringing  into  action  in  round  numbers  90,000  rifles,  7,750 
sabers,  and  342  guns,  more  than  double  the  number  that  Mac- 
Mahon  could  possibly  bring  against  them. 

On  the  part  of  the  French  this  was  certainly  the  finest 
fight  they  made  as  regards  the  courage  of  the  men  and  the 
regimental  handling  of  the  troops.  Possibly  in  this  instance 
they  might  have  held  their  own  against  equal  numerical  odds, 
for  their  discipline  and  pluck  went  far  to  atone  for  their  want 
of  tactical  instruction.  The  charge  of  Michel's  brigade  of 
cuirassiers,  and  Septeuil's  lancers  only  failed  to  be  well  timed 
by  a  couple  of  minutes,  and  even  in  spite  of  this  and  the 
absence  of  ground  scouts,  which  led  to  terrible  confusion, 
fully  obtained  its  primary  object  of  gaining  time,  for,  under 
cover  of  the  confusion  it  produced,  the  French  irrfantry,  who 
were  giving  way,  rallied  again  in  a  second  position,  and  it  took 
the  Prussians  three  hours'  hard  fighting  to  turn  them  out 
of  it. 

These  two  actions  were  the  only  ones  in  which  it  was  nec- 
essary for  the  Germans  to  put  in  the  proportion  of  troops  that 
is  generally  considered  necessary  in  peace  maneuvers  to  com- 
pensate for  the  disadvantage  of  having  to  attack  a  well-pre- 
pared and  naturally  strong  position,  as  the  following  figures 
will  show.  At  Spicheren,  fought  the  same  day,  23,700  French 
riiles,  backed  by  90  guns  and  260  sabers  holding  a  position  of 
unusifal  natural  strength  which  had  further  been  strength- 
ened artificially,  were  turned  out  of  it  by  only  26,000  German 
infantry  with  78  guns  and  840  cavalry,andthese  troops  attacked 
under  the  most  unfavorable  conditions,  being  sent  in  in  drib- 
lets as  they  arrived  on  the  field,  with  no  unity  of  command 
and  on  a  front  far  in  excess  of  what  by  all  sound  tactical  rules 
they  should  have  occupied.  At  Fredericsburg,  in  the  Ameri- 
can war,  the  Northerners,  attacking  under  circumstances  in 
every  way  more  favorable,  received  from  Lee  the  bloodiest- 
repulse  they  ever  experienced,  and  if  in  an  ordinary  war  game 
a  similar  situation  arose,  I  fancy  any  umpire  would  unhes-ti- 


8  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

tatingly  say  that  the  attacking  force  deserved,  and  could  ex- 
pect, no  better  fate :  and  yet  so  different  is  the  battle-field  to 
the  maneuver-ground  that  the  Germans  succeeded  in  winning. 

The  battle  of  Colombey — Nouilly  or  Borny — on  the  14th 
August,  gives  a  fair  sample  of  what  the  Germans  could  do, 
both  in  attack  and  defence  Though  only  a  portion  of  the 
French  troops  engaged  had  previously  been  under  fire,  they 
were  all  more  or  less  affected  by  the  course  events  had  taken. 
and  can  hardly  be  considered  as  unshaken.  The  fight  was 
brought  on  by  the  German  outposts,  who,  seeing  indications 
of  a  retreat  in  progress,  attacked  at  once  without  waiting  for 
orders,  drove  in  the  first  line  of  the  French  position,  and  then 
held  on  to  them  against  repeated  and  desperate  counter- 
attacks on  the  part  of  the  French.  No  sooner  were  the  guns 
heard,  than  every  body  of  German  troops  within  call  heade-l 
in  for  the  fight,  but  the  late  hour  at  which  it  commenced,  and 
the  distance,  prevented  any  considerable  number  from  arriv- 
ing before  dark,  and  ultimately  the  decision  was  given  by 
30,500  rifles  with  150  guns  on  the  German  side  against  50,700 
rifies  and  206  guns  on  the  French  one,  the  latter  actually 
bringing  a  five-fold  superiority  to  bear  on  the  point  of  attack, 
which  wras  easily  beaten  back,  notwithstanding  the  serious 
disadvantage  the  Germans  labored  under  of  having  the  blind- 
ing rays  of  the  setting  sun  in  their  eyes,  which  hampered  the 
practice  of  their  artillery  enormously.  The  French  at  the 
time,  and  possibly  even  now;  claim  to  have  won  this  action, 
but  in  presence  of  the  fact  that  the  Germans  bivouacked  on 
the  ground  they  had  taken  from  the  French,  and  were  only 
prevented  from  actually  pursuing  the  latter  by  the  fire  of  the 
forts  of  Metz,  behind  which  the  French  withdrew,  this  claim 
can  hardly  be  considered  proved. 

The  next  fight,  that  of  Vionville— Mars-la-Tour  (10th 
August,  1870) — was  undoubtedly  the  most  honorable  to  the 
Prussian  arms.  The  course  of  this  encounter  is  so  well 
known  that  it  would  be  superfluous  to  dwell  on  it  further 
than  to  remind  the  reader  that  it  began  with  a  surprise — very 
indifferently  executed,  by  the  way — of  the  French  cavalry 
camps  by  the  5th  German  Cavalry  Division;  and  the  sound 
of  the  premature  firing  alarmed  the  whole  of  the  French 
Army  lying  almost  close  at  hand,  who  instantly  formed  up 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  U 

and  fell  with,  overwhelming  numbers  on  the  advance  guard  of 
the  5th  Division,  3d  Corps,  just  emerging  from  the  defiles 
leading  up  from  Gorze.  Then  began  a  typical  encounter  bat- 
tle. Every  man,  horse,  and  gun  within  sound  of  the  firing 
marching  up  to  assist,  all  superior  leading  was  soon  at  an 
end,  and,  tired  and  weary  as  they  were  with  the  long  toil 
under  the  burning  sun,  the  troops  were  sent  straight  into  the 
fight,  without  any  knowledge  of  the  ground  or  the  strength  of 
the  enemy  opposed  to  them.  The  fighting  began  at  9  a.  in., 
and  up  to  3  p.  m.  only  23,700  rifles,  8,100  sabers,  and  126  guns 
had  been  brought  up,  against  which  the  French  engaged 
59,100  rifles,  6,700  sabers,  and  300  guns,  including  24 
mitrailleurs. 

After  3 :30  p.  m.,  German  reinforcements  began  to  arrive 
more  rapidly,  till  at  the  close  of  the  day  47,100  infantry,  8,300 
cavalry,  and  222  guns  on  the  German  side  were  fighting 
against  83,600  rifles,  8,000  sabers,  and  432  guns  (including  18 
mitrailleurs)  on  the  other  side. 

To  students  of  tactics,  no  battle  in  the  whole  war  offers 
so  many  points  of  interest,  for  it  is  the  only  one  in  which  all 
three  arms  bore  their  full  share  of  fighting.  It  is  not  generally 
realized  how  well  the  French  fought  individually.  They 
showed  a  steadiness  under  the  most  demoralizing  circum- 
stances that  it  would  be  utterly  vain  to  hope  for  from  their 
short-service  soldiers  of  to-day,  as,  for  instance,  the  way  they 
rallied  after  being  ridden  over  by  Bredow's  cavalry,  and, 
facing  about,  received  his  second  charge,  and  the  extreme 
gallantry  with  which  it  is  universally  admitted  they  at- 
tempted again  and  again  to  attack  in  the  face  of  the  fire  of  the 
Prussian  batteries.  It  was  admitted  by  all  that  no  troops 
could  have  done  more,  but  the  storm  of  shell  that  met  them 
proved  most  conclusively  the  impossibility  of  attacking 
directly  such  lines  of  artillery  with  success,  where  the  latter 
have  a  fair  field  of  fire ;  and  if  that  was  the  case  in  1870,  when 
common  shell  only  had  to  be  faced,  wyhat  hope  have  infantry 
now,  when  ring  shells  and  shrapnel  have  quintupled  the 
power  of  the  guns?  It  should  be  remembered  also  that  the 
3d  Corps  were  Krandenburgers — i.  e.,  true  Prussians;  and  it 
is  just  a  little  bit  doubtful  whether  the  other  corps  consisted 
of  quite  the  same  stuff.  The  French  claimed,  and  still  claim. 


Of 

171 J 


10  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

to  have  won  the  victory  in  this  day's  fighting,  but  it  is  a  pity 
for  them  that  they  did  not  substantiate  their  claim  by  a  reso- 
lute attack  next  morning,  for  it  was  the  very  opportunity  to 
have  shown  the  value  of  the  long-service  war-seasoned  army 
over  the  other  system;  and  it  is  admitted  now  by  German 
writers,  notably  by  Prince  Hohenlohe,  that  such  a  resump- 
tion of  the  offensive  had  a  fair  chance,  and  at  any  rate  was 
the  last  one,  of  success,  but  Bazaine,  the  "bon  general  ordi- 
naire" showed  here  the  want  of  Hint  iron  resolution  which 
makes  the  real  leader,  and  preferred  to  fall  back  on  to  a 
defensive  position,  from  which  he  hoped  to  show  what  the 
Chassepot  could  do  under  what  the  theorists  of  the  practice- 
ground  had  proclaimed  to  be  the  most  favorable  conditions 
for  it,  forgetting,  as  they  always  do,  in  England  no  less  than 
in  France,  the  truth  of  Suvaroff  s  favorite  saying:  "It  is  not 
the  gun,  but  the  man  who  stands  behind  it,  which  signifies." 
The  position  he  took  up  is,  by  the  general  consent  of  all 
specialists  in  field  fortification,  allowed  to  have  been  abso- 
lutely ideal.  On  the  left  it  rested  on  the  forts  of  Plappoville 
and  St.  Quentin,  which  wing  was  further  strengthened  by  a 
difficult  ravine,  which  shattered  the  order  of  every  Prussian 
attack  directed  against  it;  and  its  right  was  approached  by 
open  glacis^like  slopes,  not  only  favorable  to  the  special 
power  of  the  weapon,  but  ideally  perfect  for  the  counter- 
attack; and  at  intervals  along  its  front  lay  hamlets  of  con 
Fiderable  extent,  each  of  which  had  boon  converted  into  a 
small  fortress.  In  this  position, further  strengthened  byfield 
entrenchments,  he  drew  up  his  whole  force  of  100,000  infan- 
try, 13,300  sabers,  and  520  guns  (including  06  mitrailleurs), 
and  against  this  the  Germans  advanced  with  166,400  rifles, 
21,200  sabers,  and  732  guns.  By  bad  leading,  Bazaine  actu- 
ally only  brought  83,500 titles,  550  sabers,  and  398  guns  (in- 
cluding 54  mitrailleurs)  into  action;  but,  in  spite  of  the  natural 
strength  of  the  position  above  referred  to,  and  for  which  am- 
or dinary  umpire  would  have  required  at  least  a  two-fold  supe- 
riority for  the  attack,  109,200  rifles,  no  sabers,  and  620  guns 
proved  sufficient  to  turn  him  out  of  it.  There  never  was  a 
battle  in  which  a  better  opportunity  was  offered  of  turning 
the  scale  by  a  vigorous  counter-stroke,  initiated  by  a  charge 
of  cavalry  masses;  but  the  chance  was  lost,  and  with  it  went 
the  last  hope  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  11 

In  the  subsequent  battles  the  superiority  of  the  German 
morale  was  so  marked  that  one  is  no  longer  surprised  at  any- 
thing; still  the  French  individually  fought  with  the  courage 
of  despair  at  Sedan,  and  the  fact  that  they  could  and  did 
bring  their  masses  to  bear  by  the  radii  against  the  circumfer- 
ence of  the  circle  which  the  Germans  had  formed  round  them, 
hardly  prepares  one  for  the  statement  that  the  latter  only 
found  it  necessary  to  bring  69,000  of  their  infantry,  800  of 
their  cavalry,  and  593  guns  into  action  in  order  to  defeat  and 
take  prisoners  the  90,000  infantry  and  cavalry  with  408  guns 
of  the  French.  In  the  face  of  these  figures,  it  seems  impossi- 
ble for  the  latter  to  maintain  any  longer  the  idea  that  it  was 
only  the  numerical  superiority  of  their  opponents  which 
crushed  them,  or  for  us  to  doubt  the  possibility  of  turning  out 
good  soldiers  on  the  three-years-service  system.  The  point  I 
wish  to  make  is  this,  that,  except  in  time  of  permanent  war, 
the  long-service  army  inevitably  eats  out  its  own  heart.  The 
constant  rehearsal  of  the  same  duties  develops  into  mere  rou- 
tine, and  neither  men  nor  officers  have  any  stimulus  to  exert 
themselves.  Instruction  in  peace-time,  to  be  of  any  use,  must 
be  constantly  progressive  as  regards  the  men.  The  moment 
they  think  they  have  reached  the  end  of  their  training,  they 
begin  to  look  on  any  repetition  of  it  as  needlessly  harassing, 
and  the  officers  soon  take  the  same  view,  and  cease  to  persist 
in  the  absolute  precision  of  execution  of  all  drill  on  which 
ultimately  discipline  depends.  Besides,  with  service  exceed- 
ing six  or  seven  years,  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  men 
have  longer  service  than  the  subalterns  and  younger  cap- 
tains, on  whom  so  much  of  the  leading  in  modern  fighting 
depends.  Private  Mulvaney,  with  his  twelve  years'  color 
service,  has  his  own  opinion  as  to  2d  Lieut.  Smith's  knowledge 
of  warfare,  and  though  as  long  as  all  goes  well  he  will  follow 
him  with  devotion  for  the  honor  of  the  old  regiment,  should 
things  go  badly,  he  may  prefer  to  think  for  himself.  The 
reserve  man  on  rejoining  has  not  the  same  self-sufficiency 
about  him,  he  is  a  bit  rusty,  and  all  the  more  inclined  to  look 
up  to  his  officers,  for  it  is  only  a  recurrence  to  an  old  habit. 
And  this  has  always  characterized  the  conduct  of  long-ser- 
vice troops  when  defeat  has  set  in.  The  confidence  between 
men  and  their  immediate  superiors  once  shaken,  and  the 


1 2  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

whole  structure  of  discipline  lias  fallen  to  pieces  like  a  pack 
of  cards,  especially  after  a  comparatively  long  peace.  For- 
tunately, our  record  of  European  war  is  so  good  that  it  is  not 
easy  to  bring  forward  convincing  proofs  from  our  own  his- 
tory, but  the  retreat  to  Corunna,as  described  by  Napier,  gives 
one  an  idea  of  what  we  might  expect,  and  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  Moore  himself  was  one  of  the  best  generals  that  we 
ever  had,  and  that  the  creation  of  the  infantry  thai  afterwards 
became  so  celebrated  was  principally  the  work  of  his  hands. 
It  may  be  said  that  as  yet  we  have  not  seen  ihe  Prussian 
short-service  army  in  defeat  on  a  grand  scale,  but  we  have, 
though  it  was  a  good  many  years  ago;  but  I  do  not  believe  that 
national  courage  changes  rapidly;  the  fighting  instinct  is 
almost  the  oldest  we  possess,  and  therefore  probably  the 
slowest  to  change;  and  it  is  only  seventy-six  years,  about, 
since  a  short-service  Prussian  army  showed  what  they  could 
do,  even  under  defeat.  At  Jena  and  Auerstadt  the  old  long 
service  army,  after  a  most  desperate  resistance,  broke  to 
pieces  all  of  a  sudden, and  in  forty-eight  hours  ceased  to  exist. 
Its  place  was  taken  by  a  short-service  one,  raised  under 
every  conceivable  difficulty  that  the  ingenuity  of  Napoleon 
could  invent,  but  in  the  very  first  fight  in  which  they  again 
confronted  the  French  at  Grosz  Gorchen,  where  the  bulk  of 
their  men  had  barely  a  couple  of  months'  training,  their  ene- 
mies confessed  that  these  were  no  longer  the  same  sort  of  ene- 
mies they  had  had  to  deal  with  before,  for,  though  again  de- 
feated, they  never  lost  their  order,  and  were  ready  to  try  con 
elusions  again  next  day.  In  the  next  year's  fighting  ilSl  4» 
they  were  beaten  again  and  again,  but  still  came  up  to  time 
again,  and  at  Ligny,  the  next  year,  after  what,  by  the  general 
consent  of  all  who  took  part  in  it,  was  1he  bloodiest  and  most 
determined  struggle  of  the  whole  Napoleonic  era,  they  were, 
in  good  order  again  within  twelve  hours,  and  fought  as  well 
as  ever,  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  us  at  \Vaterloo.  The  truth 
is,  that  whilst  lacking  many  of  the  qualities  of  the  profes- 
sional soldier,  short-service  ones  have  a  far  greater  personal 
incentive  to  fight,  for  war  to  them  is  a  terrible  reality,  which 
strikes  right  at  the  heart  of  all  their  dearest  interests:  they 
are  taken  from  their  occupations  and  ties  at  home,  and  realize 
individually  the  magnitude  of  the  stakes  at  issue.  Every- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  13 

body,  both  English,  Prussians,  Austrians,  and  French,  were 
struck  with  the  determination  the  landwehr  showed  in  18GG 
and  1870,  all  the  more  so  since  even  their  own  people  had 
hardly  expected  it.  But  this  personal  interest  is  lacking  to 
the  purely  professional  soldier;  between  two  such  armies 
war  is  apt  to  degenerate  into  something  approximating  to 
the  conventional  duel,  as  opposed  to  the  Calif ornian  one;  in 
fact,  it  is  not  more  than  a  century  since  it  was  considered  the 
greatest  feather  in  a  general's  cap  to  be  able  to  boast  of  a 
successful,  but  bloodless,  campaign.  Ferdinand  von  Braun- 
schweig, one  of  the  most  celebrated  Prussian  generals  before 
•Jena,  would  have  been  as  shocked  at  the  ideas  his  descend- 
ants hold  about  war  as  Gambetta's  second  was  when  Mark 
Twain  proposed  "axes"  as  the  weapons  for  the  celebrated 
duel,  and  would  probably  have  replied  to  them  in  much  the 
same  words:  "But,  my  dear  sir,  have  you  considered  what 
the  consequences  of  an  encounter  with  such  weapons  might 
be?"  Mark  confessed  he  had  not.  "Bloodshed,  sir,  blood- 
shed," replied  the  second.  "That's  about  the  size  of  it." 
again  returned  Mark;  "and  if  1  might  ask,  what  was  your 
side  proposing  to  shed?"  I  seldom  listen  to  an  umpire's 
critique  in  this  country  without  thinking  of  the  above,  for 
undeniably  we  have  still  inherited  a  great  many  misconcep- 
tions as  to  the  nature  of  war  from  the  old  days,  and  the  extra- 
ordinary mania  for  believing  in  the  virtues  of  the  defensive 
and  for  the  necessity  of  avoiding  losses,  forgetting  that  vic- 
tory is  the  first  object,  and  is  cheaper  at  any  cost  than  defeat, 
is  distinctly  traceable  to  the  same  old  source.  But  this  opens 
another  and  a  very  wide  question. 


SMOKELESS  POWDER. 

The  discussion  on  the  relative  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages of  the  new  powders,  with  wrhich  the  military  papers  of 
all  countries  have  been  filled  during  the  past  two  years  or  so, 
reveal  in  a  most  striking  manner  the  spirit  in  which  fighting 
is  viewed  in  the  different  armies  concerned;  this  spirit  being 
the  outcome  of  the  system  of  tactical  training  in  fashion  in 
each.  Viewing  the  matter  generally,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
tendency  in  England,  France,  and  Austria  has  been  to  con- 


14  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

sider  the  advantage  derived  from  its  introduction  as  princi- 
pally on  the  side  of  the  defensive,  and  to  prophesy  an  alarm- 
ing increase  in  the  slaughter  with  which  future  battles  will 
be  accompanied.  In  Germany  alone  the  contrary  view  has 
prevailed;  there,  with  few  exceptions, it  has  been  pointed  out 
that  inasmuch  as  the  absence  of  smoke  facilitates  the  control 
oi  the  fighting  line,  that  side  which  goes  into  action  intent  on 
destroying  its  adversary,  and  not  thinking  how  to  avoid 
destruction,  is  more  certain  than  ever  to  ultimately  effect  its 
object. 

The  truth  is,  the  views  put  forward  in  the  former  coun- 
tries rest  on  a  fundamental  misconception  of  the  causes  on 
which  heavy  losses  depend ;  attributing  them  rather  to  the 
mechanical  perfection  of  the  weapon  than  to  the  obstinacy  of 
the  men  who  wield  it;  and  again,  by  concentrating  their 
attention  on  the  one  object  of  avoiding  losses,  they  lose  sight 
of  the  ultimate  aim  of  all  fighting — viz.,  the  defeat  of  the 
enemy's  army. 

Actually  a  reference  to  military  history  will  show  that 
the  losses  inflicted  in  battle  have  only  indirectly  been  affected 
by  the  nature  of  the  arms  in  use,  but  have  been  simply  con- 
ditioned by  the  relative  fighting  excellence  of  the  two  armies 
engaged.  Where  both  have  consisted  of  war-seasoned  veter- 
ans trained  to  the  highest  pitch  of  tactical  efficiency,  losses 
of  even  30  per  cent  have  not  been  found  sufficient  to  win  a 
decisive  victory,  for  the  troops  have  fought  till  sheer  physical 
exhaustion  compelled  them  to  stop  killing  one  another,  and 
neither  side  has  retained  energy  enough  to  attempt  a  pursuit. 
Zorndorf  is  a  case  in  point,  and  Waterloo  would  have  been 
but  for  the  arrival  of  the  Prussians. 

That  the  question  of  armament  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  losses  can  be  easily  seen  by  noting  how  differently  troops 
of  the  same  nation  have  borne  punishment  under  the  same 
conditions  of  armament,  but  under  different  ones  of  training. 
The  Civil  War  in  America  is  in  this  respect  most  instructive, 
for  here  we  have  two  opposing  sides  more  similar  in  fighting 
characteristics  and  mutual  obstinacy  than  can  well  occur 
where  the  contending  armies  belong  to  different  nations. 
When  these  two  forces  first  met  at  Bull's  Kun,  they  fought 
till  both  sides  were  tired  of  it,  the  victors  being  nearly  as  ex- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  15 

hausted  as  the  vanquished,  but  this  limit  of  exhaustion  was 
reached  when  a  comparatively  small  percentage  had  fallen 
on  both  sides.  But  when,  in  two  years  later,  the  same 
two  armies  met  at  Gettysburg,  there  ensued  about  the  bloodi- 
est battle  for  both  sides  that  is  known  in  modern  history.  The 
conditions  of  armament  remained  identical ;  the  only  thing 
that  had  changed  in  the  interval  was  the  "discipline,"  under- 
standing the  word  in  its  widest  sense,  of  the  contending 
armies. 

Or,  to  take  two  instances  in  more  recent  history,  when  the 
French  and  Germans  met  at  Vionville  in  1870,  both  being 
armies  in  a  relatively  high  state  of  fighting  efficiency,  but 
neither  being  armed  with  weapons  quite  up  to  the  latest 
standard,  they  fought  till  night  put  a  stop  to  the  slaughter, 
without  decisive  advantage  on  either  side.  But  when,  in 
the  last  Servian-Bulgarian  campaign,  two  forces  in  a  low 
state  of  tactical  efficiency,  but  equally  armed  with  better 
weapons  than  either  French  or  Germans  possessed,  encoun- 
tered each  other  in  a  fair  stand-up  fight,  both  sides  were 
nearly  equally  exhausted  by  a  perfectly  trifling  percentage  of 
loss. 

The  fact  is,  every  body  of  troops  possesses  a  certain 
capacity  for  resisting  loss,  and  this  capacity  varies  with  their 
discipline  and  the  fighting  talent  of  the  race.  Unequal  arma- 
ment affects  the  worse  armed  side  prejudicially,  but  with 
equal  armament  troops  will  fight  till  their  capacity  for  endur- 
ance is  exceeded,  and  then  they  will  stop,  and  nothing  more 
is  to  be  got  out  of  them.  The  only  way,  therefore,  in  which 
troops  can  be  trained  to  the  highest  skill  in  avoiding  loss  is 
by  loosening  all  the  bonds  of  discipline  and  allowing  them  to 
degenerate  into  a  mere  rabble.  Two  armies,  both  trained  on 
the  same  system,  might  go  on  worrying  each  other  almost 
indefinitely  with  the  greatest  possible  economy  of  men  on  the 
battle-field,  but  also  without  any  decisive  result  being 
obtained,  and  the  results  would  be  the  same  whatever  the 
nature  of  the  .arms  employed.  To  such  troops  the  value  of 
the  smoke-screen  is  most  obvious,  for  behind  its  veil  thou- 
sands of  unwounded  stragglers  could  withdraw  themselves 
temporarily,  only  to  turn  up  safe  and  sound  at  the  bivouac 
fires  in  the  evening;  but  to  soldiers  filled  with  the  determi- 


16  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

nation  to  kill,  and  to  keep  on  killing,  the  absence  of  the 
smoke-cloud  can  only  be  welcome.  Their  own  movements 
are,  no  doubt,  more  visible  to  the  enemy,  but  this  is  more  than 
compensated  for  by  the  clearly  defined  target  it  gives  them 
to  aim  at,  at  least  within  decisive  fighting  ranges,  for  the  con- 
cealment the  absence  of  smoke  affords  to  the  defender  is,  to 
my  mind,  in  a  great  measure  a  delusion.  It  is  Hue  one  no 
longer  sees  the  little  white  puffs  of  smoke  marking  the  line  of 
defence  to  aim  at,  but  instead  the  crest  of  the  parapet  is 
defined  by  the  bright,  scintillating  flashes  of  the  rifles,  which, 
as  far  as  my  own  observations  go,are  visible  against  all  back- 
grounds and  catch  the  eye  more  markedly  even  than  the  drift- 
ing clouds  of  smoke.  With  a  breeze  blowing  obliquely 
towards  one,  the  puff  of  smoke  may  not  become  visible  for 
some  yards  after  leaving  the  muzzle,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
fix  the  exact  spot  from  which  the  shot  was  fired;  but  the 
bright  spark  suddenly  appearing,  say  under  the  branch  of  a 
small  shrub,  enables  you  to  define  exactly  the  point  to  be 
aimed  at.  And  with  artillery  this  is  even  more  the  case  Hum 
with  small-arm  fire. 

But,  in  the  nature  of  things,  this  benefits  the  assailant 
more  than  the  defender,  for  no  one  proposes  or  ever  has  pro- 
posed to  launch  infantry  blindly  to  the  attack  of  unshaken 
infantry,  as  a  matter  of  principle.  It  may  have  to  be  done, 
and  it  may  prove  successful,  but  it  is  a  terrible  risk,  not  likely 
to  be  often  run.  But  to  troops  once  unsteadied  by  artillery 
fire  the  definition  of  the  target  is  a  matter  of  secondary  im- 
portance, and  indeed  they  are  more  likely  to  bag  something 
firing  into  the  snioke  than  attempting  to  pick  off  an  individual. 

The  essential  fact  remains,  and  always  will  remain  ad 
long  as  battles  are  fought  with  projectile  weapons  of  war, 
that  ultimately  the  successful  execution  of  an  infantry  attack 
depends  on  the  accuinmulation  by  one  side,  within  effective 
range  of  the  enemy,  of  a  sufficient  number  of  rifles  to  estab- 
lish a  fire  superiority  over  the  opposing  force.  This  supe- 
riority once  obtained,  the  success  of  the  assault  follows  as 
n  matter  of  course,  though  not  necessarily  as  the  result  of  the 
the  first  rush;  for  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  decide 
when  the  sufficient  degree  of  superiority  lias  been  attained. 
Consequently,  the  characteristic  of  all  modern  great  infantry 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  17 

• 

lights  has  been  long  fluctuating  fire  lines,  alternately  advanc- 
ing and  retreating;  victory  eventually  falling  to  the  side 
which  has  the  last  intact  reserve  to  throw  into  the  combat. 

This  advantage  will  almost  inevitably  belong  to  the 
assailant.  In  the  Franco-German  war  the  German  infantry 
armament  w^as  conspicuously  inferior  to  that  of  their  adver- 
saries; the  old  needle-gun  ranging  barely  600  yards  against 
the  2,000  and  more  of  the  Chassepot,  which  could  also  be  fired 
half  as  fast  again.  Therefore,  in  all  their  battles,  the  Ger- 
man troops  had  to  advance  without  firing,  and  hence  without 
the  supposed  advantage  of  the  smoke-screen,  up  to  what  is 
now  well  within  the  effective  range  of  modern  military  rifles 
— i.  e.,  between  500  and  600  yards;  and,  without  a  single 
exception,  they  succeeded  in  so  doing,  though  not  without 
suffering  very  heavy  losses;  still,  one  line  having  once  got 
their  footing,  a  second,  a  third,  and  even  a  fourth,  could  have 
reached  the  same  limit,  each  with  less  loss,  for  the  fire  of 
those  already  in  position  would  necessarily  have  interfered 
with  the  enemy's  power  of  retaliation.  Hence  the  ultimate 
powrer  of  establishing  the1  requisite  degree  of  superiority 
would  depend  entirely  on  the  possibility  of  having  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  troops  available  at  the  right  time  and  place. 
The  power  of  thus  assembling  a  superiority  of  force  against 
Hie  point  of  attack  is  one  which  in  the  nature  of  things 
belongs  by  right  to  the  assailant,  who  can  decide  when  and 
where  to  attack,  whereas  his  opponent  is  compelled  to  make 
his  line  equally  strong  along  his  wrhole  front.  Of  course  a 
skillful  use  of  ground,  field  fortifications,  etc.,  may  compel 
the  assailant  to  attack  where  the  defender  chooses;  but, 
broadly  speaking,  the  former  will  always  possess  the  advan- 
tage above  pointed  out — namely,  that  of  knowing  his  own 
mind. 

But  it  may  be  argued  that  howrever  superior  the  Chasse- 
pot may  have  been  relatively  to  the  needle-gun,  it  is  far 
behind  the  modern  weapons  in  rapidity  and  accuracy,  so  that 
what  wTas  possible  in  1870  will  not  be  possible  again.  With 
all  due  deference  to  the  numerous  high  authorities  who  hold 
this  view, I  believe  their  position  to  be  untenable, and  for  the 
following  reasons:  In  the  early  actions  of  the  war  it  so  hap- 
pened that  the  Germans  invariably  managed  to  attack — 


18  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

locally,  at  any  rate — against  a  very  large  (in  some  cases  ar 
enormous)  numerical  superiority.  At  Woerth  four  and  a 
half  battalions  attacked  thecenter  of  the  whole  Frencharniy 
and  were  ultimately  beaten  back,  but  managed  to  get  well 
within  the  (300  yards  limit.  At  SSpicheren  the  numerical  dis 
proportion  for  the  first  few  hours  was  almost  as  great,  and  al 
Vionville  every  single  advance  was  made  against  heavy  odds 
(in  the  case  of  the  38th  Brigade,  northeast  of  Mars-la-Tour, 
the  French  being  in  a  majority  of  at  least  four  to  one) ;  yet 
in  every  instance  the  Germans  managed  to  get  within  what  is 
no\v  very  effective  range. 

The  same  line  of  argument  applies  also  in  a  great  degree 
to  the  artillery;  for  where  the  weapons  are  the  same  on  both 
sides  the  power  of  accumulating  a  superiority  of  fire  on  anj 
one  point  must  always  be  on  the  side  of  the  strategic  assail 
ant;  relatively  to  whom  the  defender  must  generally  be  at  a 
disadvantage.  The  only  arm,  therefore,  which  would  appear 
to  be  unfavorably  affected  by  the  new  order  of  things  would 
be  the  cavalry,  to  whom  the  smoke-screen  was  undoubted!} 
a  great  advantage.  But  even  here  we  may  doubt  whether  in 
fiction  the  drawback  will  be  felt  as  much  as  people  imagine, 
for  when  the  bullets  are  actually  flying,  the  minds  of  all 
become  so  absorbed  in  the  duty  immediately  before  them 
that,  even  though  the  eye  may  see  movements  taking  place  in 
other  parts  of  the  field,  the  brain  refuses  to  register  them,— 
a  close  study  of  military  history  reveals  scores  of  such 
instances  which  in  peace-time  would  be  incredible,  and  no 
doubt,  these  will  recur  in  the  future.  One  thing,  however, 
remains  certain,  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the  endurance  of 
human  nerves,  and  that  this  limit  will  be  reached  the  more 
rapidly  the  greater  the  killing  power  of  the  arms  employed; 
and  then,  as  Hoenig  says  in  his  "Cavalry  Division  on  the  Bat- 
tle-field," "It  will  come  to  very  much  the  same  thing, 
whether  the  infantry  carry  pitchforks  or  magazine  rifles/' 

As  regards  the  question  of  sound,  we  have  been  led  to 
suppose  by  the  papers  that  the  new  powder  gave  very  much 
less  sound  than  the  old,  and  that  ultimately  a  noiseless  pow- 
der altogether  might  be  expected,  and  graphic  pictures  have 
been  given  us  of  silent  death  dropping  from  the  clouds.  This 
last  prediction  is  a  little  premature;  ultimately,  when  this 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  19 

earth  shall  have  cooled  down  to  the  point  of  solidification 
of  the  gases  of  which  the  atmosphere  consists,  and  it  pur- 
sues its  course  round  the  sun  void  of  all  atmosphere  what- 
ever, powders  may,  no  doubt,  explode  without  noise,  for  pow- 
ders always  do  when  exploded  in  vacuo;  but  then  there  will 
be  no  men  to  explode  them,  and  war  will  perforce  have  come 
to  an  end.  But  pending  that,  it  is  the  case  that  silent  death 
may  fall  on  troops  from  the  clouds,  because  the  range  of 
small-arms  is  so  increased  that  conditions  may  often 
occur  when  a  volley,  fired  at  2,500  yards  say,  will  be  inaudi- 
ble, and  the  noise  of  discharge  has  actually  been  changed  by 
the  adoption  of  a  smaller  bore  for  the  rifle. 

But  sound  has  always  been  a  very  untrustworthy  guide 
to  go  upon.  The  distances  to  which  it  will  travel  va-ry  so 
much  and  so  rapidly,  and  the  principles  which  govern  its 
transmission  are  so  little  understood,  that  no  experienced 
officer  would  ever  rely  on  it.  Here  is  a  case  in  point.  At  the 
battle  of  Spicheren,  6th  August,  1870,  a  Prussian  division 
(the  XHIth,  we  believe)  was  on  the  march,  directed  well  clear 
of  the  point  on  which  the  fight  took  place.  Suddenly  heavy 
firing  was  heard  on  the  left,  and  the  line  of  march  was  at  once 
changed,  on  the  principle  that,  when  in  doubt,  you  cannot  do 
better  than  march  towards  the  sound  of  the  guns.  The  new 
direction  took  the  column  through  a  large  forest,  and  about 
1  p.  m.,  when  they  were  half  way  through  it,  all  sound  of  fir- 
ing suddenly  ceased.  The  general  commanding  concluded 
that  it  had  only  been  an  outpost  skirmish,  and  as  his  men 
were  much  fatigued,  he  halted  the  column  and  ordered  the 
men  to  cook  their  dinners.  Simultaneously  on  the  opposite 
side  two  French  divisions,  also  hearing  the  firing,  had  got 
under  arms  and  were  in  full  march  to  the  battle-field,  when 
suddenly,  and  at  about  the  same  hour,  the  sound  of  the  firing 
ceased  and  the  French  generals,  having  marched  in  a  hurry 
and  having  left  their  camps  standing,  turned  round  and  went 
home  to  dinner.  Actually  the  firing  had  not  ceased  for  one 
moment,  but  at  the  very  time  its  sound  ceased  to  travel  it 
was  being  largely  reinforced  by  fresh  guns  on  both  sides  and 
continued  to  rage  with  undimmished  vigor  till  the  close  of 
the  day.  Meanwhile  on  both  sides  the  reinforcements  were 
being  anxiously  looked  for,  and  about  6  p.  m.  a  Prussian  gal- 


20  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

loper  found  his  men  in  the  middle  of  the  forest,  just  standh 
to  their  arms  and  beginning  to  move  off,  for  just  before  h 
arrival,  as  suddenly  as  it  had  ceased,  the  sound  of  the  firir 
had  again  become  audible,  and  the  general  had  already  issue 
orders  to  continue  the  advance.  As  a  consequence,  the  f re* 
troops  arrived  on  the  field  just  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  tin 
attack  onForbach  and  the  heights  to  the  north  west  of  ii .  Tl 
French  were  not  so  fortunate.  They  had  hardly  regaim 
their  camps,  and  the  fires  under  the  cooking-kettles  hi 
scarcely  begun  to  burn,  when,  at  the  same  hour  as  on  11 
Prussian  side,  the  sound  of  firing  recommenced,  and  sinn: 
taneously  aides-de-camp  arrived,  summoning  the  troops 
the  battle-field.  The  kettles  were  upset,  the  men  stood 
their  arms,  and  marched  off  again,  hungry  and  exhausie 
over  the  same  road  they  had  followed  in  the  morning,  on 
reaching  the  vicinity  of  the  battle-field  in  the  small  hours 
the  morning,  and  too  late  t  o  be  of  any  service  there. 

A  similar  instance  occurred  in  the  American  war  \vhe 
during  Mc(1lellan's  advance  from  the  York  Kiver  on  liic 
mond,  the  whole  of  the  Southern  army  under  Longs!  reel  \\\ 
Jackson  fell  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Northerners  and  d 
feated  it  in  full  view  of  the  remaining  half,  which  looked  o 
unable  to  go  to  their  comrades'  assistance,  owing  to  the  ii 
passabilityof  the  Chickahominy  Creek  and  a  muddy, swam] 
valley,  about  a  mile  wide,  which  lay  between  them.  Tl 
curious  part  of  the  affair  was  thai,  though  1hey  saw  evei 
part  and  phase  of  the  struggle,  riot  a  sound  of  it  reached  thei 
though  the  distance  was  little  more  than  a  couple  of  mile 
The  explanation  in  both  cases  is  similar. 

Professor  TyndalFs  experiments  on  fog  signals  off  tl 
Foreland  and  other  parts  of  1he  coast  showed  that  the  chi 
essential  for  sound  to  travel  is  a  uniform  state  of  the  atmc 
phere  between  the  two  communicating  points.  A  continuoi 
fog  or  a  clear  sky  over  a  uniform  surface  of  land  or  sea  bo 
favor  the  transmission  of  sound,  but  if  the  continuity  of  tl 
medium  is  interrupted — either  by  the  shadow  of  a  cloud  intl 
sky,  which,  by  lowering  the  temperature  underneath,  dim! 
ishes  the  tension  of  the  invisible  aqueous  vapor  in  the  air,  ( 
if  across  a  dry  stretch  of  country,  a  marsh,  stream,  or  fore 
causes  the  air  over  it  to  take  up  more  moisture  than  it  nr 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  21 

mally  holds  on  either  side  of  it — an  absolute  wall  against 
which  the  sound  rebounds  is  formed  between  the  two  sta- 
tions. Now  in  both  the  above  instances  these  conditions 
were  present  at  Spicheren.  The  sky  in  the  early  morning 
was  reasonably  clear  and  the  tension  in  the  mist  of  the  valley 
uniformly  continuous,  but  as  the  heat  of  the  day  increased 
the  vapor  rolled  up  into  clouds,  and  the  presence  of  the  forest 
caused  a  difference  of  tension  to  exist,  and  through  this  the 
sound  could  not  penetrate.  As  the  sun  lost  its  power,  and 
the  air  again  became  uniform  in  composition  throughout,  the 
sound  was  again  able  to  penetrate  freely.  In  the  same  way, 
at  Games'  Mill,  the  name  of  the  American  action  quoted 
above,  the  interposition  of  the  marshy  river  again  caused  an 
inequality  in  the  atmosphere,  with  a  similar  result.  So  it 
will  be  seen  that  sound  is  not  a  very  certain  indication  on 
which  to  base  one's  conduct,  and  the  general  who  relies  on  it 
to  guide  him  through  the  difficulties  of  a  modern  campaign 
would  be  relying  on  a  very  rotten  reed. 

But  if,  then,  it  follows  that  smokeless  powder  will  have 
no  material  effect  on  the  losses  in  actual  battle,  and  that 
therefore  no  special  change  is  called  for  in  our  formations, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  preliminary  operations  before 
the  period  of  decision  arrives  will  be  much  more  difficult  than 
formerly — as  much  on  account  of  the  absence  of  smoke  a.s 
because  of  the  increased  range  of  the  weapon  and  its  greater 
accuracy  in  the  hands  of  cool,  unshaken  men.  The  only  plan 
hitherto  proposed  which  seems  to  me  to  meet  the  require- 
ments is  that  of  Col.  von  der  Goltz — viz.,  the  formation  of 
independent  patrols,  as  described  in  another  article  and 
to  which  the  reader  is  referred. 

Perhaps,  in  our  own  case,  the  re-creation  of  the  light 
companies  might  meet  the  difficulty  best,  for  our  companies 
are  almost  too  small  for  further  depletion ;  but  in  any  case  it 
seems  to  me  that,  if  we  are  to  retain  our  position  as  an  army 
ready  to  go  anywhere  and  do  anything,  w7e  shall  again  have 
to  go  back  to  specially  selected  and  trained  light  troops, 
taught  toskirmish  like  red  Indians,  and  to  infantry  of  the  line, 
taught  also  to  fight  in  individual  order  as  far  as  their  quali- 
fications will  permit,  but  whose  chief  strength  should  lie  in 
their  absolute  discipline  when  moving  under  conditions  ia 


22  Military  Letters  and  Essays, 

which  they  are  exposed  to  losses,  but  not  able  to  return  the 
fire,  as  in  the  following  lines  of  an  attack. 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  MODERN  WARFARE. 

In  a  former  letter  I  endeavored  to  show  how  recent 
changes  in  armament  had  rather  favored  the  prospects  of  the 
cavalry  being  again  employed  in  masses,  than  the  reverse. 
This  week  I  hope  to*  set  artillery  officers  thinking  as  to 
whether  there  may  not  also  be  for  them  a  period  of  greater 
tactical  importance  approaching.  I  assume  in  all  cases,  in 
speaking  of  the  "battle" — i.  e.,  of  the  decisive  encounters  of  a 
great  war — that  the  condition  of  the  ground  on  which  it  wil) 
be  fought  out  will  be  favorable  for  maneuvers.  This  must  nec- 
essarily be  the  case  where  two  large  .armies,  equally  confi- 
dent in  their  fighting  power,  are  opposel  to  each  other ;  for 
both  will  naturally  try  to  obtain  the  conditions  best  suited  to 
give  full  play  to  their  maneuvering  capabilities,  and  also 
because  the  large  number  of  roads  necessary  for  the  move- 
ments of  the  monster  armies  of  the  day  will,  as  a  rule,  only  be 
found  in  comparatively  easy  country,  clear  of  natural  obsta- 
cles and  cover.  As  pointed  out  in  another  letter,  every  battle 
must  necessarily  commence  with  a,  great  artillery  duel,  and 
the  issue  of  this  duel  determines  for  the  rest  of  the  first  act 
of  the  drama  which  side  is  to  be  considered  as  the  attacker 
and  which  as  the  defender.  It  is  unnecessary  to  go  into 
the  details  of  such  an  encounter;  they  belong  purely  to  the 
artillery;  and,  thanks  to  the  efforts  of  our  Inspector  General 
of  Artillery  in  India,  our  gunners  have  now  as  reasonable  a 
chance  of  learning  this  part  of  their  duties  in  the  annual  prac- 
tice camps  as  those  of  any  other  army.  It  is  the  handling  of 
artillery  relatively  to  the  other  arms  that  it  is  particularly 
desired  to  bring  out.  The  first  great  point  to  be  decided  is 
whether  modern  artillery,  with  guns  of  approximately  the 
same  power  as  our  new  12-pounder,  can  be  relied  on  to  pro- 
tect their  own  front.  Colonel  ISrackenbury,  in  his  pamphlet 
on  the  use  and  abuse  of  field  artillery,  reviewed  in  these  col- 
umns a  few  weeks  ago,  thinks  it  can;  and  as  regards  an 
attack  by  infantry,  he  is  certainly  right;  but  as  against  the 
charges  of  cavalry  divisons,  his  conclusion  is  open  to  ques 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  23 

tion.  The  Austrian  artillery  in  1806  were  undeniably  brave 
and  determined  soldiers.  It  was  the  one  arm  which  in  that 
disastrous  campaign  upheld  the  honor  of  its  country;  yet 
Bredow's  regiment  of  four  squadrons  rode  into  and  captured 
18  of  their  guns  with  a  loss  of  only  13  horses,  notwithstand- 
ing the  facts  that  the  gunners  had  1,500  yards  clear  range  in 
front  of  them,  and  the  cavalry  horses  were  in  campaigning 
condition  (action  of  Tobitschau).  Similarly,  at  Vionville  his 
brigade  had  to  face  the  fire  of  36  French  guns  at  least,  over 
1,800  yards  of  open,  yet  they  practically  lost  nothing  from 
their  fire.  Indeed,  an  officer  who  rode  in  the  charge  assured 
me  that  in  his  front  only  one  gun  was  fired  twice,  and  that  the 
French  officer  in  command  of  the  battery  told  him  after- 
wards, in  the  hospital  at  Metz,  that  their  approach  had  been 
so  rapid  that  they  simply  could  not  lower  the  elevation  fast 
enough  to  follow  them.  In  the  meanwhile,  no  doubt,  the 
power  of  the  guns  has  increased  enormously,  but  there  is 
room  for  considerable  improvement  before  the  stopping  limit 
is  reached.  The  cavalry,  too,  have  also  made  progress  in  the 
speed  and  distance  they  can  gallop  and  in  the  ease  with 
which  they  maneuver;  and  charges  such  as  those  delivered 
at  the  cavalry  maneuvers  in  Alsace  in  1886,  where  two  whole 
divisions,  say  6,000  sabers,  were  hurled  at  full  gallop  against 
an  artillery  line  of  nearly  100  guns,  will  have  quite  a  different 
effect  on  the  nerves  of  the  gunners  than  the  smaller  ones  had 
An  officer  of  the  British  artillery  who  was  present  on  one  of 
these  occasions  confessed  that  the  effect  was  simply  over- 
powering, and  that  the  gunners  actually  had  barely  time  to 
fire  more  than  five  rounds  or  so.  My  conclusion  is  that,  at  any 
rate  during  the  earlier  battles  of  the  war, — until,  in  fact,  one 
cavalry  has  established  such  a  marked  superiority  over  the 
other  that  the  latter  will  not  dare  to  make  the  attempt  in  the 
face  of  its  watchful  enemy, — an  artillery  line  cannot  be  held 
as  capable  of  protecting  its  own  front  on  the  field  of  battle 
against  cavalry;  and  if  any  artillery  officers  disagree  with 
this  conclusion,  I  would  ask  them  to  go  down  to  Muridki,  if 
the  camp  is  not  over  before  this  letter  reaches  you,  and  ask 
General  Luck  to  show  them  what  a  charge  of  two  cavalry 
divisions  means,  even  over  an  apparently  open  plain. 

If  the  conclusion  is  granted,  then  it  follows  that  both 


24  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

sides  will  be  compelled  to  form  their  great  lines  of  guns 
under  cover  of  strong  infantry  advanced  guards,  and  these 
guards,  in  order  to  assist  in  the  work  of  their  artillery,  will 
endeavor  to  advance  near  enough  to  be  able  to  overwhelm 
the  enemy's  gunners  with  their  long-range  fire.  But  a  limit 
will  be  placed  on  this  advance  by  their  own  near  approach 
to  each  other;  for  if  they  cannot  succeed  in  getting  near 
enough  to  the  enemy's  guns,  the  next  best  thing  they  can  do 
will  be  to  prevent  the  enemy  getting  near  enough  to  their 
own  guns,  which  it  is  their  special  object  to  protect.  The 
consequence  will  therefore  in  all  probability  be  a  stubborn 
fire  fight  between  the  two  in  tan  tries,  and  the  next  question 
is.  How  are  the  supports  of  these  two  lines  to  be  placed?  Let 
us  assume  the  two  artilleries  distant  2,000  yards  from  each 
other,  and  the  two  infantry  guards  SOO  yards  apart, — then 
each  guard  will  be  GOO  yards  in  advance  of  its  own  guns. 
Now  it  is  evident  that  under  normal  conditions  no  support* 
can  be  placed  in  front  of  the  guns  where  they  would  be 
exposed  to  all  the  overs  nieanj  I'm-  the  front  line,  the  shells 
short  of  the  guns,  and  the  premature  bursts  of  their  own 
shells.  Equally  evident  is  it  that  it  is  not  reasonably  possi- 
ble to  place  them  closer  in  rear  of  the  guns  without  exposing 
them  to  tremendous  loss,  for  the  ground  in  rear  of  the  artil- 
lery will  be  torn  up  by  shell  splinters  and  shrapnel  bullets  for 
a  good  1,000  yards  to  the  rear.  The  consequence  is  that  at 
this  stage  of  the  proceedings  the  two  infantries  engaged  will 
be  only  800  yards  apart,  and  neither  will  have  any  support 
at  hand  within  less  than  1,000  yards.  This  does  not  very 
much  signify  to  the  side  which  means  to  attack,  and  at  this 
period,  the  result  of  the  artillery  duel  being  still  undecided, 
neither  can  yet  be  considered  as  having  renounced  the  offen- 
sive definitely.  But  the  time  must  come  when  one  or  the 
other  is  distinctly  getting  the  upper  hand,  and  the  unsuccess- 
ful side  must  make  up  its  mind  what  to  do.  It  seems  impos- 
sible to  expect  that  any  leader  would  deliberately  elect  to 
expose  his  artillery  to  piecemeal  annihilation.  Rather  it  is 
likely  that  he  will  withdraw  his  guns  while  there  is  yet  a 
chance  of  getting  them  off  in  sufficiently  good  condition  to 
render  it  possible  to  employ  them  in  a  new  direction  at  a  later 
stage  of  the  battle.  Then  comes  the  problem,  HOWT  is  the  gap 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  25 

they  leave  to  be  filled?  This  is  a  point  our  text-books  and 
easy  guides  to  promotion  do  not  tackle ;  indeed,  I  have  never 
met  a  professor  or  instructor  in  the  British  service  who  had 
ever  contemplated  it.  Yet  to  my  mind  it  is  the  crux  of  tbe 
whole  matter,  and  is  so  difficult  of  solution  that  alone  it  suf- 
fices to  establish  the  superiority  of  the  attack  over  the 
defence. 

Try  and  picture  the  scene  for  a  moment.  It  is  a  matter 
of  common  knowledge  that  nothing  works  so  detrimentally 
on  the  morale  of  infantry  as  the  withdrawal  of  the  guns,  but 
just  as  this  withdrawal  commences,  the  order  comes  to  the 
latter  to  advance.  The  enemy's  artillery  has  seen  the  prepa- 
rations for  retreat,  and  now  intensifies  its  fire  to  the  utmost, 
at  the  same  time  giving  the  elevating  screws  a  turn  to 
increase  the  range  a  little,  and  the  whole  ground  for  1,000 
yards  in  rear  of  the  target  is  torn  up  into  dust  by  the  splinters 
of  shrapnel  and  shell,  and  through  this  dust  and  confusion 
come  galloping  some  hundred  teams  of  almost  unmanage- 
able horses.  Imagine  the  position  of  an  officer  in  command 
of  one  of  the  supporting  battalions,  who  has  been  brought 
up  all  his  life  to  believe  that  only  in  extended  order  is  salva- 
tion. His  common  sense  would  tell  him  that  in  this  case  it 
would  mean  rout  entire  and  decisive;  but  it  is  hard  to  break 
with  the  fixed  conviction  of  a  lifetime  at  such  a  moment,  and 
more  especially  to  one  who  for  perhaps  some  thirty  years  has 
been  deliberately  taught  to  shirk  responsibility.  But  let  us 
suppose  his  common  sense  to  triumph,  and  that  the  battalion 
or  battalions  reach  the  crest  of  the  ridge  and  see  the  enemy 
before  them.  What  reasonable  chance  exists  of  covering 
the  remaining  six  hundred  yards  of  open  which  still  separate 
them  from  the  advance  guard  in  full  view  and  fire  of  the  vic- 
torious artillery?  Prince  Hohenlohe's  notes  on  the  French 
advances  at  Gra  velotte  and  the  fire  of  the  Guard  artillery  at 
Sedan  will  supply  the  answer. 

This,  of  course,  is  the  moment  to  be  seized  by  the  cavalry, 
as  is  pointed  out  in  another  letter,  and  therefore  need  not 
be  gone  into  again  here.  I  will,  however,  assume  that  the 
opportunity  is  allowed  to  slip,  and  that  the  defenders'  infan- 
try, thanks  to  steadiness  and  discipline,  succeed  in  reaching 
the  line  held  bv  their  advance  guard,  and  establishing  them- 


26  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

selves  in  it.  And  further,  that  they  succeed  in  beating  off 
the  attempts  of  the  assailants  to  advance  further.  The  fight, 
as  has  so  often  happened,  comes  to  a  deadlock,  both  infan- 
tries still  strong  enough  to  defend  the  ground  they  snmd  on, 
but  neither  possessing  "go"  enough  to  advance.  The  only  pos- 
sibility now  of  carrying  through  the  action  lies  in  the  ad- 
vance of  the  artillery  to  decisive  range — utterly  regardless 
of  loss.  With  each  minute  the  infantry  fight  continues,  the 
accuracy  of  fire  falls  off,  and  probably  not  one  man  on  either 
side  remains  cool  enough  to  hit  a  single  gunner  at  600  yards 
In  a  recent  letter  on  Colonel  Brackenbury's  paper  on  Field 
Artillery,  I  quoted  the  results  of  the  French  experiments  at 
Bourges,  which  showed  that  on  the  peace  practice-ground 
the  four  batteries  of  a  French  division  could  at  1,200  yards 
develop  a  fire  effect  equal  to  that  of  the  whole  infantry  of  the 
division  when  drawn  up  in  normal  attack  formation;  and 
further,  that,  from  the  Okehampton  experiments,  the  powt  r 
of  artillery  increased  enormously  as  the  range  decreased; 
hence,  since  the  accuracy  of  artillery  fire  does  not  fall  off 
under  fire  to  anything  like  the  extent  that  the  accuracy  of 
infantry  fire  does,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  an  advance 
of  the  guns  of  the  attacking  division  abreast  of  the  infantry, 
or  a  little  in  advance  of  it,  would  have  an  absolutely  over- 
whelming effect.  If  even  in  1870,  with  guns  of  barely  a  fifth 
of  the  power  of  those  of  to-day,  such  an  advance  was  in  all 
cases  except  one  (at  the  farm  of  St.  Hubert,  Gravelotte) 
practically  decisive,  to-day  there  ought  to  be  no  doubt  about 
it  at  all.  Obviously  such  an  advance  is  only  possible  at  this 
period  for  the  side  which  gained  the  upper  hand  in  the  pre- 
liminary duel,  and  it  is  only  after  some  such  attempt  has  been 
made  and  failed  that  the  defenders'  guns  can  come  on  th? 
scene  at  all,  but  then  an  opportunity  will  be  offered  them, 
which,  if  taken,  ought  to  decide  the  action  at  once.  But  to 
seize  either  this  or  the  former  one,  it  is  essential  that  the 
artillery  should  be  able  to  maneuver  well  and  rapidly;  and 
it  therefore  seems  likely  that  in  the  future  higher  demands 
than  ever  will  be  made  on  the  skill  and  pluck  of  the  drivers. 
In  spite,  therefore,  of  Prince  Hohenlohe's  statement,  that  in 
practice  he  had  never  seen  any  formations  used  but  columns 
of  subdivisions  and  line,  and  that  for  all  practical  purposes 


Military  Letters  ana  Essays.  27 

all  the  remaining  formations  in  the  drill-book  might  be  cut 
out,  it  appears  to  me  that,  though  no  doubt  this  was  the  case 
in  the  war  to  which  he  refers,  it  is  assuming  a  great  deal  too 
much  to  take  it  as  proved  that  maneuvering  will  no  longer  be 
required  in  the  next.  On  the  contrary,  if  we  are  to  be  pre- 
pared for  events,  it  would  seem  necessary  to  practice  the 
handling  of  these  large  masses  of  guns  in  peace;  very  much 
on  the  same  lines  as  those  now  followed  by  the  cavalry  divi- 
sions, the  point  in  both  being  so  far  the  same  that  in  each 
case  the  object  is  to  transfer  a  large  body  of  mounted  men 
from  a  distant  point  and  form  them  in  a  line  facing  the  enemy 
in  the  least  possible  time.  In  one  respect  here  the  Germans 
are  decidedly  ahead  of  us.  With  theul  the  field  artillery  are 
particularly  trained  to  cover  long  distances  at  the  gallop, 
and  also  do  a  certain  amount  of  maneuvering  at  that  pace. 
Of  course  we  can  gallop  too  on  occasion,  but  one  would  like 
to  see  it  a  little  more  practiced  in  peace. 

To  my  mind,  the  more  one  thinks  over  it,  the  more  one 
becomes  convinced  that  the  form  of  the  battle  is  tending 
back  every  day  towards  that  of  the  Napoleonic  era.  For  a 
time  improvements  alternately  in  the  artillery  and  infantry 
armament  gave  to  one  side  or  the  other  a  preponderance  of 
strength,  and  this  preponderating  power  gave  its  stamp  to 
the  battle.  But  the  relative  powers  of  the  two  arms  are  now 
again  very  much  what  they  were  at  the  commencement  of 
the  century,  only  each  arm  has  about  tenfold  the  striking 
distance  it  formerly  possessed.  The  shape  of  the  battle 
will,  therefore,  be  much  what  it  was  before,  only  with  the 
distance  multiplied  approximately  by  ten.  Whether  any 
modern  battle  will  ever  be  fought  out  writh  the  bloody  deter- 
mination of  say  Wagram  or  Friedland,  it  is  impossible  to 
say,  only  with  short-service  armies  it  is  at  least  improbable: 
but  it  is  because  of  these  changes  in  the  condition  of  service 
that  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  strain  of  the  fighting 
will  again  tend  to  settle  on  the  shoulders  of  the  artillery; 
and  further,  that  if  the  latter  are  trained  sufficiently  highly 
to  answer  all  demands  on  their  mobility  and  maneuvering 
skill,  it  will  be  practically  impossible  for  their  side  to  be 
defeated.  Always  provided,  of  course,  we  can  find  a  gen- 
eral who  will  know  how  to  employ  them. 


28  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

THE  COST  OF  MODERN  WAR 

It  has  become  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  contemporary 
journalism  to  refer  to  the  frightful  sacrifices  of  human  life 
that  modern  war  entails,  and  to  ask  what  rulers  would  dare 
to  incur  the  moral  responsibility  which  such  slaughter  en- 
tails. If  facts  and  statistics  bore  them  out,  there  would  be 
nothing  to  quarrel  with  in  those  phrases,  for  undoubtedly  it 
would  be  a  great  thing  to  bring  public  opinion  into  harmony 
with  the  opinions  of  the  experts  who  virtually  decide  on  ques- 
tions of  peace  or  war;  but  since  the  facts  actually  point  the 
other  way,  it  is  a  very  bad  thing  indeed  that  the  public  should 
be  misled  into  believing  the  responsibility  which  rests  on 
the  rulers  is  so  great  that  they  would  hesitate  for  a  moment 
to  embark  on  a  war  in  which  their  calculations  show  victory 
to  be  almost  certainly  on  their  side.  For  the  cost  of  war  t«> 
the  victors  is  .by  no  means  so  great  as  the  public  believes, 
and  it  may  well  happen  that  the  rulers  of  other  countries, 
perfectly  well  informed  on  this  point  and  confident  in  the 
fighting  value  of  their  armies,  may  consider  the  game  well 
worth  the  candle,  and  thereby  seriously  derange  the  calcula 
tions  of  those  whose  opinions  have  been  formed  on  thos»> 
supplied  them  by  the  daily  journalist. 

It  would  be  a  good  thing  if  every  candidate  for  a  seal  in 
Parliament  were  compelled  to  undergo  a  qualifying  exami- 
nation in  the  principles  of  war  as  an  instrument  of  politics, 
and  a  most  searching  one  in  the  statistics  of  recent  cam 
paigns.  I  fancy  the  study  this  would  involve  would  disa- 
greeably astonish  those  who  believe  that  any  considerations 
of  humanity  would  deter  a  resolute  governor  or  group  of 
governors  from  engaging  in  military  operations  in  cases 
where,  seen  from  their  own  point  of  view,  victory  might 
appear  sufficiently  certain. 

Perhaps  the  following  figures  taken  from  Dr.  Engel's 
statistical  work  on  the  campaign  of  1870-71  may  induce  some 
of  my  readers  to  consider  the  matter.  It  is  generally  be- 
lieved that  this  campaign  was  one  of  the  bloodiest  on  record* 
but  actually  the  figures  worked  out  by  this  writer,  and  which 
may  be  considered  as  nearly  accurate  as  it  is  possible  for 
figures  dealing  with  such  questions  to  be.  proved  that  ex- 
actly the  opposite  was  the  case.  Out  of  close  on  one  million 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  29 

combatants  that  Germany  poured  into  France  during  the 
seven  months  the  war  lasted,  scarcely  40,000  lost  their  lives 
in  battle  or  died  of  their  wounds  or  of  disease — i.  e.,  barely  4 
per  cent  of  the  total  number;  and  of  these  one-quarter  suc- 
cumbed to  sickness,  leaving  as  the  net  loss  in  killed  due  to 
the  enemy's  fire,  in  round  numbers,  30,000  only.  Of  the 
10,000  who  died  of  disease,  about  6,000,  according  to  the 
tables  of  the  life  assurance  offices,  were  bound  to  die  any- 
how, so  that  the  net  loss  due  to  the  campaign  amounts  to  only 
3.4  per  cent.  Compare  this  with  the  losses  of  human  life 
that  any  board  of  railway  or  canal  directors  is  prepared  to 
risk  with  a  light  heart  in  an  undertaking  promising  5  per 
cent  return  on  the  capital  entrusted  to  their  charge,  and  the 
deduction  is  obvious,  that  the  statesmen  who  have  the  lives 
and  happiness,  to  say  nothing  of  the  financial  welfare,  of  the 
nation  they  rule  to  look  after,  are  a  good  deal  more  justified 
in  incurring  the  risk  which  the  care  and  attention  they  have 
devoted  to  their  powers  of  offence  has  reduced  to  a  minimum. 
The  statistics  of  human  life  lost  in  commercial  undertakings 
are  not  as  carefully  kept  as  is  desirable,  but  it  is  pretty  cer- 
tain that  the  percentage  of  deaths  on  the  Hurnai  line,  for 
example,  pretty  largely  exceeded  that  quoted  above,  and 
equally  so  that  of  the  Suez  and  Panama  canals;  the  Severn 
tunnel,  and  balf  a  hundred  other  undertakings  whose  names 
will  readily  occur  to  any  engineer  of  experience,  were  also 
not  completed,  if  completed  at  all,  without  a  far  greater  pro- 
portionate sacrifice  of  life  than  it  cost  Germany  to  subdue 
France.  And  in  comparison  with  the  return  in  both  moral 
and  material  welfare  that  this  campaign  brought  to  the 
former,  what  has  any  commercial  undertaking  to  show?  It 
is  quite  impossible  to  state  in  figures  wrhat  the  value  of  the 
new  sense  of  power  is  to  the  Germans  as  a  race;  but  no 
nation  in  Europe,  even  including  England,  can  show  any- 
thing like  the  material  development  that  has  taken  place 
along  the  banks  of  the  Khine,  principally  since  the  fear  of 
French  invasion  was  definitely  removed,  and  that,  too,  in 
spite  of  the  losses  which,  bimetallisms  maintain,  the  intro- 
duction of  the  gold  coinage  inflicted  on  the  nation,  losses 
which  in  their  opinion  far  exceeded  in  amount  the  indemnity 
levied  upon  France,  which  in  itself  barely  paid  the  expenses 


30  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

of  the  war.  Now  in  this  particular  case  there  was  no  im- 
mediate prospect  of  great  benefit  to  trade,  there  were  no  col- 
onies worth  speaking  of  to  acquire,  nor  was  Germany  in  a 
position  to  secure  the  naval  supremacy  necessary  to  com- 
mand trade  over  her  enemy.  How  different  would  it  be  in  a 
war  between  France  and  England!  and  it  is  scarcely  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  this  obvious  lesson  of  the  war  has  been 
lost  on  our  neighbors  across  the  Channel.  Would  it  not  be 
as  well  if  this  view  of  the  case  were  brought  prominently 
before  those  commercial  members  of  the  House  who  oppose 
every  proposed  addition  to  our  armaments?  They  at  least, 
as  directors  of  paying  concerns,  ought  to  know  that  they 
themselves  would  not  hesitate  to  recommend  a  proportional 
risk  of  life  to  their  shareholders  for  a  corresponding  profit. 
Why,  therefore,  should  the  directors  of  a  state,  who  only  do 
for  their  country  on  a  large  scale  what  they  are  paid  to  do  for 
their  shareholders,  hesitate  to  incur  an  equal  risk? 

But  the  special  military  interest  of  these  statistics  lie* 
more  in  the  tables  of  the  wounded.  Most  of  us  can  probab' v 
face  the  prospect  of  sudden  death  in  the  performance  of  duly 
—that  is  the  special  prerogative  of  our  calling,  as  Schiller 
in  the  "Keiterlied"  sings — 


"Wer  den  Todt  ins  Angesicht  schauen  kann- 
Der  Soldat  allein  ist  der  freie  Mann." 

"He  who  can  look  death  in  the  face— 
The  soldier  alone  is  a  free  man." 


But  the  prospect  of  mutilation  and  agonizing  wounds  is  by 
no  means  so  pleasant,  and  it  is  interesting  to  see  what  our 
chances  of  escape  actually  are  against  the  breech-loader. 
Possibly,  too,  the  figures  may  give  us  some  foundation  to  go 
on  in  reasoning  out  our  tactical  formations. 

The  total  number  of  men  wounded  were,  in  the  Infantry, 
103,569  (including  4,365  officers);  in  the  Cavalry,  3,546  (in- 
cluding 262  officers);  in  the  Artillery,  5,869  (including  421 
officers);  and  in  the  Engineers,  402  (including  41  officers); 
or  a  grand  total  of  113,386  of  all  arms  and  ranks.  Hence,  out 
of  every  1,000  infantrymen  wounded,  42.1  per  mille  were 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  31 

officers  and  957.9  men;  of  every  1,000  cavalry  wounded,  73.9 
per  mille  were  officers  and  the  rest  men ;  and  similarly  for  the 
other  two  arms  71.7  and  102  per  mille  were  officers  respect- 
ively. This  rather  upsets  one's  preconceived  opinions,  for  I 
confess  I  was  quite  unprepared  to  find  that  even  in  a  cam- 
paign in  which  the  engineers'  services  were  so  little  required 
comparatively,  the  sapper's  chances  of  being  hit  were  2£ 
times  as  great  as  that  of  his  comrade  in  the  line;  and  that  a 
cavalry  officer's  chance,  also  in  a  campaign  in  which  they 
met  with  no  real  opposition,  was  worth  so  much  less  purchase 
than  an  infantryman's.  The  same  fact  is  even  more  aston- 
ishing in  the  case  of  artillery,  for  there  seems  no  particular 
reason  why  the  artillery  officer  should  be  in  nearly  double  the 
danger  of  the  -infantry  officer,  who  is  compelled  to  expose 
himself  for  the  sake  of  example  to  his  men  much  more  fre- 
quently than  the  gunner  officer,  who  walks  about  his  battery 
apparently  in  no  more  special  danger  than  the  men  who  serve 
the  guns. 

Another  curious  fact  is  also  brought  out  in  a  battle, 
showing  the  severity  of  the  wounds — viz.,  that  it  is  again  the 
engineers  and  cavalry  who  share  the  distinction  of  getting 
the  severest  wounds,  for  22.4  per  mille  of  the  former  died  cf 
their  wounds  within  24  hours,  and  13.3  per  mille  of  the  cavalry, 
against  only  8.5  per  mille  of  the  artillery  and  infantry  officers; 
and  as  regards  men,  182.2  per  ruille  of  the  cavalry,  146.9  of 
the  infantry,  and  only  105  of  the  artillery;  the  figures  for 
the  engineers  being  a  fraction  less  than  for  the  infantry. 

This  result  is  even  more  astounding  than  the  former,  for 
one  would  naturally  have  expected  the  artillery  to  have  suf- 
fered more  from  shell  wounds  generally,  far  the  most  dread- 
ful to  look  at,  than  the  other  arms;  and  similarly,  where  the 
greater  proportion  of  both  cavalries  only  used  blunt  swords 
in  steel  scabbards,  and  where  about  a  fifth  of  both  were  fur- 
ther protected  by  cuirasses,  the  natural  expectation  would 
have  been  to  find  a  considerable  percentage  of  insignificant 
bruises  and  few  dangerous  wounds.  These  figures,  of  course, 
only  show  the  proportions  in  the  troops  who  actually  came 
under  fire.  Taking  them  over  the  whole  army,  they  come  out 
very  differently,  for  cavalry  and  pioneers  were  far  less  fre- 
quently engaged  than  the  other  two  arms. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

It  is  interesting  also  to  note  the  comparative  degree  of 
danger  to  which  the  different  ranks  are  exposed.  Out  of  every 
1,000  of  each  rank,  25.64  generals  were  killed,  96.29  staff  otti- 
cers,  78.9  captains,  80.5  lieutenants,  and  3  surgeons;  and  of 
the  men  in  the  ranks  only  31.17 — figures  which  show  pretty 
conclusively  that  the  officers  did  their  duty,  and  that  the  posi- 
tion of  general  staff  officer  under  breech-loading  fire  was  not 
altogether  a  sinecure.  Comparing  the  probabilities  of  being 
wounded,  the  staff  still  head  the  list  with  182.2  per  mille,  the 
lieutenants  coming  next  with  176,  the  captains  with  151,  the 
generals  with  87,  and  the  doctors  last  with  only  22  per  miile. 
This  last  figure,  and  the  corresponding  one  above,  ought,  by 
the  way,  to  cause  the  militant  officer  of  the  medical  staff  to 
draw  in  his  horns  a  bit. 

Unfortunately,  Dr.  Engel  only  gives  the  number  of  fatal 
cases  of  sickness,  not  the  number  treated  in  hospital,  so  it  is 
difficult  to  compare  the  relative  losses  that  we  suffer  in  an 
Indian  campaign  with  those  which  were  occasioned  by  the 
conditions  of  a  European  campaign.  Dysentery,  diarrhea, 
and  small-pox  claimed  most  of  the  victims,  and  principally  in 
the  army  of  investment  round  Metz,  who  certainly  were  com- 
pelled to  live  under  exceptionally  unhygienic  conditions. 
But  comparing  the  actual  losses  suffered  by  the  officers  with 
those  which  would  have  occurred  under  normal  conditions 
in  peace-time,  according  to  the  tables  of  the  life  assurance 
societies,  it  appears  that  a  campaign  in  France,  in  spite  of  its 
drawbacks  of  bivouacs  in  cold  and  wet,  was  distinctly  more 
favorable  to  longevity  than  their  usual  manner  of  life  in 
peace.  But  against  this  must  be  set  the  fact  that  the  officers 
as  a  body  were  picked  lives,  and  the  insurance  tables  only 
deal  with  average  lives.  At  any  rate,  it  is  enough  to  raise 
envious  feelings  in  the  minds  of  those  who  are  serving  their 
•country  in  Ind,  to  find  that  even  in  peace-time  they  are  incur- 
ring about  three  times  the  risk  that  the  Prussians  ran  in  war- 
time from  natural  causes.  Even  the  rank  and  file,  who  lost 
twice  as  many  as  the  officers  in  proportion,  were  more  favor- 
ably circumstanced  than  we  are  under  ordinary  conditions. 
But  it  is  a  strong  point  in  favor  of  those  who  believe  with 
Darwin  that  the  existence  of  an  aristocracy  justifies  the 
theorv  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  to  find  that  the  officers. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  33 

the  pick  of  the  aristocracy  of  Germany,  were  only  half  as  lia- 
ble to  disease  as  the  men,  who  themselves  are  not  the  scimi 
of  the  nation,  but  to  a  considerable  extent  selected  lives,  and 
no  one  who  knows  the  German  army  would  attempt  to  main- 
tain that  this  immunity  was  due  to  the  officers  having  taken 
advantage  of  their  position  to  secure  more  favorable  sur- 
roundings, for  the  German  officer  considers  it  as  much  a  mat- 
ter of  honor  to  share  the  hardships  of  the  men  as  we  ourselves 
do.  Of  course  the  senior  officers  are  able  to  take  more  care 
of  themselves  than  the  junior  regimental  officers,  and  with 
disciplined  troops  this  is  as  it  should  be;  but  the  figures 
show  pretty  clearly  how  much  less  elastic  the  older  consti- 
tutions are  than  the  young  ones,  for  the  death-rate  in  the 
ranks  of  the  generals  was  20.5  per  mille  as  against  8.17  and 
7.24  in  those  of  the  lieutenants  and  captains  respectively, 
whilst  for  the  men  it  was  only  13.8,  or  a  fraction  over  the 
British  peace-time  average,  including  India  and  the  Colonies. 
The  reason  for  the  sentimental  outcry  about  the  slaughter 
in  this  war  is,  of  course,  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  even  3  per 
cent  on  a  million  makes  a  pretty  large  figure,  and  the  ordi- 
nary human  mind  has  a  tendency  to  consider  human  suffer- 
ing as  cumulative,  and  not  individual.  But  this  is  the  one 
mistake  the  soldier  should  guard  against  making,  for  it  leads 
to  an  altogether  false  appreciation  of  the  facts.  Unless  the 
will  is  steeled  to  resist  it,  the  sight  of  a  great  number  of 
maimed  and  mutilated  fellow-creatures  will  create  an  impres- 
sion altogether  overpowering.  But,  in  reality,  it  is  the  indi 
vidual  suffering  only  which  counts.  The  sufferings  of  a  man 
shattered  beyond  recognition  almost  by  an  explosion  of  gun- 
powder— probably  the  most  intense  form  of  anguish  known 
—are  not  in  the  least  alleviated  to  the  man  himself  by  the 
knowledge  that  Jie  is  the  only  sufferer.  Indeed,  the  tendency 
of  the  human  mind  is  directly  the  other  way,  and  it  is  a  satis- 
faction even  to  a  man  with  a  toothache  to  find  a  fellow-suf- 
ferer. On  the  other  hand,  it  must,  of  course,  be  admitted 
that  where  a  large  number  of  wounded  are  gathered  together, 
their  individual  comforts  are  liable  to  be  curtailed ;  but  then, 
where  suffering  is  really  great,  it  is  astonishing  how  little 
the  sufferer  cares  about  these  comforts.  Probably  this  letter 
will  seem  most  cold-blooded  and  inhuman  to  civilians,  but  it 


34  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

is  written  primarily  for  soldiers,  and  to  soldiers  it  is,  above 
all  things,  necessary  that  no  conceivable  amount  of  human 
suffering — which,  by  the  way,  they  may  themselves  be  shar- 
ing next  moment — should  be  able  to  shake  their  resolution. 
There  is  a  saying  in  vogue  in  the  German  cavalry  which 
might  also  be  extended  to  every  other  arm — viz.,  "Care  for 
your  horses  (resp.  men)  in  the  stable  like  a  miser  cares  for 
his  gold,  risk  them  in  battle  like  a  gambler,"  and,  it  might  be 
added,  be  absolutely  regardless  for  the  lives  of  your  eneiay. 

The  truth  is,  that  it  is  this  invincible  hardness  of  charac- 
ter, far  more  than  ingeniousness  of  brain,  which  really  makes 
the  great  commander.  The  mere  intellectual  effort  of  form- 
ing a  military  plan  to  turn  an  enemy's  flank  or  pierce  his  cen- 
ter is  so  slight  that  the  commonest  schoolboy's  brain  would 
suffice  for  it.  The  reason  why  such  plans  as  Napoleon  carried 
out  against  his  enemies  are  not  more  frequently  met  with  in 
military  history  is  because  the  majority  of  men  cannot  face 
the  awful  responsibility  for  human  lives  which  such  plans 
entail.  This  is  no  new  doctrine ;  in  fact,  it  is  identical  with 
the  advice  Krishna  gave  to  Arjuna  in  the  Mahabharala, 
which  goes  to  prove  how  very  similar  human  nature  was  in 
those  days  to  what  it  is  now;  and  to  all  those  who  may  be  called 
on  toassumethe  responsibility  of  leadingmen  against  theene- 
my,  I  cannot  do  better  than  recommend  the  passage,  which 
they  will  find  in  Edwin  Arnold's  translation  of  the  Bhagaved 
Gita — a  book  which  contains  far  more  valuable  maxims  for 
the  officer  than  all  the  text-books  of  tactics  put  together. 

Tactically,  the  lessons  to  be  deduced  from  these  figures 
are  equally  important.  It  is  shown  now  beyond  possibility 
of  question  that  the  actual  danger  of  material  loss,  even  in 
face  of  such  a  far  superior  weapon  as  that  with  which  the 
French  were  armed,  is  far  less  than  what  it  was  with  the  old 
muzzle-loader — a  result  the  exact  opposite  of  what  was 
prophesied  by  the  gun-maker ;  and  hence  it  seems  a  fair  de- 
duction to  make  that  in  the  next  war,  with  equal  arms  on  each 
side,  the  losses  wall  be  still  less.  For,  owing  to  the  increase*) 
range  at  which  these  new  arms  are  effective,  there  will  bo 
more  time  for  the  nervous  to  get  frightened,  and  a  corre- 
sponding increase  in  opportunity  for  those  whose  hearts  are 
not  in  it,  to  escape  from  the  danger;  in  other  words,  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  35 

amount  of  skulkers  will  be  greater — a  probability  for  which 
the  Germans,  at  least,  seem  prepared,  at  any  rate  to  a  far 
greater  extent  than  any  other  power.  If,  for  example,  for 
one  man  hit  formerly  five  were  frightened,  next  time  the  pro 
portions  will  be  as  one  to  ten;  and  since  frightened  troops 
are  the  special  prey  of  the  cavalry,  the  opportunities  for  its 
employment  will  be  doubly  great.  But  if  we  wish  to  avoid 
this  danger,  the  path  seems  perfectly  clear  before  us.  We 
must  base  our  formations  more  on  those  which  render  the 
preservation  of  order  easier,  than  on  those  which  tend  to 
reduce  losses.  It  is  better  to  lose  a  dozen  men  out  of  fifty 
and  keep  the  remainder  in  hand,  than  to  save,  say  six,  and 
have  the  whole  of  the  rest  beyond  control;  and  the  most 
feasible  means  of  attaining  this  object  will  be  found  either 
in  Major  Young's  silver  medal  scheme,  or  in  that  of  the  "Mid- 
summer-Night's Dream,"  which  was  recently  reviewed  in 
your  columns.  The  principle  of  both  is  the  same,  and  either 
would  serve  the  required  purpose. 


GERMAN  CAVALRY  MANEUVERS. 

I  have  just  ridden  in  from  the  cavalry  drill-ground,  where 
the  general  officer  commanding  the  llth  Corps  has  been 
inspecting  the  two  regiments  of  the  Hessian  Dragoon  Guards 
quartered  here,  and  sit  down  at  once  to  record  my  impres- 
sions whilst  they  are  still  fresh  and  vivid  before  me.  I  went 
down  to  the  ground  this  morning  almost  prepared  to  scoff, 
but  I  have  returned  decidedly  inclined  to  pray,  figuratively 
speaking.  It  is  intensely  difficult  for  any  Englishman, 
proud  of  his  race  and  the  magnificent  material  for  cavalry 
soldiers  it  produces,  to  divest  his  mind  of  the  patriotic  bias 
and  to  view  things  as  they  really  are,  after  his  ideas  of  mili- 
tary smartness  and  etiquette  have  been  upset  by  seeing  the 
individually  dirty  and  badly  turned-out  types  of  the  German 
soldier  about  the  street  It  is  impossible  to  avoid  drawing 
unfavorable  conclusions  between  the  half -grown  country 
bumpkins  in  uniform  one  sees  on  sentry-go  here,  with  the 
smart,  well-set-up  hussar  or  lancer  one  is  accustomed  to  see 
swaggering  down  the  Mall,  say  at  Meerut  or  Lucknow;  and 


36  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

in  each  case  the  bias  leads  one  unconsciously  to  contrast  the 
extreme  types  of  either,  instead  of  taking  a  fair  average  of 
both. 

As  I  rode  down  towards  the  artillery  range  on  which  the 
inspection  was  held,  I  reviewed  in  my  mind  all  that  I  had  pre- 
viously written  on  the  subject,  and  almost  convinced  myself 
that  I  had  really  formerly  sinned  in  the  anti-patriotic  line, 
and  that  these  troops  could  not  be  so  good  as  they  had  ap- 
peared to  me  to  be  at  a  distance.  But  almost  the  first  ap 
pearance  of  the  regiment  on  parade Jbrought  me  to  my  senses. 
I  rode  along  the  line  two  or  three  times  to  be  quite  certain 
that  I  was  not  mistaken,  and  I  saw  that  every  horse  was 
drawn  up  dead  square  to  the  alignment,  and  every  stirrup 
practically  touching — i.  e.,  the  two  fundamental  principles 
of  accurate  maneuvering  strictly  fulfilled.  Presently  the 
general  arrived  and  rode  down  the  line,  and  then  the  march- 
past  began — in  column  of  divisions  at  a  walk.  About  this 
there  was  nothing  particular  to  notice,  except  that  the  horses, 
though  in  singularly  plump  condition  for  Germany,  looked 
terribly  overweighted,  and  that  the  position  of  their  heads 
was  uniformly  good.  On  the  other  hand,  their  saddlery  and 
bridles  left  a  great  deal  to  be  desired,  though  the  men's  uni- 
forms were  sufficiently  well  kept.  There  was  no  trot-pa,s+, 
and  immediately  after  the  walk-past  the  regiment  formed  -up 
in  squadron  columns  at  close  interval,  and  the  movements 
began.  They  lasted  nearly  an  hour  and  a  half  without  a  sin- 
gle halt  to  dismount,  and  it  is  hardly  possible  to  recall  the 
run  of  them,  but  I  will  attempt  to  do  so. 

First  they  moved  off  at  a  trot  and  executed  a  beautiful 
wheel  in  this  close  order,  then  wheeled  into  half-column  and 
moved  diagonally  with  perfect  steadiness  for  about  400 
yards;  then  wheeled  back  again  into  squadron  columns  and 
opened  to  full  intervals;  broke  again  into  half-column,  and 
after  another  quarter  of  a  mile  of  this  diagonal  movement, 
formed  to  the  front  on  the  leading  division  and  galloped 
some  200  yards;  then  broke  into  column  left  in  front,  and. 
still  at  a  gallop,  moved  off  to  the  left  flank.  This  gallop  ii- 
column  of  divisions  was  quite  the  thing  of  the  day,  there  be- 
ing five  squadrons  of  64  files  each.  The  column  was  but  lit- 
tle short  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile  long,  and  consisted  of  twenty 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  37 

divisions  ("zttge"),  yet,  in  spite  of  its  great  length,  the  rear  divi- 
sions swung  along  as  smoothly  as  the  front  ones,  and  there 
was  no  perceptible  opening  out.  After  keeping  this  up  in 
the  original  direction  for  1,500  yards  at  least,  the  head  of 
the  column  changed  direction  to  the  left,  and  when  it  had 
gone  another  600  yards,  as  near  as  I  can  measure  it  off  a  very 
fair-sized  map — which  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  to  be  ac- 
curate— the  "wheel  into  line"  was  sounded,  and  the  whole  ad- 
vanced, still  at  the  same  pace,  for  another  500  yards  (making 
in  all  close  on  3,000  yards  at  the  gallop),  and  then  broke  into 
a  trot  and  eventually  halted  for  a  moment's  rest.  The  pace 
had  been  so  good  that  I  had  myself  been  left  behind,  and  can- 
not say  how  the  wheel  into  line  was  actually  carried  out;  but, 
judging  the  final  advance  from  the  flank,  it  seemed  to  have 
been  carried  out  w7ith  wonderful  exactness. 

Fresh  instructions  having  been  issued,  the  regiment 
again  broke  into  column  of  divisions  and  disappeared  at  a 
trot  up  one  of  the  broad  roads  leading  through  the  semi-per- 
manent camp  which  skirts  the  drill-ground.  Presently  we 
heard  the  "halt"  and  the  equivalent  sound  of  "troops  about*' 
sounded,  and  immediately  after  the  "gallop"  again.  About 
500  yards  from  the  mouth  of  the  road  lay  a  ridge  of  low  sand- 
hills, which  was  evidently  supposed  to  be  occupied  by  in- 
fantry, and  against  these  each  squadron  front-formed  and 
charged  as  they  emerged  from  the  defile.  In  spite  of  the 
ground,  which  is  a  heavy  sand,  rather  firmer  than  that  about 
Lawrencepore,  the  pace  was  tremendous,  and  though  the 
charges  were  hot  delivered  in  quite  as  well  closed  order  as 
they  might  have  been,  yet,  considering  the  squadrons  had 
already  been  galloping  some  distance  before  they  front- 
formed,  the  performance,  on  the  whole,  was  of  a  very  high 
order.  After  the  charge,  the  usual  melee  was  represented, 
and  two  squadrons  charged  again  in  capital  order  without 
re-forming;  then  the  assembly  sounded,  and  the  regiment 
re-formed  in  rendezvous  formation.  They  were  allowed 
only  a  few  moments  to  recover  themselves,  and  then  were 
off  again  working  as  a  regiment  in  the  front  line  of  a  brigade. 
There  were  some  more  diagonal  movements  in  half -column, 
and  then  line  formed  to  the  front  at  a  gallop  with  chargemelee 
and  pursuit  «fa  capo — about  15  minutes'  more  drilling  with  a 


38  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

formation  to  the  front  again  from  columns  already  gallop- 
ing, but  with  no  charge,  and  then  the  work  was  brought  to  a 
close  by  a  charge  of  the  regiment  in  the  conventional  three 
lines  against  a  marked  enemy — led  by  an  independent  leader, 
who  very  cleverly  threw  two  of  his  skeleton  squadrons  on  to 
the  melee  when  the  whole  of  the  other  regiment  was  already 
engaged.  At  last  the  regiment  halted,  and  whilst  the  officers 
rode  out  to  the  critique,  the  squadrons  wnv  once  again 
formed  up  for  the  final  gallop  past.  This  was  very  well  car- 
ried out.  The  officers  having  rejoined  their  troops,  the 
whole,  headed  by  the  band,  moved  off  at  the  gallop.  The  lat- 
ter, when  level  with  the  saluting  point  nearly,  wheeled  off  to 
a  flank,  and  wheeled  up  again  as  usual,  but  playing  their  in- 
struments and  galloping  at  the  same  time,  and  the  good  old 
kettledrum  horse  galloped  proudly  into  his  jplace  by  an  in- 
verse wheel  to  that  of  the  rest  of  the  band,  and  pulled  up  as 
accurately  in  his  place  as  any  man  could  have  done;  and 
then  the  squadrons  swept  by  with  an  even  smoothness  of 
motion  that  left  nothing  to  be  desired.  The  ground  was  so 
soft  that  the  beat  of  the  hoofs  was  hardly  audible,  and  hence 
there  was  less  of  the  "pulse  of  war  and  passion  of  wonder" 
feeling  about  it  than  usually  fills  the  hearts  of  those  privi- 
leged to  see  the  gallop-past  of  a  British  regiment  over  the 
hard  maidan*  of  the  East;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  though 
the  pace  was  as  good  as  it  ever  ought  to  be, — viz.,  15  miles  an 
hour  at  least, — the  horses  were  still  Hiormighly  in  hand  200 
yards  beyond  the  saluting  point,  and  the  formation  in  two 
ranks  distinctly  preserved — two  points  which  have  too  often 
in  India  been  only  conspicuous  by  their  absence  at  reviews 
wrhich  could  be  named.  This  closed  the  proceedings  for  tli«> 
first  regiment  inspected,  and  the  officers  were  again  fallen 
out  to  listen  to  what  I  afterwards  learnt  to  have  been  the 
most  complimentary  remarks  of  the  inspecting  officer. 

The  next  regiment  went  through  much  the  same  move- 
ments, so  it  is  unnecessary  to  treat  it  in  such  detail  How- 
ever, it  struck  me  as  distinctly  inferior  to  the  other;  and  in 
subsequent  conversations  with  the  staff  officers  of  the  bri- 
gade, I  found  my  idea  was  confirmed ;  still  it  was  very  good 
indeed,  and  would  have  compared  most  favorably  with  the 
best  performances  of  our  own  regiments.  Only  one  point 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  39 

struck  me  as  distinctly  inferior  to  what  I  have  seen  in  India, 
and  that  may  perhaps  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the 
inspecting  officer  was  an  infantryman,  and  therefore  it  was 
thought  safe  to  go  in  for  a  bit  of  eyewash  which  could  not 
have  escaped  a  cavalryman's  keener  perception.  I  allude  to 
the  melees;  they  were,  on  the  whole,  only  indifferently  done, 
though  I  have  seen  independent  squadrons  of  the  same  regi- 
ment execute  them  perfectly  some  few  years  ago.  But  to- 
day the  men  stuck  together  and  hardly  broke  up  at  all ;  and 
I  should  like  to  have  been  able  to  show  the  Germans  what, 
for  instance,  the  llth  Bengal  Lancers  can  do  in  the  same 
line. 

The  condition  of  the  horses  wras  simply  wonderful;  for 
the  last  three  weeks  they  have  been  out  five  times  a  week  at 
regimental  drills,  rarely  of  less  duration  than  five  hours  from 
the  time  of  leaving  barracks  to  returning,  and,  working  out 
the  distances  with  the  map  and  my  friends,  I  cannot  put  it 
down  below  30  miles  a  day,  in  field-day  order  certainly,  but 
still  at  a  pace  which  one  can  only  believe  when  one  has  seen 
i  t.  The  very  day  before  the  inspection  the  regiment  was  out  r,-£ 
hours;  I  went  to  stables  to  see  the  horses  after  they  came  in. 
yet  they  were  sleek  and  fat  enough,  and  none  of  them  showed 
signs  of  fatigue.  To-day,  after  our  return,  I  went  down 
again;  though  they  had  not  dismounted  once  during  the 
drill,  and  had  been  going  at  full  regulation  pace  of  8  miles  an 
hour  trot  and  15  gallop,  yet  they  looked  as  well  as  possible. 
How  they  do  it  is  still  a  mystery  to  me.  Their  allowance 
of  oats  is  certainly  fractionally  better  than  ours,  allowing 
for  the  smaller  size  of  the  horses,  and  their  hay  ration  consid- 
erably smaller — how  much  so  I  cannot  say  off-hand,  but  mast 
refer  my  readers  to  a  previous  letter  on  the  subject  of  horses', 
rations  some  three  months  back.  I  cannot  see  that  their 
stable  management  in  detail  is  superior  to  ours — in  fact,  I 
think  it  is  decidedly  the  reverse;  and  the  only  explanation 
1  can  offer  for  the  fact  is  the  marked  advantage  they  have 
over  us  in  being  able  to  keep  their  remounts  till  they  are  ris- 
ing 7  years  before  putting  them  to  hard  work. 

On  my  way  back  I  had  a  long  conversation  apropos  of 
this  subject  with  one  of  the  officers  who  had  himself  been  in 
India  in  1887,  and  had  seen  our  cavalrv  in  several  stations. 


40  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

notably  in  Rawalpindi;  and  that  was  the  only  reason  he  could 
assign  for  what  was  as  evident  to  him  as  to  me. 

A  great  part  of  the  maneuvers  of  both  regiments  were 
executed  on  the  silent  system;  it  was  an  extremely  still 
morning,  with  a  light  haze  hanging,  and  the  sound  carried 
extremely  well,  as  long  as  they  were  working  by  words  of 
command.  But  when  they  dispensed  with  them,  the  effect 
of  this  large  mass  moving  silently  over  the  soft  ground,  with 
only  a  confused  jangle  of  accouterments,  was  weird  in  the 
extreme.  And  it  was  astonishing  how  every  movement  of 
the  colonel,  the  senior  major,  the  adjutant,  and  two  trump- 
eters, riding  some  150  yards  in  front  of  the  line,  was  followed 
and  obeyed;  it  was  a  triumph  for  the  follow-my-leader 
school;  and  I  for  one  cannot  believe  it  possible  that  such 
movements  could  have  been  performed  with  our  "base" 
system. 

I  have  been  told,  and  indeed  can  see  for  myself,  that 
immense  improvements  have  been  made  in  the  last  seven 
years;  perhaps  the  limit  of  the  possible  attainable  with  such 
material  has  been  attained.  Recollect  that  the  outside  ser- 
vice any  man  in  the  ranks  can  have  is  only  four  years,  and  the 
majority  have  only  two  years  and  eight  months  at  the  out- 
side; that  the  men  are  soldiers  under  compulsion,  and  not  by 
free  will,  and  the  majority  are  simply  incapable  of  teaming  to 
ride  really  well  "because  they  are  not  built  that  way" ;  andthcu 
think  what  might  we  not  accomplish  with  our  very  decided 
superiority  in  material,  both  of  horse  and  man,  if  only  we 
would  con  descend  to  step  out  of  our  shellsof  insularprejudice 
and  adopt  a  system  which  is  not  by  any  means  only  German, 
but  which  may  be  said  to  obtain  in  the  conduct  of  every  civil- 
ized business  throughout  the  world  except  in  our  army — viz., 
the  decentralization  of  authority,  and  the  giving  to  every 
man  according  to  his  rank  full  power  to  make  the  most  of 
what  is  in  him  and  in  the  men  under  him. 


Since  my  last  letter  T  have  been  out  to  drills  and  inspec- 
tions almost  daily.  I  do  not  profess  to  attempt  to  describe 
all  I  saw  in  detail,  but  will  confine  myself  to  those  points  that 
struck  me  most  as  likely  to  be  interesting  to  my  readers.  The 
inspection  of  the  cavalry  brigade  was  a  sight  not  easily  for- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  41 

gotten;  the  two  regiments  turned  out  five  squadrons,  each 
from  60  to  64  files — two  pretty  imposing  masses  to  handle. 
One  of  the  most  noticeable  features  about  the  drill  was  the 
absolutely  simultaneous  obedience  to  the  trumpet  sounds  or 
words  of  command.  As  the  last  notes  of  the  trumpets  still 
rang  in  the  air,  every  horse  throughout  the  whole  mass 
moved  off  at  the  prescribed  pace.  When  one  takes  into  con- 
sideration the  fact  that  the  brigade  in  columns  of  divisions 
was  about  700  yards  long,  and  that  literally  as  quick  as  one's 
eye  could  sweep  from  one  end  of  the  formation  to  another 
the  last  horse  of  the  body  was  moving,  it  will  be  evident  to 
what  perfection  they  have  attained.  Equally  striking  was 
it  to  see  the  regiments  in  close  column  of  squadrons  move 
off  together,  and  the  wheeling  of  the  brigade,  in  both  rep- 
ments  in  this  formation,  was  simply  extraordinary,  each  regi- 
ment maintaining  its  exact  shape  like  a  small  rectangular 
block  without  the  least  appearance  of  straggling  at  the 
edges;  the  best-drilled  infantry  wheeling  in  quarter-column 
could  not  have  excelled  them. 

One  of  the  most  startling  things  I  have  seen  done  was  an 
impromptu  charge  against  infantry.  To  explain  it,  I  must 
say  a  word  about  the  ground.  It  is  a  large  irregular  rectan- 
gle, about  3,000  yards  by  1,500,  bounded  on  the  south  and 
east  by  woods  with  broad  roads  cut  through  them,  and  on  the 
north  by  the  line  of  the  artillery  semi-permanent  encamp- 
ment, whilst  to  the  west  it  meets  with  cultivation  which  may 
not  be  ridden  over.  The  soil  is  a  somewhat  heavy  sand,  with 
a  little  clay  mixed  with  it,  and  it  is  broken  by  a  few  gentle 
undulations  hardly  perceptible  at  a  distance,  but  still  deep 
enough  to  hide  even  lancers  from  the  eye.  The  brigade  had 
been  trotting  up  the  northern  boundary  of  the  camp  in  col- 
umn of  squadrons  in  a  westerly  direction,  and  had  then 
wheeled  half-left  into  half-column.  When  the  inspecting 
officer,  riding  on  the  central  ridge,  saw  a  regiment  of  infantry 
just  beginning  to  issue  from  the  skirts  of  the  wood  on  the 
south,  and  to  his  right  rear,  he  instantly  so umied  "troops 
right  about,"  which  brought  them  into  half-column,  or  ob- 
lique echelon,  exactly  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  in 
which  they  had  previously  been  proceeding;  then  sounded 
the  "gallop"  and  "line  to  the  front"  for  the  right  regiment, 


4:2  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

whilst  the  left  one  continued  its  movement  in  half-column 
till  it  got  in  position  to  act  as  support  to  the  first  line,  which 
meanwhile  swept  over  the  ridge  and  came  down  on  the  in- 
fantry so  rapidly  that  hardly  200  men  were  able  to  get  out  of 
the  wood  and  open  fire  on  them.  Two  hundred  rifles,  even 
repeaters,  with  barely  300  yards  of  open  to  develop  their  tire 
on,  against  1,000  sabers  advancing  at  full  gallop,  and  there- 
fore under  fire  for,  at  the  outside,  thirty  seconds  only,  could 
hardly  hope  for  success,  and  it  gave  one  an  idea  of  how  great 
the  opportunities  for  cavalry  which  may  still  arise  are,  if 
only  the  latter  can  maneuver  and  their  leaders  know  how  to 
takeadvantageof  the  ground  properly.  Altogether  within  the 
week  I  have  seen  upwards  of  twenty  charges  of  the  whole  bri- 
gade in  line,soinetimes  formed  from  squadron  columns  already 
at  the  gallop,  and  though  occasionally  one  noticed  squadrons 
a  little  bit  too  loose  at  the  moment  (supposed)  of  collision, 
yet,  on  the  whole,  I  have  seen  nothing  to  alter  my  opinion  as 
to  their  immense  superiority  in  this  knee-to-knee  riding  over 
the  performances  of  our  own  regiments;  and  in  conversa- 
tion with  the  officers  I  find  an  absolute  agreement  amongst 
them  that  such  riding  is  only  possible  with  thoroughly 
broken  horses,  and  where  troops  are  maneuvered  on  the  fol- 
low-my-leader  system — i.  e.,  where  the  squadron  leaders  fol- 
low the  regimental  leaders,  and  the  squadrons  regulate  their 
pace  and  intervals  by  watching  their  own  leaders,  and  not 
by  turning  their  heads  towards  a  directing  base. 

But  by  this  time  most  of  my  readers  will  have  had 
enough  of  cavalry  for  this  week,  so  I  will  now  turn  for  a  short 
space  to  the  infantry.  As  I  have  often  pointed  out  before, 
the  new  regulations  have  introduced  but  little  external 
change  in  the  drills,  except  that  they  no  longer  march-past 
at  the  advance,  but  at  the  slope;  and  that  the  men  have  a 
little  more  space  in  the  ranks.  The  reviews  present  nothing 
striking,  and  even  in  the  maneuvers  there  is  but  little  to 
change.  The  new  equipment  has  not  yet  been  served  out, 
though  it  is  in  store  for  almost  the  whole  army  now,  and  the 
smokeless  powder  has  not  made  its  way  down  south  yet. 
Apropos  of  this  latter,  those  most  likely  to  know  are  far  from 
taking  the  sanguine  views  of  the  popular  writers  about  it. 
There  is  still  more  than  a  question  as  to  its  stability,  even 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  43 

under  the  climatic  conditions;  and  as  to  its  noiselessness, 
they  say  it  is  only  less  noisy  because  hitherto  it  has  only  been 
experimented  with  out  of  smaller  calibers  than  those  gener- 
ally in  use,  and  that,  in  point  of  fact,  under  similar  condi- 
tions, it  is  rather  the  noisier  of  the  two;  and,  indeed,  since  it 
gives  the  highest  muzzle  velocities,  it  must  necessarily  Jki 
so,  for  the  report  of  a  gun  depends  on  the  velocity  with  which 
the  bullet  or  other  object  projected  and  the  particles  created 
by  the  explosion  encounter  the  particles  of  air  at  the  muzzle; 
at  least,  that  is  the  opinion  of  experts  in  sound,  such  as 
Tyndall. 

One  change,  however,  has  been  carried  out — namely,  in 
the  manner  of  carrying  the  old  equipment — which  has  con- 
duced to  the  comfort  of  the  man,  if  not  to  his  appearance. 
This  is,  that  the  greatcoat  is  no  longer  worn  horse-collar 
fashion  over  the  left  shoulder,  but  is  rolled  over  the  knap- 
sack, thus  relieving  the  man  of  a  great  deal  of  pressureacross 
the  chest,  and  rendering  it  easier  for  him  to  get  under  cover 
and  to  shoot  when  lying  dowrn.  Formerly,  too,  the  helmets 
were  made  too  straight,  they  tell  me,  for  a  man  to  shoot  lying 
down.  With  the  coat  on  the  knapsack,  the  helmet  was  tilted 
down  over  his  eyes  so  that  he  could  not  see,  as  is  still  the 
case  in  our  army;  but  at  length  a  genius  arose  who  discov- 
ered how  to  avoid  this  by  altering  the  pattern  of  the  head- 
dress, and  the  change  which  has  afforded  so  much  relief  to 
the  soldier  has  been  carried  out.  When  will  a  similar  far- 
sighted  being  arise  in  our  own  service  I  wonder?  But  whar 
the  soldier  has  gained  in  comfort  he  has  lost  in  appearance. 
The  rolled  great-coat  gave  the  man  a  look  of  immense  depth 
of  chest  and  general  sturdiness,  and  misled  a  great  many 
observers  to  the  opinion  that  the  men  actually  were  thicker 
set  than  our  own,  which  statistics  show  to  be  decidedly  not 
the  case,  and  which  is  now  evident  to  everyone. 

I  saw  several  attacks  delivered,  and  though  none  of  them 
were  exactly  identical  in  detail,  the  broad  principles  were  in 
all  the  same.  As  near  as  possible,  the  sequence  was  as  fol- 
lows: The  advance  guard  found  the  enemy,  always  a  skel- 
eton one,  and  opened  fire  upon  him,  while  the  troops  in  rear 
formed  up  in  quarter-column  under  cover.  The  captains 
were  then  sent  for,  and  the  commander  gave  his  instructions. 


44  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

Let  us  assume  the  attacking  force  to  be  a  regiment  of  three 
battalions;  it  was  generally  drawn  up  with  two  battalions 
in  first  line,  and  the  third  in  second,  and  in  rear  of  one  of  the 
two  wings.  The  battalion  to  which  the  advance  guard  be- 
longed now  received  the  order  to  engage  1  lie  enemy  in  front, 
while  the  two  others  prepared  to  attack  him  in  flank.  Th^ 
action  of  the  retaining  battalion  was  very  similar  to  our  own 
ordinary  attack — viz.,  an  advance  of  skirmishers  at  about 
four  paces  interval,  the  skirmishers  advancing  in  groups  of 
about  eight  men  with  an  N.  C.  O.,  and  leaving  intervals  for  re- 
inforcement, not  quite  as  great  as  the  front  of  one  of  these  sec- 
tions; the  idea  being  that  each  section  should  close  on  its  cen- 
ter as  casualties  occurred  to  make  room  for  the  reinforcement 
to  come  up.  Each  company  formed  its  own  support,  whilst  a 
complete  company  formed  the  main  body  or  reserve.  Ac 
cording  to  the  ground, the  advance  was  either  a  purely  skirm- 
ishing one,  group  by  group  creeping  upas  opportunity  offered, 
or,  if  the  terrain  was  suitable,  the  whole  company  front  ran 
forward  together  till  the  whole  were  within  about  300  yards 
of  the  enemy.  Meanwhile  the  attacking  wing  had  opened 
out  into  lines  of  company  columns,  1  wo  in  first,  two  in  second, 
two  in  third,  and  two  in  fourth  line,  generally  arranged 
chess-board  fashion,  or  sometimes  echeloned  outwards,  ac- 
cording to  the  requirements  of  the  case.  Each  company  then 
threw  out  a  dense  line  of  skirmishers,  retaining  usually  one 
"zug" — i.  e.,  one-third — in  support.  The  remaining  lim's 
followed  about  400  to  500  yards  in  rear  of  each  other — mostly 
in  ordinary  two-deep  line — with  drums  and  fifes  sounding 
and  the  men  in  "parade  marsch."  The  effect  of  this  was  in- 
describably fine.  Viewed  from  the  enemy's  side,  the  ad- 
vance seemed  perfectly  irresistible.  The  fighting  line 
pressed  on  to  within  600  to  700  yards  without  firing  a  shot,  it 
being  one  of  the  points  chiefly  insisted  on  in  Germany  that 
fire  should  not  be  opened  too  soon.  Then,  however,  it  began 
by  spurts,  as  it  were;  three  rounds  independent  fire;  then 
the  whistle  was  heard,  and  the  whole  tiring  ceased  for  a  mo- 
ment, and  then,  a  fresh  order  being  given,  recommenced. 
Once  or  twice  in  this  stage  I  saw  volleys  fired ;  but,  as  a  gen- 
oral  rule,  volleys  in  the  attack  are  not  believed  in.  As  the 
supports  closed  on  the  fighting  line,  the  latter  rose  and  ran 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  45 

forward  in  two  echelons  only,  each  rush  being  for  about  100 
yards,  so  that  three  of  them  brought  the  line  up  to  decisive 
distance  from  the  enemy's  muzzles.  By  this  time  the  sup- 
ports, and  sometimes  the  main  body  of  the  first  line,  had  been 
absorbed,  but  always  the  arrival  of  the  next  following  line 
was  awaited,  and  then  followed  a  few  moments  of  perfectly 
appalling  magazine  fire.  Then  the  whistles  sounded  all 
along  the  front,  and  the  whole  mass  threw  themselves  on  the 
enemy  with  a  cheer.  The  next  line  came  up,  passed  through 
or  over  the  first,  and  took  up  the  pursuit  by  firing  volleys 
after  the  enemy,  whilst  the  remainder  rallied  with  surpris- 
ing rapidity;  and,  just  as  with  the  cavalry,  a  fresh  operation 
was  undertaken  in  a  new  direction  with  the  rallied  forces. 
It  was  this  recommencement  of  operations  at  once  which 
principally  struck  me.  With  us  the  rush  at  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion is  too  generally  held  to  be  the  finale  of  the  day's  proceed- 
ings, whereas  actually  it  would  more  often  be  only  the  begin- 
ning. But  one  criticism  on  the  German  practice  I  will  per- 
mit myself,  and  that  is,  that  to  follow  the  defeated  enemy 
again  in  extended  order  seems  to  me  a  very  dangerous  game 
to  play,  for  it  is"  just  at  this  moment  that  offensive  returns 
by  fresh  bodies  of  troops  may  be  expected,  and  these  will 
necessarily  be  made  in  close  order,  and  through  the  dust, 
smoke,  and  confusion  will  break  on  the  pursuers  with  a  sud- 
denness which,  backed  by  the  magazine  rifle,  will  be  more 
terrible  than  any  bayonet  attack  of  the  past.  There  were 
many  other  minor  sins  of  omission  and  commission  which  re- 
called the  admirable  criticisms  of  Prince  Hohenlohe.  Majors 
and  colonels  insisted  on  riding  in  the  front  line,  instead  of. 
commanding  from  their  proper  places  in  rear,  and  on  one 
occasion  I  saw  two  companies  brought  up  to  within  twenty 
paces  of  the  fighting  line,  then  within  300  yards  of  the  <>ne- 
my's  position,  in  column;  but,  on  the  whole,  one  could  not 
help  remarking  the  extraordinary  rapidity  and  swing  with 
which  the  movements  went.  None  of  that  dawdling  about 
and  delay  which  is  so  common  on  our  own  drill-grounds,  and 
very  far  less  of  the  direct  interference  of  the  senior  officers 
with  their  subordinates  which  tends  to  whiten  the  hair  of 
onr  unfortunate  captains. 


46  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

INDEPENDENT  PATROLS. 

A  pamphlet  has  recently  appeared  in  Berlin  from  the 
pen  of  the  well-known  military  writer  Von  der  Goltz,  author 
of  that  excellent  work  the  "Nation  in  Arms,"  which  has  been 
translated  into  English  more  or  less  indifferently  well,  and 
hence  has  become  tolerably  familiar  in  the  service. 

The  object  of  his  present  pamphlet  is  to  elucidate  the 
questions  connected  with  smokeless  powder  and  long-range 
small-arms,  and  to  recommend  the  formation  and  training  of 
independent  patrols  of  men  picked  for  their  courage  and 
adroitness  in  true  skirmishing,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
out  a  closer  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  position  than  can 
be  executed,  according  to  his  views,  by  the  cavalry  alone. 
What  it  comes  to  is  briefly  the  formation  of  a  new  light  divi- 
sion, a  special  corps  d?  elite  chosen  from  each  company  of  th^ 
army,  and  forming  an  integral  part  of  it,  but  liable  to  be  de- 
tached and  grouped  together  under  the  general  direction  of 
an  officer  equally  chosen  for  dash  and  skill  in  directing  the 
so-called  minor  operations  of  war. 

General  Von  der  Goltz's  reputation  stands  so  high  that 
it  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  he  does  not  see  the  obvious 
difficulties  such  an  organization  would  entail;  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  the  apparently  hopeless  difficulty  of  securing  ade- 
quate co-operation  between  the  different  groups.  There 
must  be  some  way  out  of  them,  and  his  request,  not  to  con 
denan  his  plan  hastily,  deserves  that,  as  far  as  space  permits, 
he  should  be  allowed  to  speak  for  himself.  I  will  put  his 
concluding  sentences  first,  and  then  follow  him  through  the 
course  of  a  modern  action  as  it  presents  itself  to  him. 

"There  may  no  doubt  be  many  circumstances  in  war  in 
which  these  patrols  could  not  be  employed,  or  in  which  we 
might  dispense  with  them  without  inconvenience.  But  at 
least  it  will  be  granted  that  such  bodies,  composed  of  intelli- 
gent men,  can  do  no  harm  to  any  one.  Through  them  we 
should  raise  a  portion  of  the  army  above  the  level  of  the  com- 
mon herd,  and  create  in  our  companies  a  kernel  of  soldiers, 
reliable  and  ambitious,  always  at  hand,  and  who  would  act, 
aim,  and  shoot  deliberately  with  their  senses  all  awake,  who 
would  understand  patrolling  in  its  highest  sense,  be  able  to 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  47 

make  reliable  reports,  and  generally  understand  the  phe- 
nomena of  war.  From  such  men  one  could  expect  a  higher 
sense  of  duty  and  a  fidelity  on  which  the  captains  could 
count  in  all  circumstances.  These  reasons  alone  ought  to 
suffice  to  render  it  worth  our  while  to  select  and  specially 
train  those  who  show  most  aptitude  for  the  work." 

To  begin  now  at  the  beginning:  "Those  leaders,"  h«* 
writes,  "will  have  the  best  chance  of  success  who  can  succeed 
in  bringing  up  their  troops  into  the  enemy's  position,  in  com- 
pact tactical  units  and  without  having  suffered  considerable 
loss.  The  power  of  modern  fire-arms,  even  at  extreme 
ranges,  is  so  considerable,  that  even  lines  of  skirmishers  will 
find  themselves  exposed  to  heavy  loss  from  the  moment  tlie 
ground  ceases  to  give  them  any  cover,  and  be  able  to  inflict 
very  little  indeed  in  return  on  the  enemy,  owing  to  the  small  - 
ness  of  the  target  he  exposes.  Hence,  just  as  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  century  skirmishers  had  to  precede  the 
column  to  draw  off  the  enemy's  attention,  so  is  it  necessary 
to  interpose  a  similar  buffer  between  the  dense  lines  of  skir- 
mishers and  their  foe. 

"The  greatest  caution  must  be  observed  before  commit- 
ting these  dense  and  not  very  manageable  fighting  lines  to  an 
action ;  it  is  absolutely  essential  to  wait  till  our  artillery  has 
established  its  superiority,  and  pending  that,  the  fight  must 
be  maintained  by  groups  numerically  weak,  but  composed 
of  picked  men,  whose  steady  aimed  fire  will  absorb  the  atten- 
tion of  the  adversary." 

In  fact,  so  far  these  independent  patrols  will  fulfil  ex- 
actly the  role  of  the  light  companies  and  light  division  of 
the  Peninsula  days,  the  only  difference  being  in  their  organi- 
zation, which  he  now  proceeds  to  explain : 

"The  leaders  and  men  of  these  patrols  must  receive  in 
peace  a  specialized  instruction.  Each  <zug'  of  a  company 
will  furnish  one  of  them,  consisting  of  a  non-commissioned 
officer  and  eight  men,  whose  packs  will,  wherever  feasible, 
be  carried  for  them,  they  themselves  carrying  only  their 
ammunition  and  rations;  the  latter  to  enable  them  to  get- 
along  even  if  separated  for  a  couple  of  days  from  their 
companies. 


48  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

"They  will  not  be  employed  for  the  immediate  protec- 
tion of  their  own  companies — that  duty  will  continue  to 
devolve  on  the  ordinary  patrols;  but  they  will  be  used  to 
carry  on  special  missions  ordered  by  the  officer  in  command 
of  the  whole  body  of  troops  to  which  at  the  time  they  belong." 

Let  us  follow  now  in  detail  the  method  of  their  employ- 
ment he  proposes.  The  cavalry  division  having  established 
the  region  in  which  the  enemy  is  moving,  clears  the  front  and 
leaves  the  two  armies  in  the  presence  and  within  striking  dis- 
tance of  one  another;  the  immediate  necessity  is  to  establish 
precisely  the  position  to  be  attacked.  In  first  line  this  duty 
devolves  on  the  divisional  cavalry  (which  is  unfortunate  for 
us,aswe  have  nowreduced  ours  to  only  one  squadron  perdivi 
sion,  altogether  too  small  a  proportion),  but  a  man  and  horse 
offerstoo  gooda  targetand  finds  too  great  difficulty  in  getting 
cover  to  be  counted  on  to  get  within  less  than  1,000  yards  of 
the  enemy,  if  as  near,  and  once  within  the  zone  in  which  with 
the  best  will  in  the  world  they  cannot  hold  out  any  longer, 
they  must  be  relieved  of  their  duties  by  these  independent 
infantry  patrols,  who  will  simply  "stalk"  the  enemy,  brush 
away  any  small  outposts  meant  to  keep  off  intruding  cavalry 
and  scouts,  and  fix  in  detail  the  exact  outline  of  the  enemy's 
position.  On  the  importance  of  this  information  to  the 
leader  before  he  determines  on  his  line  of  attack  it  is  unnec- 
essary to  dwell.  Hitherto  this  duty  has  been  undertaken 
by  the  advance  guard,  and  even  in  1870  it  was  found  that  the 
nature  and  composition  of  ordinary  troops  of  the  line  could 
not  be  trusted  to  carry  it  through. 

Instead  of  "stalking"  the  enemy,  they  went  for  him 
straight,  became  involved  in  a  decisive  engagement,  and  in- 
stead of  the  following  troops  benefiting  by  the  result  of  tho 
intelligence  secured,  they  had  to  be  sacrificed  to  make  good 
the  previous  blunders.  The  essential  point  of  difference, 
therefore,  lies  in  that  the  action  of  the  patrols  does  not  for?o 
the  hand  of  the  commander.  The  risks  they  run  are  propor- 
tionately great,  and  for  that  purpose  the  men  must  be  spe- 
cially selected  for  courage  and  skill  as  skirmishers  in  the  old 
sense  of  the  word;  and  in  this  skill  they  will  find  the  best 
means  of  reducing  their  losses. 

Mean  while  and  under  cover  of  these  patrols  the  artillery 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  49 

conies  up  into  position,  and  as  the  skirmishing  action  in  front 
does  not  commit  any  one  to  decisive  fighting,  they  can  set 
about  the  work  of  "ranging"  with  greater  coolness  and  delib- 
eration, which  is  all  the  more  important  because  smoke-clouds 
no  longer  expose  the  position  of  the  enemy's  guns.  Even 
the  flash,  which  with  the  new  powder  is  peculiarly  vivid,  no 
longer  betrays  them,  since  the  method  of  indirect  laying  has 
reached  its  present  perfection. 

"At  the  present  moment  authorities  are  not  agreed 
whether  artillery  should  be  assigned  to  the  advance  guard 
or  not.  For  us  the  question  is  without  importance  as  soon 
as  we  have  settled  the  question  how  the  advance  guard  should 
be  employed.  Its  commander  is  authorized  to  seize  what- 
ever chances  offer  themselves  by  taking  the  initiative  boldly. 
For  this  purpose  he  requires  the  guns.  If,  for  instance,  it  is 
necessary  to  seize  a  village  or  a  defile,  he  requires  their  sup- 
port. If  he  meets  the  enemy  advancing  in  force,  he  must  put 
in  every  gun  at  his  disposal  to  check  them.  But  if,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  enemy  is  found  in  position,  it  is  his  duty  not 
to  commit  his  troops;  otherwise  he  would  be  forcing  the 
hand  of  the  chief  commander,  who  would  thereby  lose  all 
freedom  of  action,  and  this  will  be  the  necessary  consequence 
ol  engaging  either  guns  or  infantry  too  soon.  The  independ- 
ent patrols  afford  him  a  means  of  avoiding  both  faults. 

"Once  the  batteries  have  come  into  action,  and  the  direc- 
tion of  the  attack  decided  on,  they  must  reduce  the  guns  of 
the  adversary  to  silence,  and  then  endeavor  to  shake  his  in- 
fantry as  much  as  possible. 

"Their  fire  must  be  kept  up  over  the  heads  of  the  ad- 
vancing lines  as  long  as  possible,  and  when  at  last  it  is  impos- 
sible to  distinguish  friend  from  foe,  a  couple  of  turns  of  the 
elevating  screw  should  send  the  shells  crashing  into  any 
advancing  reserves  the  latter  may  be  bringing  up,  whether 
visible  or  not.  They  should  be  there,  and  if  they  are  not,  it 
is  just  one  of  the  few  cases  where  it  is  better  to  waste  the 
shells  on  the  chance. 

"The  use  of  these  independent  patrols  will,  however, 
immensely  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  side  which  through 
want  of  numbers,  or  the  configuration  of  the  ground,  is  com- 
pelled to  adopt  a  defensive  or  offensive  attitude.  Behind 


50  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  screen  formed  by  them,  a  line  of  guns  may  be  drawn  up. 
whilst  the  bulk  of  the  forces  are  held  in  reserve  and  in  posi- 
tion on  another  front.  Look  at  the  case  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  assailant  acting  in  the  ordinary  method.  His 
cavalry  have  received  a  heavy  fire  of  infantry  and  artillery 
apparently  in  position  facing,  say,  northwest.  The  advance- 
guard  batteries  come  into  action  mid  the  following  infantry 
are  drawn  up  for  attack  and  committed  to  an  advance. 
Formerly  it  was  possible  to  tell  from  the  puffs  of  smoke  ap- 
proximately in  what  strength  the  infantry  were  present — a 
rapfd  fire  from  a  small  number  of  rifles  betrayed  itself;  now 
one  is  no  longer  able  to  judge  whether  the  rifles  are  few  or 
many.  As  the  attack  develops,  the  line  falls  back,  and  the 
guns  disappear  suddenly,  unmasking  a  fresh  position  facing 
west,  and  the  assailant  finds  himself  compelled  to  change 
front  under  effective  fire.  What  that  implies,  those  who 
were  present  in  1870  can  form  an  opinion." 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  author  is  in  this  case — and, 
indeed,  throughout — making  rather*  too  sure  of  the  invisi- 
bility of  the  new  powder.  This  method  of  action  was,  I 
believe,  perfectly  feasible  even  with  ordinary  powder;  and, 
indeed,  I  have  often  recommended  it  in  these  columns  with 
reference  to  the  necessity  of  keeping  up  the  true  light  in- 
fantry principles  of  skirmishing  in  contradistinction  to  tin* 
hybrid  form  of  individual-order  fighting,  which  is  neither 
fish,  flesh,  nor  fowl,  and  which  finds  its  expression  in  our 
normal  attack  formations  as  practised  on  our  drill-grounds. 
The  smokeless  powder  did  not  strike  me  last  autumn  in  Ger- 
many as  so  very  invisible.  True,  there  were  no  puffs  of 
smoke, but  there  were  many  conditions  of  background,  wind, 
and  atmosphere,  which,  skillfully  taken  advantage  of,  as 
they  should  be  by  good  skirmishers,  rendered  the  blank  car- 
tridges of  the  old  powder  quite  as  invisible  as  those  of  the 
new.  Indeed,  I  saw  a  case  in  point  at  Niederbronn  this 
year,  in  which,  the  morning  haze  still  hanging,  but  very 
lightly,  myself  and  three  other  British  officers  watching  a 
line  of  skirmishers  firing,  decided  they  were  using  smokeless 
powder  when  actually  they  had  only  the  old  one,  and  again 
later  in  the  day,  when  the  mist  had  lifted  and  a  fresh  breeze 
sprang  up,  we  made  the  same  mistake  with  another  body  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  51 

troops,  and  went  away  under  the  firm  conviction  that  we  ha  1 
seen  a  very  successful  experiment  with  the  new  powder  and 
knew  all  about  it,  and  were  not  a  little  sold  when  we  learnt 
our  mistake  from  the  German  officers  in  the  evening.  It  is, 
however,  only  just  to  ourselves-  to  add  that  there  had  been 
very  little  firing,  and  that,  too,  exclusively  by  the  masked 
enemy,  who  were  very  widely  extended.  The  attacking 
force  being  only  exercised  in  preliminary  movements,  prac- 
tising the  battalion  commanders  in  the  use  of  the  ground  as 
cover  from  sight,  and  in  moving  through  some  woods,  the 
"cease  fire"  always  sounding  as  soon  as  the  time  for  deploy- 
ment arrived. 

But  subsequently,  on  the  drill-ground  at  Frescate  ne*ir 
Metz,  where  I  saw  the  new  powder  used  by  three  different 
brigades  independently,  so  that  there  was  nothing  to  guide 
one's  eye  to  the  likely  places  from  which  to  expect  the  fire, — 
an  advantage  one  always  has  when  working  against  an 
enemy, — I  came  to  a  very  different  conclusion  to  that  of  in/ 
author.  It  seemed  to  me  that  there  was  no  mistaking  the 
flash  of  discharge  of  the  new  cartridges.  Poets  are  apt  to 
talk  of  the  dewdrops  sparkling  like  jewels  on  the  sward,  but 
1hey  refer  to  the  sward  immediately  at  one's  feet,  and  not 
&  thousand  yards  away.  When,  however,  a  bright  scintillac- 
ing  line  of  jewel-like  sparkles  is  suddenly  drawn  right  across 
the  mass  of  a  brown  hillside,  and  when,  as  would  be  the  case 
in  war,  the  whole  air  is  the  next  moment  alive  with  a  noise 
like  a  myriad  nightmare  mosquitoes,  singing  past  one's  ears, 
and  the  ground  at  one's  feet  is  simultaneously  torn  up  in  lonj; 
furrows  pointing  in  a  given  direction,  there  can  be  very  little 
doubt  what  the  scintillating  line  just  seen  really  means. 
I  think  that  day  I  must  have  seen  the  new  powder  against 
every  conceivable  kind  of  background,  from  the  dark  edge 
of  a  wood,  the  border  of  a  village,  across  the  face  of  a  hill, 
and  the  line  of  a  hedge,  but  in  all  cases,  the  bright  line  of 
flashes  betrayed  themselves  at  least  as  well  as  the  puffs  of 
sinoke  of  even  full  charges  would  have  done.  A  properly 
trained  reconnoitering  officer  would  have  had  no  difficulty 
at  all  in  seeing  through  any  ruse  of  the  kind  above  mentioned : 
for,  even  without  the  aid  he  possesses  in  the  knowledge  of 
the  direction  in  which  to  look,  which  would  have  been  sup- 


t>2  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

plied  if  by  chance  he  did  not  know  it  by  the  graze  of  the  bu! 
lets,  and  the  possession  of  a  map  by  the  aid  of  which  his  sol- 
dierly instinct  should  have  taught  him  whence  to  expect  the 
fire,  I  found  no  difficulty  in  distinguishing  the  various  fight- 
ing lines,  though  three  independent  battles  were  raging 
around  me,  and  two  of  them  were  more  than  two  miles  dis>- 
lar»t.  T  cannot  help  thinking  that  the  case  for  independent 
patrols,  or,  at  any  rate, trained  light  infantry,  whether  organ- 
ized as  light  companies  or  as  a  whole  division,  would  have 
been  rendered  even  stronger  had  their  claims  been  put  for 
ward  solely  on  the  results  of  1870,  and  not  as  a  consequence 
of  the  new  factor. 

A  MODERN  BATTLE. 

In  continuation  of  my  remarks  on  Von  der  Goltz's  "Inde- 
pendent Patrols,"  I  propose  to  give  almost  in  full  his  descrip- 
tion of  a  modern  battle,  as  it.  will  probably  shape  itself  with 
the  new  weapons  and  powder  now  in  use. 

The  advance  patrols  of  cavalry  having  established  ti:< 
presence  of  the  enemy  on  a  given  line  and  the  points  on  which 
his  flanks  rest,  the  general  officer  in  command  will  have  to 
decide,  while  still  at  a  distance  of  perhaps  a  day's  march, 
whether  to  attack  straight  to  his  front  or  to  attempt  to  ma- 
neuver the  enemy  out  of  his  position.  The  length  of  front 
occupied  gives  an  approximate  indication  of  the  enemy's 
strength,  and  its  position  on  the  map  also  reveals  in  part  the 
enemy's  design,  but  for  the  rest  the  general's  own  knowledge 
of  the  situation  and  of  the  nature  of  his  adversary  must  suf- 
fice for  his  first  decision.  Let  us  assume  that  he  elects  for 
the  direct  attack;  possibly  the  strategic  situation  leaves  him 
no  choice.  Before  committing  his  troops,  a  detail  reconnais- 
sance is  necessary.  "More  than  ever  care  is  required  in  this 
operation,  for  the  enemy,  no  longer  betrayed  by  the  tell-tale 
puffs  of  smoke,  will  have  taken  advantage  of  every  possible 
means  of  cover  to  mislead  the  assailant  and  induce  him  to 
deploy  for  action  on  a  false  direction."  How  fatal  such  a 
mistake  was,  and  how  easy,  even  in  1870,  the  destruction  of 
Von  WedelPs  Brigade  (38th)  at  Mars-la-Tour  and  the  action 
of  the  9th  Corps  and  the  Guards  at  St.  Privat  amply  show. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  53- 

Standing  on  the  spur  of  the  hill  running  out  from  Aman\M- 
lers,  and  on  which  the  first  batteries  of  the  former  corps  un- 
limbered — to  surprise  the  French,  and  were  themselves  sur- 
prised by  receiving  fire  in  return  from  three  sides — one  could 
not  help  being  struck  with  the  value  of  the  smokeless  pow- 
der, assuming  its  invisibility  to  be  as  great  as  it  is  usually 
claimed  that  it  is.  It  must  have  been  bad  enough  to  stand 
there  and  see  the  smoke-puffs  surrounding  one  round  three- 
fourths  of  the  total  horizon.  What  it  would  have  been  like 
with  nothing  to  indicate  the  origin  of  the  storm  which  sud- 
denly tore  open  the  ground  in  apparently  every  direction 
beneath  one's  feet  one  can  hardly  conceive.  That)  initial 
blunder  entailed  as  a  consequence  all  subsequent  ones,  in- 
cluding the  premature  engagement  of  the  Guard,  and 
against  a  capable  general  should  have  caused  the  Germans 
the  loss  of  the  day,  and  probably  did  cost  them  some  10,000 
killed  and  wounded.  What  under  modern  conditions  it 
might  imply  can  be  better  imagined  than  described,  and  no 
precaution  which  could  guard  against  it  ought  to  be  neg- 
lected. But,  as  previously  pointed  out,  the  existing  organi- 
zation furnishes  no  satisfactory  way  out  of  the  difficulty.  The 
German  cavalry  in  1870  was  not  wanting  in  dash  and  self- 
sacrifice,  yet  in  each  of  the  above  instances  their  action  did 
not  suffice.  The  advance  guards  were  daring  enough,  but  it 
was  precisely  that  daring  that  did  the  harm.  The  "independ- 
ent patrol"  of  picked  brave  men  is  the  only  way  out  of  1.1' e 
difficulty. 

"The  current  idea  (in  Germany)  is  to  deploy  opposite  all 
the  points  of  the  enemy's  position  which  seem  to  require 
attention  a  line  of  companies,  each  of  which  sends  out  a  sec- 
tion or  half-section  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire  and  then  detect 
his  disposition. 

"But  consider  the  formation  of  these  units  on  a  war  foot 
ing:  are  they  suited  for  the  purpose?  The  whole  company 
will  probably  only  have  one  officer  of  the  age  and  experience 
requisite;  the  reserve  officers  and  the  bulk  of  the  men  wilt 
be  entirely  unsuited  for  it.  Besides,  the  body  itself  is  too 
large  a  target,  and  will  probably  be  shot  to  pieces  by  invisi- 
ble foes  before  it  gets  within  1,000  yards  of  the  position, 
where  thev  will  lie  down,  waste  their  ammunition,  and  event- 


54  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

ually,  if  not  supported,  bolt  back,  carrying  demoralization 
everywhere. 

"No!  This  is  essentially  a  field  in  which  only  excep- 
tional skill  and  courage  combined  can  be  of  any  avail;  and 
the  combination  being  but  rare,  those  men  who  have  it  must 
be  carefully  trained  and  set  aside  for  this  special  purpose. 
The  general  officer  in  command  will  personally  dispose  of 
the  patrols  furnished  by  the  advance  guard,  who  will,  hav- 
ing received  their  instructions,  advance  \vith  the  greatest 
caution.  If  the  enemy  opens  on  them  with  volleys  at  dis- 
tances over  1,000  yards,  the  results  are  likely  to  be  infinitesi- 
mal, and  in  any  case  the  position  of  these  patrols  cannot 
become  specially  critical,  as  the  enemy  is  not  likely  to  come 
out  of  his  trenches  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  them,  and 
they  will  be  too  small  a  target  to  employ  cavalry  against. 

"Under  protection  of  this  chain  of  patrols,  the  officers 
of  the  staff  and  of  the  cavalry,  provided  with  good  field 
glasses,  execute  their  reconnaissance,  taking  advantage  of. 
every  good  point  of  observation  the  ground  offers;  whilst 
officers'  patrols  from  the  cavalry  seek  to  penetrate  round  the 
flanks  and  in  rear  of  the  enemy. 

"On  the  information  thus  collected,  the  commanding  gen- 
eral chooses  the  front  attack.  This  front  should  fulfil  the  fol- 
lowing conditions:  (1)  space  to  bring  into  action  a  larger  num- 
ber of  guns  than  can  be  opposed  to  us  by  the  enemy — the 
larger  the  better;  (2)  concealed  lines  of  approach  to  the  ene- 
my's position;  (3)  and  under  no  circumstances  should  werun 
the  risk  of  exposing  our  guns  or  infantry  to  concentric  fire, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  should  seek  always  to  bring  conver- 
gent fire  against  the  enemy. 

"The  choice  having  been  made,  every  available  gun  is 
brought  into  action  and  the  artillery  duel  commences.  Too 
much  importance  cannot  be  attached  to  this  phase  of  the  bat- 
tle, for,  if  the  assailant  fails  to  establish  his  superiority,  his 
infantry  has  no  hope  of  success. 

"Unfortunately,  owing  to  want  of  time  in  the  maneuvers 
and  an  insufficient  supply  of  blank  ammunition,  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  give  a  fair  representation  of  this  part  of  the  action ; 
but  it  is  most  important  that  this  abridgement  of  the  pro- 
ceedings does  not  lead  to  any  misconception  on  the  part  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  55 

the  infantry  officers,  who  must  realize,  once  for  all,  that,  with 
An  approximate  equality  between  troops,  it  is  only  the  com- 
bined action  of  the  two  arms  which  can  ensure  the  result. 

"The  enormous  increase  in  the  power  of  the  guns  renders 
it  essential  that  the  utmost  solicitude  and  watchfulness 
should  be  devoted  to  its  training,  for  in  no  other  arm  can 
faults  or  neglect  in  instruction  entail  such  terrible  conse- 
quences. Not  only  must  it  be  technically  perfect,  but  it 
must  be  commanded  by  first-class  men,  and  on  mobilization 
undergo  the  least  changes  possible.  Batteries  formed  only 
on  the  outbreak  of  war  are  more  useless  than  any  similar 
formations  of  other  arms  can  possibly  be,  and  their  value 
generally  varies  in*  inverse  proportion  with  the  number  of 
strange  officers,  men,  and  untrained  horses  they  have  to  ab- 
sorb on  mobilization." 

The  above  passage,  I  may  add  in  passing,  is  meant  as  a 
particular  hit  at  the  present  war  administration  in  Germany, 
which  has  allowed  its  artillery  in  these  respects  to  fall  far 
behind  the  French  standard  in  immediate  readiness  for  the 
field. 

" While  the  combat  of  artillery  is  proceeding,  the  in- 
fantry form  up  iu  rendezvous  formation  under  cover,  and 
make  all  disposition  for  the  coming  attack,  such  as  getting 
some  food,  issuing  extra  ammunition,  and  stacking  their 
packs,  which  will  now  generally  be  left  behind.  As  each 
fresh  battalion  arrives,  its  independent  patrols  fall  out,  and 
are  sent  up  to  reinforce  the  line  already  engaged,  and  which, 
by  true  skirmishing  tactics,  seeks  to  injure  the  enemy  and 
approach  his  position  as  closely  as  possible. 

"At  length,  the  enemy's  artillery  having  been  reduced 
to  silence,  and  the  fire  of  our  guns  turned  on  his  infantry  fop 
a  sufficient  time,  the  signal  to  advance  to  the  attack  is  given, 
and  the  first  line,  a  dense  chain  of  skirmishers,  breaks  cover, 
and,  without  firing  a  shot  in  reply,  seeks  to  press  up  to  the 
limit  reached  by  the  independent  patrols,  say  600  yards." 

Against  such  a  target  the  defender,  firing  untroubled 
by  smoke  and  at  known  distances,  ought  to  make  splendid 
practice;  in  fact,  it  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  a  sufficient 
number  of  the  assailants  could  survive  the  ordeal,  unless  the 
nerves  of  the  defenders  have  been  already  unsteadied  by  the 


56  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

combined  action  of  the  infantry  patrols  and  the  artillery, 
and  it  is  very  much  the  custom  at  present  in  England  to 
underrate  the  assailant's  prospects  of  securing  this  result. 
Certainly,  given  our  long-service  soldiers  and  our  racial  char- 
acteristics, there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  now,  as 
formerly,  we  should  stand  pounding  longer  than  any  other 
nation;  but  again  it  is  only  a  question  of  time,  and  uHi- 
mately  the  defender  must  collapse.  Let  us  put  ourselves  in 
his  place. 

''For  several  hours  his  infantry,  strung  up  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  expectation  and  anxiety  as  to  what  is  coming,  has 
been  lying  in  its  trenches.  Occasional  weak  bodies  of  iho. 
enemy's  cavalry  have  been  seen,  and  a  distant  and  desultory 
fire  has  been  carried  on  against  hardly  visible  patrols,  im- 
possible to  hit,  but  steadily  creeping  in  closer  and  closer. 
Then  of  a  sudden,  from  out  of  the  sky,  so  to  speak,  a  storm 
of  bursting  shells  has  filled  the  air,  whose  smoke  conceals 
from  the  eyes  of  the  infantry  the  light  cloud  of  dust,  with  pos- 
sibly occasional  flashes — all  there  is  to  betray  the  position 
of  the  guns  from  which  they  are  fired. 

"Their  own  artillery  is  bcinii  sensibly  overpowered, 
and  is  seen  to  be  moving  to  the  rear.  Suddenly  the  intensity 
of  the  enemy's  fire  is  redoubled,  and  the  noise  of  the  bursting 
shells,  together  with  their  destructive  effects,  produces  rap- 
idly most  disastrous  effects  on  the  nerves  of  the  defenders. 
The  need  of  reinforcement  in  the  fighting  lino  becomes 
urgent,  but  the  ground  behind  it  is  so  swopl  by  the  enemy's 
fire  that  body  after  body  attempting  to  move  forward  is 
beaten  back,  and  only  the  debris  of  a  few  partially  successful 
efforts  ever  readies  the  front. 

"It  is  just  at  this  moment  that  the  fighting  line  of  iln> 
assailant  makes  its  appearance,  anywhere  between  2,000  and 
1,000  yards  distant.  If  the  officers  on  the  defenders' side  can 
succeed  in  distracting  the  attention  of  their  men  from  ihe 
terrible  spectacle  of  the  vain  efforts  of  their  supports  to  suc- 
cor them,  and  in  concentrating  it  on  the  advancing  enemy, 
that  will  be  about  as  much  as  can  be  expected,  and  their  fire 
will  hardly  be  as  carefully  directed  as  the  theorists  of  the 
practice-ground  are  in  the  habit  of  assuming.  But  if,  on  the 
contrary,  our  artillerv  fails  in  its  task,  and  the  infantry  ad- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  57 

vances  without  the  intermediate  buffer  formed  by  our  inde- 
pendent patrols  with  their  carefully  aimed  fire,  then  the  hope 
of  pressing  in  to  600  yards  without  firing  a  shot  is  illusory. 

"Let  us,  however,  continue  the  former  picture.  The 
carefully  aimed  fire  of  the  patrols  is  suddenly  reinforced  by 
the  rapid  fire  of  the  fighting  line,  and,  covered  by  this, 
a  second  line  advances  at  somewhere  about  1,000  yards'  dis- 
tance. If  the  first  line  reached  its  position  without  serious 
loss,  it  is  evident  that  the  second  will  suffer  even  less,  and  its 
unexpected  energy  will  suffice  to  shove  forward  the  whole 
line  another  100  yards  or  so. 

"Then,  and  another  1,000  yards  behind,  appear  the  real 
assaulting  troops  with  fixed  bayonets,  meant  as  a  visible 
sign  to  the  men  themselves  of  what  is  now  expected  of  them. 
With  drums  beating  and  colors  flying,  the  bands  playing  the 
most  inspiring  of  our  national  war-songs,  the  battalions  ad- 
vance as  in  review  order,  animated  with  only  one  sentiment, 
to  conquer  or  die." 

The  author  no  longer  proposes  to  push  into  200  yards 
before  commencing  the  "fire  of  decision,"  but  hopes  to  be  able 
to  effect  all  that  was  formerly  expected  at  this  range,  thanks 
to  the  flatter  trajectory  of  the  new  weapons,  at  400.  The 
subsequent  steps  call  for  no  further  remark.  The  storming 
troops  pursue  the  enemy  to  the  further  limit  of  the  position 
with  the  bayonet,  and  beyond  by  fire,  and  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery gallop  up  to  complete  the  rout. 

This  picture  only  differs  from  that  drawn  by  Meckel,  and 
which  was  reproduced  in  these  columns  a  few  weeks  ago,  in 
so  far  that  the  latter  assumed  a  considerably  higher  degree 
of  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  and  provided  for  it  by 
a  larger  number  of  successive  lines.  He  also  proposed  to 
march  his  actual  fighting  line  up  to  the  range  at  which  fire 
is  opened — i.  e.,  600  yards — in  close  order,  whereas  Von  der 
Goltz,  in  spite  of  his  independent  patrols  covering  the  ad- 
vance, speaks  of  his  fighting  line  advancing  "extended." 

Meckel  is  looked  on  as  the  extreme  exponent  of  the  close- 
order  school  in  Germany,  and  Von  der  Goltz  belongs  to  the 
moderates,  but  in  this  case  it  is  difficult  to  see  wherein  lies 
the  advantage,  if  any,  of  the  individual  or  extended-order 
formation.  The  task  set  them  is  to  cover  1,400  yards  under 


58  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

fire  without  check  and  without  replying.  The  chain  is  a 
"dense  one/'  so  as  a  target  it  is  as  vulnerable  as  an  ordinary 
line;  but  in  which  would  the  men  be  most  amenable  to  disci- 
pline and  least  likely  to  shoot  their  friends  the  independent 
patrols,  from  the  rear,  whether  the  line  should  be  in  single 
rank  or  double,  is  another  question,  dependent  on  the  quality 
of  the  troops,  the  point  being  that  the  spirit  of  the  close-order 
school  should  be  observed. 

Making,  however,  this  "correction" — I  beg  his  pardon, 
"alteration" — in  the  above,  in  what  single  point,  except  dis- 
distances,  does  the  form  above  suggested  differ  from  the  old 
Peninsula  tradition,  or  its  still  earlier  prototype,  Frederick 
the  Great's  line  formations  at  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War?  Of  the  two, it  is  really  nearer  the  latter, for  Frederick's 
"Freischaaren"  were  a  much  closer  approximati6n  to  the 
"independent  patrol"  idea  than  our  own  Light  Division;  for 
the  "Freischaaren"  consisted  of  small  parties  of  privileged 
blackguards,  whose  real  object  was  plunder,  and  into  whose 
actions,  provided  they  did  the  light  infantry  duty  of  the  army 
bravely,  no  one  inquired  too  closely.  Organized  in  small 
squads  under  a  leader  of  their  own  choice,  they  hung  on  the 
skirts  of  the  army,  and  acted  as  a  screen  against  the  Pan- 
dours  and  Croats  of  the  Austrian*,  so  that,  except  in  so  far 
as  Von  der  Goltz's  patrols  are  to  be  animated  by  patriotism 
instead  of  a  desire  for  loot,  the  two  ideas  cover  one  another 
pretty  exactly.  Whether  the  further  step  involved  in  group- 
ing those  patrols  together  to  form  a  division  is  advisable,  is 
open  to  discussion.  But  the  point  involved  for  us  remains 
this:  after  twenty  years  of  hot  controversy,  and  the  intro- 
duction of  a  dozen  new  weapons  of  destruction,  each  more 
terrible  than  the  other,  one  of  the  leading  minds  in  Germany, 
with  ample  war  experience  and  an  enormous  backing  of  edu- 
cated opinion,  lays  down  as  his  conception  of  the  method  in 
which  an  attack  can  alone  be  carried  out,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  the  exact  equivalent  of  the  way  we  should  have 
attacked  in  1870,  had  we  been  called  on  to  do  so — viz.,  two 
or  more  successive  lines  covered  by  real  skirmishers  and  pre- 
ceded by  a  heavy  artillery  fire.  As  each  successive  improve- 
ment in  fire-arms  was  introduced,  all  that  was  necessary  waa 
to  add  on  a  hundred  vards  or  so  to  the  distances,  and  this  is 


Military  Letters  anc^  Essays.  59 

about  what  the  Duke  of  Cambridge  and  the  survivors  of  the 
Mutiny  and  Sikh  Wars  would  have  done  had  they  been 
allowed  their  own  way.  But  the  young  generation  of  the 
time  was  too  clever  for  this  by  half;  they  mistook  cause  for 
eftect,  and  worshiped  the  rising  sun  of  success.  The  battle- 
fields of  1870  were  principally  conspicuous  for  clouds  of  skir- 
mishers (and  stragglers),  the  Germans  won — ergo,  skir- 
mishers were  a  good  thing  and  must  be  copied  at  once;  bat 
it  escaped  these  gentlemen  that  the  French  also  skirmished, 
and,  on  the  whole,  with  greater  adroitness,  but  were  never- 
theless defeated.  The  Germans  themselves,  notably  the 
highest  authorities,  knew  all  along  that  the  presence  of  skir- 
mishers in  such  quantities  was  the  effect  of  too  short  a  train- 
ing and  want  of  absolute  discipline,  and  have  sought  by 
every  means  in  their  power  to  obviate  the  latter  effect. 

It  is  inconceivable  to  me  that  H.  K.  H.  the  Duke  of  Cam- 
bridge, with  his  constant  opportunities  of  hearing  German 
views  from  the  very  highest  sources,  could  have  remained 
ignorant  of  what  was  in  their  minds;  indeed,  I  know,  from 
having  heard  many  of  his  "critiques"  at  Aldershot  and  else- 
where,  that  he  was  all  along  fully  alive  to  them.  Only  his 
words  fell  on  deaf  ears — or,  rather,  on  hearing  organs  too 
dull  to  catch  the  true  vibrations — and  he  was  openly  abused 
in  the  press  by  the  scribblers  as  a  fifth  wheel  to  the  coach,  an 
old  drill  sergeant,  etc.;  yet  which  system  would  have  ad- 
vanced us  the  furthest?  The  troops  of  twenty  years  ago  at 
least  knew  how  to  obey  orders,  and  would  have  marched  un- 
hesitatingly to  death  if  told  to.  With  such  men  a  leader 
might  have  achieved  anything,  for  it  rests  with  the  judgment 
of  the  leader,  and  can  only  be  estimated  by  him,  when  and 
where  to  strike  the  necessary  blow.  Will  the  infantry  of 
to-day,  taught  to  look  on  a  direct  advance  across  the  open  as 
certain  slaughter,  prove  themselves  as  reliable  a  weapon  to 
trust  to?  Fortunately,  the  drivel  of  the  text-books  has  not 
really  made  much  impression  on  the  rank  and  file,  or  even  on 
the  subaltern  officer;  they  are  still  British,  and  look  on  the 
matter  from  a  very  common-sense  side, and  if  only  there  were 
a  few  more  "Mulvaneys"  in  the  ranks,  wTe  should  not  be  in 
danger  of  going  far  wrong.  The  danger  really  lies  in  the 
higher  ninks.  who  have  been  trained  in  the  reformers' 


60  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

school;  and  the  difficulty  is  that  amongst  these  men  there 
are  very  many  of  great  ability,  who  have  devoted  much  time 
and  thought  to  the  matter,  and  whose  conclusions  logically 
follow  from  their  premises.  But  the  premises  themselves 
are  false,  and  it  is  almost  impossible  to  bring  this  home  to 
them. 

Within  the  last  few  years  there  has  sprung  up  in  Eng- 
land what  may  be  called  a  new  tactical  cult,  the  cult  of  the 
"Prussian  Official,"  which  is  believed  by  the  sect  to  be  verbally 
inspired,  like  the  Bible.  They  search  this  scripture  diligently 
day  by  day,  and  deduce  strictly  logical  conclusions  from  its 
data,  but  all  the  while  they  are  drifting  further  and  further 
away  from  real  knowledge,  for  the  assumption  always  under- 
lies their  work  that  "It  was  done  in  1870,  therefore  it  is 
right,"  whereas  in  Germany  they  would  say,  "It  was  done  in 
1870,  therefore  the  presumption  is,  it  is  wrong." 

STUDY  OF  A  MODERN  BATTLE. 

A  third  edition  of  Colonel  Meckel's  work  on  tactics  an-1 
the  leading  of  troops  in  the  field  has  recently  appeared  iu 
Berlin.  The  author  is  an  officer  of  the  general  staff,  and  is 
well  known  as  the  supporter  of  the  extreme  conservative 
school  of  tactics;  indeed,  he  has  at  last  admitted  that  he 
wrote  the  celebrated  "Midsummer-Night's  Dream,"  about 
which  of  late  wre  have  heard  so  much,  but  with  the  qualifica- 
tion that  he  had  purposely  pushed  his  argument  to  its  furth- 
est length  in  order  to  attract  attention  and  secure  discussion, 
in  both  of  which  he  has  been  undeniably  successful.  But  m 
his  book  he  takes  a  far  less  advanced  position,  and  one  which 
I  cannon  help  thinking  will  commend  itself  specially  to  the 
regimental  officers  of  our  own  service.  I  propose,  therefore,  to 
give  almost  in  extenso  the  picture  he  draws  of  the  probable 
course  of  a  modern  battle,  so  that  each  reader  can  form  an 
opinion  for  himself  as  to  the  best  method  of  training  troops 
to  undertake  the  greatest  and  most  serious  duty  that  can  fall 
to  their  lot — viz.,  the  frontal  attack  of  a  position  over  almost 
completely  open  ground. 

The  strength  of  the  army — or,  rather,  of  the  section  of 
it  which  he  is  considering — is  five  corps,  and  the  field  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  (51 

action  the  well-kiiown  glacis-like  slope  of  St.  Privat  le  Mon- 
tagne,  which  presents  in  its  extremest  form  perhaps  the 
most  disadvantageous  conditions  for  the  attack  which  can 
reasonably  be  conceived.  The  two  armies  are  supposed  to 
have  arrived  within  striking  distance  of  one  another  over 
night,  so  that  the  troops  maybe  ranged  in  their  proper  order, 
and  the  course  of  the  whole  action  regulated  in  so  far  as  such 
regulation  is  possible.  All  movements  take  place  across 
country,  and  the  troops  are  not  confined  to  defiling  along  the 
roads.  The  duty  of  determining  the  extension  of  the  enemy's 
line,  and  its  occupation,  falls,  of  course,  primarily  to  the  cav- 
alry; but  as  the  two  armies  approach  each  other,  the  latter 
must  clear  the  front  and  form  up  on  the  wings;  at  least  one 
division,  however,  joining  the  general  reserve  for  special 
employment  by  the  commander-in-chief  himself. 

"The  approach  to  the  battle-field  is  carried  out  in  rendez- 
vous formation — i.  e.,  in  the  old  double  company  column  of 
battalions;  the  corps  in  the  center  being  formed  with  the 
divisions  in  mass  and  side  by  side.  Those  on  the  flanks  are 
in  line  of  battalion  columns,  and  one  division  in  front  of  the 
other  or  in  echelon  to  it  to  cover  flanks.  The  advance  guards 
of  the  separate  columns  take  up  position  outside  of  the  effect- 
ive artillery  range  of  the  enemy  to  cover  the  deployment  of 
the  columns.  And  in  order  to  determine  the  exact  position 
of  the  enemy,  the  batteries  attached  to  these  advanced 
guards,  reinforced  if  necessary  by  the  divisional  artillery, 
open  fire  at  long  range  (not  less  than  2,500  yards)  to  compel 
his  reply;  but  in  this  stage  of  the  proceedings  a  reckless  and 
hasty  advance  to  decisive  range  is  specially  to  be  avoided. 
The  time  which  will  be  required  to  get  all  the  columns  into 
their  proper  place  must  be  utilized  in  the  reconnaissance  of 
the  ground  to  the  front,  and  especially  of  any  undulations 
which  may  give  cover  to  the  advance;  precautions  which, 
be  it  noted  in  passing,  were  conspicuously  neglected  in  the 
last  war  by  the  38th  Brigade  at  Mars-la-Tour  and  the 
Guards  at  St.  Privat. 

"All  being  at  length  in  readiness,  and  the  first  section  of 
the  ground  to  be  taken  up  to  cover  the  position  of  the  guns 
for  the  artillery  duel  having  been  indicated,  a  simultaneous 
advance  on  the  whole  front  should  be  made,  in  small  col- 


62  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

umns  covered  by  skirmishers.  This  first  position  should  be 
outside  the  zone  of  effective  infantry  fire,  but,  where  possible, 
near  enough  to  allow  the  infantry  to  support  the  artillery  by 
means  of  long-range  fire.  It  must  be  selected  with  due  refer- 
ence to  the  cover  aii'orded  either  by  the  ground  or  by  villages, 
copses,  etc.,  and,  as  soon  as  reached,  defensive  arrangements 
with  pick  and  spade  should  be  undertaken  to  strengthen  it. 
Where  the  enemy  has  himself  occupied  advanced  positions 
which  nearly  coincide  with  this  line, — such,  for  instance,  as 
St.  Marie  aux  Chenes  in  front  of  St.  Privat, — the  capture  of 
such  places,  for  which  special  bodies  of  troops  will  be  de- 
tailed, forms  part  of  this  operation,  and  the  whole  power  of 
the  available  artillery  should  be  brought  to  bear  on  them 
from  positions  outside  of  the  range  of  the  enemy's  guns  \\\ 
the  main  position.  But  the  troops  to  which  such  tasks  ar-> 
assigned  must  be  particularly  cautioned  not  to  go  beyond 
the  further  limit  of  these  positions. 

"Then  follows  the  artillery  duel  and  preparation,  and 
for  this  purpose  every  available  gun  for  which  room  can  be 
found  must  be  brought  up,  even  from  the  corps  and  divisions 
in  reserve,  and  only  after  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns  has 
been  completely  reduced,  is  the  preparatory  fire  on  their 
infantry  to  be  begun." 

This  is  a  point  round  which  many  controversies  and  dis- 
putes rage  in  England;  yet  I  think,  if  the  matter  is  closely 
gone  into,  the  difficulties  will-  mostly  be  found  to  vanish. 
There  is  no  royal  road  to  victory,  and  mistakes  may  and  must 
happen.  The  defender's  artillery,  for  instance,  may  prove 
the  stronger  of  the  two,  and  in  that  case  the  roles  change 
over — the  would-be  assailant  w^ill  find  himself  attacked.  It 
has  happened — as,  for  instance,  at  Gettysburg — that  i.h-.> 
defender's  artillery  has  intentionally  ceased  firing  to  econo- 
mize ammunition  and  then  again  come  into  action  the  mo- 
ment the  attacldnginfantry  broke  ground,  and  it  is  frequently 
recommended  in  text-books  that  the  defender's  guns,  when 
it  is  found  that  they  are  being  overpowered,  should  be  with- 
drawn under  cover  till  the  time  for  the  assault  approaches. 
But  both  these  courses  are  only  possible  where  the  assailant 
gives  himself  away  by  overhastiness,  for,  when  once  the  arli!- 
l.-'rv  fire  of  the  defence  ceases,  the  work  of  destroying  the  in- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  63 

fan  try  may  proceed  with  all  necessary  deliberation;  and 
then,  when  the  latter  have  had  their  spirit  completely 
broken,  the  reappearance  of  the  artillery  will  have  little  or 
no  effect  on  the  decision,  for,  whatever  their  power  may  be 
against  infantry  alone,  against  victorious  infantry  and  guns 
as  well  they  can  have  no  ultimate  chance  of  success  what- 
ever. It  therefore  follows  that  guns  once  committed  to  a 
decisive  struggle  can  never  be  withdrawn,  but  must  be  fought 
to  the  last;  at  any  rate,  their  resistance  gains  time,  and  time 
may  mean  the  arrival  of  fresh  reserves,  or,  if  the  day  is 
growing  short,  strategic  reasons  may  compel  the  assailant 
to  risk  an  assault  without  waiting  for  the  proper  completion 
of  the  preparation.  All  this,  however,  is  a  digression  from 
Meckel's  text,  for,  as  no  one  questions  the  correctness  of 
these  ideas  in  Germany,  he  does  not  consider  it  necessary  to 
allude  to  them. 

"As  soon, therefore,  as  the  artillery  fire  has  had  its  effect, 
a  general  move  forward  of  all  the  arms  takes  place.  The 
advanced  infantry  is  reinforced,  the  hitherto  retained  re- 
serves of  the  leading  corps  advance  by  brigades,  up  to  tiio 
limitof  effective  infantry  fire,  and  need  not  fear  to  cross  open 
spaces  previously  swept  by  artillery  fire.  Taking  advantage 
of  all  possible  cover,  they  take  up  positions  either  on  the 
flanks,  or  not  less  than  500  yards  in  rear  of  the  artillery  lines. 
The  divisional  cavalry  approaches  the  front  line  of  the  In- 
fantry as  far  as  the  available  cover  permits  it  to  do  so,  and  the 
cavalry  division  is  placed  under  cover, of  course, in  a  position 
from  whence  it  may  eventually  be  employed  in  the  most  ad- 
vantageous manner  and  has  the  best  field  of  advance. 

"The  batteries  advance  to  closer  ranges,  and,  whilst 
firing  on  the  infantry,  remain  ready  to  crush  any  fresh  gnus 
the  enemy  may  bring  into  action.  And  now,  out  of  the  previ- 
ously arranged  line  of  shelter,  the  fighting  line  of  the  infantry 
commences  *ts  advance,  on  a  broader  front  and  in  a  denser 
line.  It  is  not  yet  the  assault,  but  an  advance  borne  for- 
ward, if  necessary,  by  fresh  reinforcements  to  the  limit  of 
effective  aimed  fire.  As  the  bursting  shells  of  the  artillery 
diminish  at  any  particular  point  the  intensity  of  the  enemy's 
infantry  fire,  the  part  of  the  line  immediately  opposed  to  it 
rises  and  presses  in.  As  resistance  increases  by  the  addition 


64  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

of  fresh  reserves  to  the  enemy's  line,  it  will  probably  fall  back 
till  the  balance  is  re-dressed  by  fresh  supports  from  the  rear, 
and  the  result  will  be  the  long  undulating  lines  of  fire,  which 
were  so  characteristic  of  the  battles  of  1870. 

"The  impulse  for  the  final  assault  may  be  given  by  a 
counter-attack  by  the  enemy.  There  are  armies  which  can 
not  bear  the  punishment  such  a  fire-fight  implies,  passively, 
and  these  will  break  out  to  the  front  to  get  breathing-room. 
Such  a  proceeding  can  only  be  welcome  to  the  assailant. 
Whilst  the  gunners  and  infantry  overwhelm  the  advancing 
line  with  fire,  the  nearest  reserves  are  brought  up  wHb 
drums  beating,  in  close  order,  to  give  the  necessary  impulse 
for  a  counter-assault,  and  the  divisional  cavalry  follows  up 
to  cut  in  as  opportunity  offers.  Even  a  whole  brigade  or 
division,  handy  enough  to  find  room  to  get  through  the  in- 
fantry line,  may  in  such  cases  be  the  first  into  the  enemy's 
position. 

"But  if  the  defender  remains  inactive,  the  point  to  be 
assaulted  is  selected  by  the  commander-in-chief,  who  brings 
up  a  couple  of  divisions  from  the  corps  in  reserve  under  cover 
and  at  hand  either  to  follow  the  assaulting  troops  in  second 
line  or  to  take  part  in  the  attack  in  first  line,  as  the  conditions 
of  the  moment  may  require.  The  corps  on  either  side  will 
support  the  attack,  but  must  guard  against  letting  the  whole 
of  their  reserves  out  of  hand. 

"The  assault  is  then  delivered — in  united  closed  front  of 
whole  brigades — possibly  even  of  divisions.  The  use  of 
cover  has  no  longer  any  value ;  to  try  and  avail  oneself  of  it 
would  destroy  the  unity  of  the  assault.  The  brigades  must 
now  advance  straight  across  the  open  country.  It  is  as  im- 
possible to  avoid  passing  through  artillery  lines  as  it  is  fo? 
the  latter  to  avoid  firing  over  the  infantry;  both  must  co- 
operate together  up  to  the  last,  and  there  is  no  room  to  estab- 
lish this  co-operation  in  any  other  way.  The  mass  of  the 
artillery  will  maintain  its  position  for  the  present,  but  a  pro- 
portion of  batteries  must  limber  up  and  accompany  the 
advance. 

"In  arranging  the  infantry  for  the  advance,  depth  of 
formation  is  the  principal  point  to  be  borne  in  mind.  A 
gradual  increase  in  the  fire  power  and  of  momentum  up  to  its 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  .  65 

utmost  possible  limit  must  be  secured  by  fresh  reinforce- 
ments from  the  rear.  With  this  object  in  view,  a  brigade 
(i.  e.,  two  regiments  of  three  battalions  each)  would  best  be 
formed  in  the  following  manner — viz.,  regiments  side  by  side, 
with  one  battalion  each  in  the  front  line,  and  each  of  these 
battalions  will  have  three  companies  in  the  fighting  line  aa<l 
one  following  some  500  yards  in  rear.  The  companies  will 
be  formed  with  two  uzugs"  in  front  and  one  in  immediate 
support,  and  the  "zugs"  will  be  in  line  in  single  rank,  with 
the  files  just  sufficiently  lessened  to  allow  of  the  use  of  the 
rifle  to  the  best  effect.  The  battalions  in  second  line  follow 
some  500  yards  behind  the  supports  of  the  first,  and  again 
300  yards  behind  follow  the  brigade  reserves,  so  that,  as  a 
rule,  the  latter  will  not  leave  their  cover  till  the  fighting  line 
is  in  hottest  action  with  the  enemy.  The  advance  takes  place 
with  drums  beating,  and,  in  the  case  of  the  brigade  reserves, 
with  bands  playing.  Without  checking  for  a  moment,  the 
lighting  line  moves  up,  if  possible,  to  decisive  range  at  once. 
If,  however,  fresh  reinforcements  on  the  enemy's  side  causes 
a  halt,  the  company  and  battalion  supports  are  at  hand  to 
carry  the  line  on,  and  the  gunners  make  use  of  the  temporary 
check  to  deliver  a  couple  of  rounds  of  rapid  fire,  increasing 
their  elevation  by  a  couple  of  hundred  yards;  if, Bowing  to 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  the  advancing  infantry  has  already 
masked  their  target,  these  shells  will  seriously  interfere  with 
the  bringing  up  of  the  enemy's  reserves. 

"The  rearward  bodies  of  infantry  remain  in  uninter- 
rupted for  ward' motion,  so  that — and  the  above  distances  are 
based  on  this  consideration — every  time  after  four  or  live 
minutes'  rapid  fire,  the  leading  line  receives  the  impulse  to 
advance  from  the  fresh  advancing  troops  behind.  Thus  step 
by  step  the  wave  of  the  attack  rises,  till  at  last,  by  constant 
accession  of  strength  from  the  rear,  its  momentum  can  no 
longer  be  restrained,  and  it  must  break  through  to  the  front." 

Here  victory  is  achieved,  not  by  absence  of  order,  not 
through  the  initiative  of  the  subordinate  ranks,  not  by  skulk- 
in  g  under  cover,  but  mainly  as  the  result  of  careful  peace- 
time training  in  absolute  discipline;  in  fact,  as  Clausewitz 
put  it,  by  teaching  the  soldier  "to  know  how  to  die,  and  not 
how  to  avoid  dying."  It  seems  unnecessary  to  pursue  the 


66  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

course  of  the  battle  further.  It  is  not  intended  to  be  under- 
stood as  the  only  possible  type  of  a  pitched  battle,  but  only  to 
indicate  the  direction  in  which  progress  is  to  be  sought,  me! 
to  warn  against  some  modern  and  dangerous  tendencies,  to 
point  out  clearly  to  leaders  of  all  three  arms  the  object  they 
must  keep  in  mind,  and  to  show  how  on  their  co-operation  the 
solution  of  the  battle  problem  depends. 

"Looking  back  on  the  past,  we  see  quite  another  picture. 
The  pitiable  self-destructive  belief  in  the  unavoidable  dis- 
order and  the  impossibility  of  guiding  the  lighting  instincts 
of  the  individual  finds  in  the  events  of  twenty  years  its  own 
condemnation.  There,  too,  we  heard  the  drums  beating,  and 
saw  the  colors  waving,  and  whole  brigades  dashing  recklessly 
across  the  open,  only,  however,  to  break  to  pieces  against  the 
unshaken  fire  power  of  the  adversary,  and  then  every  trace  of 
order  disappeared  in  the  confusion  of  the  independent  order 
of  fighting.  Woods,  villages,  hollows  hitherto  empty  were 
suddenly  crowded  with  stragglers,  and  the  open  fields  lay 
tenanted  only  by  the  victims  of  premature  violence.  But 
reverse  the  order  of  the  proceeding,  let  the  thunder  of  the 
guns  go  before  the  beat  of  the  drums,  the  roar  of  musketry 
before  the  bayonet,  and  skirmishing  in  its  old  signification 
before  the  assault,  and  not  follow  after  it,  and  the  fight  will 
again  assume  a  healthy  aspect." 

A  few  lines  of  explanation  may  perhaps  make  some  of 
the  allusions  in  the  latter  paragraph  and  the  general  idea  of 
the.  whole  thing  clearer.  Meckel  belongs  essentially  to  the 
school  of  tacticians  who  consider  that  the  "Prussian  Official" 
history  of  the  war  should  be  studied,  not  in  order  to  be  copied, 
but  in  order  to  learn  what  should  be  avoided.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  modern  school  in  England  for  the  last  twenty 
years  has  adopted  the  former  course,  and,  indeed,  has  raised 
the  book  almost  to  the  position  of  a  divine  inspiration,  no 
word  of  which  is  to  be  questioned.  Everything  that  hap- 
pened on  the  battle-fields  is  believed  to  have  been  previously 
thought  out  and  arranged,  and  not  to  have  been,  as  it  too 
often  happened,  the  result  of  circumstances  beyond  the  con- 
trol of  the  leaders.  Skirmishers  were  a  leading  character- 
istic of  the  combats,  and  therefore  we  are  taught  that  skir- 
mishing alone  is  of  any  avail;  but,  as  Meckel  points  out. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  67 

these  skirmishing  lines  were  formed  as  a  result  of  bad  lead- 
ing, and  not  of  design.  The  troops  showed  themselves 
adepts  in  availing  themselves  of  cover  (10,000  men  managing 
to  get  out  of  sight  and  out  of  control  in  a  little  wood  of  not 
more  than  1,000  by  600  yards  area;  about  the  same  number 
are  said  to  have  taken  shelter  behind  a  wretched  farm-house, 
which  would  have  been  amply  garrisoned  by  200);  therefore 
we  too  must  train  our  men  to  avoid  exposure,  and  so  on, 
through  the  whole  list;  and  the  worst  of  it  is  that  these 
views  have  been  so  persistently  hammered  into  people's 
heads  that  there  is  now  in  existence  an  English  tactical 
school  based  almost  entirely  on  hearsay,  and  not  on  experi- 
ence, which  holds  in  almost  every  respect  views  diametrically 
opposed  to  those  held  by  the  men  who  actually  were  *ther<: 
and  know  what  happened;  and  this  school  will  soon  have 
almost  the  whole  training  of  our  infantry  in  its  hands,  for  it 
originated  primarily  in  the  competitive  system  of  study  for 
marks  at  the  Staff  College.  In  saying  this  I  do  not  wish  to 
be  understood  as  belonging  to  those  who  habitually  sneer  at 
that  institution,  its  products  and  its  professors;  for,  though 
a  certain  number  of  the  "products"  may  justify  the  unkind 
remarks  made  about  them,  the  army  itself,  and  the  spirit 
which  tolerates  the  sending  of  men  obviously  unsuited  for 
staff  duties  from  regiments  to  compete  for  admission,  is 
primarily  responsible.  The  evil  I  allude  to  is  due  to  quite 
another  cause,  in  itself  highly  creditable  to  its  victims — viz.* 
the  keenness  of  desire  for  personal  distinction,  which  leads 
to  too  close  a  study  of  pamphlet  literature  and  the  "Prussian 
Official,' 'both  of  which  are  dangerous  except  to  those  who  pos- 
sess, through  the  men  who  were  there,  the  key  to  a  proper 
understanding  of  them. 

The  divergence  between  the  German  school,  as  taught  in 
its  new  regulations  and  practiced  on  the  drill-ground,  and 
the  stereotyped  way  in  which  our  own  field-exercises  are 
applied  at  Aldershot,  or  any  other  tactical  center,  is  simply 
astounding,  not  so  much  as  regards  the  form  as  the  spirit 
which  underlies  it.  With  us  the  "form"  is  everything;  it  is 
a  kind  of  fetish  which  we  worship,  believing  it  will  show  us 
everywhere  the  road  to  victory  with  a  minimum  of  losses; 
or,  indeed,  one  might  drop  the  idea  of  victory  altogether  and 
sn>  that  it  will  enable  us  to  fight  without  getting  killed;  and 


•68  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

we  believe  that  somewhere  or  other  there  exists  an  ideal  form 
which  will  suit  all  cases. 

The  object  of  Meckel's  writings  is  to  prove  that  no  such 
form  does  or  can  exist,  but  that  the  German  Regulations  are 
correct  in  prohibiting  the  employment  of  such  stereotyped 
forms,  and  fixing  on  each  commander,  according  to  his  sta- 
tion, the  responsibility  of  adopting  the  means  at  his  disposal 
to  the  end  in  viewr.  In  Germany,  where  the  principle  of  the 
delegation  of  responsibility  has  long  been  an  accomplished 
fact,  the  only  difficulty  to  be  encountered  is  the  inertia  of 
individuals  in  peace-time,  who  naturally  prefer  to  have  their 
thinkingdone  for  them.  Butwith  us  not  onlydoesthis  same 
difficulty  exist,  but  also  the  far  graver  one  which  results  from 
our  officers  not  having  been  trained  to  exercise  this  responsi- 
bility in  each  successive  rank  they  have  held.  Sooner  or 
later,  if  we  are  to  continue  to  exist  as  a  fighting  force,  this 
difficulty  will  have  to  be  faced,  and  now,  when  we  have  a 
reasonable  chance  of  a  few  years'  peace,  and  our  junior 
officers  in  Burma  have  so  brilliantly  asserted  their  claims  to 
be  trusted,  would  seem  to  me  the  best  time  for  making  the 
experiment. 

ATTACK  OR  DEFENCE. 

A  former  letter  was  devoted  to  the  consideration  of  the 
statistics  the  German  general  staff  have  recently  published 
for  the  avowed  purpose  of  proving  that,  weight  for  weight, 
or  numbers  for  numbers,  their  men  could  thrash  the  Freacli 
without  calling  in  the  aid  of  the  sin  Hat  all :  for.  as  the  figures 
showed  on  several  occasions,  even  when  better  leading  had 
placed  a  large  numerical  superiority  on  the  ground,  the  ac- 
tion was  carried  through  and  won  with  a  force  inferior  in 
numbers  to  that  opposed  to  them.  But,  though  perfectly 
willing  to  agree  in  the  main  with  their  conclusion,  it  appears 
to  me  that  they  have  succeeded  in  proving  too  much,  and,  in 
attributing  their  victories  entirely  to  the  fighting  value  of 
their  troops,  have  ignored  too  much  the  superiority  they 
acquired  by  their  almost  invariable  use  of  the  offensive,  and 
the  force  they  derived  from  the  better  co-operation  of  the 
two  arms — viz.,  the  artillery  and  infantry.  As  I  have  stated, 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  69- 

I  think  the  evidence  distinctly  does  prove  the  individual 
superiority  of  the  German  soldier,  in  spite  of  the  inferiority 
of  his  infantry  armament,  over  the  French  one  in  the  yem* 
1870.  But  it  is  impossible  to  ignore  the  facts  that  on  many 
an  occasion  in  the  Napoleonic  era  the  reverse  was  equally 
well  established,  and  that  fifty  years  before  that  again  Fred- 
erick the  Great's  Prussians  were  as  much  superior  to  the 
Frenchman  of  that  day  as  in  1806  they  were  the  contrary. 
Therefore,  I  take  it,  it  follows  that  the  raw  material  from 
which  the  troops  were  created  have  in  all  three  eras  been 
relatively  about  equal,  and  the  reasons  for  their  changing 
qualities  as  trained  soldiers  must  be  sought  for  in  other 
causes,  such  as  the  difference  in  training  of  the  troops,  the 
different  forms  of  fighting,  and  the  greater  or  less  co-opera- 
tion between  the  three  arms.  Thus,  for  instance,  at  Rossbach 
5,000  Prussian  cavalrj-  under  Seidlitz,  24  guns  and  7  battal- 
ions of  infantry,  two  of  which  fired  only  five  rounds  a  head, 
and  the  remaining  five  only  two,  broke  up  and  routed  the 
French  army  under  Soubise,  which  numbered  64,000,  and 
took  from  them  72  guns.  22  stand  of  colors,  besides  killing 
some  7,000  of  them.  At  Jena  and  Auerstadt,  fifty  years 
afterwards,  over-centralization  of  command  and  a  slavish 
adherence  to  the  letter  and  not  to  the  spirit  of  Frederick'* 
regulations  led  to  about  the  most  disastrous  defeat  in  history; 
and  little  more  than  sixty  years  after  that  again,  decentrali^ 
zation  of  authority  and  the  combined  action  of  the  artillery 
and  infantry  enabled  69,000  Germans*  to  attack,  defeat,  and 
take  prisoners  an  army  of  but  little  short  of  100,000  French 
at  Sedan. 

When  the  breech-loader  was  first  introduced,  it  was 
universally  maintained  by  the  adherents  of  the  new  arm 
that  its  rapidity  of  fire  would  confer  an  immense  superiority 
on  the  defensive.  Few  of  the  principal  soldiers  in  Germany 
adopted  the  view,  for  they  maintained  that,  though  it  might 
and  would  alter  the  tactics  of  the  infantry,  yet  that  the  prin 
c!pli»  of  the  superiority  of  the  offensive  over  (he  defensive 
was  based  on  the  nature  of  the  man  himself,  and  not  on  the 
technical  perfection  of  the  weapon  he  carried.  Tl-e  French 
took  diametrically  the  opposite  view.  Their  idea  of  (.he  tacti- 

*This  refers,  of  course,  to  the  troops  actually  engaged  in  the  attack. 
According  to  Borbstaedt,  the  German  army  at  Sedan  numbered  200,000  men,, 
of  whom  121,000  were  engaged.— A.  L.  W. 


70  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

cal  employment  of  the  new  arm  was  to  entrench  themselves 
up  to  their  ears,  pour  in  a  terrible  fire  from  their  secure  posi- 
tion on  the  assailants,  and  then  dash  at  them  with  the  bayo- 
net. It  is  a  most  fascinating  theory  on  paper,  and  still  keeps 
a  firm  hold  on  our  own  tactical  notions,  but  it  is  based  on  -t 
misconception  of  human  nature,  and  ignores  also  tin-  fail 
that  the  infantry  are  not  the  only  arm  to  be  considered  on  the 
battle-field.  At  any  rate,  the  two  systems  were  practically 
tested  on  the  battle-fields  of  1870,  and  with  the  same  invaria- 
ble results  in  favor  of  the  former. 

Wherever  the  artillery  prepared  the  way  adequately, 
the  infantry  broke  through  without  much  trouble ;  wherever 
the  gunners  failed  in  their  duty,  the  attack  was  beaten  back; 
the  essential  point  being,  it  will  be  noted,  the  preparation  by 
the  artillery.  Now  it  is  just  this  point  that  I  have  always 
found  it  hardest  to  get.  infantry  officers  to  appreciate.  To 
them  a  battle  merely  implies  a  scrimmage  between  two  in- 
fantries, and  if  the  other  arms  are  there  at  all,  it  is  either  for 
the  purpose  of  making  a  noise  or  fighting  an  independent 
•duel  on  their  own  account,  and  this  view  is  not  only  confined 
to  the  junior  officers  at  company  trainings,  but  is  equally 
shared  by  the  general  officers  and  colonels  who  read  and  dis- 
cuss United  Service  lectures  both  in  India  and  at  home. 
Their  favorite  line  of  argument  is  about  this :  If  two  individ- 
uals armed  with  rifles  of  equal  power  are  placed,  say  700 
yards  apart,  and  one  of  them  is  comfortably  sheltered  in  a 
nice  little  hole,  wThilst  the  other  has  to  advance  against  him 
right  across  the  open,  the  odds  are  about  twenty  to  one  on 
the  man  in  the  pit;  and,  therefore,  if  100  or  1,000  men  are 
placed  under  the  same  relative  conditions,  the  betting  is 
equally  in  favor  of  the  ones  under  cover.  Certainly  if  in 
fantry  alone  made  up  the  combined  whole  of  a  battle,  this 
reasoning  would  be  perfectly  correct;  but,  unfortunately  for 
them,  there  is  another  factor  to  be  reckoned  with — viz.,  the 
guns.  These  latter  stand  far  away,  back  out  of  reach  of  the 
rifle-fire  of  the  defenders,  and  fill  the  air  over  their  heads 
with  such  a  tempest  of  shrieking  splinters  and  bullets  that 
by  degrees  the  nerves  of  the  former  give  way,  and  they  can 
no  longer  take  accurate  shots  at  the  advancing  foe.  There 
seems  no  limit  to  the  degree  of  demoralization  which  may  be 
broughtabout  by  a  sufficiently  concentrated  rain  of  shell  fire, 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  71 

for  human  nerves  can  only  stand  a  certain  limited  number  of 
hours  of  intense  strain,  the  limit  depending  on  the  men  them- 
selves and  the  quality  of  their  discipline;  and  it  is  quite  con- 
ceivable, and  it  has  indeed  occurred,  that  the  artillery  prepa- 
ration has  so  completely  broken  down  the  pluck  of  the  de- 
fenders that  the  attack  has  succeeded  with  hardly  apprecia- 
ble loss — as,  for  instance,  at  the  Bois  de  laGarenne  at  Sedan. 
Yes,  but  the  defenders  themselves  have  guns,  it  is  urged,  and 
they  will  not  be  altogether  inactive  spectators  whilst  this  is 
going  on.  This  just  misses  the  point  of  the  whole  thing,  for 
by  the  time  the  preparation  of  the  attack  is  commenced  the 
fire  of  the  defender's  guns  will  have  already  been  silenced; 
for  otherwise — i.  e.,  if  they  had  silenced  those  of  the  assailant 
—they  would  themselves  proceed  to  prepare  the  way  for  their 
own  infantry,  and  the  roles  would  have  changed  hands; 
otherwise  the  action  wroiild  have  come  to  a  standstill,  and 
neither  side  could  claim  a  victory.  It  might  appear  from  this 
that  the  form  adopted  by  either  army  from  the  outset  mat- 
tered very  little  at  all,  and  it  would  be  so  were  it  not  for  the 
fact  that  the'artillery  of  that  side  which  determines  to  attack 
starts  with  an  immense  advantage  over  its  adversary — viz., 
that  he  knows  when  and  where  he  means  to  attack,  and  can 
bring  all  his  guns  to  bear  on  the  chosen  point,  and  thus  attain 
a  preponderance  from  the  very  outset.  The  defender,  on  the 
other  hand,  must  either  distribute  his  batteries  in  what  he 
judges  to  be  the  most  favorable  or  most  likely  positions,  in 
which  case  he  runs  the  risk  of  finding  that  the  enemy  takes 
a  different  view  of  the  matter,  and  he  has  to  change  position 
under  fire,  or,  he  must  keep  back  his  batteries  in  reserve,  and 
bring  them  up  when  the  plan  of  the  assailant  is  fully  devel- 
oped; in  both  cases  having  to  come  into  action  under  fire  — 
an  operation  dangerous  enough  even  when  only  percussion 
shells  were  employed  in  1870,  and  ten  times  more  so  in  these 
days  of  melinite  bursters  and  shrapnell. 

If  the  English  view  of  the  superiority  of  the  defensive 
form,  as  expressed  by  our  Umpire  Eegulations,  is  correct, — 
viz.,  that  to  force  a  position  by  frontal  attack,  and  all  battle- 
field attacks  are  locally  frontal  ones,  it  is  necessary  to  bring 
a  numerically  superior  force  of  from  two  to  three  fold  the 
enemy,  varying  with  the  passive  strength  of  the  position 


72  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

itself, — it  would  follow  that  the  German  troops,  who  carried 
such  positions  with  only  a  bare  superiority,  were,  in  spite  of 
their  inferior  weapon,  some  four  or  five  times  as  good,  man 
for  man,  as  their  opponents.  But  it  is  submitted  that  the  e  vi 
dence  as  to  their  actual  fighting  powers  hardly  bears  out  that 
view.  Wherever  French  and  Prussian  or  German  infantry 
met  under  conditions, which  precluded  the  use  of  artillery  on 
either  side,  such  as  in  wood-fighting,  of  which  there  was  a 
great  deal,  the  equality  of  the  two  was  pretty  even,  though 
wood-fighting  robbed  the  French  otf  the  advantage  their  supe- 
rior rifle  gave  them  when  they  met  in  the  open ;  it  required  a 
very  decided  numerical  superiority  on  the  German  side  to 
make  any  head  way  at  all,  unless,  as  before  stated,  the  gunners 
had  done  their  work  first.  Undoubtedly  the  German  gun 
was  superior  to  the  French  one,  both  in  itself  and  by  the  bet- 
ter training  of  the  men  who  worked  it  Still,  by  itself  this 
superiority  was  not  enough  to  account  for  their  invariable 
success.  The  tactical  handling  of  the  artillery,  as  a  whole, 
has  to  be  considered;  and  it  appears  to  me,  after  carefully 
going  through  the  different  battles,  that  if  the  conditions 
had  been  reversed,  and  the  Germans  compelled  to  defend 
whilst  the  French  attacked,  the  former  could  have  done  no 
better  or  different  than  the  latter.  The  French  artillery 
were  as  fully  alive  to  the  advantage  of  massing  their  guns  as 
the  Germans;  and  if  they  were  less  successful  in  the  execu- 
tion of  their  ideas,  a  little  reflection  will  show  that  the  uncer- 
tainty which  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  defensive 
was  the  chief  cause  of  their  failure. 

The  successful  formation  of  masses  of  guns  is  primarily 
dependent  on  their  mobility,  and  at  the  outset  of  the  cam- 
paign the  French  artillery  was  probably  superior  to  the  Ger- 
man, for  all  their  guns  were  horsed  in  time  of  peace,  whereas 
the  latter  kept  up  only  four  guns  per  battery,  the  remaining 
two  being  dependent  on  the  country  horses  brought  up  on 
mobilization,  and  which  were  not,  and  could  not  be,  in  very 
high-class  condition  for  fast  work.  Certainly  the  French 
commissariat  arrangements  were  so  bad  that  it  is  not  likely 
that  they  preserved  this  initial  advantage  for  long,  but  we 
have  the  testimony  of  their  enemies  to  prove  that  their  capac- 
ity for  maneuvering  excited  the  warmest  admiration,  and  in 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  73 

all  discussions  as  to  the  next  war  it  is  the  French  artillery 
that  the  Germans  primarily  fear.  The  study  of  combined 
tactics  is  so  little  prosecuted  in  our  service  that  few  officers 
realize  the  position  of  the  artilleryman  on  the  defensive,  but 
a  more  complicated  problem  hardly  exists,  for  at  every  turn 
he  is  thrown  in  contact  with  the  conflicting  interests  of  the 
other  arms  and  the  character  of  the  ground  itself.  And,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  be  other- 
wise, for  though  in  the  attack  the  artillery  may  be  boldly 
sent  in  advance  with  the  Conviction  that  it  can  defend  its 
own  front  for  a  considerable  time,  and  if  forced  to  retire  can 
do  so  without  ^particular  risk,  the  defender,  having  to  hold 
his  position  against  all  comers,  must  from  the  first  occupy 
it  in  strength  with  infantry;  otherwise  the  gunners,  if  forced 
to  retire,  would  leave  a  dangerous  gap  in  the  continuity  of 
their  defences,  which  it  might  be  impossible  to  fill  up  in  time. 
The  advantages  of  the  attack  increase  rapidly  with  the 
number  of  men  engaged  on  each  side.  Where  only  two  divi- 
sions fight  independently,  both  sides  have  ample  freedom  of 
movement;  but  when  half  a  dozen  corps  are  working  to- 
gether, they  hamper  each  other's  development  very  consid- 
erably. Still,  even  with  smaller  numbers,  and  with  refer- 
ence only  to  the  infantry,  the  attack  still  possesses  an  inher- 
ent superiority  over  the  defence,  assuming  always  that  the 
former  make  their  advance  with  a  sufficient  depth,  or  follow- 
ing number  of  lines.  This  arises  from  a  species  of  natural 
selection  which  takes  place  in  the  advance.  Of  course  the 
bullets  are  perfectly  impartial  choosers  of  the  slain,  but 
figures  show  that  they  fortunately  do  not  select  a  very  high 
percentage  of  the  men,  and  if  reinforcements  were  only  re- 
quired to  fill  the  gaps  they  produce,  probably  a  strength  of 
75  per  cent  of  the  first  line  would  be  more  than  adequate  for 
all  purposes,  seeing  that  only  once  in  modern  history  has  this 
proportion  of  loss  been  exceeded  in  a  single  battalion,  and 
that,  too,  in  a  whole  day's  fighting.  But  experience  has 
shown  that  at  least  ten  men  to  the  yard  run  of  front  are  re- 
quired to  carry  a  position  by  assault,  and  since  at  the  outside 
not  more  than  three  men  can  conceivably  use  their  weapons 
with  effect  in  this  space,  the  balance  is  necessary  to  supply 
the  places  of  the  "skulkers,"  who,  as  a  reference  to  the  pages 


74  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

oi  a  "Midsummer-Night's  Dream"  will  show,avail  themselves 
of  their  opportunities  most  liberally.  Hence  the  men  who 
actually  deliver  the  assault  are  a  clear  case  of  the  survival 
of  the  the  fittest,  men  who  are  there  because  they  want  to  be 
there,  and  have  been  brave  enough  to  resist  all  temptations 
to  stay  behind.  But  no  such  sorting-out  process  is  conceivable 
in  the  defence,  more  especially  where  the  defenders  are  en- 
trenched. There  a  line  of  troops,  say  at  the  rate  of  two 
men  to  the  yard,  have  been  from  the  first,  and  the  weaker  ves- 
sels have  had  no  opportunity  to  get  away.  If  we  assume  an 
equal  degree  of  pluck  on  both  sides  to  commence  with,  then 
at  least  an  equal  proportion  of  the  men  on  the*defensive  will 
have  been  as  anxious  to  get  away  as  were  anxious  to  stay  be 
hind — indeed,  a  larger  proportion ;  for  the  advantage  the  lat- 
ter possess  of  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  behind  them 
must  not  be  forgotten,  and  therefore  some  four-fifths  of  the 
defenders  may  be  expected  to  face  the  advancing  foe  only  up 
to  that  point  when  the  fear  of  the  bayonet  in  front  balances 
the  danger  of  the  fire-swept  ground  behind.  This  is  assura 
ing  the  defender's  line  to  be  taken  up  some  little  way  down 
the  slope  of  the  position,  as  will  generally  be  the  case,  both 
in  order  to  secure  a  better  field  of  fire,  and  also  to  render  it 
less  easy  for  the  men  to  get  away  than  it  would  be  if  they  held 
the  extreme  crest  of  a  range.  It  seems  impossible  to  do  any- 
thing to  avoid  this  defect  of  the  defence  by  reinforcements, 
for  these  can  rarely  be  near  enough  at  hand,  being  necessarily 
distributed  equally  along  the  whole  front,  whilst  the  assail- 
ant has  massed  all  his  together  for  an  effort  against  one 
point,  and  also  because  too  frequent  reinforcements  would 
lead  to  hopeless  overcrowding  in  the  trenches  themselves. 

To  my  mind,  these  German  statistics  finally  settle  the 
question  of  attack  or  defence  in  favor  of  the  former;  for  it 
must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  the  German  conduct  of  these 
battles  was  only  sound  in  its  general  principles,  wrhile  the  de- 
tail execution  fell  very  much  short  of  the  ideal.  Take  all 
the  battles  in  succession,  and  eliminate  the  gross  blunders 
and  losses  they  caused,  such  as  the  attempt  to  storm  the 
heights  above  Worth  held  by  the  French  army  of  42,000  odd 
men  with  4£  battalions;  the  direct  assault  on  the  Spicheren 
position  without  proper  artillery  preparation  by  some  10 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  75 

battalions  along  a  front  of  nearly  7,000  yards;  the  attack  of 
the  Guards  at  St.  Privat, — all  gross  mistakes  for  which  no 
palliation  can  be  found, — and  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Ger- 
mans might  easily  have  won  their  victories  with  even  fewer 
men. 

This  much,  however,  is  certain — viz.,  that  the  events  of 
the  war  fixed  the  idea  of  the  offensive  more  firmly  than  ever 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  took  victorious  part  in  it,  and  it 
is  only  amongst  the  Austrians  and  French  who  were  defeated 
that  the  opposite  view  obtained ;  and  even  in  those  armies  it 
is  rapidly  dying  out.  We  only  adhere  to  it  in  England  be- 
cause we  still  imagine  that  to  carry  out  the  attack  neces- 
sarily requires  a  numerical  superiority.  This  is  true,  no 
doubt,  as  regards  the  actual  tactical  execution,  but  it  is  not 
true,  even  theoretically,  as  regards  the  whole  army.  Hither- 
to it  was  only  possible  to  advance  theoretical  reasons  for  our 
faith,  but  now  there  are  these  practical  examples  worked  out 
on  the  battle-field  to  refer  to,  and  no  shadow  of  a  proof  can 
be  advanced  in  favor  of  the  opposite  view.  If  only  this  be- 
lief in  the  defensive  could  be  driven  out  of  our  tactical  books 
and  schools,  it  would  be  equivalent  to  doubling  the  numerical 
strength  of  the  army,  and  it  would  not  add  twt)  pence  to  the 
•estimates.  Here  is  an  opportunity  for  the  reformer. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  EXTENDED-ORDER  FIGHTING. 

The  heading  of  this  article  is  really  a  misnomer,  for  the 
origin  of  extended-order  fighting  really  is  lost  in  the  mists  of 
antiquity.  It  is  certainly  older  than  pre-glacial  man,  for  the 
baboons*  who  opposed  a  British  light  infantry  regiment  in 
the  first  Bhootan  expedition  are  said  to  have  shown  them- 
selves .skillful  individual  fighters;  but  it  is  no  part  of  my  in- 
tention to  go  in  for  antiquarian  research,  but  only  to  trace  the 
•development  of  the  idea  since  fire-arms  became  sufficiently 
perfected  to  render  their  power  the  decisive  element  on  the 
field  of  battle. 

For  all  practical  purposes  the  first  Silesian  War  may  be 
taken  as  the  starting-point  of  modern  tactical  evolution,  and 

*The  incident  of  the  combat  between  a  British  force  and  a  tribe  of  apes 
will  be  found,  to  the  best  of  my  recollection,  in  Darwin's  "Descent  of  Man.' 


76  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  subsequent  Seven  Years'  War  is  the  basis  of  all  line  tac- 
tics proper,  the  question  of  extended  versus  close  order  only 
commencing  in  Europe  with  the  French  Revolution,  broadly 
speaking,  in  1792.  The  object  of  this  letter  is  to  show  how 
all  the  questions  connected  with  these  two  different  ideas 
were  threshed  out  in  the  military  literature  of  the  day;  and 
how,  though  the  advocates  of  individual  or  extended  order 
had  the  best  of  it  on  paper,  the  close-order  school  triumphed 
on  the  battle-field;  and  how,  seeing  the  line  of  development 
fire-arms  have  taken,  and  the  results  obtained  by  them  on 
the  battle-field,  it  seems  probable  that  the  latter  will  do  so 
again ;  and  further,  how  we  as  a  nation  have  missed  leading 
the  way  of  tactical  reform,  owing  primarily  to  our  want  of 
self-reliance  in  military  matters;  for  it  was  purely  our  igno- 
rance of  tactical  history  which  led  to  the  revolution  in  our 
ideas  in  1871.  Had  we  followed  the  course  of  events  on  both 
sides  since  Waterloo,  it.  would  have  been  apparent  to  all  that 
no  nation  stood  further  to  the  front  and  was  more  ready  to 
make  the  most  of  the  power  of  the  new  weapons  than  we 
were  at  the  time. 

I  have  recently  come  across  a  copy  of  a  small  work  on 
tactics  written  by  a  very  remarkable  man,  whom  the  Ger- 
mans call  the  father  of  modern  tactics,  in  1805.  This  man 
was  Heinrich  Dietrich  von  Billow.  Originally  trained  in 
one  of  the  Prussian  war  schools,  after  a  few  years  in  the 
cavalry  he  left  the  country  and  visited  America,  England, 
Belgium,  and  France,  noting  everywhere  all  that  he  saw  of 
tactical  importance.  His  training  in  the  lower  ranks  of  tlje 
Prussian  army  had  made  him  thoroughly  alive  to  all  its  de- 
ficiencies in  matters  of  detail,  the  result  of  pure  pedantry, 
but  had  failed  to  afford  him  any  insight  into  the  higher  prin- 
ciples on  which  the  line  formations  actually  rested;  and  to 
the  last  he  appears  never  to  have  been  able  to  take  any 
higher  view  of  the  matter  than  that  of  a  subaltern  officer. 
In  America  he  had  become  acquainted  with  the  fate  that  our 
British  line  had  too  often  encountered  at  the  hands  of  the 
colonists  and  the  Ked  Indians;  and  in  France  he  had  seen 
all  that  the  volunteers  of  the  Meuse  army  could  show  in 
the  way  of  extended-order  fighting;  but  of  his  own  army  ho 
appears,  as  is  very  often  the  case,  to  have  learnt  only  its 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  77 

faults  and  none  of  its  triumphs.  On  his  return  to  his  country 
he  wandered  about  to  all  the  little  German  courts,  trying  to 
find  a  position  as  tactical  instructor,  and  putting  in  his  spare 
time  by  writing.  But  in  spite  of  the  undeniable  genius  and 
brilliancy  of  many  of  his  ideas,  his  extraordinary  onesided- 
ness  and  his  unfortunate  addiction  to  sarcasm  stood  in  his 
way.  He  ended  by  mortally  offending  everyone,  and  was  at 
last  taken  up  on  the  charge  of  treasonable  writing;  and 
though  not  convicted,  he  was  considered  too  insane  to  be  at 
large  and  was  kept  in  confinement  at  Colberg,  whence — how, 
has  never  been  cleared  up — he  passed  into  the  hands  of  the 
Russians,  and  is  believed  to  have  died  from  the  effect  of  the 
cruelty  and  neglect  of  his  custodians.  My  reason  for  refer- 
ring to  him  is  that  his  tactical  papers  contain  every  one  of 
the  ideas  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  the  modern  extended- 
order  school,  such  as  the  "Tactical  Retrospect"  and  Bogng- 
lawski;  and  so  close  is  the  resemblance  that  one  is  tempted 
to  believe  that  these  two  authors  copied  from  him  direct 
without  acknowledgment. 

That  pedantry  had  reached  its  extremest  limits  in  the 
regimental  drill  of  the  Prussian  infantry  there  is  not,  and 
never  has  been,  any  question.  When  we  find  the  most  re- 
vered* writer  of  the  drill-ground  school  gravely  discussing 
whether  the  cadence  of  the  quick  march  should  be  76  or  75 
to  the  minute,  and  eventually  deciding  that,  on  the  whole, 
after  ripe  consideration,  he  gave  the  preference  to  the  latter, 
it  is  easy  to  imagine  what  his  followers  must  have  been  like; 
and  one  can  easily  understand  that  with  such  perverted  ideas, 
Von  Billow's  description  of  the  advance  of  a  Prussian  line 
in  action  may  not  be  far  off  the  truth.  This  is  what  he  says 
about  it: 

"Let  us  take  the  simplest  example,  the  advance  of  a  line 
straight  to  its  front.  It  is  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  place  a  lino 
of  points,  and  carefully  dress  the  men  on  them ;  all  this  takes 
some  time;  then  the  word  is  given,  and  the  line  steps  off  76 
to  the  minute,  rigid  and  silent,  every  man  afraid  of  the  stick, 
and  praying  that  they  may  not  encounter  a  ploughed  field,  a 

*I  have  since  learned  that  "Saldern,"  the  writer  to  whom  T  referred,  and 
who  was  the  founder  of  our  own  drill-book,  was,  as  a  fact,  about  the  best  prac- 
tical infantry  leader  that  Frederick  the  Great  ever  possessed;  having  seen 
the  ground  at  Torgau  over  which  he  maneuvered  his  brigade,  I  feel  it  due  to 
apologize  to  his  memory,  though  I  cannot  realize  his  mental  attitude. 


78  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

mole-heap,  or  half-a-dozen  heavy  flintstones.  These  sorts  of 
things  ought  not  to  be  on  a  battle-field;  they  upset  the  order 
too  much;  nevertheless  they  sometimes  are  there,  and  then 
it  is  very  inconvenient.  Suppose,  for  instance,  a  six-foot 
ditch  is  met  with :  what  is  to  be  done  ?  A  peasant  or  poacher 
would  jump  across  it,  but  with  troops  it  is  not  to  be  thought 
of;  their  trowsers  are  too  tight,  and  the  soldier  too  stiff  and 
too  weary. . .  .But  I  have  said  nothing  of  the  two  boys  and  the 
two  old  men  (the  guides  and  the  sergeants)  who  are  to  give 
the  time  to  the  whole  battalion,  which  has  to  look  to  them  to 
keep  step,  although  every  rational  man  prefers  to  look  in  the 
direction  in  which  he  is  going — i.  e.,  to  his  front.  One  sees 
that  such  tactics  are  not  based  on  anatomy,  but  what  then  ? 
Nature  must  bow  to  art,  and  the  man  must  be  taught  to  squint. 
Keally  I  find  prose  almost  too  feeble  to  describe  what  would 
happen  against  my  line  of  smart  handy  skirmishers,  each  one 
lying  flat  on  the  ground,  waiting  till  the  enemy  are  within  30 
yards  before  they  fire;  the  result  would  be  absolute 
annihilation." 

Possibly  it  might  be;  but,  unfortunately  for  his  argu- 
ment, the  line  of  skirmishers  has  never  yet  been  found  that 
would  do  as  he  would  have  them.  A  little  further  on  he 
describes  another  method  of  advance  as  in  those  days  a 
favorite  fad  of  the  drill-masters — viz.,  the  oblique  advance, 
not  by  the  diagonal  march,  as  one  would  suppose,  but  by  a 
series  of  diagonal  steps,  the  body  being  kept  square  to  the 
front.  But  he  gives  himself  away  rather  by  admitting  that 
in  real  work  these  errors  correct  themselves;  and  as,  for  in- 
stonce,  at  Torgau,  where  the  grape  from  200  guns  in  line 
proved  more  than  flesh  and  blood  could  stand,  the  line  broke 
through  to  the  front  and  threw  themselves  forward  as  fast 
as  they  could  run,  throwing  themselves  down  to  get  their 
wind  and  going  on  again.  His  own  ideal  is,  as  he  says,  the 
swarm  of  the  Iroquois  Indians,  and  actually  what  both 
French  and  Germans  have  since  practised — a  dense  line  of 
skirmishers,  one  man  to  the  yard,  backed  by  company  col- 
umns. He  would  have  the  men  trained  as  sportsmen  rather 
than  as  soldiers,  each  man  to  take  individual  advantage  of 
cover  and  to  "stalk"  his  enemy,  and  never  to  fire  till  within 
30  yards;  whereas  the  line  was  supposed  to  open  fire  at  300. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  79 

As  regards  the  confusion  which  his  style  of  fighting  wou'cl 
entail,  he  simply  says,  "We  must  learn  to  organize  disorder," 
"The  battles  of  the  future  will  be  decided  by  skirmishing 
fire,"  two  sentences  familiar  enough  to  readers  of  modern 
tactical  literature. 

Perhaps  the  most  singular  instance  of  his  foresight  was 
his  exact  prophecy  of  what  happened  at  Jena.  There  the 
Prussians  did  advance  in  faultlessly  dressed  echelons,  and 
were  met  by  the  French  Tirailleurs,  who  treated  them  as  he 
had  foretold;  but  what  he  and  his  followers  in  modern 
times  have  forgotten  to  notice  was  that,  thanks  to  the  faulty 
leading  of  the  superior  commanders,  the  line  was  always 
fighting  against  double  and  even  fourfold  odds.  As  is  well 
known,  Jena  was  the  death-knell  of  the  Prussian  line;  the 
reaction  against  the  foolish  pedantry  which  had  proved  its 
ruin  swept  it  all  away — its  good  points  as  well  as  its  evil 
ones — and  many  would  have  gone  the  whole  way  advocated 
by  Von  Billow.  Fortunately,  a  few  first-rate  men  preserved 
their  heads  sufficiently  to  realize  the  weak  points  in  Von 
Billow's  structure — viz.,  that  battles  are  not  fought  by  a  sin- 
gle line  alone,  but  by  the  successive  employment  of  the  re- 
serves, and  that  infantry  is  not  the  only  arm  on  the  battle- 
field. Still  the  principle  of  the  small  column  and  skir- 
mishers asserted  itself  over  that  of  the  line,  and  has  main- 
tained itself  to  this  day;  though  the  long  peace  and  the 
almost  universal  neglect  of  military  study  everywhere  except 
in  Berlin  has  caused  its  subsequent  history  to  be  forgotten. 
In  brief,  this  was  as  follows:  When  the  skirmishers  and 
small  columns  met  one  another,  it  was  speedily  seen  that  in 
this  way  no  decision  whatever  could  be  arrived  at,  a  fact  of 
which  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  line  tacticians  had  been 
perfectly  well  aware;  the  two  lines  of  skirmishers  engaged 
along  the  whole  front,  and  as  the  small  columns  were  called 
up,  the  fire  line  fluctuated  backwards  and  forwards;  it  be- 
came necessary  to  settle  the  matter  one  way  or  another,  and 
where  the  others  tried  it  in  a  haphazard  way,  Napoleon  sys- 
tematized the  thing.  First  he  drove  in  the  skirmishers,  if 
necessary,  by  a  charge  of  cavalry,  and  established  his  line 
of  guns  at  case-shot  ranges;  then  it  was  discovered  pretty- 
simultaneously  everywhere  that  Von  Billow's  theory  of  skir- 


80  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

inishers  versus  artillery  was  not  quite  what  he  had  expected 
it  to  be.  But,  the  old  absolute  discipline  of  the  line  having 
been  forgotten,  there  remained  nothing  to  oppose  to  the  guns 
but  columns,  and  it  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  Conti- 
nental leaders  to  let  those  columns  lie  down,  as  our  own  Duke 
used  to  make  them  do.  A  massed  charge  of  cavalry,  if  not 
interfered  with  by  the  opposing  horse,  then  generally  de- 
cided the  matter,  and  the  conquered  position  was  occupied 
by  columns  with  sloped  arms.  Sometimes  the  enemy's 
artillery  could  not  be  so  easily  dealt  with,  and  then  it  became 
necessary  to  advance  against  them;  and  since,  as  recently 
described  in  a  letter  on  the  Napoleonic  conscription,  the 
quality  of  the  French  infantry  had  deteriorated  so  far  that 
they  could  no  longer  be  induced  to  advance  in  any  other  way, 
heavy  columns  had  again  to  be  employed — a  proceeding 
which  was  prompty  copied,  like  everything  else  the  French 
did,  by  the  other  side.  Hence  on  the  Continent,  at  the  close 
of  the  great  war,  both  line  and  skirmishers  were  everywhere 
somewhat  discredited,  and  the  battalion  column  reigned 
supreme  for  battle  employment. 

No  one  thought  of  enquiring  how  the  French  system  had 
answered  against  the  British  line,  or,  as  time  wrent  on,  how 
our  line  had  fared  against  other  opponents.  It  was  the  "line" 
borrowed  from  the  Prussians,  and  therefore  a  relic  of  ihe 
past,  with  which  the  enlightened  present  could  have  nothing 
to  do.  Those,  however,  who  did  not  think  of  it,  remembering 
the  reputation  the  British  infantry  had  everywhere  made  for 
itself,  frankly  admitted  that  though  it  might  suit  us  very 
well,  their  troops  had  not  got  the  stuff  in  them  to  imitate  us. 
Then  came  the  introduction  of  the  breech-loader  simultane 
on  sly  with  the  adoption  of  short  service;  and  it  seemed  for 
the  moment  that  the  supporters  of  Von  Biilow  would  have  it 
all  their  own  way-,  for  the  power  to  load  in  any  position  filled 
up  what  had  hitherto  been  the  weakest  point  of  their  system. 
Instinctively,  therefore,  the  Prussians  adopted  his  views  in 
presence  of  the  enemy,  and  against  the  muzzle-loader  they 
answered  well  enough.  But  when  they  themselves  had  to 
face  an  enemy  not  only  armed  with  as  good  a  weapon,  but 
with  a  very  much  better  one,  which  held  them  under  fire  for 
a  thousand  yards  before  they  could  return  a  shot,  things 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  81 

changed  altogether,  for  the  troops  suffered  most  severely, 
and  arrived  at  their  first  shooting  position  in  such  disorder 
that  to  all  intents  and  purposes  they  were  out  of  hand,  and 
fought  simply  by  individual  instinct.  What  the  resulting 
confusion  was  like,  the  "Midsummer-Night's  Dream"  and 
similar  papers  will  give  an  idea;  and  it  was  universally  felt 
that  somehow  or  other  this  state  of  things  must  be  put  a 
stop  to. 

There  is  always  a  difficulty  in  following  the  course  of  an 
idea  at  Berlin,  for  the  highest-placed  commanders,  who  make 
the  regulations,  do  not,  as  a  rule,  write  pamphlets,  and  there 
seems,  too,  both  from  the  few  that  have  appeared,  and  still 
more  from  the  study  of  their  regulations,  to  be  always  some- 
thing concealed  behind  what  they  do  write,  a  something 
which  can  only  be  understood  by  those  who  have  been 
through  the  mill,  and  possess  the  requisite  key  to  under- 
stand the  esoteric  meaning  of  the  works.  One  can  only 
judge  by  what  was  done  or  allowed  to  go  on,  on  parades  and 
inspections;  but,  from  what  I  heard  and  saw  as  far  back  as 
1874,  the  principle  of  the  line  received  very  much  more  atten 
tion  than  that  of  the  column  or  extended  order. 

Their  writers  had  begun  to  turn  their  attention  to  the 
history  of  their  old  wars,  and  had  discovered  wherein  the  real 
spirit  of  the  old  line  lay.  This,  according  to  Frederick  him- 
self, was  not  the  bayonet  charge  in  line,  as  so  often  imagined, 
but  rather  the  development,  opposite  to  the  point  of  the  ene- 
my's position  selected,  of  an  overwhelming  superiority  of 
fire ;  and  this  superiority  once  obtained,  the  further  advance 
with  the  bayonet  was  merely  to  clear  the  enemy  out,  and  what 
order  it  was  made  in  was  perfectly  immaterial.  Volleys 
from  a  three-deep  line  was  the  best  method  for  establishing 
this  superiority,  and  since,  too,  the  only  fire  to  be  faced  dur- 
ing the  advance  was  that  of  artillery,  and  of  a  few  skir- 
mishers who  were  easily  held  in  check.  Line  was  in  all 
respects  the  best  adapted  to  his  purpose,  the  attempt  to 
advance  in  column  and  then  deploy  into  line  being  an 
obvious  waste  of  time.  Now,  this  is  exactly  what  we  want 
to  do  at  the  present  time,  only  the  increased  range  of  mod- 
ern arms  compels  us  to  move  everything  back  a  stage  fur- 
ther, and  the  fire  of  the  magazine  rifle  at  short  ranges  has 


82  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

taken  .the  place  of  the  bayonet  charge  of  former  times. 
Dealing  with  the  purely  infantry  attack,  a  necessity 
which  may  arise  where  the  two  artilleries  are  too  well 
matched  for  either  to  obtain  a  decisive  superiority  over  the 
other,  it  is  obviously  necessary  to  bring  one's  own  infantry 
up  to  effective  range  as  rapidly  and  in  as  good  order  as  possi- 
ble. It  will  therefore  be  necessary  to  advance  without  halt- 
ing to  fire,  in  order  to  reduce  the  time  of  exposure;  and  to 
keep  the  men  in  hand  they  will  have  to  be  in  a  close-order 
formation  of  some  sort,  preferably  in  line,  though  by  "line'* 
we  no  longer  mean  a  long  unbroken  line  of  brigade,  but 
a  line  of  companies,  separated  by  greater  or  smaller  in- 
tervals, according  to  circumstances,  and  whether  in  single 
rank  or  double  rank  is  a  matter  which  will  depend  on  the 
quality  of  the  men  themselves.  That  such  a  line  can  advance 
without  firing  to  within  effective  range,  say  700  yards,  I  be- 
lieve to  have  been  sufficiently  proved  by  what  happened  in 
1870,  where,  in  spite  of  the  absence  of  the  covering  screen  of 
smoke,  and  in  spite,  too,  sometimes,  of  the  want  of  artillery 
preparation,  the  Germans  invariably  got  in  even  closer,  no 
matter  even  if  the  numerical  superiority  was  as  high  as  four 
to  one;  and  the  instances  of  the  38th  Brigade  recently  quo  ted 
and  of  St.  Privat  show  to  my  mind  conclusively  that  they  suf- 
fered no  worse  wrhen  in  line  than  when  in  any  other  forma- 
tion. The  fact  that  these  advances  succeeded  even  against 
great  numerical  superiority  disposes  of  any  objection  founder! 
on  the  more  rapid  fire  of  modern  arms.  Even  admitting  that 
the  present  rifles  fire  twice  as  fast,  and  that  this  rate  of  fire 
can  be  maintained,  which  is  far  in  excess  of  the  truth,  we  can 
afford  to  divide  the  20,000  French  at  Bruville  by  2,  and  the 
fact  will  still  remain  that  the  Prussian  infantry  did  face  on 
that  occasion  a  fire  as  heavy  as  10,000  men  wTith  modern  rifles 
could  pour  out,  and  reached  a  limit  well  within  effective 
range  without  returning  a  shot.  But  if  one  line  could  get 
there,  another  could  have  followed  it  equally  well,  and  a 
third  and  fourth  if  necessary,  always  supposing  that  the 
superior  leading  had  massed  the  requisite  number  of  troops 
opposite  to  the  point  of  attack,  and  hence  the  eventual  accu- 
mulation of  a  sufficient  superiority  becomes  principally  a 
matter  of  time.  That  this  superiority  will  be  decisive  at  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  8& 

first  range  is  unlikely,  but  it  will  be  sufficient  under  the  im- 
pulse of  fresh  troops  from  the  rear  to  get  in  a  stage  closer, 
and  at  each  stage  the  same  result  repeats  itself,  till  within 
400  to  300  yards  the  resistance  of  the  enemy  will  be  utterly 
broken,  and  the  subsequent  advance  will  be  merely  to  occupy 
a  position  tenanted  only  by  the  dead  and  dying. 

Of  course,  in  proportion  as  the  gunners  have  been  able 
to  do  their  share  of  the  work,  the  difficulty  of  the  attack  de- 
creases, and  it  will  be  the  business  of  the  leader  to  adapt  his 
formations  to  the  conditions  of  the  moment;  and  if  the  ene- 
my can  be  turned  out  by  an  ordinary  skirmishing  line,  there 
is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  be. 

Keviewing  the  matter  in  all  its  bearings,  it  appears  to 
me  that  the  difficulties  and  drawbacks  attending  Von  Billow's 
method  are  even  greater  now  than  when  he  first  started  them. 
Of  course,  it  is  as  hopeless  to  expect  in  a  big  battle  a  decision 
from  a  line  of  skirmishers  now  as  it  was  then,  but  the  main 
difficulty  now  of  getting  them  anywhere  near  the  enemy  in 
open  order  is  increased.  Troops,  unless  disciplined  like  iron, 
will  return  fire  when  in  extended  order,  the  moment  they  be- 
gin to  feel  it.  Formerly,  when  it  was  only  a  matter  of  fifty 
yards  one  way  or  the  other,  it  did  not  much  signify  if  they 
did ;  now,  if  they  began  blazing  at  each  other  at  1,800  or  2,000 
yards,  the  fight  would  be  indefinitely  prolonged,  and  the 
losses  proportionately  greater.  That  they  will  do  so,  what 
happened  pretty  generally  in  1870,  though  I  believe  not  in 
the  38th  Brigade,  shows  pretty  conclusively.  In  spite  of  a 
fairly  high  order  of  discipline,  individuals  began  firng  at 
double  the  effective  range  of  their  rifles,  even  though  they 
knew  they  could  not  hope  to  hit;  then  how  much  harder  will 
it  be  to  stop  them  when  they  know  that  the  bullets  will  at 
least  go  as  far  as  those  they  are  receiving;  and  to  stop  this, 
nothing  but  effective  discipline  in  close  order  under  the  eyr 
of  an  officer  has  ever  been  known  to  be  of  any  avail. 

The  view  taken  of  the  matter  in  Berlin  generally  tallies 
with  this,  though  they  have  adopted  in  their  drill  every  one 
almost  of  Von  Biilow's  ideas,  such  as  developing  the  individ- 
uality of  the  man  to  the  utmost.  Doing  away  with  all  super- 
fluous relics  of  the  past,  they  have  never  ceased  to  exact  the 
most  rigid  steadiness  when  in  close  order;  but  they  assert,. 


84  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

and  I  believe  this  to  be  the  key  to  their  whole  system,  that 
tactics  are  only  relatively  good  and  bad — a  formation  ad- 
mirably adapted  for  to-day  /may  prove  deliberate  man- 
slaughter to-morrow;  and  that  it  is  not  for  the  troops  to 
judge  when,  where,  and  in  what  formation  to  attack.  For 
instance,  if  the  need  suddenly  arises  for  troops  to  move 
against  the  enemy  across  a  perfectly  fire-swept  space,  no 
other  line  being  available,  you  don't  want  all  the  men  to  reel 
that  this  time  it  is  all  up — we  are  all  "gone  coons" — for  it  does 
not  at  all  necessarily  follow  that  they  are,  and  the  leader  is 
the  best  judge  of  that. 

Now,  in  that  way  I  believe  we  were  very  much  better 
off  in  1870  than  now ;  as  the  army  then  stood,  with  its  tradi- 
tion of  absolute  unquestioning  obedience, a  good  leader  could 
have  done  what  he  pleased  with  them.  It  is  true  that  many  of 
the  line  regiments  were  a  little  awkward  at  outpost  duty  and 
skirmishing  proper,  but  there  was  no  inherent  reason  in  the 
nature  of  things  why  they  should  not  have  been  brought  up 
to  the  standard  of  our  best  rifle  and  light  infantry  regiments, 
in  which  absolute  discipline  was  of  just  as  high  an  order. 
The  fault  lay  in  exaggerating  the  dangers  to  be  faced,  and 
teaching  everybody  that  it  was  a  duty  he  owed  to  the  state 
no  less  than  to  himself  to  avoid  every  possible  chance  of  in- 
juring his  own  skin.  Instead  of  repeating  like  parrots  the 
terrible  stories  of  bloodshed  we  learnt  from  our  war  corre- 
spondents, who  wrote  primarily  for  the  taste  of  the  British 
public,  we  might  at  least  have  pointed  out  that  even  the  worst 
of  them  in  their  exaggerated  form  was  no  worse  than  many 
we  had  successfully  faced  before,  and  that  common  sense 
showed  that  a  bullet  from  a  breech-loader  was  no  more 
deadly  than  from  a  muzzle-loader,  the  only  question  being 
the  quantity  of  bullets  to  be  faced  in  a  given  time,  and  that 
the  duration  of  that  time  depended  primarily  on  the  use  we 
made  of  our  own  weapons. 

We  had,  however,  come  to  believe  in  the  bayonet  charge 
as  the  essential  feature  of  line  tactics,  and  not  in  its  fire 
power,  and  this  alone  appears  to  me  to  have  prevented  our 
progress.  Otherwise  all  that  would  have  been  required 
vould  have  been  to  move  back  our  first  fire  position  a  little 
further  with  each  successive  improvement  in  the  range  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  85 

our  weapon.  Fire  superiority  alone  decides,  has  decided, 
and  more  than  ever  will  decide;  and  the  power  of  accumulat- 
ing this  superiority  by  right  belongs  to  the  offensive,  fwlio 
brings  up  his  masses  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  then  sends 
them  in  against  the  defender,  who  by  the  nature  of  things  is 
compelled  to  be  equally  strong — i.  e.,  equally  weak — at  all 
parts  of  his  line,  and  common  sense  and  experience  alike 
prove  that  the  principle  of  close-order  "line"  will  enable  that 
accumulation  of  rifles  to  be  best  carried  out. 


THE  LEGEND  OF  ST.  PRIVAT  LE  MONTAGNE. 

Possibly  some  of  my  readers  may  be  inclined  to  consider 
anything  relating  to  an  event  already  more  than  twenty 
years  old  as  ancient  history,  but  I  can  assure  them  that,  as 
regards  the  question  of  the  evolution  of  contemporary  Brit- 
ish infantry  tactics,  the  correct  history  of  what  happened  on 
the  "blood-stained  glacis  of  St.  Privat  on  the  18th  August, 
1870,"  is  still  one  of  the  most  pressing  and  important  ques- 
tions of  the  day;  for  an  amount  of  legend,  rivalling  in  quan- 
tity even  that  of  the  Waterloo  campaign,  has  already  ac- 
creted round  it  in  English  tactical  schools,  which  is  likely,  if 
the  tendency  is  not  checked  soon,  to  have  the  most  detri- 
mental effect  possible  on  our  fighting  formations. 

The  conventional  idea  of  what  occurred  on  this  occasion 
was  primarily  derived  from  a  pamphlet  written  shortly  after 
the  war  by  Lieutenant  Field  Marshal  the  Duke  of  Wurtem- 
berg,  an  Austrian  officer  who  followed  the  German  armies 
in  France,  but  who  was  not  personally  an  eye-witness  of  this 
particular  event.  His  account  of  what  took  place  is  sub- 
stantially as  follows: 

"About  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  commander  of 
the  guard  considered  the  enemy  to  be  sufficiently  shaken  for 
him  to  risk  an  assault  across  the  open  and  gently  ascending 
ground.  The  4th  Brigade  (Von  Kessel)  first  moved  forward 
from  Habonville  in  the  direction  of  St.  Privat  in  'line  of  col- 
umns' in  two  lines,  with  skirmishers  thrown  out  in  front;  and 
a  quarter  of  an  hour  later  the  advance  of  the  1st  Division  (Von 
Pape)  commenced  in  the  same  formation.  The  front  of 
attack  included  little  more  than  2,000  paces,  so  that  there 


-86  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

were  about  ten  men  to  the  pace.  This,  however,  was  the 
closest  formation  of  attack  employed  by  the  Prussians  in  this 
campaign.  The  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire,  even  at  a  distance 
of  more  than  1,500  paces,  was  so  murderous  that,  according 
to  the  accounts  received,  nearly  6,000  men  fell  in  ten  minutes, 
.and  the  advance  had  to  be  immediately  discontinued." 

The  fact  that  the  commander  of  the  Guard  Corps  was 
himself  Prince  August  of  Wurtemberg  has  probably  led 
many  people,  who  only  study  these  things  superficially,  to 
conclude  that  the  author  of  the  pamphlet  and  the  commander 
of  the  Guard  were  one  and  the  same  person,  and  hence  to 
attach  undue  weight  to  this  pamphlet.  But  only  the  habit 
of  exaggeration  which  seems  innate  in  a  certain  class  of  Eng- 
lish military  writers  can  account  for  the  extraordinary  way 
in  which  this  simple  narrative,  which  does  not  vary  very 
much  from  the  truth,  except  as  regards  losses,  has  been  dis- 
torted and  made  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  all  sorts  of  ridiculous 
schemes  of  attack.  For  the  term  "line  of  columns"  "heavy" 
or  "dense"  or  "massive"  columns  have  been  substituted,  and 
these  again  have  been  interpreted  to  mean  battalion,  and 
even  regimental,  columns.  Whilst  for  the  modest  "nearly" 
0,000  men  who  fell  in  ten  minutes,  7,000,  and  even  8,000,  have 
been  interpolated. 

Let  us  see  what  actually  did  happen  according  to  the  regi- 
mental histories  of  the  troops  actually  engaged,  and  first  let 
us  take  the  account  of  the  part  played  in  the  battle  by  the 
first  "Garde  Regiment  zu  Fusz."  The  original  would  occupy 
several  columns,  so  I  have  condensed  it,  even  to  the  sacrifice 
of  style.  According  to  this  authority: 

"Between  3:30  p.  in.  and  4  p.  m.  the  brigade  to  which  we 
belonged  (Von  Kessel's)  stood  about  500  yards  south  of  St. 
Marie  aux  Chenes  (a  little  village  on  the  great  chausee  which 
leads  to  St.  Privat,  and  distant  from  the  latter  place  about 
2,000  yards  in  a  westerly  direction),  fronting  north,  the  two 
regiments  (which  constituted  the  brigade)  side  by  side  with 
the  fusilier  battalions  of  each  as  first  'treffen'  (or  line),  their 
flank  companies  in  advance;  the  second  battalions  formed 
the  second  'treffen'  in  half -battalion  columns  (500  men)  at 
deploying  intervals,  and  the  remaining  two  battalions,  the 
first  of  each  regiment,  stood  in  the  same  formation  as  third 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  87 

^treffen.'  For  nearly  two  hours  we  lay,  suffering  constant 
losses  from  chassepot  bullets  and  from  shrapnel  fire  from  the 
French  batteries  on  our  right  flank  about  St.  Privat,  and  the 
incessant  strain,  watching  for  the  little  white  clouds  of 
smoke  which  puffed  out  in  the  sky  above  us,  and  then  the  few 
seconds  of  intense  anxiety  to  know  where  the  bullets  thus 
released  would  strike,  did  not  fail  to  have  its  effect.  [I  may 
mention  here  that  the  French  shrapnel  was  of  an  extremely 
inferior  nature,  and  moreover  their  artillery  was  so  thor- 
oughly held  in  check  by  that  of  the  Prussians  that  they  had 
but  little  attention  to  give  the  infantry,  which,  moreover,  was 
so  far  off  as  to  be  beyond  the  supposed  limit  of  shrapnel  lire 
in  those  days.] 

"At  last,  about  5:30,  came  the  long-wished-for  order  to 
.advance  and  storm  the  village  of  St.  Privat.  The  task  set  us 
was  about  as  follows:  at  the  foot  of  a  long  glacis-like  slope, 
which  rose  gently  for  some  3,000  paces,  and  without  a  parti- 
cle of  cover  to  screen  our  movement,  to  change  front  half- 
right,  and  then  move  to  the  left  across  the  chausee,  here  en- 
closed by  two  deep  side  ditches,  and  then  to  wheel  into  line 
again  and  advance  to  the  assault. 

"The  order  was  executed  in  the  following  manner :  The 
two  fusilier  battalions,  having  moved  northwards  across  the 
chausee,  wheeled  to  the  right  and  advanced,  that  of  the  third 
•Garde  Regiment  zu  Fusz'  next  to  the  road,  ours  next  on  its 
left.  The  second  battalions  followed  across  the  road  and 
.also  wheeled  to  the  right,  joining  the  fighting  line  then  on  the 
left  of  their  respective  fusilier  battalions.  The  battalions 
of  the  third  'treffen'  followed  in  a  similar  manner;  but  as 
soon  as  they  crossed  the  road,  the  necessity  of  supporting  at 
-once  the  troops  in  the  fighting  line  caused  them  to  be  broken 
up  by  companies  and  sent  to  join  the  fighting  line  wherever 
their  aid  was  most  required." 

Von  Kessel,  the  Brigadier,  describes  the  movement  in 
the  following  manner: 

"Shortly  after  5:30,  the  divisional  commander,  Von 
Pape,  rode  up  to  me  and  gave  me  the  order  to  advance  and 
storm  the  village,  which  he  pointed  out  to  our  right  flank. 
1  called  up  the  regimental  commanders  and  repeated  it  ver- 
~ballv  as  I  had  received  it,  and  then  added  that  immediately 


88  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

after  sounding  the  advance,  I  should  order  a  change  of  front, 
quarter-right  on  the  right  battalion.  On  completion  of  this, 
the  skirmishers  of  the  first  'treffen'  were  to  be  thrown  out, 
and  then,  as  soon  as  the  chause'e  had  been  crossed,  I  should 
order  a  second,  quarter-right,  change  of  front. 

"The  first  wheel  was  executed  in  good  order,  but,  imme- 
diately after  passing  the  chause'e,  the  columns  came  under  so- 
heavy  a  fire,  both  of  artillery  and  chassepots,  that  the  ad- 
vance was  seriously  impeded.  About  100  paces  in  front  of 
St.  Frivat  dense  lines  of  French  skirmishers  lay  skillfully 
concealed,  and  their  fire,  which  began  by  bugle  sound,  cost 
us  heavy  losses.  I  saw  at  once  that  all  the  columns,  irre- 
spective of  distances,  caught  it  equally.  The  bullets,  still 
effective  after  several  ricochets,  made  all  calculation,  based 
on  the  principle  of  'distances,'  illusory.  The  French  shoot 
without  aiming,  and  leave  it  to  the  flat  trajectory  of  the  bul- 
let to  find  its  own  billet.  The  nature  of  the  ground  com- 
pelled us  to  run  forward  by  groups,  and  then  to  throw  oar- 
selves  down  to  take  breath.  With  severe  effort,  and 
leaving  men  behind  us  at  every  step,  we  managed  to  reach 
a  slight  undulation  some  600  yards  in  front  of  the  village* 
and  our  resolute  advance  had  the  effect  of  making  the  French 
skirmishers  abandon  their  position  and  take  shelter  behind 
the  walls  of  the  village,  and  their  fire  from  this  new  position 
was  fortunately  less  effective. 

"I  had  sent  the  fusilier  battalions  which  first  crossed 
the  road  direct  against  the  village,  and  had  allowed  the  fol- 
lowing ones  to  continue  the  movement  to  the  northward  (i.  e., 
left),  because  1  hoped  they  would  find  better  cover  further  on. 
Also  I  knew  I  could  rely  on  my  regimental  commanders  to 
join  in  as  circumstances  required.  For  myself,  I  remained 
near  the'  chause'e,  as  I  felt  that  my  personal  presence  was 
most  required  there,  for  the  losses  in  officers  was  already 
great.  From  that  moment  I  did  nothing  but  drive  the  col- 
umns forward  so  as  to  get  to  closer  quarters  from  which  our 
shorter-range  weapons  might  be  used  with  effect.  The  noise 
of  the  bursting  shells  and  the  heavy  infantry  fire  rendered 
it  almost  impossible  to  make  oneself  heard;  both  skirmishers 
and  columns  had  to  throw  themselves  down  to  get  breath^ 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  89 

I  must  confess  that  they  always  rose  to  my  call  and  resumed 
the  advance. 

"When  a  large  body  of  troops  advances  over  a  plain,  it 
is  particularly  unfortunate  that  every  man  Can  see  the  losses 
that  are  incurred,  and  the  sight  of  them  increases  the  terror 
enormously.  Whoever  denies  that  such  scenes  have  an  effect 
on  the  young  soldier,  has  never  personally  been  through  such 
an  ordeal.  Whenever  for  a  moment  we  offered  a  favorable 
target,  we  heard  a  bugle-call  in  the  French  lines,  and  the  next 
moment  came  such  a  hail  of  lead  that  all  were  compelled  to 
throw  themselves  on  their  faces.  The  losses  in  the  fighting 
line  caused  fresh  troops  to  be  sent  up,  the  columns  rapidly 
diminished,  gaps  began  to  appear  in  the  front,  and  the  loss 
of  officers  became  very  sensible.  Individuals  went  forward, 
mostly  stooping  low,  and  with  averted  faces,  with  hands 
raised  in  front  of  them,  as  men  instinctively  do  in  a  hailstorm, 
their  features  distorted  by  terror.  The  terrible  moral  effect 
could  not  remain  unrecognized.  I  ordered  all  buglers  and 
drummers  to  sound  and  beat  the  'advance,'  and  for  myself 
kept  reiterating  the  command,  'Forward!' 

"By  this  time  at  least  fifty  officers  in  the  brigade  must 
have  fallen.  One  must  have  commanded  in  such  a  crisis  to 
know  what  it  means.  It  struck  me  as  I  looked  round  ttiat 
if  things  went  on  at  this  rate  for  long,  the  whole  brigade 
would  be  down  before  we  reached  St.  Privat. 

"About  this  time,  Colonel  von  Roder  (3d  Guard  Regi- 
ment) came  up  to  me  and  described  the  position  of  the  left 
wing, — half  a  battalion  of  his  regiment  was  moving  on  Ron- 
court  (a  village  about  1,000  yards  north  of  St.  Privat),  and  a 
few  of  the  skirmishers  of  his  first  battalion  had  also  gone  off 
in  the  same  direction.  The  columns  of  the  center  had  di- 
rected themselves  on  a  small  height,  which  broke  the  level 
of  the  ground  a  little  to  our  side  of  a  line  joining  Roncourt 
and  St.  Privat,  and  were  suffering  less.  I  fully  agreed  to 
what  he  said,  all  the  more  as  I  could  do  nothing  to  alter 
things,  and  gave  him,  as  he  was  on  foot,  his  horse  having 
been  killed,  the  horse  of  my  adjutant.  Lieutenant  von  Kessel, 
who  had  just  been  knocked  clean  out  of  his  saddle  by  the 
blow  of  a  chassepot  bullet  in  the  right  shoulder.  My  second 
galloper,  whom  1  had  sent  to  ride  down  the  front  and  order 


90  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  drums  to  beat  the  'advance/  received  a  bullet  through 
his  hand  and  did  not  return  to  me.  Of  my  two  orderlies, 
both  had  lost  their  horses,  and  one  was  mortally  wounded. 
The  bullets  now  came  in  harder  and  faster  than  ever,  and  my 
horse  had  become  through  fear  almost  unmanageable. 

"From  the  low  meadow  ground  where  I  had  spoken  to 
Colonel  von  Koder,  I  rode  towards  the  chause'e,  and  found 
everywhere  the  ranks  much  thinned.  For  all  eventualities 
I  wished  to  have  a  formed  body  of  men  in  hand,  and  gave  the 
necessary  orders. 

"So,  by  the  alternate  advance  of  the  columns,  a  position 
was  at  length  reached  from  which  we  could  reply  advantage- 
ously to  the  fire  of  the  French. 

"Roncourt  was  easily  carried,  and  now,  about  6:45,  we 
partially  enclosed  the  village  of  St.  Privat  from  the  north- 
west and  west,  and  thus  had  attained  a  position  from  which 
it  was  possible  to  advance  to  the  storm  of  the  place. 

"I  reported  my  position  to  the  general  officer  command 
ing,  and  added  that,  as  matters  stood,  we  were  too  weak  to 
advance  further,  but  that,  under  cover  of  our  fire,  columns 
might  still  be  brought  up  in  rear  of  the  center. 

"My  idea  was  that  I  had  certainly  lost  far  the  larger  1ml  f 
of  niy  officers,  and  at  least  half  of  niy  men,  without  having  as 
yet  inflicted  any  appreciable  loss  on  the  enemy.  Still,  as  I 
watched,  I  could  plainly  see  that  our  opponent  was  no  longer 
unshaken;  detachments  began  to  break  back  and  were 
driven  to  the  front  again. 

"In  the  village  itself  I  saw  columns  advancing,  but  a  pil- 
lar of  smoke  rose  up  from  one  of  the  farms  by  the  road  and 
stood  out  black  against  the  sky,  which  was  already  touched 
with  the  sunset  colors.  The  fire  at  least  was  a  help  to  us, 
and  its  appearance  was  greeted  by  our  men  with  loud  cheers. 

"To  the  northeast  of  the  village  I  saw  a  regiment  of  cav- 
alry on  gray  horses  advancing,  apparently  with  the  intention 
of  riding  down  our  fighting  line.  Infantry  which  on  open 
ground  has  already  experienced  considerable  loss  never  quite 
likes  it  when  it  sees  cavalry  advancing  to  the  charge.  There 
is  a  considerable  feeling  of  uncertainty  as  to  how  the  matter 
will  turn  out  *1  nst  at  this  moment  my  horse  was  shot  under 
me.  Clearing  myself  from  his  body.  I  took  my  revolver  out 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  91 

of  the  holsters,  and,  walking  up  to  the  skirmishers,  told  them 
what  to  expect,  and  gave  the  order  to  reserve  their  fire  till 
the  enemy  were  within  fifty  paces,  and  if  that  did  not  stop 
them,  to  let  themselves  be  ridden  over. 

"The  men  of  the  first  'Garde  Kegiment  zu  Fusz'  were 
noticeably  cool  and  collected,  adjusted  their  sights,  and  my 
adjutant  stayed  with  them  to  give  them  the  word  of  com- 
mand. In  order  to  give  the  same  orders  further  down  the 
line,  I  Doubled  across  a  small  hollow,  but  was  so  blown  and 
fatigued  in  my  long  boots,  and  owing  to  the  great  heat,  that 
1  was  almost  speechless  when  I  reached  the  next  body  of 
troops,  and  here  there  was  no  single  officer  erect  to  receive 
my  orders,  and  all  my  staff  had  been  left  behind.  The  ap- 
pearance of  the  cavalry  had  its  effect  along  the  whole  line. 
Some  prepared  to  receive  them  in  rallying  squares,  others 
in  groups,  and  in  the  center  the  men  mostly  remained  lying 
down.  Fortunately,  nothing  came  of  it.  The  cavalry  evi- 
dently had  no  desire  to  charge  home,  and  presently  vanished. 

"But  now  the  Saxons  began  to  put  in  an  appearance, 
and  with  them  the  men  seemed  again  inspired  with  a  desire 
to  close." 

So  far  General  von  Kessel;  now  let  us  turn  back  and 
trace  'the  fate  of  the  individual  battalions: 

"The  Fusiliers  on  the  right  flank  of  the  brigade  lay  in  the 
line  of  the  heaviest  fire — and,  as  already  mentioned,  their 
flank  companies  had  been  sent  forward  as  skirmishers  in 
advance. 

"Already  before  crossing  the  chause'e  they  had  come 
under  a  heavy  chassepot  fire.  They  executed  their  change 
of  front,  quarter-right,  satisfactorily,  in  spite  of  a  couple  of 
shells  which  burst  amongst  them,  and  went  forward  in  the 
direction  of  St.  Privat. 

"Suddenly,  on  the  rising  ground  above  the  village,  a  line 
of  smoke  rose  clear  in  the  air,  and  the  next  moment  we  were 
overwhelmed  with  a  storm  of  projectiles,  and  the  men  foil 
in  heaps.  General  von  Kessel  gave  personally  the  order  to 
two  or  three  section  leaders  to  extend  their  men,  and  in  a 
few  moments  almost  the  entire  flank  companies  were  dis- 
solved— only  Lieutenant  von  Alvensleben  IT.  kept  his  men 
m  hand  about  one  hundred  yards  behind  the  skirmishers. 


92  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

Here,  as  everywhere,  the  advance  was  continued  by  alternate 
rushes.  Though  the  distance  was  still  far  beyond  the  range 
of  our  weapons,  the  men  were  allowed  to  fire.  Under  the 
appalling  rain  of  the  enemy's  projectiles,  one  seemed  so  pow- 
erless that  any  means  of  keeping  up  the  men's  spirits  was 
resorted  to. 

"After  a  few  moments  to  get  breath,  a  fresh  rush  was 
attempted.  The  only  drummer  still  remaining  had  both 
arms  torn  off  by  a  shell;  Lieutenant  von  Halkewitz  was  hit 
in  the  side,  and  fell;  Lieutenant  von  Maltzahn  was  shot 
through  the  right  foot,  and  could  not  go  on.  The  adjutant  of 
the  battalion,  Lieutenant  von  Wartensleben,  had  his  horse 
shot  under  him,  but  joined  a  company,  and  was  himself  dis- 
abled a  few  moments  afterwards  by  two  bullets.  The  com- 
pany again  rose  and  raced  forward  some  fifty  paces.  Cap- 
tain Graf  von  Finckenstein  was  hit  in  the  foot,  and  gave  over 
his  command  to  his,  subaltern.  When  we  got  within  600 
paces  of  the  village,  we  saw  the  French  falling  back  out  of 
their  advanced  trenches  on  the  village. 

"The  2d  Battalion  came  up  on  our  left  flank.  The  losses 
increased  from  minute  to  minute,  and  the  noise  of  the  burst- 
ing shells  and  of  the  breech-loaders  was  so  deafening  that  no 
commands  could  be  heard,  and  only  the  whistle  asserted  its 
power.  The  right  wing  division  of  Lieutenant  von  Alvens- 
leben's  'zug'  was  struck  by  a  shell,  and  at  the  same  moment 
the  left  wing  of  the  same  command  was  simply  swept  away 
by  a  round  of  a  mitrailleur,  which  struck  the  ground  like  a 
charge  of  shot.  But  the  advance  continued,  and  after  each 
halt  the  men  again  rose  up  and  advanced  with  determination. 
About  this  time  the  10th  and  llth  companies  (i.  e.,  the  ttvo 
center  companies,  which  had  hitherto  occupied  the  position 
of  our  old  main  body  in  the  attack)  were  brought  up,  and 
with  'drums  beating'  (which  means  in  'parade  marsch'),  the 
officers  in  front,  the  whole  went  forward  together;  but  again, 
and  at  about  400  paces  from  the  village,  we  were  compelled 
to  lie  down.  At  this  moment  the  cry,  'Down!  the  cavalry  is 
coming!'  was  heard,  and  to  our  left  front  we  saw  the  gray 
horses  and  white  cloaks  of  the  horsemen;  but,  fortunately, 
the  charge  did  not  come  off,  for  on  all  sides  the  want  of  am- 
munition was  beginning  to  be  felt.  Four  more  officers  fell; 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  93 

c.  captain,  still  mounted,  ordered  the  battalion  to  lie  down 
and  not  to  advance — and,  greatly  excited,  Count  Schulen- 
berg  seized  Lieutenant  von  Boiiim  by  the  arm  and  said,  'We 
must  go  on,  believe  me.  We  shall  lose  far  fewer  by  advanc- 
ing than  by  being  out  here' ;  and  between  them  they  got  The 
men  to  advance  to  within  200  yards  of  the  village,  where  they 
captured  a  shelter  trench  which  had  been  deserted  by  the 
French,  and  took  cover  in  it.  It  was  nowr  about  6 :30,  and  tbe 
ammunition  was  about  expended.  With  difficulty,  Lieuten- 
ant von  Boniin  crawled  round  and  collected  cartridges  froin 
the  killed  and  wounded.  Here  for  more  than  half  an  hour 
lay  the  remains  of  the  battalion — waiting  with  longing  for 
reinforcements,  but  certainly  not  'morally'  shaken.  A  Saxon 
shell  burst  short  in  amongst  them  and  killed  two  men,  be- 
sides wounding  several,  and  seven  more  officers  fell.  Out  of 
the  village  they  could  hear  the  French  bugles  sounding  what 
they  took  to  be  the  'advance'  (it  is  the  same  in  our  own  and 
both  the  French  and  German  armies),  and  every  moment  they 
expected  a  counter-attack." 

Here  we  will  leave  the  Fusiliers,  and  only  add  that  the 
brave  and  fortunate  young  subaltern  Lieutenant  von  Bonim 
eventually  led  them  through  the  actual  assault  of  the  village 
and  out  of  action.  Poor  Von  Schulenberg,  whose  words 
qiioted  above  show  what  a  soldier's  insight  into  things  lie 
possessed,  was  left  for  dead  in  the  trench,  but  I  believe  event- 
ually recovered,  and  the  total  losses  of  the  battalion 
amounted  to  18  officers,  93  non-commissioned  officers,  and 
372  men. 

Let  us  take  up  the  history  of  the  2d  Battalion : 

"After  it  had  deployed  into  half-battalions  and  crossed 
the  chause'e,  it  moved  further  to  the  left,  and  then  followed 
as  a  left  echelon  to  the  Fusiliers,  the  idea  being  to  get  round 
the  Hank  of  the  enemy  and  attack  from  his  weakest  side. 

"As  soon  as  the  front  had  moved  in  to  the  direction  of  St. 
Privat,  General  von  Kessel  ordered  skirmishers  to  be  sent 
out,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  colonel  ordered  the  half -bat- 
talions to  separate  into  company  columns.  In  this  order 
they  gained  ground  a  little  way,  but  still  fresh  skirmishers 
were  called  for  by  the  general.  The  distance  was  still  too 
£-reat  for  our  weapons,  and  a  shorter  range  had  to  be  ol»- 


94:  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

tained,  and  the  companies  advanced  almost  without  firing  a 
shot.  The  attention  of  the  men  to  the  officers,  the  'appell' 
(untranslatable  in  our  language,  more  is  the  pity),  and  the 
lire  discipline  were  not  for  a  moment  impaired. 

"Lieutenant  von  Brasne'e  and  Lieutenant  von  Woyrich 
led  their  'zu£s'  forward  by  alternate  rushes  of  from  100  to 
150  paces,  and  the  French  steadily  fell  back  before  them. 
About  6:45  the  cavalry  above  referred  to  appeared,  wheeled 
into  line,  and  advanced  at  a  trot  direct  for  Lieutenant  von 
BrasneVs  'zug.'  The  latter  ceased  firing,  cautioned  his  men 
to  shoot  slow  and  low,  and  ordered  them  to  wait  for  his  word. 
At  about  300 yards  he  gave  the  order  for  independent  fire,  and 
before  this  fire  the  cavalry  turned  tail  and  bolted. 

"Meanwhile  the  5th  and  Gth  companies  had  closed  in 
again  on  each  other  and  lay  in  line  two  deep." 

The  7th  and  8th  companies  had  much  the  same  experi- 
ence as  the  other  two;  only  it  is  worth  calling  attention  to 
the  fact  that,  on  the  right  wing,  where  men  of  two  different 
corps  had  become  intermingled,  confusion  set  in,  and  no  ex- 
ertion of  the  officers  could  prevent  them  bolting.  Still  the 
intact  portion  of  the  companies  was  saved,  and  they  eventu- 
ally forced  themselves  forward  and  lay  down  in  line  with, 
their  comrades  in  the  Fusiliers,  waiting  for  the  fresh  impulse 
to  advance;  and  here  we  wrill  leave  them  till  next  week. 

A  great  deal  of  this  article  has  been  written  between  in- 
verted commas,  but  I  should  wish  it  to  be  understood  that  it 
does  not  profess  to  be  a  literal  transcript,  but  is  only  a  precis 
of  some  thirty  pages  of  the  original.  I  had  hoped  to  quote 
all  the  officers'  names  as  they  fell,  so  as  the  better  to  show 
how  the  gradual  dissolution  of  the  force  set  in;  but  they  fell 
in  such  numbers  that  the  names  alone  would  have  filled  half 
a  column.  Next  week  I  hope  to  continue  the  article,  though 
not  in  such  detail,  for  the  experiences  of  all  were  pretty  uni- 
form, and  till  then  I  withhold  any  comments.  Only  one  or 
two  points  I  should  like  to  particularize  here,  and  that  is  the 
very  evident  difference  of  opinion  that  appears  to  have  ex- 
isted between  the  regimental  officers,  those  in  closest  con- 
tact with  the  men  and  the  general  officer  commanding,  as  to 
the  use  of  extended  order,  for  here  we  find  the  general  calling 
for  skirmishers  and  the  subalterns  holding  them  back. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  95 

Those  of  niy  readers  who  remember  the  Midsummer-Night's 
Dream,"  reviewed  in  these  columns,  will  recall  a  complaint 
on  this  head  by  the  writer — a  point  it  will  be  useful  to  bear 
in  mind. 


I  have  traced  the  fortunes  of  the  Fusiliers  and  2d  Bat- 
talion 1st  Guard  Grenadiers  "zu  Fusz"  in  the  attack  of  St. 
Privat  in  considerable  detail.  The  experiences  of  the  3d 
Battalion — and,  indeed,  of  all  the  other  regiments — were  so 
very  similar  that  I  propose  only  to  note  a  few  of  the  most 
essential  points. 

The  1st  Battalion  of  the  above-mentioned  regiment  ad- 
vanced at  first  in  two  half -battalion  columns,  which,  how- 
ever, soon  lost  all  connection,  one  column  being  called  on  to 
reinforce  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  the  other  to  fill  up  a 
gap  in  the  center  of  the  fight.  Both  columns  appear  to  have 
deployed  into  line  from  the  outset;  it  is  expressly  stated  to 
have  been  done  by  the  right  half-battalion,  and  is  implied 
in  the  case  of  the  other  one ;  and  in  this  formation  they  ad- 
vanced right  into  the  fighting  line,  and  only  then  deployed 
their  skirmishing  sections. 

Their  arrival  gave  the  impetus  for  a  fresh  series  of 
rushes,  but  their  momentum  was  insufficient  to  carry  the 
troops  on  to  the  final  storm,  and  so  they,  too,  at  length  lay 
down  to  wait  the  arrival  of  the  Saxons,  who,  by  the  way,  dis- 
tinguished themselves  by  firing  into  the  left  rear  of  their 
friends.  Whilst  lying  out  here  in  the  open,  it  is  expressly 
stated  that  several  of  the  companies  previously  extended 
managed  to  rally  their  men  and  re-form  them  in  "two-deep 
line."  I  mention  the  two-deep  line,  because,  whene/er 
"line"  without  this  qualification  is  used  in  German  works 
previous  to  1888,  thre^-deep  line  is  understood. 

As  for  the  last  rush,  or,  properly  speaking,  the  actual 
assault  on  the  village,  I  will  again  quote  the  brigadier's  (Von 
Kessel's)  account: 

"The  last  position  of  the  brigade  before  St.  Privat 
formed  from  right  to  left  a  continuous  line.  On  the  right, 
owing  to  the  heavy  losses,  there  were  no  supports.  On 
the  left  there  were  still  some  closed  columns  behind  the 
fighting  line.  As  soon  as  I  had  mounted  a  fresh  horse,  I 


Uti  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

strove  hard  to  rally  stragglers  who,  owing  to  their  officers 
having  fallen,  were  trying  to  skulk  off.  I  also  endeavored 
to  drive  on  those  who  had  contented  themselves  with  lying 
down  under  cover;  it  was  a  heavy  task,  and  only  partially 
successful. 

"Our  line  was  now  converging  round  the  village,  the 
artillery  were  pouring  shell  into  it,  and  as  the  losses  on  the 
French  side  became  heavier,  ours  diminished  in  proportion. 
No  order  was  given  for  the  assault,  every  one  acted  spohtim-'- 
ously — a  general  conviction  appeared  to  seize  on  all  that  nov 
or  never  was  the  time.  They  all  dashed  forward  together, 
and  after  a  sharp  struggle  at  the  walls,  in  which  many  fell, 
the  streets  were  filled  with  our  men,  and  a  succession  of  d<^- 
peiate  house-to-house  fights  ensued,  in  which  the  most  indis- 
criminate firing  took  place;  in  many  places  our  troops  firing 
into  one  another,  whilst  during  the  first  few  moments  a  l'"\v 
of  our  own  shells  added  to  the  confusion. 

"At  the  same  time  the  French  artillery  also  poured  shell 
into  us;  the  village,  too,  was  on  fire  in  several  places." 

in  the  attempt  to  debouch  out  of  the  village,  which  uns 
ultimately  successful,  and  in  the  terrible  artillery  duel 
which  followed,  when  .the  Guard  artillery  took  up  its  final 
position  just  in  front  of  the  overcrowded  infantry,  and  which 
lasted  for  possibly  another  hour,  the  losses  were  very  heavy, 
though  of  course,  in  the  growing  darkness  and  almost  hope- 
less confusion,  they  did  not  attract  the  attention  the  earlier 
ones  did.  But,  in  considering  the  actual  losses  in  the  attack 
with  reference  to  the  question  of  formations,  these  must  not 
bo  left  out  of  account. 

I  may  note  here  in  passing,  as  this  "spontaneous"  move- 
ment of  the  whole  is  very  characteristic,  that  the  state- 
ment quoted  above  is  confirmed  by  two  other  witnesses  w'lo 
watched  the  fight  from  the  rear — viz.,  Prince  August  of  Wiir- 
temberg  and  Prince  Hohenlohe;  the  latter  of  whom  de- 
scribes in  his  "Letters  on  Artillery"  how,  as  he  was  talking 
to  the  former  behind  the  line  of  his  guns,  the  corps  artillery 
of  the  Guard,  and  as  they  watched  the  gradually  slackening 
fire  of  the  French,  suddenly  the  thought  struck  them  both 
simultaneously,  and  turning  to  each  other  they  both  cried 
out,  "Now  is  the  time!"  but  then  in  the  same  moment,  an«l 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  97 

before  an  aid-de-camp  could  be  sent,  the  whole  line  rose  and 
rushed  for  the  village. 

The  regimental  history  of  the  4th  Guard  Infantry  I  shall 
treat  in  a  much  more  summary  manner;  it  is  written  with 
far  less  ability,  and  the  author  is  a  little  too  fond  of  using 
phrases  such  as  "without  firing  a  shot,"  etc.,  which  other  evi- 
dence does  not  bear  out  to  commend  his  accuracy  of  observa- 
tion to  the  reader.  But  as  it  is  confirmed  from  other  sources, 
I  notice  his  account  of  the  advance  of  the  other  regiment  of 
the  brigade,  the  2d,  at  the  very  hottest  of  the  fight,  with  its 
three  battalions  in  line  (three  deep),  with  "drums  playing 
and  with  colors  flying" — an.  expression  which  in  Germany 
means  in  the  "parade  marsch"  as  in  an  advance  in  review 
order,  and  in  this  manner  not  only  reached  the  limit  attained 
by  the  others  already,  but  some  further  distance  beyond 
them.  Their  losses  were  actually  slightly  less,  even  though 
they  were  collectively  longer  under  fire  than  the  other  regi- 
ments, who  brought  up  their  battalions  successively,  and 
also  in  spite  of  their  line  of  advance  lying  in  the  zone  of  the 
most  intense  fire. 

The  total  losses  incurred  by  the  two  brigades  from  first 
to  last,  in  an  action  which,  beginning  about  4  p.  m.,  lasted  till 
late  into  the  night,  reached  the  following  totals: 

1st  Brigade,  1st  Foot  Guards,  36  officers,  1,072  men. 

1  st  Brigade,  3d   Foot  Guards,  36  officers,  1,067  men. 

2d  Brigade,  2d    Grenadiers .. 30  officers,  1,034  men. 

2d  Brigade,  4th  Grenadiers.  .29  officers,     913  men. 

Total 140  4,086 

About  their  effective  strength  on  the  morning  of  the 
fight  I  have  no  reliable  information  to  my  hand  at  this  mo- 
ment, but,  exclusive  of  officers  and  train  soldiers,  it  cannot 
have  been  less  than  12,000  men;  so  that  the  day's  fighting 
cost  them  in  round  figures  one-third  of  their  strength. 

Now,  as  regards  tactical  formations  and  their  influence 
in  diminishing  loss,  what  is  the  outcome  of  the  whole  matter? 
Simply  this,  that  there  appears  to  be  nothing  whatever  to 
choose  between  them  on  the  battle-field,  whatever  the  prac- 
tice-ground experiments  may  teach ;  in  fact,  as  it  has  often 
been  put  in  these  columns  before,  "The  rain  falls  equally  on 


98  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  just  and  the  unjust  alike,  and  the  longer  you  are  out  in  it, 
the  wetter  you  will  get."  I  confess  that  in  reading  these  de- 
tailed accounts  1  was  not  prepared  to  find  so  much  evidence 
to  prove  that  the  fire  of  the  French  actually  was  under  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  control,  and  was  distinctly  directed  on  cer- 
tain marks  as  they  offered  themselves  from  time  to  time,  but 
this  only  makes  my  contention  stronger,  that  when  dealing 
with  "unaimed"  fire — and  it  is  the  business  of  the  artillery 
to  see  to  it  that  the  fire  to  be  encountered  in  the  advance  is 
uunaimed" — the  style  of  formation  is,  within  reasonable 
limits,  practically  immaterial. 

The  fact  is,  the  attack,  or  the  idea  of  the  attack,  was  first 
mooted  under  a  wrong  apprehension  of  the  conditions  to  be 
dealt  writh — viz.,  that  2,000  yards  was  well  within  the  killing 
range  of  the  chassepot.  For  had  one  single  responsible  staff 
officer  been  aware  of  the  danger  they  were  about  to  incur, 
even  though  the  necessity  for  attacking  was  very  urgent,  he 
would  either  have  set  about  it  in  some  other  way,  or,  as  at 
Vionville,  sent  in  the  cavalry — not  against  the  village,  of 
course,  but  against  the  left  flank  of  the  4th  (French)  Corps, 
L'Adfflirault's,  which  was  at  that  moment  causing  or  threat- 
ening danger  to  the  Hessians  and  3d  Brigade  of  the  Guards 
near  Habonville.  Possibly  it  would  be  better  to  say  that  the 
troops  would  never  have  been  placed  in  their  initial  position 
at  all,  for,  as  pointed  out  above,  they  were  actually  within 
reach  of  the  chassepot  almost  from  the  moment  they  moved 
off;  but  to  discuss  that  question  would  take  us  far  beyond 
the  limits  of  my  space. 

The  lesson  that  maneuvering  or  attempting  to  maneu- 
ver within  effective  range  of  musketry  fire  almost  invariably 
spells  defeat,  required  no  new  illustration,  for  it  was  pre- 
cisely a  similar  mistake  which  led  to  Frederick's  defeat 
at  Kolin  as  far  back  as  the  Silesian  War;  and  the  Na- 
poleonic campaigns  are  full  of  similar  examples — a  fact 
of  which  the  Prussian  general  staff  required  no  new  re- 
minder. The  time  may  have  been  ill-chosen,  and  cavalry 
was  certainly  the  arm  which  should  have  been  called  on  to 
gain  the  required  respite;  but  had  it  not  been  for  the  losses 
and  confusion  caused  by  the  attempt  to  move  to  a  flank  with- 
in effective  range  of  the  enemy,  the  attack  would  probably 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  99 

have  been  a  brilliant  success,  and  would  have  gone  down  to 
history  as  an  example  of  what  infantry  soldiers  can  achieve. 
What  the  Germans  actually  did  learn  from  this  and  simi- 
lar experiences  was — first,  the  absolute  importance  of  await- 
ing the  result  oi  the  artillery  nre;  secondly,  how  much  the 
infantry  may  do  for  themselves  by  their  own  fire  in  case  the 
moment  for  attack  has  been  anticipated;  for  it  will  have 
been  noticed  above,  that  as  soon  as  the  Prussians  reached 
a  position  from  which  their  own  fire  could  be  made  to  tell, 
the  resistance  of  their  enemy  rapidly  fell  off  in  its  determina- 
tion; thirdly,  no  formation  is  in  itself  a  guarantee  against 
loss,  but  since  the  moral  power  is  the  decisive  factor,  no  more* 
troops  are  to  be  extended  than  can  use  their  fire-arms  with 
full  effect  in  the  front  simultaneously:  all  the  remainder 
should  be  kept  in  the  hands  of  their  leaders  up  to  the  last 
moment  possible.  Relatively  to  the  rest  of  the  army,  and  to 
any  infantry  likely  to  be  found  in  the  existing  Continental 
armies,  the  Guard  fully  justifies  its  claim  of  precedence; 
for  it  is  evident  from  the  accounts,  and  also  is  well  known 
in  the  army  itself,  that  the  percentage  of  skulkers  was  re- 
markedly  small  compared  to  what  was  seen  on  other  parts 
of  the  field.  Possibly,  if  all  corps  had  done  equally  well, 
the  type  of  attack  to  be  seen  at  any  maneuvers  in  Germany, 
in  which  at  last  the  fighting  line  stands  from  eight  to  ten 
deep,  would  never  have  been  involved.  This  overcrowding  is,, 
of  course,  only  a  peace-time  result  from  the  idea  of  successive 
reinforcements  from  the  rear  to  give  the  necessary  impulse 
for  advance,  and  is  intended  principally  as  a  school  to  accus- 
tom men  and  officers  to  the  noise  and  confusion  inseparable 
from  the  fighting  line.  But  it  is  at  once  apparent  how  the 
reduction  of  loss  in  any  given  encounter  would  be  dependent, 
not  on  formation,  but  on  the  relative  superiority  of  the  at- 
tacking troops.  A  superiority  which  might  result,  either 
from  the  men  being  from  the  first  better  disciplined  and  of 
higher  courage,  or  from  want  of  these  qualities  either  db 
initioQY  induced  by  the  effect  of  artillery  fire  on  the  defenders. 
This  deduction  is  in  fact  the  key  to  what  may  be  called 
the  "esoteric"  side  of  German  tactical  teaching,  without 
which  the  greater  part  of  their  literature,  and  the  whole  of 
their  drill  book,  is  unintelligible.  English  tacticians — nota- 


100  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

bly  the  Volunteer  colonels,  who  are  at  present  endeavoring 
to  teach  the  regimental  officers  of  the  army  how  to  extract 
nutriment  from  the  egg  of  the  domestic  fowl — always  start 
from  the  premise  that  both  sides  maintain  throughout  the 
fight  the  same  absolute  position  towards  each  other  as  re- 
gards courage  as  that  with  which  they  started.  If  this  idea 
was  correct,  their  deductions  might  commend  themselves  to 
us,  but  it  is  perfectly  obvious — or,  at  any  rate,  a  very  short 
course  of  study  would  make  it  so — that  it  has  absolutely  no 
foundation,  either  in  practice  or  theory.  Fortunately,  our 
tactical  vagaries  attract  so  little  attention  in  Germany  that 
no  one  considers  it  worth  his  while  to  notice  them  seriously, 
but  if  any  of  their  own  writers  took  to  the  same  line,  the  con- 
tempt with  which  he  would  be  treated  would  be  lofty  indeed. 
The  worst  of  it  all  is  that  we  have  no  one  but  ourselves  in  the 
army  to  blame  for  this  condition  of  affairs.  Had  not  the 
study  of  military  history,  particularly  that  portion  of  it  re- 
ferring to  our  own  past,  been  allowed  to  fall  to  so  low  an  ebb 
as  it  did  in  the  years  preceding  1878,  no  surprise  whatever 
would  have  been  felt  amongst  soldiers  at  the  tales  of 
slaughter  and  bloodshed  which  reached  us  from  France  and 
Germany,  and  the  somewhat  hysterical  pamphlets  which 
reached  us  from  the  other  side  of  the  Channel  would  have 
found  neither  translators  nor  readers.  Amongst  the  edu- 
cated portion  of  the  German  army  these  writers  excited  only 
disdain,  for  between  them  they  told  us  nothing  essentially 
newr;  they  all,  even  including  Von  Soherff  in  his  first  work, 
showed  that  either  they  had  never  studied — or,  at  any  rate, 
had  failed  to  understand — their  Clausowitz. 

Many  years  ago,  1872, 1  was  sitting  in  the  room  of  a  Ger- 
man officer,  many  years  my  senior,  and  was  occupying  my 
time,  whilst  awaiting  his  return,  in  reading  a  lot  of  the  pam- 
phlets of  the  day.  When  ho  came  in,  he  smiled  at  my  zeal, 
and  going  up  to  his  bookshelf,  took  out  a  well-worn  and  bat- 
tered copy  of  Clausewitz's  "Vom  Krieg"  ("On  War"),  and 
having  opened  it  at  the  chapter  on  danger  and  the  moral 
force  in  battle,  handed  it  to  me  saying:  "There,  if  you  want 
to  know  what  war  is  and  always  will  be,  you  had  better  not 
waste  your  time  over  that  trash,  but  study  this."  I  took  it, 
and  having  read  it  through, — it  was  only  two  or  three  pages, 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  101 

—I  said:  "Yes,  it  seerns  common  sense,  but  I  am  afraid  1 
should  not  get  many  marks  in  an  examination  for  this." 
"That  is  just  where  it  is,"  he  replied;  "you  in  England  study 
to  get  marks,  we  here  have  to  learn  in  order  to  safeguard 
the  lives  and  interests  of  the  men  under  our  command"-  -a 
remark  which  I  neither  relished  nor  appreciated  at  the  time, 
but  the  truth  of  which  has  daily  come  more  and  more  to  me 
during  the  eighteen  years  wrhich  have  since  elapsed. 


VON  WEDELL'S  BRIGADE  AT  MARS-LA-TOUR, 
AUGUST  1G,  1870. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  is  usually  credited  with  the 
saying  that  "at  the  close  of  every  great  campaign,  truth  lies 
at  the  bottom  of  a  very  deep  well,  and  it  takes  twenty  years 
to  get  her  out  of  it.''  Whoever  said  it,  its  correctness  is  be- 
ginning to  be  brought  home  to  us  very  forcibly  with  regard 
to  the  history  of  the  1870  campaign.  For  a  long  time  past, 
English  tacticians  have  been  in  the  habit  of  relying  abso- 
lutely for  their  facts  on  the  truth  of  the  statements  in  the 
Prussian  official  history  of  the  war,  and  I  confess  openly 
that  I  have  often  been  in  the  same  boat  with  them  in  this 
respect.  But  during  the  last  few  years  we  have  been  con- 
fronted with  a  series  of  other  evidences,  which  go  far  to 
undermine  one's  faith  in  our  previous  premises. 

As  an  instance  of  the  slaughter  occasioned  by  the  new 
weapons,  the  case  of  the  Guard  Corps  at  St.  Privat  has  been 
cited  ad  nauseam;  but,  curiously  enough,  an  instance  of  far 
worse  slaughter,  more  rapidly  inflicted,  has  hitherto  almost 
escaped  our  notice,  for  in  the  pages  of  the  "Prussian  Official" 
the  slaughter,  though  admitted,  has  been  passed  over — prin- 
cipally because  it  was  unnecessary  and  not  crowned  by  suc- 
cess— in  such  a  way  as  not  to  attract  attention.  But  a  new 
work,  entitled  "Investigation  into  theTactics  of  the  Future," 
has  just  been  published  in  Berlin,  which  throws  an  alto- 
gether new  light  on  the  subject,  and  which  proves  that,  accu- 
rate as  are  the  facts  stated  in  the  official  account  in  the  main, 
the  literary  skill  of  the  department  of  military  history  in 
the  Wilhelm-Strasse  has  been  able  to  clothe  them  in  a 
manner  which,  if  not  altogether  a  direct  denial  of  the  facts?, 


102  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

is,  nevertheless,  very  little  short  of  a  suggestis  falsi. "  We 
owe  this  new  light  to  the  pen  of  Captain  Fritz  Hoenig,  an 
officer  who  was  present  with  WedelFs  Brigade  in  the  action, 
and  who  recounts  his  experiences  in  a  very  convincing  man- 
ner. His  story  has  been  before  the  German  military  world 
since  1881,  when  this  particular  portion  of  it  was  first  pub- 
lished in  a  work  called  "The  Two  Brigades,"  and  in  which 
the  incidents  of  the  fight  of  the  28th  Brigade  at  Problus-Bor 
in  the  battle  of  Koniggratz  and  the  38th  Brigade  at  Mars-la- 
Tour  were  made  the  subjects  of  an  absolutely  masterly  dis- 
section. The  facts  brought  forward  in  it  have  never  beeu 
questioned,  but,  on  the  contrary,  though  the  book  encoun- 
tered most  severe  opposition  from  the  authorities,  these 
facts,  and  the  method  in  which  they  were  treated,  have  met 
with  the  warmest  acknowledgments  of  nearly  all — except 
those  on  whom  the  blame  was  shown  to  lie — of  those  v/ho 
were  present.  As  far  as  my  reading  extends,  I  believe  the 
facts,  or  the  story,  contained  in  this  wrork  to  be  in  every  way 
the  most  instructive  piece  of  military  history  yet  placed 
before  us,  with  perhaps  the  sole  exception  of  the  "Midsum- 
mer-Night's Dream."  As  an  introduction  to  what  follows, 
I  may  briefly  mention  that 'it  was  WedelPs  Brigade  (the  38Mi) 
which  arrived  on  the  field  of  Mars-la-Tour  about  4  p.  m.,  JUST 
after  the  French  were  recovering  from  the  temporary  paraly- 
sis occasioned  by  the  charge  of  Bredow's  Cavalry  Brigade. 
It  was  sent  in  haste  to  check  the  advance  of  L'Admirault's 
corps,  was  driven  back  in  confusion  with  a  loss  of  53  per  cent, 
and  only  saved  from  annihilation  by  the  dashing  charge  of 
the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  (Queen  Victoria's  regiment),  who 
rode  down  the  pursuing  French,  and  gained  time  for  the  Bri- 
gade to  re-form  in  something  like  order.  With  these  few 
introductory  remarks,  I  will  leave  the  eye-witness  to  speak 
for  himself;  only  considerations  of  space  will  compel  me  to 
"precis"  him  very  liberally. 

"The  38th  Brigade,  consisting  of  the  16th  and  57th  Rep- 
rnents,  less  one  battalion  of  the  57th  Regiment  on  detach- 
ment, and  with  two  batteries  and  two  companies  of  1hf- 
Pioneers  of  the  corps  attached,  had  left  Thiaucourt  at  5:30 
a.  m.  under  command  of  Gener.il  von  Srhwarzkoppen.  The 
Brigade  of  Guard  Dragoons  with  Planitz's  horse  artillery 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  103 

battery  was  about  one  hour  in  advance.  At  10  a.  m.  this  lat- 
ter detachment  reached  St.  Hilaire,  and  on  arrival  there, 
hearing  artillery  fire  to  the  east,  they  pushed  on  in  that  direc- 
tion, having  previously  obtained  the  consent  of  General  von 
Schwarzkoppen,  who  must  have  been  perfectly  well  aware 
of  where  the  artillery  fire  came  from.  The  infantry  brigade 
reached  the  same  place  at  a  little  after  11  a.  m.,  having 
marched  15  miles,  with  only  one  halt  of  10  minutes  in  4^ 
hours  (without  packs;  these  had  been  left  behind  at  Saar- 
brtick,  and  had  never  overtaken  the  troops,  the  men  only 
carried  rolled  greatcoats,  cooking-pots  and  their  ammunition 
in1  the  haversack).  It  was  a  burning  hot  August  day. 

"The  enemy  was  supposed  to  be  retreating  on  Verdun — 
and,  indeed,  partly  on  the  very  road  by  which  we  were  ad- 
vancing; consequently  there  was  a  suppressed  feeling  of 
excitement  in  the  staff,  and  the  maps  had  been  constantly 
studied,  and  we  were  agreeably  surprised  when  we  occupied 
the  road  without  any  opposition  on  his  part.  The  five  ba  t- 
talions,  the  two  batteries,  and  the  two  Pioneer  companies 
took  up  a  bivouac  southeast  of  St.  Hilaire,  with  outposts  of 
the  2d  Battalion  57th  Regiment,  and  a  squadron  2d  Guard 
Dragoons,  thrown  out  in  front;  and  the  troops  received 
orders  to  cook  their  dinners. 

"At  this  time  I  was,  with  several  other  officers  and  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von  Roell,  at  the  right  flank  picket,  and  we 
discussed  matters,  which  usually  bear  another  aspect  to  the 
troops  to  that  which  they  have  for  the  staff.  The  latter 
know,  as  a  rule,  the  why  and  wherefore  of  things,  which  the 
former  do  not;  and  therefore  uneasiness  is  apt  to  ari«e 
amongst  them.  But  here  this  was  not  the  case,  for  since 
early  morning  we  had  known  the  general  situation  with  tol- 
erable accuracy,  and  our  objective  accurately.  We  had 
promised  ourselves  great  results,  and  were  proportionately 
astonished  when  we  reached  our  destination  without  opposi 
tion,  though  we  had  heard  and  seen  artillery  fire  on  our  right 
for  some  time. 

"The  order  to  halt  and  cook,  received  under  these  circum- 
stances, afforded  matter  for  consideration,  as  it  well  might. , 
for  it  showed,  first,  that  the  commander  was  determined  to 
remain  at  St.  Hilaire  till  further  orders  arrived;  and  second, 


104  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

that  iu  spite  of  the  growing  noise  of  the  cannonade,  lie 
counted  on  time  enough  for  the  troops  to  finish  their  mi -a! 
before  these  orders  reached  him.  Is'ow,  it  is  certainly  a  first 
rule  for  the  leaders  to  utilize  every  opportunity  to  rest  and 
refresh  their  men  by  the  way,  but  to  halt  and  cook  here 
meant  that  the  general  himsejf  was  quite  in  the  dark  as  to 
what  was  happening,  and  was  doing  absolutely  nothing  TO 
find  out.  We  had  not  -found  the  enemy  there  whore  we  ex- 
pected him,  but  knew  from  the  sound  of  the  guns  that  he  was 
in  action  not  far  off,  and  therefore  his  first  duty  should  have 
been  to  have  strained  every  nerve  to  clear  up  the  situation. 

"Just  as  the  fires  began  to  burn  up  brightly,  an  officer 
galloped  in,  his  horse  covered  with  sweat  and  pretty  well 
done  up,  and  immediately  afterwards,  the  'fall  in'  was 
fcov.nded,  cooking-kettles  upset,  and  the  troops  set  themselves 
in  march.  'Chambley'  was  assigned  us  as  our  objective,  an- 1 
we  hardly  trusted  our  eyes  when  we  found  the  place  on  on; 
maps, 

"At  first  it  had  been  the  intention  of  the  divisional  com- 
mander to  move  on  Ville  sur  Yron,  almost  behind  the  flan  ; 
of  the  enemy,  but  as  we  drew  nearer,  and  from  our  hors-.^ 
could  see,  from  the  long  lines  fringed  with  fire  and  smoke, 
and  behind  them  the  dense  rising  dust-clouds,  that  a  very 
large  force  was  before  us,  and  as,  further,  1  he  wounded  whom 
we  now  began  to  meet  gave  somewhat  despondent  accounts 
of  what  was  going  on,  this  direction  appeared  too  risky,  and 
he  bent  off.  half  right,  so  as  to  establish  connection  with  the 
Hid  Corps,  a  decision  wrhich  was  undeniably  sound. 

"Amongst  others  wounded,  I  met  an  officer  I  knew  rid 
ing  back  with  a  bullet  through  his  chest.  Almost  before  T 
could  speak,  he  said  with  a  smile:  'Well,  I  hope  you  will 
have  better  luck  than  we  had;  it  wyill  surprise  you,  this  is 
no  "catshooting"  like  '60.'  That  was  scarcely  encouraging, 
but  there  was  a  soldierly  jocularity  about  his  manner  which 
carried  it  off  well.  About  3 :30  p.  m.  wre  formed  up  for  action 
about  1,000  yards  southwest  of  Mars-la -Tour.  The  generals, 
Von  Schwarzkoppen  (division  commander)  and  Von  Wedell 
(brigade  commanding  officer),  had  ridden  on  in  advance  to 
reconnoiter.  As  they  had  ample  time,  and  the  Guard  Dra- 
goons had  been  skirmishing  with  the  enemy  for  the  last  two 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  105 

hours,  there  should  have  been  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  the 
required  information — more  especially  since  the  ground  was 
almost  completely  open.  At  this  moment  the  French  had  it 
ail  their  own  way;  they  had  occupied  the  high  ground  above 
and  north  of  Mars-la-Tour,  and  from  its  summit  could  see  for 
miles  around.  To  turn  them  out  of  it,  without  great  numeri- 
cal superiority,  was  impossible,  and  further  to  their  left,  and 
our  right,  our  troops  were  being  driven  back  out  of  the  Tron- 
ville  copses,  which  they  had  hitherto  held.  Fortunately, 
they  suddenly  checked  in  their  advance,  and  the  only  expla- 
nation we  can  give  of  this  is,  that  the  sudden  appearance  of 
our  solitary  brigade  threatening  their  line  of  retreat  seemed 
to  them  to  indicate  the  advance  of  at  least  a  whole  corps — 
for  it  would  have  been  presuming  too  much  on  the  incapacity 
of  their  adversary  to  assume  that  our  isolated  advance  had 
actually  no  connection  whatever  with  any  other  movements. 
Possibly,  too,  the  capture  of  two  or  three  of  the  Guard  Dra- 
goon scouts  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Guard  itself  was 
at  hand.  The  position  in  which  they  halted  was  one  just 
suited  to  their  far-ranging  weapon;  their  front  and  right 
fiank  was  protected  by  a  ravine  which  ran  along  it  and  then 
bent  sharp  to  the  north,  from  the  further  edge  of  which  tho 
ground  fell  away  in  a  glacis-like  slope  for  three  or  four  miles, 
broken  only  by  the  village  of  Mars-la-Tour  about  1,000  yards 
to  the  front;  and  our  approach  was  rendered  yet  more  diffi- 
cult by  wrire  fences,  which  seriously  incommoded  us,  and  still 
more  impeded  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  in  their  subsequent 
charge.  The  extent  of  their  position  was  about  3,000  yards, 
and  was  held  by  Grenier's  Division  in  1st  line  and  the  whole 
of  the  remainder  of  the  4th  Corps  in  support.  The  open 
space  we  had  to  cross  was  about  2,000  yards. 

"Whilst  we  were  awaiting  orders  to  advance,  the  Roman 
Catholic  chaplain  galloped  up  to  our  colonel,  and,  after  a 
word  or  two  with  him,  rose  in  his  stirrups  and  addressed  us 
in  the  following  words:  'Comrades,  the  Hid  Corps  is  hard 
pressed,  and  to  you  is  assigned  the  duty  of  relieving  them. 
Attack,  therefore,  without  fear  of  death,  and  then  God  will 
be  with  yon.  A  men.'  His  manner  and  words  acted  like  a 
charm  on  all,  and  immediately  afterwards  the  order  to  un- 
cover the  colors  was  given;  the  colonel  added  a  few  words 


106  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

in  the  same  spirit,  and  the  inarch  began,  the  direction  being 
that  previously  assigned  to  us — viz.,  northeast — on  the  coi- 
ner of  the  Tronville  copses.  At  the  time  this  order  w<»s 
given,  the  French  right  only  extended  as  far  as  these  bushes, 
and  our  movement  was  intended  to  form  part  of  a  combined 
attack  with  ten  other  battalions  on  our  right  on  the  above- 
mentioned  copses;  but  long  before  we  reached  the  ground, 
the  French  line  had  been  extended  along  the  position  previ- 
ously indicated.  The  ten  battalions,  having  attacked  pre- 
maturely, were  at  the  time  of  our  advance  already  falling 
back,  so  what  we  really  were  trying  to  do  was  to  march 
diagonally  across  the  front  of  a  whole  corps  in  position  with 
only  five  and  a  half  battalions,  a  movement  which  could  not 
have  the  smallest  prospect  of  success.  But  even  after  the 
advance  had  commenced,  we  were  still  in  complete  darkness 
as  to  where  we  were  going,  or  what  we  were  to  do  when  v  " 
got  there.  General*  von  Schwar/koppen  and  Wedell  had 
decided  between  themselves,  but  they  only  gave  1  he  gfin»;'u! 
direction  to  the  regimental  commanders,  and  certainly  the 
battalion  commanders  knew  nothing  whatever.  My  colonel, 
for  instance,  said  to  me  somewhat  sarcastically:  'This  seems 
the  chaplain's  day;  had  it  not  b^en  for  him,  we  should  have 
had  no  idea  whatever  as  to  what  was  going  on' — and  this  re- 
mark expressed  about  what  we  all  felt.  Hut  presently  the 
enemy  opened  fire  on  us,  on  our  left  flank,  and  we  proceeded 
to  wheel  to  the  left  to  face  him,  all  the  battalions  moving  up 
into  one  line.  Of  artillery  preparation  there  was  no  word, 
for  our  guns  only  came  into  action  after  we  were  already 
under  the  effective  fire  of  the  French.  This  wheel,  of  course. 
took  time,  and,  indeed,  was  never  actually  completed,  for  the 
pivot  flank  could  not  wait,  and  came  in  contact  with  the 
enemy,  and  was  broken  and  retiring  before  the  outer  flank 
could  reach  them.'' 

This  remark  is  in  anticipation  to  explain  what  follows, 
for  now  our  author  comes  down  to  the  detail  of  the  move- 
ment of  his  own  regiment: 

"In  this  movement  we  reached  the  southeastern  corner 
of  Mars-la-Tonr,  where  Von  Schwarzkoppen  and  his  staff 
officer,  Von  Scherff,  were  sitting  near  us.  But  a  little  fur- 
ther to  the  rear  siood  two  squadrons  of  the  4th  Cuirassiers. 
Shells  were  falling  amongst  them,  and  as  these  became  more 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  107 

numerous,  they  wheeled  about  and  retired  a  short  distance; 
in  their  place  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  moved  up. 

"The  troops  were  advancing  briskly,  and  General  v  >n 
Schwarzkoppen  seemed  to  anticipate  the  success  of  the 
movement;  at  any  rate,  as  my  colonel  passed  him,  and  as 
the  violence  of  the  mitrailleur,  artillery,  and  infantry  tire 
was  fairly  astonishing  us,  he  called  out  to  him:  'Send  out 
strong  skirmishing  swarms  and  we  will  soon  get  them,'  and 
afterwards:  'Left  shoulders  up  a  little  on  the  copses/ 
Mean  while  1-57  had  extended  two'zugs'in  the  above  direction, 
and  it  seemed  as  if  a  wide  gap  would  be  formed  between 
ourselves  and  the  16th  Kegiment.  The  general,  who  noticed 
this,  rode  up  and  ordered  a  company  from  our  battalion  to 
fill  it,  which  was  at  once  carried  out.  But  the  next  moment 
its  captain  fell,  and  the  men  bearing  off  to  their  left  towards 
a  fold  of  the  ground  which  seemed  to  offer  cover,  the  gap  was 
again  created,  and  was  eventually  filled  by  the  fusilier  bat- 
talion of  the  16th,  so  that  from  a  very  early  moment  the  regi- 
ments were  intermixed.  The  abo  ve  orders  were  the  only  ones 
we  received  throughout  the  day. 

"The  co-operation  between  the  individual  battalions 
throughout  the  action  was  practically  nil.  I  was  on  horse- 
back till  I  fell  wounded  at  the  moment  almost  of  our  repulse, 
exactly  in  the  center  of  the  whole  line,  and  could  see  all  round 
me  till  the  smoke  became  too  thick,  and  the  two  battalions 
on  our  left  were  hidden  by  it. 

"The  battalions  pressed  on  independently  from  left  to 
right  towards  the  north,  whilst  our  two  batteries  fired  over 
our  heads.  As  the  1-16  and  11-16  were  on  the  shorter  line, 
they  managed  to  penetrate  the  furthest,  crossed  the  ravine 
above  mentioned,  and  kept  their  start  over  us  to  the  end. 
The  right  (Fusiliers,  57th  Regiment,  and  the  two  companies 
Pioneers)  had  the  widest  arc  to  describe, and,  in  spite  of  every 
effort,  must  have  reached  the  alignment  some  half -hour  later. 
When  we  reached  the  beginning  of  the  descent  towards 
the  ravine,  about  600  yards  from  the  enemy,  our  order  from 
right  to  left  was  as  follows:  In  the  fighting  line  5-16,  7-10, 
3-16,  2-16,  11-16,  2  zugs  2-57,  10-16,  1  zug  2-57,  1-57.  In  sup- 
port, 160  yards  in  rear— 8  and  6-16,  4  and  11-16,  12  and  9-lfi, 
4-57,  0  and  11-57,  12  and  10-57,  and  2  companies  Pioneers. 
Bui  shortly  afterwards  the  supports,  all  except  4  companies, 


108  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

pressed  forward  and  joined  the  fighting  line,  and  the  order 
was  then  as  follows:  5-16,  6-16,  7-16,  8-16,4-16,3-16,2-16,11-16, 
M6,  2  zugs  2-57, 10-16,  1  zug  2-57,  12  and  9-16,  1  zug  1-57,  11 
ind  9-57, 1  zug  1-57, 12  and  10-57, 1  zug  1-57,  with  the  Pioneers, 
and  two  other  companies  of  the  57th  Regiment  as  last  reserve 
200  yards  to  the  rear.  Till  we  reached  the  600-yard  limit  our 
losses  had  not  been  very  heavy,  but  now  we  came  under  an 
indescribably  heavy  cross-fire;  for  we,  who  had  expected,  or 
been  intended,  to  outflank  the  enemy,  now  found  we  were 
ourselves  outflanked.  The  enemy,  who  had  hitherto  lain  flat 
on  the  ground,  now  rose  and  overwhelmed  us  with  a  fire 
which  caused  us  to  halt  and  attempt  to  return  it.  This 
ruined  our  attack,  for  the  men  threw  themselves  on  the 
ground,  which  afforded  them  no  cover;  two-thirds  of  the 
officers  had  fallen,  and  after  a  while  the  inevitable  came, 
and  the  line  fell  back.  Part  of  our  line — some  eight  com- 
panies— on  the  left  certainly  reached  the  opposite  side  of 
the  ravine,  owing  to  their  having  come  on  a  gap  in  the  French 
line,  but  of  the  remainder  none  got  nearer  to  the  enemy  than 
at  nearest  400  yards. 

"The  work  of  the  general  staff  has  described  this  attack 
in  a  most  attractive  manner,  possibly  as  a  salve  to  the  troops 
for  their  tragical  fate,  but  I  can  only  state  that  its  account 
is  pure  fancy.  I  will  confine  myself  to  contradicting  it  iu 
the  following  points: 

"1.  The  five  battalions  did  not,  as  therein  described, 
cross  the  ravine  and  appear  within  80  to  100  yards  of  the 
French  line.  Of  the  20  companies,  only  8  (the  1st,  2d,  3d,  4th, 
7th,  8th,  llth  of  the  16th,  and  2d  of  the  5th)  got  across  at  all ; 
these,  having  the  shortest  way  to  go,  and  the  best  cover, 
anticipated  the  completion  of  the  French  line,  and  were 
eventually  turned  out  by  a  counter-attack.  The  remainder 
did  not  even  reach  the  hither  side  of  the  ravine  by  some  100 
yards. 

"2.  The  needle-gun  and  chassepot  did  not  act  with 
'devastating  fury'  against  each  other,  for  the  former  hardly 
jcot  within  its  effective  range,  and  we  suffered  our  losses 
without  the  power  of  retaliation. 

"3.  After  we  had  already  commenced  to  fall  back, 
the  French  got  within  50  to  30  yards  of  us,  but  this  was  due 
to  the  density  of  the  smoke  of  our  own  weapons,  under  cover 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  109 

of  which  they  made  good  their  advance,  and  if  in  places  it 
came  to  a  hand-to-hand  struggle,  it  was  because  our  men 
were  too  exhausted  to  run  away  fast  enough.* 

"4.  It  was  only  in  the  retreat  that  the  losses  rose  to  the 
point  of  dispersing  us  altogether.  Fortunately  for  us,  as 
the  enemy  had  passed  the  limit  of  our  advance  by  some  150 
j  ards,  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  attacked  them,  and  rode  them 
down.  They  ran  back,  masking  the  fire  of  their  own  linea  in 
rear,  shooting  wildly  in  every  direction,  and  throwing  kits 
tmd  arms  away  in  their  panic.  Then  followed  a  general 
pause  along  the  whole  line,  even  the  artillery  ceased  firing, 
and  the  battle  appeared  to  be  at  an  end. 

"The  38th  Brigade  had  marched  25  miles  under  a  burn- 
ing sun  to  the  battle-field  (without  packs);  between  2,500  to 
2,000  yards  from  the  enemy  one-third  of  each  company  had 
been  extended  as  skirmishers,  by  the  general's  direct  order, 
who  rod^  about  saying,  'Only  skirmishers,  gentlemen,  only 
skirmishers,'  to  all  the  officers  he  met;  and  shortly  after- 
wards each  company  in  first  line  reinforced  its  skirmishers 
v  ith  a  second  zug,  keeping  only  a  single  zug  as  support  in 
close  order.  The  second  line  was  formed  of  half-battalion 
columns.  Finally  all  were  merged  in  one  shooting  line,  ex- 
cept two  companies,  who  remained  in  close  order,  lying 
down  by  direct  order  of  my  colonel,  who  remarked,  as  he 
gave  it,  that  he  did  not  expect  much  from  the  style  of  fight- 
ing going  on.  And  to  complete  the  picture  of  the  last  mo- 
ment, companies  12  and  9  of  the  16th  lay  in  close  order  on 
the  ground;  companies  9,  10,  11,  and  12  of  the  57th  stood 
upright  in  line  (firing  volleys  over  the  heads  of  their  skir- 
mishers), and  made  one  attempt  to  go  forward  again  to  the 
attack. 

"Every  sort  of  formation  was,  therefore,  tried — line,  col- 
rmn,  and  skirmishers — on  a  field  of  battle  which  bore  onJy 
one  character. 

*The  picturesque,  but  not  very  candid,  account  of  the  attack  in  the 
"Official  History"  contains  the  following:  "With  regardless  energy,  how- 
ever, the  Westphalian  regiments  press  onward ;  the  second  line  moves  up  to 
the  skirmishing  line  in  order  to  nil  the  vacancies  in  the  rapidly  thinned 
ranks  ;  only  weak  detachments  are  left  in  close  order  behind  the  front.  Alter- 
nately making  rushes  of  100  to  150  paces,  and  lying  down,  the  companies 
hastily  descend  the  hillside.  Here  comes  unexpectedly  to  view  in  their  front 
a  steep  ravine,  in  places  hard  on  50  feet  in  depth,  like  a  ditch  in  front  of  a 
sti'ongly  occupied  entrenchment;  but  even  this  obstacle  does  not  «»top  their 
advance.  Scaling  the  opposite  slope,  all  five  battalions  rise  quickly  to  view 
within  150,  100,  yea,  even  within  30  paces  of  the  French  line."  [Clark's  Trana 
lation,  Part  1,  Vol.  I.,  p.  407.]— A.  L.  W. 


110  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

"The  regiments  of  the  brigade  stood  side  by  side  and 
covered  a  mean  distance  of  1,500  yards  under  a  heavy  fire 
from  troops  previously  unshaken  by  artillery,  and  lost  in  do- 
ing so  72  officers  and  2,542  men,  out  of  95  officers  and  4,54(j 
men.  They  advanced  steadily  in  quick  time,  and  not  by 
rushes,  and  did  not  halt  till  compelled  to  do  so  by  the  enemy's 
fire." 

I  propose  next  week  to  summarize  the  author's  criti- 
cisms, which,  though  somewhat  long-winded,  are  for  the 
most  part  very  valuable.  In  concluding  this  letter,  I  would 
only  again  call  attention  to  what  I  noticed  in  the  case  of  the 
St.  Privat  attack — viz.,  that  it  was  the  general,  and  not  the 
regimental  officers,  who  trusted  in  extended  order  from  the 
first. 

What  possible  object  it  could  serve  to  extend  one-third 
of  the  men  almost  2,000  yards  before  they  came  up  to  the 
limit  of  the  effective  fire  of  their  own  weapon,  I  leave  to  wiser 
heads  to  discover.  But,  judging  by  his  subsequent  writings, 
Von  Scherff,  who  was  present  as  the  general's  staff  officer, 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  favorably  impressed  with  the 
value  of  this  course. 


In  my  last  week's  letter  I  followed  the  brigade  up  to  the 
moment  when  the  advance  to  the  attack  was  begun,  and 
pointed  out  how  over-haste  and  hurry  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
mander led  to  thejir  moving  off  even  before  the  change  of 
front  to  the  left  was  completed,  so  that  the  right  wing  (the 
27th  Eegiment)  was  racing  to  get  round  into  the  new  align- 
ment, which  indeed  they  never  succeeded  in  reaching.  This 
is  how  Major  Hoenig  describes  what  followed: 

"Up  to  within  some  200  yards  of  the  dip  into  the  ravine 
the  two  half-battalions  in  support  of  the  inner  flanks  of  the 
two  regiments  advanced  level  with  one  another;  here  the 
half-battalion  of  the  57th  lay  down  by  command  of  Colonel 
von  Roell;  the  half-battalion  on  our  left  continued  their 
advance.  I  was  about  40  paces  on  their  right  rear.  At  this 
moment  a  color-sergeant  of  the  2d  company  57th,  which  it 
will  be  remembered  had  been  thrown  into  and  between  the 
companies  of  the  16th  Regiment  by  direct  order  of  the  gen- 
eral, came  up  to  Colonel  von  Roell  and  reported  that  his  'zng' 
would  no  longer  follow  him;  he  had  repeatedly  risen  and 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  Ill 

gone  in  front  of  them,  but  they  would  not  get  up.  The  colo- 
nel turned  to  me  and  said,  'Hide  back  with  him,  and  see  what 
YOU  can  do/  I  went,  but  most  of  the  men  lay  dead  or 
wounded  on  the  ground  in  the  ranks  just  as  they  had  stood. 
With  the  aid  of  some  few  devoted  men  and  the  color-sergeant 
—a  real  hero  in  the  truest  sense  of  the  word — we  succeeded 
in  getting  some  of  the  survivors  to  go  on.  The  rest  attached 
themselves  to  the  advancing  half-battalion  in  support,  which 
now  pushed  forward  and  joined  the  shooting  line.  I  returned 
and  found  the  colonel  where  I  had  left  him.  On  our  right 
another  half -battalion  of  our  regiment  has  just  deployed  and 
fired  a  couple  of  volleys,  apparently  into  the  backs  of  the 
company  in  front.  The  colonel  turned  to  me  and  said,  'We 
must  get  some  order  into  the  state  of  things;  the  Fusiliers 
(57th)  are  firing  into  my  1st  company,  the  16th  have  carried 
away  my  second.  If  only  Bernewitz  (commander  of  the  3d 
company)  with  the  flag  will  look  out/  This  is  simple  hell.' 
We  rode  forward  together,  and  so  came  in  rear  of  the  fusilier 
battalion  of  the  16th,  which  was  lying  behind  a  small  hedge ; 
and  this  is  the  picture  that  we  saw:  The  colonel  on  foot,  at 
his  side  the  adjutant  severely  wounded  on  the  ground,  both 
their  horses  dead  behind  them.  A  captain,  Ohly,  still  on 
his  horse,  close  to  him  the  colors;  he  had  a  rifle  in  his  hand, 
and  was  alternately  encouraging  his  men  and  shooting  at 
the  enemy.  Skirmishers  lay  on  either  flank  and  in  front,  bill 
the  half-battalion  which  this  officer  commanded,  and  which 
has  been  referred  to  above,  was  still  in  close  order.  A  few 
shots  only  fell  from  our  men,  there  was  no  regular  fire  fight. 
The  colonel  of  the  Fusiliers  (16th)  begged  my  chief  to  dis- 
mount, which  he  did.  The  next  moment  his  horse  reared  up 
and  fell  over  dead.  He  knelt  down  by  the  side  of  the  others, 
who  said,  'We  have  a  little  cover  here ;  as  long  as  the  fire  con- 
tinues so  heavy  we  must  stay;  their  ammunition  cannot  last 
lor  ever.'  A  moment  or  two  later  the  regimental  adjutant 
of  the  16th,  Lieutenant  von  Wolzogen,  rode  up.  His  white 
charger  was  bleeding  from  several  wounds;  but  he  himself 
was  unhurt,  and  as  calm  as  on  church  parade.  He  reported : 
'My  chief  is  dead,  and  we  have  been  repulsed.'  Scarcely  h-.id 
he  said  this  when  out  of  the  hollow  in  front,  and  not  100  yards 
distant,  the  enemy  rose  up  with  shouts  of  'En  avant!  en 

avant!    Courage!    courage!' My  colonel  shouted  one 

^pST^-3 

foJ^  OS 


11^  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

last  order  and  fell  dead;  then  everything  went  back I  p 

to  this  point,  though  our  losses  had  been  very  heavy, 
yet  they  had  not  been  sufficiently  severe  to  rob  us  of  all  de- 
fensive power;  but  the  attack  was  too  sudden;  favored  by 
the  ground  and  the  dense  clouds  of  smoke,  the  enemy  had 
vaanaged  to  bring  a  vast  numerical  superiority  right  up  to 
our  muzzles,  and  the  impression  was  too  much  for  the  nerves 
of  the  men.  Had  the  French  not  stopped  to  plunder  our  d^ad 
and  wounded,  it  would  have  been  all  over  with  u,s. 

"About  this  moment  I  myself  was  wounded,  but,  sup- 
ported by  a  couple  of  men,  I  managed  to  drag  myself  a  little 
way  back;,  but  then  both  of  my  bearers  were  hit,  and  we  ail 
three  lay  together. 

"The  French  had  halted  a  few  moments,  but  soon  re- 
sumed their  advance  and  now  passed  over  us:  first  a  skir- 
mishing line,  then  a  second,  also  in  extended  order,  and  final- 
ly a  battalion  in  line;  it  was  a  moment  of  horrible  suspense 
lor  us.  The  first  line  was  firing  briskly,  in  the  second  every- 
thing was  in  disorder;  each  man  seemed  to  be  trying  to  keep 
his  pluck  up  by  shouting  'Courage!  En  avant!'  but  no  one 
took  any  notice  of  his  neighbor,  but  devoted  himself  to  rob- 
bing the  fallen.  This  was  the  moment  in  which  the  1st 
Guard  Dragoons  attacked;  the  enemy's  infantry  was  thrown 
into  complete  disorder,  but  on  the  whole  remained  on  /V.v 
ground.  Their  fire  ceased,  howrever,  and  there  was  an  oppor 
trinity  for  rallying  and  re-forming  what  remained  of  the  bri- 
gade. But  here  occurred  an  evil  contretemps.  An  adjutant 
galloped  across  the  field  from  left  to  right,  shouting  with  all 
his  might,  'Retreat  on  Thiaueourt!'  I  raised  myself  up  and 
took  a  last  view  of  the  scene  all  round  me — killed,  wounded, 
and  a  terrible  wrailing,  and  on  the  top  of  all,  this  order ;  could 
1  form  any  other  conclusion  but  that  all  wras  lost?  The  regi- 
ments had  lost  almost  all  their  officers,  and  the  men  were 
retiring  in  every  direction;  actually,  the  majority  only  ral- 
lied to  their  flags  about  noon  the  next  day.  This  is  an  exam- 
ple of  how  not  to  give  orders  on  the  battle-field.  The  over- 
hastiness  which  had  ruined  our  advance  was  now  equally 
fatal  in  the  retreat.  All  were,  however,  not  so  indiscreet. 
The  artillery  fire  had  again  re-commenced  with  great  vio- 
lence, when  I  saw  Lieutenant  Neumeister,  of  the  staff  of  the 
10th  Corps,  riding  quietly  at  a  walk  across  the  field,  halting 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  113 

now  and  again  to  give  orders.  A  man  of  really  iron  charac- 
ter, he  deserves  the  highest  praise  for  his  coolness  and  devo- 
tion to  duty.  He  it  was  to  whom  the  credit  of  bringing  order 
out  of  chaos  is  principally  due.  His  calm  bearing  revived 
our  sinking  spirits;  everything  then  was  not  as  yet  lost. 

"The  retreat  of  the  38th  Brigade  was  the  most  terrible 
drama  of  the  whole  war.  It  had  lost  53  per  cent  of  ics 
strength,  and  the  proportion  of  killed  to  wounded  was  as  o 
to  4.  The  burning  heat,  the  preceding  forced  march,  and  the 
racing  pace  at  which  we  had  attacked  had  done  their  work. 
The  soul  had  no  longer  power  over  the  body.  I  saw  men 
crying  like  children;  others  fell  dead  from  exhaustion;  most 
had  only  one  thought — viz.,  for  water.  'Water !  water!'  was 
almost  the  only  cry  one  heard  from  these  shadow-like  bodies. 
The  enemy's  bullets  still  hummed  and  whistled  after  them, 
but  slowly,  with  drooping  heads  and  distorted  features,  they 
v/ound  along,  too  dead-beat  to  feel  their  danger.  A  couple 
of  smart  squadrons  of  lancers,  and  not  a  soul  would  have 
escaped.  Whoever  has  once  looked  on  the  faces  of  men  in 
such  extreme  moments  can  never  forget  the  impression  of 
absolute  insanity  they  convey— insanity  brought  on  by  over- 
exertion  of  the  body  and  the  horrible  strain  on  the  mind. 
Through  the  broken  remains  of  the  infantry  rode  here  and 
there  individual  men  of  the  cavalry,  their  swords  still  ex- 
tended forward  at  the  engage,  but  horse  and  rider  perfect  ly 
mad,  still  under  the  impression  that  they  are  charging. 

'*  ' Where  are  your  officers?7  asked  the  men  in  the  bat- 
teries of  the  stragglers.  'We  have  none  left/  was  the  an- 
swer, and  with  few  exceptions  this  was  almost  literal  truth; 
but  these  few  did  what  men  could  do  to  rally  the  men,  and 
\vith  partial  success,  for  some  did  succeed  in  getting  together 
from  twenty  to  forty  men  and  marching  them  off  the  field  in 
order.  One  fact  in  particular  deserves  to  be  borne  in  mind, 
mid  that  is,  that  in  no  single  case  did  I  see  a  man  throw  awav 
Ms  arms  or  accouterments." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  follow  Major  Hoenig  into  his  re- 
searches how  the  brigade  should  have  been  handled,  for  the 
mistakes  made  are  too  self-evident,  and  a  positive  result 
against  such  enormous  odds  out  of  the  question;  but  the  fol- 
lowing notes  as  to  the  formation  actually  employed,  and  the 


114  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

duration  of  the  attack,  will  be  useful  for  those  who  believe 
the  secret  of  victory  to  be  in  the  use  or  disuse  of  certain 
formations. 

"At  2,500  meters  from  the  enemy,  the  2d  battalion  IGth 
TV  as  in  line  of  company  columns,  and  next  to  it  the  1st  bat- 
talion with  two  companies  in  first  line,  each  in  column,  and 
the  remaining  two  following  in  half-battalion  column,  and 
the  fusiliers  of  the  same  regiment  in  similar  formation. 

"Then  came  the  1st  battalion  57th,  two  companies  wholly 
extended  almost  from  the  first,  and  the  other  two  in  company 
columns.  The  fusilier  battalion  stood  originally  in  column 
of  double  companies  on  the  center,  but  broke  in  two  half- 
battalion  columns  on  entering  the  zone  of  fire.  The  two 
pioneer  companies  remained  in  company  columns.  As  the 
fight  progressed,  they  all  melted  into  skirmishers,  except 
one  half-battalion  of  the  16th,  two  company  columns  of  the 
same,  and  the  Pioneers.  These  closed  bodies  were  brought 
up  with  drums  beating  and  colors  flying  into  the  fighting  line, 
and  carried  it  forward  a  little,  and,  as  far  as  one  can  make 
out  from  the  table  of  losses,  suffered  on  the  whole  slightly 
less  loss  than  those  which  were  extended;  but  the  rout  at 
the  end  renders  it  useless  to  attach  any  importance  to  those 
figures. 

"As  regards  the  duration  of  the  attack,  as  near  as  can 
be  calculated,  2,000  meters  was  passed  over  in  about  30  min- 
utes; the  troops  held  out  in  the  position  they  had  reached 
about  the  same  time,  and  the  retreat  lasted  nearly  as  long. 
A  s  to  the  expenditure  of  ammunition,  it  is  impossible  to  give 
more  than  a  vague  estimate;  it  was,  at  any  rate,  very  slight. 
The  fusilier  companies  of  the  57th  did  not,  according  to  their 
officers,  fire  more  than  3  to  5  rounds  per  man;  and  the  rest 
about  10  or  thereabouts;  making  a  total  of  about  20,000 
rounds.  The  French,  on  the  other  hand,  are  estimated  to 
have  expended  at  least  1,600,000  rounds;  and  comparing  this 
with  the  number  of  killed  and  wounded,  we  get  one  Prussian 
hors  de  combat  for  760  rounds;  and  this  in  spite  of  a  far- 
ranging,  flat-trajectoried  weapon,  and  a  perfectly  open  field 
of  fire.  One  cannot  help  wondering  what  the  result  would 
have  been  had  the  artillery  preparation  been  thoroughly  car- 
ried out  first,  and  the  Prussian  rifle  been  equal  in  the  above 
dualities  to  that  of  their  adversaries. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  115 

"The  French  return  their  own  losses  at  200  officers  and 
2,258  men,  which  must  all  have  been  inflicted  by  the  38th 
Brigade,  its  two  batteries,  and  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons.  But, 
MS  above  pointed  out,  the  infantry  only  fired  20,000  rounds, 
and  there  was  no  particular  artillery  preparation.  These 
figures  appear  incredible,  even  to  the  Germans  themselves, 
but,  though  enquiries  have  been  made  in  Paris,  the  French 
stick  to  their  figures.  Possibly  the  artillery  fire  during  and 
after  the  retreat  may  have  been  more  effective  than  supposed, 

"It  is  a  fair  assumption  that  half  the  German  losses  were 
inflicted  on  them  in  the  retreat.  The  five  battalions,  or  4,500 
men,  lost,  therefore,  in  advancing  a  mile  across  the  open 
under  fire,  36  officers  and  1,016  men,  about.  And  this  in 
face  of  a  fire  whose  quantity  could  not  reasonably  be  in- 
creased by  the  introduction  of  the  magazine  rifle,  for  the 
numerical  superiority  must  be  taken  into  account.  But  the 
brigade  reached  the  effective  limit  of  fire  of  their  own  arms, 
still  in  a  condition  to  continue  the  struggle.  The  formations 
adopted,  therefore,  justified  themselves,  and  the  reason  for 
the  defeat  cannot  fairly  be  attributed  to  them,  but  can  only 
be  found  in  the  wrant  of  skill  and  unity  in  the  command,  its 
numerical  inferiority,  and  general  ignorance  of  the  state  of 
things  on  the  side  of  the  enemy." 

I  think  the  above,  and  the  account  of  the  attack  of  the 
Guards  at  St.  Privat  recently  published  in  these  columns, 
ought  pretty  well  to  break  down  the  received  ideas  on  which 
our  recent  infantry  tactics  have  been  based.  These  ideas 
may  be  reduced  to  the  contention  that,  in  face  of  the  modern 
arms  of  precision  (?  one  man  disabled  for  760  rounds  fired), 
troops  can  only  advance  in  extended  order.  Yet  in  both 
these  two  examples,  the  bloodiest  in  the  whole  war,  we  not 
only  find  that  they  did  advance  in  close  order,  but  that  the 
companies  that  did  so  not  only  did  not  incur  heavier  losses, 
but  pushed  up  to  the  front  and  carried  the  wavering  line  of 
skirmishers  a  little  bit  further  with  them.  The  dispropor- 
tion in  the  numbers  was  altogether  so  overwhelming  in  the 
case  of  the  38th  Brigade  that  more  could  not  have  been 
expected  of  them  than  what  they  actually  accomplished; 
but  this  very  disproportion  settles,  to  my  mind,  conclusively 
that,  under  reasonable  conditions  as  to  armament  and  nurn- 


116  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

bers,  the  possibility  of  an  advance  in  a  similar  formation — 
i.  e.,  skirmishers  in  front  and  line  or  small  columns  behind — 
is  by  no  means  precluded,  and,  indeed,  that  as  regards  suita- 
bility for  the  end  in  view  in  a  decisive  attack,  close  order  has 
altogether  the  best  of  it  For  the  object  in  such  an  attack 
is  to  win  at  any  cost,  for  the  bloodiest  victory  is  cheaper  than 
defeat,  and  the  possibility  of  victory  is  primarily  dependent 
on  the  number  of  rifles  that  can  ultimately  be  brought  to 
bear.  Taking  into  account  the  tendency  to  "skulk"  now  ad- 
mitted by  the  Germans  themselves,  and  it  is  evident  that 
close-order  formations  will  deliver  a  larger  number  of  rilles 
on  the  line  of  skirmishers  than  any  other  formation,  and  it 
will  depend  entirely  on  the  quality  of  the  troops  themselves 
what  degree  of  closeness  is  considered  necessary,  though 
under  ordinary  circumstances  the  choice  will  be  between 
t  ompany  columns  and  line  two  deep.  It  will  matter  nothing, 
if,  when  the  lists  of  killed  and  wounded  are  made  out  the  day 
after  the  victory,  the  percentage  of  loss  stands  a  little  higher, 
than  may  seem  to  the  critics  to  have  been  necessary.  Suc- 
cess is  the  only  criterion,  and  that  success  may  fairly  be 
attributed  to  the  all-compelling  power  of  discipline  and  the 
habit  of  close-order  training,  which  rendered  it  possible  to 
deliver  the  right  number  of  rifles  in  line  at  the  right  place. 
All  experience  proves  the  difficulty  of  forcing  men  on  in  face 
of  heavy  loss  in  individual  order,  and  that  a  far  higher  per- 
centage of  loss  can  be  borne  by  the  line,  though  the  exact 
ratio  is  impossible  to  arrive  at;  but  it  may  reasonably  be 
assumed  as  1  to  2.  Let  us  assume  the  fire  of  2,000  rifles 
at  400  yards  as  requisite  to  turn  an  enemy  out  of  position: 
then  if  20  per  cent  is  the  highest  loss  troops  trained  princi- 
pally to  open-order  fighting  can  be  got  to  advance  against, 
then  probably  10,000  men  will  have  to  be  put  in  to  bring  the 
fighting  line  up  to  the  required  strength;  but  if  close-order 
training  forms  the  groundwork  of  their  military  education, 
then  probably  4,000  will  be  amply  sufficient,  for,  since  they 
will  continue  to  advance  under  losses  which  would  have 
brought  the  others  to  a  standstill,  fewer  reinforcements  will 
be  required,  and  the  total  time  under  fire  will  be  correspond- 
ingly diminished.  Of  course,  in  either  case  the  fighting  line 
must  be  in  extended  order,  because  that  extended  order  is 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  117 

required  to  develop  its  fire  effect  to  the  fullest  possible  limit; 
but  what  is  meant  is  that  the  basis  of  all  infantry  training 
should  be  discipline  and  concentration  of  will  in  the  old 
close-order  school,  and  not  the  training  of  men  to  avoid 
losses.  What  that  means,  the  pages  of  the  "Midsummer- 
Night's  Dream"  show  us  pretty  graphically.  What  the  other 
signifies,  Albuera,  and  the  countless  other  exploits  of  the 
line,  whose  names  are  borne  on  our  regimental  colors  and 
those  of  the  German  army,  are  there  to  testify;  and  since  the 
nature  of  man  changes  but  slowly,  I  believe  that  the  same 
contempt  of  death  can  be  induced  by  training  nowadays  as 
it  was  then;  for,  to  my  mind,  death  and  disablement  are  just 
as  unpleasant  to  face,  whether  from  the  muzzle  of  the  latest 
improvement  in  repeating  small-bore  weapons  or  from  a  ten- 
rupee  jezail — indeed,  to  the  thinking  mind  the  latter  is  the 
more  terrible,  as  it  carries  the  larger  bullet  of  the  two. 


Major  Fritz  Hoenig's  work  is  not  exactly  conspicuous 
for  lucidity  of  arrangement,  and  he  is  terribly  given  to  repe- 
tition. His  book  is  divided  into  two  parts — the  first  histor- 
ical, and  the  second  "psychological,"  as  he  chooses  to  call  it; 
and  in  the  second  he  goes  over  much  the  same  ground  as  in 
the  first,  with  the  addition  of  more  personal  experiences  and 
observations,  many  of  them  of  very  great  value  to  all  English 
soldiers  who  really  wish  to  grasp  the  true  principles  of  their 
profession.  For  it  must  be  understood  that  the  current 
notions  on  the  nature  of  breech-loading  fighting  in  Great 
Britain  at  the  present  are  almost  entirely  based  on  false 
premises;  chief  amongst  which  are  the  three  so  often  com- 
bated in  these  columns — viz.,  that  the  losses  in  battle  were: 
1st.  abnormally  heavy;  2d,  that  they  were  due  exclusively 
to  the  breech-loader;  and  3d,  that  experience  proved  that 
troops  could  only  advance  to  the  attack  in  extended  order. 
Actually  every  one  of  these  premises  is  directly  contradicted 
by  facts,  and  the  bulk  of  German  regimental  officers  who 
were  eye-witnesses  of  the  events  themselves  have  long  been 
aware  that  it  was  so.  Only  for  many  and  obvious  reasons 
they  have  not  chosen  to  publish  these  facts  to  the  world. 
Whether  they  will  be  grateful  to  Major  Hoenig,  I  am  doubt- 
ful; if  they  are,  they  will  give  proof  of  great  magnanimity. 


118  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

After  reading  the  book  most  carefully,  I  am  inclined  to 
believe  that  the  real  motive  of  its  publication  has  been  to 
inform  the  junior  officers,  who  have  hitherto  had  no  war  ex- 
perience, what  the  battle-fields  of  '70  were  really  like,  and 
thus  prevent  them  from  falling  into  the  same  errors  as  we 
have  done;  and  this  I  should  think  it  was  admirably  calcu- 
lated to  effect,  as  it  strips  the  gilt  off  the  gingerbread  in  a 
very  wholesome  manner.  But  I  will  let  the  author  speak  for 
himself.  The  introductory  portion  of  the  second  part  is  so 
admirable  that  I  give  it  almost  in  extenso. 

"Frederick  the  Great  conquered  the  armies  of  half 
Europe,  not  so  much  because  his  tactics  were  better,  as  re- 
gards form,  than  those  of  his  enemies,  but  because  they 
were  based  on  a  more  thorough  appreciation  and  knowledge 
of  the  human  factor,  the  soldier.  Where  he  asked  too  much 
of  them,  as  at  Kolin,  his  grenadiers  were  swept  away  in 
spite  of  their  iron  discipline,  like  the  38th  Brigade  at  Mars- 
la-Tour.  The  great  king  was  above  all  things  a  student  of 
humanity,  and  used  to  announce  his  discoveries  with  a 
straightforward  truthfulness  that  no  other  general  has  ever 
excelled.  His  army  was  in  the  full  tide  of  its  success  when 
he  wrote  to  his  generals  in  one  of  his  tactical  instructions: 
'The  Prussian  soldier,  taken  in  the  mass,  is  naturally  indo- 
lent—i.  e.,  does  little  or  nothing  on  his  own  initiative,  but 
requires  to  be  driven/  That  no  one  dies  willingly,  and  that 
naturally  every  one's  chief  desire  is  to  preserve  his  life  and 
avoid  danger,  is  true  now  as  it  was  then.  If  one  keeps  that 
idea  before  one,  it  is  possible  to  approximate  an  idea  of  what 
may  reasonably  be  expected  from  the  self-sacrifice  of  the 
individual,  and  what  remains  to  be  done  by  discipline  and 
1he  example  of  the  officers.  This  nature  of  the  man  must 
indicate  the  forms  which  are  required  to  combat  this  natural 
'indolence/ 

"The  great  majority  of  our  men  are  only  impressed  by 
deeds,  and  therefore  the  king  honored  every  bold  action,  in 
order  to  stimulate  the  emulation  and  courage  of  the  officers, 
to  enable  them  to  react  on  the  men.  His  successes  in  the 
attack  were  based  on  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  a  check 
in  the  forward  motion  is  generally  synonymous  with  failure. 
Hence  he  allowed  no  artificial  pauses  for  rest  or  to  g^t 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  119 

breath,  but  strove  all  he  could  to  avoid  them,  and  sought  to 
attain  perfection,  inspiring  the  officers  with  a  feeling  of 
honor,  and  developing  in  them  a  power  of  will,  which  quailed 
before  no  losses.  That  was  their  "education.'  The  moral 
ellect  of  fire  is,  as  a  rule,  much  greater  than  the  actual  losses 
it  inflicts,  and  this  is  more  the  case  now  with  magazine  riiles 
and  high  explosive  shells  than  it  was  then;  and  that  system 
of  tactics  which  enables  the  example  of  the  leaders  to  do 
most,  must  still  be  theoretically  the  best.  His  frontal 
attacks  were  even  more  bloody  than  any  executed  against  the 
breech-loader,  but  the  iron  discipline  and  the  example  of  the 
leaders  triumphed  over  all.  In  the  main,  his  principles  were 
those  of  the  'Midsummer -Night's  Dream'  school.  The  sol- 
dier iired  only  by  word  of  command,  and  only  at  the  short- 
est ranges,  but  then  with  a  rapidity  hitherto  undreamt  of 
(five  volleys  a  minute),  and  every  effort  was  made  to  keep  the 
racks  closed.  But  the  difference  between  then  and  now  lay 
in  the  fact  that  the  prospect  of  heavy  losses  was  taken  into 
account  from  the  first,  and  every  effort  made  to  teach  ihe 
troops  to  endure  them,  whereas  now  the  tendency  either  is 
to  consider  the  individual  too  much  or  too  little,  assuming 
tli at  even  on  the  battle-field  he  will  work  with  the  precision 
of  a  machine  bereft  of  nerves  and  their  functions.  Meckel 
is  the  exponent  of  one  extreme,  and  Boguslawski  and  his 
school  of  the  other;  the  former  making  of  the  company  (or 
small  unit  under  an  officer)  a  shooting  machine  working  auto- 
matically under  the  officer's  control;  the  latter  making  de- 
mands on  the  individual  heroism  of  the  man  which  only  an 
army  of  heroes  would  be  capable  of  attaining  to.  But  of  all 
the  factors  which  condition  a  man's  actions,  self-preserva- 
tion lasts  longest;  the  others  melt  away  sooner  or  later  in 
presence  of  danger,  but  the  latter  waxes  only  stronger;  and 
if  the  system  of  training  leads  the  men  to  suppose  that  the 
care  of  their  own  life  is  the  primary  consideration,  and  it  is 
theirs  and  not  their  leaders'  to  choose  when  they  are  to  give 
it  up,  no  prospect  of  success  lies  before  them." 

Then  follow  two  or  three  exceedingly  interesting  pages, 
but  a  little  too  tedious  for  ordinary  readers,  the  gist  of  which 
is  that  compromise  is  the  common-sense  way  out  of  the  difii- 
cultv;  utilize  the  heroism  of  the  individual  man  as  far  as  it 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

goes,  but  when  whistling  bullets  and  shrieking  shell  splin- 
ters have  taken  off  the  first  edge  of  their  gallantry,  be  pre- 
pared to  back  them  up  by  men  trained  to  follow  their  officers, 
and  train  those  officers  as  in  fact  only  officers  can  be  trained 
— viz.,  by  tradition,  honor,  and  strength  of  character  above 
I  In:  fear  of  death,  which  with  short-service  soldiers  (i.  e., 
three-year  conscripts)  is  an  unattainable  ideal. 

As  regards  the  possibility  of  so  training  them  (the 
officers),  what  he  says  is  deserving  of  close  study,  particu- 
larly by  those  who  have  not  yet  undergone  the  ordeal  by  tiro. 
First  the  sense  of  "responsibility"  must  be  brought  home  to 
them.  This  compels  a  man  to  think  and  to  train  himself, 
and  fills  those  who  have  it  in  them  to  become  leaders  with  a 
feeling  of  duty  and  of  confidence  in  themselves;  weaker 
natures  are  frightened  at  responsibility.  The  system  of 
1  mining,  therefore,  should  be  such  as  will  weed  them  out. 
Although  exceptional  strength  of  will  is  rare,  still  a  certain 
degree  of  it  can  be  developed  in  all  men  who  are  not  abso- 
lutely vicious  or  cowardly;  and  by  a  course  of  moral  train- 
Ing  like  that  which  Madame  Blavatsky's  chelas  are  said  to 
undergo. 

"Only  under  pressure  of  responsibility  will  a  man  put  his 
heart  into  his  work,  and  responsibility  teaches  a  man  to 
think,  but  close  thinking  is  precisely  the  hardest  exertion 
of  all,  if  it  be  continuous."  Axioms,  the  truth  of  which  will 
be  recognized  by  all  who  have  ever  been  through  the  mill, 
and  which  seem  to  have  been  written  expressly  for  the  Brit- 
ish army,  for  the  most  striking  difference  one  notices  be- 
tween our  officers  and  men  of  the  same  families  and  educa- 
tion, but  engaged  in  civil  life,  such  as  barristers,  engineers, 
etc.,  is  that  the  former,  though  frequently  full  of  informa- 
tion, cannot  think,  and  seem  unable  to  co-ordinate  in  their 
minds  facts  in  their  relative  order  of  importance.  But  to 
rel  urn  to  our  author : 

"Responsibility  leads  to  the  development  of  a  proper 
feeling  of  pride,  with  its  concomitant  power  of  feeling  shame; 
and  these  two  together  are  the  most  important  moral  lever 
for  overcoming  temporary  weakness;"  and  then  follow 
passages  in  liis  own  life  almost  as  remorselessly  directed 
as  Marie  Bashkirtseff  in  her  now  celebrated  diary  discloses 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  121 

her  own  secrets ;  and  from  these  experiences  he  deduces  the 
conclusion  that  what,  was  possible  for  him  is  possible  for  all 
other  ordinary  characters;  and  therefore  that  it  is  just  and 
expedient  to  make  sharp  examples  of  those  who  cannot  over- 
come their  natural  weaknesses.  Again  a  lesson  we  would 
do  well  to  take  to  heart,  for  the  knowledge  that  such  punish- 
ment was  inevitable  would  do  much  to  steel  a  weakening 
resolution.  "When  an  army  only  consists  of  the  lowest, 
classes  of  the  population,  then  the  officer  is  everything,  and 
his  men  nothing  more  than  automatons;  but  when  such  men 
find  themselves  in  a  really  tight  corner,  then  nothing  c-iu 
hold  them.  Where,  on  the  contrary,  the  army  embraces  all 
classes  in  its  ranks,  then  the  interval  between  officer  and  man 
is  correspondingly  reduced,  and  nothing  can  be  effected  by 
the  old  methods  of  compulsion.  As  false,  therefore,  as  it  is 
to  hope  everything  from  the  maintenance  of  the  tactical 
formations  of  Frederick  the  Great's  day,  just  as  false  is  it, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  wish  to  banish  all  close-order  forms 
from  the  battle-field ;  because  then  all  leading  is  at  an  end, 
and  the  majority  of  the  men  would  never  be  brought  within 
effective  attacking  range  at  all.  Therefore  the  men  must 
be  trained  in  both  directions,  so  that  the  superior  leading 
may  avail  itself  of  either  power  according  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  fight." 

We  now  come  to  the  psychological  dissection  of  he 
events  of  the  16th  of  August  in  as  far  as  they  concern  the 
38th  Brigade  (Von  Wedell's): 

''The  38th  Brigade  had  accomplished  the  distance  from 
Bingen  (on  the  Rhine)  to  Pont  a  Mousson  in  10  days,  and,  in 
spite  of  great  hardship  from  the  heat,  had  borne  their  exer- 
tions well.  During  the  march  news  of  victory  had  reached 
it  from  all  sides,  so  that  the  men  looked  forward,  full  of  con- 
fidence, to  their  first  meeting  with  the  enemy.  I  am  no  friend 
of  such  expressions  as  'burning  with  battle  ardor,'  for  they 
are  only  misrepresentations  of  human  nature,  which  wo-ild 
rather  shun  danger  than  encounter  it.  But  in  this  case  the 
reckless  declaration  of  war  had  wounded  the  feelings  both 
of  king  and  nation,  and  as  a  consequence  the  love  of  country 
of  the  troops  was  inflamed  to  the  highest  degree.  The  aim 
of  1  he  general  had  become  that  of  (he  army  and  of  the  nation, 


122  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

and  every  oiie  was  prepared,  and  actually  did  do,  all  that  in 
him  lay  to  carry  it  out;  aiid  what  we  did,  equally  with  what 
we  failed  to  do,  shows  the  extreme  limits  of  what  national 
passion  can  achieve.  For  even  in  peace-time  the  march 
would  have  been  an  exceptional  one,  and  would  not  have 
been  accomplished  with  so  small  a  percentage  of  stragglers." 
[Unfortunately,  the  percentage  is  not  given,  but  appears  to 
have  been  about  10  per  cent,  which,  considering  half  the  men 
were  reservists,  in  no  training  for  marching,  and  in  ii'i\v 
boots,  is  certainly  a  very  low7  average.] 

"But  a  battle  with  its  thousand-fold  dangers,  in  which 
the  life  of  the  individual  appears  to  be  directly  threatene.i. 
and  each  remains  constantly  under  the  impression  of  .danger, 
requires  a  higher  grade  of  will-power.  If  on  the  march,  the 
quality  is  apparent  in  the  determined  endurance  of  hardship ; 
on  the  battle-field  a  higher  'potential'  is  required;  the  man 
who  would  march  till  he  dropped  cannot  be  induced  to  leu  ve 
his  protecting  shelter  and  go  forward  across  the  bullet-swept 
ground  in  front  of  him,  either  by  command  or  by  the  most 
daring  example;  and  the  sergeant,  who  through  a  long  S«T- 
vice  of  peace  and  war  has  won  the  reputation  of  being  a  brave 
soldier,  and  who,  moreover,  is  supposed  to  possess  a  degree 
of  moral  superiority,  and  has  been  called  to  the  honor  of 
carrying  the  colors  of  the  regiment,  those  symbols  of  all  mili- 
tary virtues,  throws  himself  flat  on  the  ground  the  moment 
the  eye  of  his  officer  is  no  longer  on  him,  and  only  for  the 
moment  will  the  Has  wave  above  the  field  when  the  cry  of 
'Falme  hoch!'  ('Raise  the  colors!')  recalls  him  for  a  few  sec- 
onds to  a  sense  of  his  duty — only  for  a  few  seconds,  for  self- 
preservation  is  the  first  law  of  nature,  and  only  heroes  can 
break  through  it. 

"Who  would  lead  troops  must  be  a  judge  of  men,  and 
the  officer  must  never  forget  that  the  measure  he  applies  to 
himself  can  only  be  applied  to  a  few  of  those  he  leads.  Will, 
determination,  devotion,  and  courage,  even  in  the  bravest, 
are  not  always  at  the  same  tension.  It  is  not  to-day  what  it 
was  yesterday,  and  changes  with  a  hundred  conditions,  such 
as  the  man's  health,  state  of  hunger,  etc.,  a  fact  which  every 
one  can  ascertain  for  himself;  but  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  troops  of  the  88th  Brigade  went  into  action  under  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  123 

most  favorable  conditions  possible  for  the  development  of 
these  characteristics.  But  did  these  suffice  to  save  them 
from  defeat  and  its  inevitable  consequences?  No!  They 
fell  back  so  completely  broken  that  they  did  not  even  think 
of  defence.  Hence  it  follows  that  there  is  a  limit  to  what 
may  be  accomplished,  even  where  all  these  characteristics 
are  present  in  their  highest  development,  and  this  limit  must 
be  recognized  by  the  leader,  so  that  he  learns  to  limit  his 
demands  to  the  attainable,  and  does  not  live  in  a  world  of 
illusions. 

"I  do  not  hesitate  to  confess  that  the  impressions  of  the 
fire  we  encountered  at  Mars-la-Tour  shook  my  nerves  for 
months  afterwards.  Troops  who  have  been  through  such  an 
ordeal  are  shaken  for  a  long  time,  both  the  officers  and  men. 
Even  Skobeleff,  to  whom  none  will  deny  the  possession  of 
the  rarest  qualities  of  personal  courage  and  restless  activity, 
made  the  same  admission  as  to  his  own  command  after  the 
three-days  fighting  at  the  Green  Hills  at  Plevna,  and  yet  his 
losses  in  the  whole  three  days  fell  far  short  of  ours  at  Mars- 
(u-Tour  (42  per  cent  against  53  per  cent) ;  and  sober  men  who 
know  what  war  really  is  will  recognize  the  truth  of  my  state- 
ments. The  only  courage  which  can  stay  is  based  on  self- 
conquest,  and  not  the  mere  expression  of  physical  health  and 
strength." 

Notes  on  the  Battle-Field  and  the  Enemy's  Forces. 

"Of  the  fighting  line  of  the  10th  and  3d  Corps  east  of 
Mars-la-Tour  we  could  only  see  four  batteries  in  action,  but 
already  from  a  point  a  little  south  of  the  great  road,  Mars-la- 
Tour,  Vionville,  one  could  take  in  the  French  position,  which 
stretched  from  the  height  (846)  on  the  map  of  the  Prussian 
official  account  westwards  up  to  La  Grey  ere  Ferme  (about 
o.500  yards),  and  was  occupied  by  long  deployed  lines  of  in- 
fantry with  groups  of  batteries  in  the  intervals,  whose  sheila 
were  already  falling  in  and  beyond  the  village.  To  form  an 
accurate  estimate  of  their  total  strength  was  impossible,  but 
?r  was  certainly  not  less  than  a  whole  division.  It  was  4 
o'clock  as  we  moved  off  to  the  attack. 

"I  would  here  ask,  first.  What  had  been  done  to  recon- 
noiter  the  enemy's  position?  and,  secondly,  Is  it  possible  that 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

what  we  all  saw  from  the  troops  was  not  seen  by  the  general, 
who  had  occupied  the  very  spot  over  which  we  advanced  t'or 
some  time  previously?  and  if  he  did  see  it,  what  steps  were 
taken  to  bring  it  to  our  knowledge? 

"Judging  by  what  followed,  nothing  whatever  of  what 
should  and  could  have  been  done  had  been  attended  to.  A 
general  who  on  the  maneuver-ground  ventured  to  run  his 
head,  without  previous  reconnaissance,  against  an  almost 
unassailable  position,  occupied  by  a  live-fold  numerical 
superiority  of  men  armed  with  a  far  superior  weapon,  would 
at  once,  and  very  rightly,  have  his  services  dispensed  wi(i«. 
The  excuse  that  we  were  making  a  tiank  is  untenable,  for  a 
flank  attack  with  such  a  weak  front  as  was  here  the  case 
would  be  folly;  but  a  flank  attack  which,  instead  of  being 
directed  on  the  enemy's  flank,  is  really  sent  in  diagonally 
across  his  front,  and  so  is  itself  taken  in  flank,  and  at  the 
same  time  encounters  obstacles  in  the  ground  (wire  fencing 
and  the  ravine)  which  could  not  have  been  known  or  antici- 
pated by  the  executive  officers,  can  only  end  as  it  did  in  1his 
case.  But  though  the  whole  of  this  ground  had  been  in  our 
hands  for  the  last  six  hours,  not  one  word  of  the  difficulties 
to  be  encountered  had  been  allowed  to  come  to  our  knowl- 
edge; and  one  is  inclined  to  question  all  one  hears  as  to  the 
way  in  which  our  cavalry  fulfilled  its  mission  as  scouts.  J5ut 
failing  this  knowledge  of  the  ground  and  the  approximate 
strength  of  the  enemy,  what  premises  remained  on  which 
to  base  a  properly  considered  tactical  operation?  But  no, 
every  one  was  in  too  great  a  hurry.  The  brigade  was  sent  in 
even  before  it  had  completed  its  deployment;  for,  as  already 
related,  on  arrival  on  the  ground  we  stood  with  our  front 
almost  perpendicular  to  the  enemy,  and  were  in  the  act  of 
changing  front  to  the  right  when  the  order  to  advance  reached 
us,  and  we  moved  off  before  completing  it." 

PRESENT  TACTICAL  TENDENCIES  IN  THE 
GERMAN  ARMY. 

In  recent  letters  I  have  dealt  with  Major  Hoenig's  views 
51  s  to  the  action  of  the  38th  Brigade  at  Mars-la-Tour,  and  the 
deductions  he  draws  therefrom,  and  I  trust  I  have  been  able 
to  enlist  the  interest,  if  not  the  sympathies,  of  my  readers 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  125 

on  his  side — which  side  is,  indeed,  merely  the  common-sense 
view  of  the  events  as  they  actually  occurred,  and  not  the 
theoretical  aspect  of  them  as  they  presented  themselves  to 
interested  "exploiteurs"  of  new  fads,  who  wrote  their  his- 
tories or  chose  their  facts  to  fit  in  with  their  fads,  instead  of 
adopting  the  reverse  process. 

Signs  are  not  wanting  that  the  common  sense  of  the 
army  is  beginning  to  rebel  against  the  extremely  theoretical 
views  on  tactics  that  it  has  been  the  object  of  our  text-books 
and  instructors  to  cram  down  our  throats;  but  the  danger 
is  that,  when  the  inevitable  reaction  comes,  ideas  should 
swing  to  the  other  extreme  and  adopt,  as  recklessly  as  the 
other  side  did  before,  the  extreme  views  contained  in  the 
''Midsummer-Night's  Dream,"  the  translation  of  which  is 
now  appearing  in  the  United  Service  Magazine  and  which, 
to  judge  by  what  one  hears  around,  is  being  only  too  readily 
absorbed  by  those  who  take  an  interest  in  the  question. 

I  think  it  maj^,  therefore,  be  of  interest  to  lay  before 
my  readers  the  following  precis  of  a  chapter  of  Major  Hoe- 
nig's  new  book  already  referred  to,  which  will  give  a  very 
eood  idea  as  to  how  the  matter  at  present  actually  stands 
between  two  extreme  schools  in  Germany — i.  e.,  how  the  bulk 
of  the  army  actually  interprets  their  own  regulations  in  the 
light  of  the  teaching  of  the  past. 

According  to  Major  Hoenig,  the  primary  cause  of  the 
heavy  losses  incurred  during  the  early  battles  of  the  war  was 
the  failure  of  the  proper  responsible  authorities  to  communi- 
cate to  the  troops  the  result  of  the  experiments  with  the 
chassepot  rifles — the  consequence  of  which  was  that  both 
leaders  and  men  entered  the  campaign  with  an  uncomforta- 
ble feeling  of  distrust  in  their  own  arm,  and,  according  to 
their  personal  idiosyncrasy,  an  exaggerated  dread  of,  or  con- 
1cmpt  for,  the  weapon  of  their  adversary.  The  result  was 
[I  am  not  quoting  his  exact  words,  but  trying  to  give  the 
spirit  of  several  pages  of  his  book  in  a  sentence],  that  when 
the  bullets  began  to  fly  and  men  to  drop  at  distances  of  1,800 
>  ft  rds  and  over,  a  feeling  of  uncertainty  took  possession  of 
all,  and  the  troops  simply  ran  away  in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy.  The  confusion  resulting  from  this  style  of  fighting 
led  to  enormous  avoidable  loss,  without  any  adequate  return, 


126  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

and  this  confusion,  being  the  salient  experience  of  all,  was 
seized  on  by  both  parties,  which  presently  developed  them- 
selves, and  which  indeed  were  already  in  existence  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  and  made  the  basis  of  two  opposing  schools  of 
tactics,  of  which  the  one  argued  that  the  confusion  was  the 
direct  consequence  of  the  breech-loaders'  fire,  the  other  that 
it  was  the  outcome  of  insufficient  steady  drill. 

The  former  school  were  first  in  the  field,  and  it  is  the  ir 
writings  which  hitherto  have  had  the  widest  circulation  in 
England — due  to  the  fact  that  these  have  been  the  only  ones 
translated,  and  not  to  any  inherent  value  in  the  pamphlets 
themselves.  Its  chiefest  exponents  are  Boguslawski  and 
Keim,  with  Tallenbach  and  a  host  of  other  writers  of  lesser 
ability.  Their  motto  is  "Organized  disorder,"  an  idea  they 
borrowed  without  acknowledgment  from  an  earlier  writer, 
who,  as  far  back  as  1800,  fell  into  the  same  mistake  with  re- 
gard to  the  tactics  of  the  French  Revolution — viz.,  that  troops 
require  no  compulsion  to  face  fire,  but  rather  enjoy  it  than 
otherwise.  So  they  may  the  first  half-hour  or  so,  but  not  at 
the  end  of  a  long  day's  fighting,  or  after  a  couple  of  re- 
verses. They  were  good  enough  to  admit  that  education 
was  required  to  fit  them  to  fight  in  this  fashion;  but  they 
seem  to  have  built  their  structure  on  an  ideal  type  of  recruit, 
which  one  very  seldom  sees  in  Prussia  or  anywhere  else. 
Their  one  idea  of  carrying  through  a  combat  is  the  develop- 
ment of  a  superiority  of  rifle  fire  by  skirmishers  enveloping 
the  point  of  attack;  and,  logically  speaking,  they  would 
not  tolerate  anywhere  within  range  of  the  enemy  a  closed 
body  in  any  form,  but  all  troops  behind  the  fighting  line 
should  move  in  rank  entire  at  open  intervals — i.  e.,  in  the 
form  of  the  line  without  its  spirit.  But  one  has  only  to  pic- 
ture to  oneself  the  appearance  of  a  battle-field  with  even 
100,000  men  engaged  on  either  side  to  see  the  utter  iinpracti- 
cabilityof  the  idea. 

The  opposite  school  is  represented  by  Meckel  and  his  fol- 
lowers,-and  the  "Midsummer-Night's  Dream,"  though  not 
written  by  him,  may  be  taken  as  fairly  representative  of  his 
view.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  numbers  who  more 
or  less  follow  him.  In  fact,  he  may  be  considered  as  the  ex- 
ponent of  the  military  Tory  party;  of  all  who  consider  them- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  127 

selves  guardians  of  the  old  Prussian  line  traditions;  and  even 
in  Austria  he  has  many  supporters.  I  confess  to  being  a 
believer  in  him  myself,  and  consider  Hoenig  hardly  fair  jji 
assigning  the  extreme  views  of  the  "Dream"  to  him — but  it 
is  just  as  well  to  hear  the  worst  that  can  be  said  of  one's 
party  outright : 

"This  party  strives  after  an  ideal  too  fair  for  this  work- 
aday world,  It  is  the  exact  opposite  of  the  former,  and  I  say 
with  absolute  conviction  that  it  is  based  on  a  similar  false 
psychological  foundation.  They  will  have  nothing  to  say 
to  long-distance  shooting,  and  will  hear  nothing  of  skirmish- 
ing fire  and  skirmishing  forms  on  the  battle-field;  their  con- 
ception of  fighting  is  the  advance  of  small  units  of  automata, 
controlled  absolutely  by  an  officer,  to  ranges  of  200  to  300 
yards,  and  then  volley-firing — i.  e.,  they  demand  the  impossi- 
ble from  their  own  point  of  view.  But  their  demands  are 
none  the  less  dangerous  because  actually  impossible;  for  in 
peace,  when  the  bullets  are  not  flying,  their  ideal  is  not  only 
possible,  but  very  much  the  most  convenient.  The  chief 
representatives  of  this  idea  have  concentrated  around  the 
Berlin  drill-ground,  and  thence  their  views  have  been  spread 
as  those  of  men  having  authority ;  and  if  before  1888  war  had 
broken  upon  us,  against  a  respectable  enemy,  then  we  should 
probably  have  had  many  bloody  lessons  to  learn — nay,  possi- 
bly the  Berlin  drill-ground  might  have  proved  again,  as  it 
did  in  1806,  the  point  of  origin  of  the  destruction  of  the  State. 
Every  one-sidedness  in  tactics  leads  only  too  surely  to  stere- 
olyped  attack  formations,  and  these — to  defeat;  but  this 
very  one-sidedness  has  found  supporters  even  amongst  men 
who  otherwise  have  given  proof  of  ability  and  power.  Those 
who  in  1806  bore  the  blame  for  the  misfortunes  of  the  coun- 
try were  neither  stupid  nor  ignorant;  they  were  not  even 
<un soldierly';  it  was  merely  their  misfortune  that  there  hap- 
pened at  the  time  to  be  no  counter-current  of  opinion  against 
which  to  test  the  value  of  their  ideas. 

"It  is  particularly  noticeable  that  it  was  precisely 
amongst  the  very  troops  whose  experiences  at  St.  Privat 
ought  to  have  taught  them  better  that  these  ideas  princi- 
pally struck  root.  These  very  experiences  ought  to  have 
proved  to  them  that  there  was  no  short-cut  to  victory  for  any 


1~8  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

one  arm  alone,  but  that  the  united  action  of  the  two  arms, 
artillery  and  infantry,  is  requisite  to  ensure  success.  In- 
stead, they  tried  to  tind  the  cause  of  our  disasters  where  the/ 
were  not — viz.,  in  the  forms  employed,  and  not  in  the  place 
where  they  actually  originated,  the  faulty  collective  leading 
and  adaptation  of  means  to  the  end  in  view — and  in  so  doing 
gave  themselves  over  into  the  hands  of  their  opponents,  the 
BoguslawTski  school. 

"Between  these  two  divergent  ideas  there  lies,  however, 
a  middle  way,  the  principal  promoters  of  which  have  b?jn 
Von  Scherff,  Liebert,  and  Von  Ariiim;  these  will  have  noth- 
ing to  do  with  extremes  of  either  class,  but  desire  individual 
fire  and  individual  order  for  the  lighting  line,  and  forms 
^hich  are  susceptible  of  command — i.  e.,  small  columns  or 
lines  for  the  troops  in  rear.  They  demand,  further,  a  thor- 
ough preliminary  reconnaissance  of  the  ground  in  front,  so 
that  the  most  can  be  made  of  it  for  purposes  of  covered  ap- 
proach, and  the  troops  be  kept  in  hand  to  the  last  moment 
possible.  They  do  not  relinquish  in  advance  the  possibili- 
ties of  distant  fire,  but  still  prefer  to  retain  the  fire  in  hand 
as  long  as  possible,  in  order  then  to  bring  its  full  power  to 
bear;  and,  on  the  whole,  iheir  ideas  are  covered  by  the  new 
regulations  of  1st  September,  1888. 

"If  anyone  will  take  the  maps  of  the  scene  of  action  of 
the  Guard  Corps  and  the  38th  Brigade  at  St.  Privat  and 
Vionville  respectively,  and  follow  the  course  of  both  fights 
carefully,  he  will  be  compelled  to  admit  that,  even  under 
present  and  probable  future  conditions  of  fire-arms,  there  is 
no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  bring  up 
closed  bodies  of  troops  to  within  GOO  yards  of  the  enemy's 
position;  and  more  we  do  not,  as  a  rule,  require.  Worse  cir- 
cumstances and  higher  requirements  can  hardly  occur  or  be 
demanded  of  troops.  Only  in  the  case  of  the  38th  Brigade  in 
particular,  a  more  reasonable  balance  of  numbers,  and  a  more 
thorough  preparation  by  artillery,wouldbe  required;  but  these 
two  conditions  fulfilled,  there  is  no  reason  in  the  nature  of 
things  why  whole  brigades,  still  under  control,  should  not  b»* 
brought  up  to  the  effective  range  of  modern  rifles  (GOO  yards), 
but  from  that  point  forward  all  possibility  of  leading  ceases, 
and  the  result  would  depend  on  the  courage  and  dash  of  the 
individual  units  themselves. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  129 

"With  these  two  examples  before  one's  eyes,  it  is  possi- 
ble to  predict  with  tolerable  certainty  the  course  the  struggle 
would  take  if  all  close-order  forms  were  abolished,  and  the 
attempt  made  to  advance  2,000  yards  in  successive  lines  of 
skirmishers.  Where  the  front  is  so  limited,  there  is  literally 
no  room  for  the  deployment  of  a  sufficient  number  of  rifles 
lor  the  fire  fight;  and  to  support  each  other  at  the  proper 
time,  the  open  lines  would  have  to  follow  each  other  so 
closely  that,  with  the  flat  trajectories  of  modern  arms,  no 
practical  diminution  in  the  losses  would  be  attained,  and  the 
difficulty  of  bringing  troops  forward  without  the  moral  &id 
of  the  shoulder-to-shoulder  formation  would  render  the  whole 
mass  a  rabble  impossible  to  drive  forward  at  all.  The  men 
would  throw  themselves  down  and  decline  to  get  up  again; 
and  in  the  end  not  one  man  in  five  would  arrive  in  the  shoot- 
ing line;  and  this  reinforcement  would  neither  bring  with  it 
the  necessary  impulse  for  a  rush  forward,  nor  even  make  up 
tor  the  losses  already  incurred. 

"It  is  not  the  question  of  'forms'  which  is  the  burning 
one,  but  rather  the  handling  of  the  troops  of  all  arms  in 
combination,  and  their  employment  with  due  regard  to  the 
nature  of  the  ground  and  the  momentary  condition  of  things.'7 

To  me  it  seems  that  to  a  considerable  extent  all  three 
schools  base  themselves  too  exclusively  on  the  purely  in- 
fantry views  of  a  battle,  and  ignore  the  point  of  view  of  the 
leader  in  supreme  command.  To  a  great  extent  also  they 
shut  their  eyes  to  the  teachings  of  the  past,  and  hastily  as- 
sume that  the  type  of  encounter  that  took  place  in  1870  is  a 
fixed  form,  incapable  of  variation.  This  I  believe  to  be  a 
fundamental  error;  the  form  the  battles  assumed  was  con- 
ditioned by  the  want  of  experience  in  "battle  leading"  on 
both  sides,  which  led  to  the  employment  of  the  troops  every 
where  in  driblets,  and  nowhere  with  any  definite  purpose, 
and  furthermore,  by  the  fact  that  the  French  resistance  was 
generally  broken  in  what  in  the  Napoleonic  era  would  have 
been  the  preliminary  stage  of  the  fight  only.  For  on  neither 
side  were  the  battle  reserves,  even  when  there  were  any,  put 
into  action  either  for  counter-attack  or  to  complete  the  decis- 
ion. On  both  sides,  but  more  especially  by  the  French, 
fresh  troops  were  simply  frittered  away  in  driblets,  causing 


130  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

momentary  fluctuation  in  the  fighting  line,  so  that  actually 
the  French  resistance  was  broken  down  when  the  first  line 
of  troops  had  carried  the  position  before  them.  But  such 
haphazard  leading  is  not  likely  to  occur  again — at  any  rau\ 
it  would  be  unwise  in  the  extreme  to  count  on  it. 

The  result,  however,  of  an  encounter  between  twa 
armies,  both  of  which  retain  large  reserves,  and  intend  to 
employ  them,  will  necessarily  be  that  the  decision  of  the- 
fight  will,  as  formerly,  be  brought  about  by  them,  and  not 
by  the  first  fighting  line,  and  it  is  quite  inconceivable  how 
the  infantry  of  these  bodies  can  be  employed  in  any  other 
but  close-order  formations. 

The  infantry,  therefore,  must  be  trained  to  meet  both 
requirements — viz.,  to  fight  in  individual  order  on  one  day 
in  the  first  line,  and  in  close  order,  perhaps,  the  next  as  a 
reserve;  and  the  difficulty  of  combining  the  two  contradic- 
tory requirements  is  the  present  stumbling-block  in  all 
armies,  though  not,  I  believe,  an  insuperable  one. 

Again,  none  of  the  writers  above  mentioned  seem  to 
realize  either  the  moral  effect  actually  produced  by  the 
artillery  in  the  last  war,  or  the  enormous  development  of  its 
destructive  power  relatively  to  that  of  the  infantry  which 
has  since  taken  place. 

If  the  leader  of  the  three  arms  thoroughly  understands 
his  work,  the  infantry  will  never  be  put  in  until  the  enemy's 
resistance  has  been  sufficiently  broken  to  reduce  all  risk  of 
heavy  loss  to  a  minimum.  If  they  are,  it  follows  that  the 
leader  failed  in  that  appreciation  of  the  circumstances  which 
is  perhaps  the  greatest  of  qualities  in  a  general,  and  the  pos- 
session of  which  in  a  marked  degree  really  constitutes  a  man 
a  genius. 

Of  course,  such  mistakes  must  often  occur,  for  the  num- 
ber of  geniuses  available  is  but  small,  and  in  peace-time  they 
have  but  little  opportunity  to  come  to  the  front;  but,  as  a 
general  rule,  it  may  be  taken  that  the  true  index  to  the  char- 
acter and  value  of  a  commander  is  found  in  the  proportion 
the  results  obtained  bear  to  the  losses  suffered  in  gaining 
them,  and  not,  as  is  too  frequently  believed,  exclusively  in 
the  butcher's  bill  of  one's  own  side. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  131 

THE  PHYSIQUE  OF  EUROPEAN  ARMIES. 

A  most  interesting  article  to  military  men  is  a  careful 
comparison  of  the  relative  improvement  or  deterioration  in 
the  physique  of  the  European  armies  during  the  last  forty 
years,  from  the  pen  of  Mr.  W.  M.  Gattie.  At  first  sight,  see- 
ing that  in  all  countries  recruits  on  joining  are  duly  weighed 
and  measured,  and  the  results  recorded  and  published,  it 
does  not  seem  difficult  to  settle  the  question  of  relative  phys- 
ique in  a  few  pages;  but,  unfortunately,  the  systems  by 
which  these  measurements  are  recorded  vary  so  much  in 
method  that  it  is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty  to  arrive  at  a 
true  conclusion,  and  Mr.  Gattie's  article  runs  to  the  imposing 
length  of  twenty  pages,  each  of  which  is  full  of  interesting 
facts  and  observations.  Broadly  speaking,  he  considers  it 
to  be  established  that  in  those  countries  in  which  universal 
service  has  lasted  for  a  couple  of  generations,  the  figures 
show  a  marked  tendency  in  the  direction  of  improvement, 
and  that,  too,  in  spite  of  the  drain  of  life  on  the  battle-fields^ 
which,  however,  has  been  very  much  less  than  he  appears  to 
be  aware  of.  In  our  own  army,  not  based  on  universal  ser- 
vice, there  has  been  a  slight  deterioration,  though  far  less 
than  those  who  talk  of  the  service  going  to  the  dogs,  etc., 
would  have  us  believe;  but  it  would  seem  that  the  army  as. 
a  whole  is  a  fair  reflex  of  the  classes  from  which  it  is  re- 
cruited, and  that  actually  the  stature  of  the  lower  classes  has 
been  decreasing,  and  the  cause  of  this  decrease  he  assigns 
to  be  the  growth  of  the  large  towns  and  manufactures  hav- 
ing drained  the  agricultural  communities. 

From  the  last  report  of  the  British  Army  Medical  De- 
partment it  appears  that  the  average  height  of  the  recruits 
finally  approved  for  service  is  5  feet  5.8  inches,  and  average 
weight  9  stone  2  pounds.  According  to  the  French  statistics, 
the  average  height  of  the  Frenchman  at  twenty  years  of  age 
is  5  feet  4£  inches,  the  minimum  height  for  enlistment  is  5 
feet  Of  inch,  and  the  percentage  of  rejections  for  insufficient 
stature  has  been  gradually  falling. 

In  Germany,  where  the  minimum  height  is  5  feet  1 4-5 
inches,  the  percentage  of  rejections  under  the  same  head  has 
also  been  falling  steadily,  and  the  average  height  of  recruits.' 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

passed  into  the  service  is  5  feet  5J  inches,  with  a  weight  of  9 
stone  12  pounds,  the  average  height  of  the  race  appearing  to 
be  5  feet  6£  inches;  but  the  measurements  from  which  Mr. 
Gattie  derives  this  figure  seem  to  us  hardly  sufficient  to  war- 
rant this  conclusion.  We  should  be  inclined  to  put  it  lower. 

In  Austria-Hungary  the  percentage  of  rejections  is  also 
falling,  and  the  average  height  of  all  the  diverse  nationali- 
ties that  go  to  make  up  the  empire,  between  the  ages  of 
twenty  to  twenty -two,  is  5  feet  5i  inches.  In  Italy  the  aver- 
age height  of  the  conscript  is  5  feet  4J  inches,  and  the  same 
decrease  in  rejections  is  also  noticeable,  and  the  Eussian 
statistics,  though  less  full  and  scarcely  trustworthy,  point  to 
similar  conclusions. 

"It  seems  then,"  to  quote  Mr.  Gattie's  words,  "that,  so 
far  as  statistics  are  available,  or  may  be  accepted  as  a  guide, 
there  is  a  general  tendency  on  the  Continent  towards  physical 
improvement.  At  any  rate,  there  are  no  such  serious  indica- 
tions in  the  opposite  direction  as  those  which  have  caused 
natural  disquietude  in  this  country.  The  fact  has  to  be 
faced,  that  while  the  physique  of  the  English  army  is  deteri- 
orating under  influences  already  considered,  the  material 
from  which  foreign  armies  are  drawn  is  on  the  whole  better 
and  more  vigorous;  and  this,  be  it  remembered,has  come  about 
in  spite  of  tremendous  wars  in  which  every  Continental  power 
of  the  first  rank  has  sacrificed  much  of  the  flower  of  its  youth." 
This  improvement  he  attributes  to  the  healthy  effects  of  the 
three  years'  training  undergone  by  every  healthy  representa- 
tive of  the  nations  under  the  colors,  and  urges  that,  since  we 
cannot  have  conscription,  it  would  be  as  well  to  introduce 
some  course  of  physical  training  into  the  board  school  cur- 
riculum— which  has  actually  to  some  extent  been  already 
done. 

It  seems  to  us,  however,  that  Mr.  Gattie  has  gone  rather 
ahead  of  his  facts.  Though  as  regards  Germany,  in  which 
country  the  liability  to  service  has  been  in  force  for  the  last 
eighty  years,  it  is  fair  to  attribute  the  universal  improve- 
ment in  physique — which  is,  we  think  we  may  say,  univer- 
sally admitted — to  the  action  of  this  cause;  yet  in  no  other 
country  in  Europe  has  universal  liability  to  service  been  law 
long  enough  to  allow  of  an  opinion  being  formed.  The  earli- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  133 

est  children  of  the  first  batch  of  recruits  enlisted  under  the 
new  act  can,  nowhere  except  in  Italy,  have  as  yet  reached 
the  age  of  twenty.  Previous  to  1870,  conscription  with  sub- 
stitutes was  the  order  of  the  day,  and  under  that  system  the 
flower  of  the  race  everywhere  escaped,  whilst  the  long-ser- 
vice men,  and  particularly  the  substitutes,  had  vices  of  their 
own  not  likely  to  make  them  fathers  of  healthy  children.  As 
to  the  drain  of  the  wars  above  referred  to,  from  1815  to  July, 
1870,  though  exact  statistics,  except  in  the  case  of  Prussia 
proper,  are  wanting,  it  is  not  possible  that  the  nation  lost 
more  than  25,000  possible  fathers;  and  though  other  coun- 
tries suffered  more  severely,  still  in  no  case  did  the  death 
rate  assume  very  alarming  proportions. 

Though  universal  liability  to  service  seems  to  us  an  unat- 
tainable ideal  in  our  own  country,  still  it  is  interesting  to 
note  where  we  would  stand  in  the  scale  if  Ave  had  it.  The 
British  Association  fixes  the  average  stature  of  the  typical 
Englishman  at  5  feet  7-J  inches,  with  chest  girth  of  36^  inches 
and  weight  of  10  stone  10  pounds;  and  since  this  is  the  aver- 
age of  men  who  have  never  undergone  any  exceptional  culti- 
vation of  their  physique,  it  seems  only  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  an  army  recruited  only  from  the  best  men,  and  able  to 
afford  a  percentage  of  rejections  for  physical  unfitness  higher 
than  any  other  country  can  do,  would  be  able  to  improve 
very  markedly  on  their  figures,  which  even  by  themselves 
show  us  to  be  normally  a  considerably  taller  and  broader 
set  of  men  than  any  others  on  the  Continent.  There  is, 
therefore,  no  real  ground  for  the  pessimism  which  most 
readers  of  Mr.  Gattie's  article  are  likely  to  carry  away  with 
them. 

THE  WEAPON  OR  THE  MAN. 

In  the  history  of  the  2d  "Leib"  Hussar  Regiment  of  the 
Prussian  army  in  the  war  of  1870, 1  have  come  across  a  curi- 
ous instance  of  the  absurdity  of  basing  tactics  or  formations 
primarily  on  the  nature  of  the  weapon,  and  not  on  that  of  the 
man  who  handles  it.  This  regiment  formed  part  of  the  4th 
Cavalry  Division,  and  at  the  end  of  September  formed  the 
extreme  advance  of  the  army  then  engaged  in  investing  Paris. 
Its  nearest  cavalry  supports  lay  some  three  marches  in  ita 


134:  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

rear,  the  infantry  still  further,  and  in  its  front  the  first  Army 
of  the  Loire  was  gathering  round  and  about  Orleans.  As  the 
^nemy  developed  more  and  more  enterprise,  two  battalions 
of  Bavarian  infantry  were  detached  to  its  support;  other- 
wise it  had  to  rely  on  its  own  resources,  and  even  these  sup- 
porters had  to  be  extended  over  an  exceedingly  wide  front; 
so  much  so  that,  when  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  October  its 
outposts  were  driven  in  by  a  brisk  attack  of  the  enemy,  it 
could  only  muster  1  battalion  of  infantry,  10  horse  artillery 
guns,  and  2  brigades  of  cavalry,  but  the  actual  fighting  only 
fell  on  one  of  these  two  brigades.  Against  a  hostile  force  of 
12  battalions,  12  squadrons,  and  18  guns,  amongst  which 
were  several  African  battalions  and  some  other  regular 
troops,  including  all  the  cavalry,  it  held  its  own  for  three 
hours,  then  quietly  withdrew  for  a  couple  of  miles,  and 
after  having  been  under  the  fire  of  all  three  batteries  and  of 
dense  swarms  of  skirmishers  on  a  plain  which  afforded  prac- 
tically no  cover  whatever,  its  losses  for  the  day  amounted  to 
only  5  wounded  and  19  missing,  4  horses  killed  and  G  wounded. 
The  number  of  missing  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that 
a  Bavarian  infantry  picket  was  surprised  in  the  night  and 
mostly  captured.  The  method  ef  fighting  adopted  is  of  in- 
terest, for  it  does  not  often  happen  that  cavalry  alone  is 
called  on  to  face  such  overwhelming  odds.  The  site  of  the 
net  ion  was  a  gently  sloping  plain,  falling  towards  the  Prus- 
sians. Their  right  rested  on  t^o  yi'llio-o  of  Boissay.  occu- 
pied by  a  company  of  Bavarians,  and  next  to  it  stood  the 
guns  and  their  escort  of  one  squadron,  mostly  thrown 
out  as  skirmishers  well  to  the  flank.  In  rear  of  the  center, 
the  village  of  Foury  on  the  Orleans  road  was  held  by  two 
more  companies  of  Bavarians,  and  their  fourth  company 
held  a  small  house  on  the  railway  embankment  which  ran 
north  and  south,  parallel  with  the  road,  and  between  which 
and  Boissav,  on  a  front  of  some  2,000  yards,  the  line  was 
held  only  by  cavalry  skirmishers;  beyond  the  railway  the 
line  was  continued  by  more  skirmishers  backed  by  two  closed 
squadrons.  The  French  infantry  fired  away  as  hard  as  they 
could,  and  made  numerous  forward  movements,  whilst  the 
guns  on  both  sides  indulged  in  an  artillery  duel,  the  French, 
however,  sending  a  few  shells  at  the  closed  squadrons  in  rear. 


Military  Letters  ana  Essays.  135 

cue  of  which  accounted  for  three-fifths  of  the  total  loss.  The 
method  of  fighting  was  the  old-fashioned  one  for  cavalry  skir- 
mishers— viz.,  riding  in  circles,  individually  firing  their  car- 
bines from  time  to  time,  and  behind  them  the  closed  squad- 
rons kept  on  the  move  to  distract  the  enemy's  aim.  As  for 
armament,  the  Prussian  needle-gun  carbine  was  a  perfect 
beast  of  a  weapon,  short,  clumsy,  and  certainly  not  capable 
of  accurate  fire  at  400  yards  range.  The  French,  both  cav- 
alry and  infantry,  were  armed  throughout  with  chassepots, 
abundantly  supplied  with  ammunition,  with  which  they  kept 
up  a  fire  over  the  whole  ground  in  their  front  up  to  a  distance 
of  over  2,000  yards.  At  one  moment  they  began  to  come  too 
close  up  to  the  gunners,  when  a  troop  of  the  escort  and  a  few 
skirmishers  charged  the  advancing  swarm  and  rolled  them 
completely  up,  and  the  attempt  was  not  renewed  for  about 
an  hour.  On  the  other  flank  the  skirmishers,  finding  the 
French  could  not  hit  them,  grew  bolder  and  bolder,  and  gal- 
loped close  up  to  them,  actually  succeeding  in  forcing  them 
back  for  some  little  distance,  and  bagging  several  of  them.  To 
drive  them  off,  six  squadrons  of  cavalry  were  brought  up,  but 
the  Hussars  wanted  no  better  chance,  and  with  the  three 
squadrons  at  hand  prepared  to  charge  them ;  but  the  French 
halted,  wheeled  about,  and  retired,  and  the  Prussians  in  turn 
had  to  go  back  under  a  heavy  fire,  by  which,  however,  only 
one  horse  was  slightly  grazed  just  enough  to  draw  blood. 

Now  these  French  troops  were  fresh,  well  fed  and  equipped, 
and  contained  some  excellent  material  and  devoted  officers. 
They  were  certainly  very  far  removed  from  the  condition 
of  utter  mental  and  bodily  prostration  to  which  in  process  of 
time  even  the  best  troops  may  be  ultimately  reduced.  Yet, 
as  we  have  seen,  they  could  hit  nothing  at  all,  and  even  if  we 
assume  the  present  repeater  to  be  double  as  effective  as  the 
chassepot — which  is  hardly  the  case — and  double  the  losses 
accordingly,  the  result  is  still  ludicrously  small.  No  doubt 
against  attacking  infantry  they  would  have  made  a  better 
show,  as  these  present  necessarily  a  more  stationary  target, 
but  even  in  that  case  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  it  would 
have  made  much  difference  whether  the  attacking  troops  had 
stood  two  deep  or  four  deep,  or  one  pace  apart  or  three.  But 
the  whole  essence  of  leading  lies  in  not  committing  either 


136  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

infantry  or  cavalry,  till  the  artillery  tire  has  induced  an  equal, 
if  not  a  greater,  degree  of  prostration  in  the  enemy.  Where 
circumstances  press  for  a  decision,  and  since  in  any  case  it 
is  never  possible  to  make  certain  of  your  adversary's  condi- 
tion, then,  as  a  principle  for  all  decisive  attacks,  march  to 
meet  him  with  your  leading  troops  in  such  a  formation  that 
they  can  at  any  moment  develop  their  utmost  man-killing 
power,  and  those  in  rear  in  whatever  sized  column  or  line 
best  suits  either  the  ground  or  their  slate  of  discipline,  but 
never  let  fear  of  the  enemy's  bullets  influence  your  choice. 
This  would  give  us,  according  to  the  quality  of  the  troops, 
either  single  rank  with  elbow-room  or  ordinary  two-deep  lim- 
for  the  leading  troops,  and  line  or  company  column  for  the 
rearward  ones. 

But  to  expose  the  hopelessness  of  the  position  adopted 
by  the  official  British  school — i.  e.,  those  whose  duty  it  is  to 
train  the  future  staft'  and  leaders — let  me  here  adduce  in  com- 
parison the  fire-power  possessed  by  the  good  old  Brown  I  Jess 
of  former  days.  It  will  be  readily  granted  that  when  there 
were  no  sights  to  be  fumbled  with,  and  firing  was  all  done  at 
point-blank  ranges,  its  effect  was  likely  to  be  much  greater 
than  nowadays,  when  to  open  at  1,000  yards  and  forget  to  put 
down  the  sights  as  the  enemy  advances,  destroys  all  hope  of 
hits  on  the  foremost  fighting  line,  the  one  on  which  the  decis- 
ion depends.  But  the  actual  number  of  bullets  delivered 
per  yard  run  of  the  usual  formations  in  those  bygone  days 
was  at  least  as  great  as  that  delivered  in  the  same  time  by 
the  extended  lines  and  weapons  in  use  in  the  Franco-German 
war.  There  were  two  forms  of  fire  then  employed.  In  the 
first  the  troops  standing  four  deep  (this  was  about  1730) 
formed  eight  deep  as  we  now  form  fours.  There  was  thus 
a  man's  breadth  between  the  files.  The  lea  ding  file  fired  and 
countermarched  through  the  interval;  No.  2  stepped  up 
and  delivered  his  fire,  and  followed  Xo.  1,  and  so  on  through- 
out the  file;  and  in  this  way  the  rapidity  of  fire  was  brought 
up  to  12  and  even  16  rounds  per  yard  run  of  front. 

The  other  method,  which  was  principally  developed  by 
Frederick,  and  was  a  consequence  of  the  iron  ramrods,  was 
half-company  volleys  three  deep,  five  and  even  six  to  the 
minute,  wThich  gave  something  over  15  rounds  per  minute, 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  137 

since  the  space  allowed  in  the  ranks  was  only  22  inches.  It 
is  only  fair  to  add  that  this  lire  left  much  to  be  desired  on 
the  score  of  accuracy ;  but  in  this  respect  it  could  never  be  as 
bad  as  it  is  at  present,  for,  after  all,  the  bullets  fell  with  man- 
killing  force  somewhere  within  an  area  500  yards  deep  at  the 
outside,  instead  of  within  one  of  2,500  or  more,  as  with  the 
chassepots.  The  muskets  also  in  Prussia  were  purposely 
made  heavy  at  the  muzzle  to  keep  them  down,  and  special 
precautions  were  made  to  train  the  men  mechanically  to  keep 
1beui  muzzles  low. 

I  Jut  at  all  times  since  the  days  of  Maryborough,  the  fire- 
power of  the  line,  when  that  line  consisted  of  steady  troops, 
lias  been  sufficient  to  mow  down  their  opponents  with  one 
single  volley.  The  problem  has  always  been,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  keep  the  men  steady;  on  the  other,  to  insure  that  the 
enemy  was  not  steady  at  the  moment  of  attack.  This  must 
not  be  understood  as  a  pleading  for  the  old  weapons  back 
again;  such  a  thing  would  be  ridiculous,  for  the  first  and 
greatest  object  to  be  kept  before  one  is,  that  the  soldier  should 
have  confidence  that  he  is  as  well  if  not  better  armed  than 
his  antagonist,  the  point  again  being,  not  the  nature  of  the 
weapon  in  itself,  but  its  effect  on  the  mental  condition  of 
the  man. 

Hearing  the  above  in  mind,  it  is  interesting  to  contrast 
the  conduct  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  on  this  occasion  with 
that  of  our  own  15th  Hussars  and  other  Prussian  and  Aus- 
trian squadrons  in  1792-93  under  somewhat  similar  circum- 
stances. On  the  17th  September,  1792,  some  1,500  Prussian 
Hussars  with  horse  artillery  guns  charged  and  routed  some 
10,000  French  troops  under  General  Chazot,  and  at  Villiers 
en  Couche,  on  24th  April  of  the  following  year,  80  Austrians 
and  200  sabers  of  the  British  15th  Hussars,  then  Light  Dra- 
goons, broke  10,000  French  with  artillery  who  stood  to  re- 
ceive them  in  an  immense  square.  They  killed  900,  captured 
400,  and  brought  in  5  guns.  At  Cateau  Cambresis,  two  days 
subsequently,  an  Austrian  regiment  and  9  squadrons  of  Brit- 
ish cavalry  broke  and  dispersed  a  French  corps  of  27,000  in- 
fantry, destroying  some  3,000  and  rapturing  22  guns,  and  in 
a  second  charge  the  same  day,  made  by  four  British  and  two 
Austrian  squadrons,  another  column  was  defeated  with  a 

i    10 


138  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

loss  of  1,000  men  and  10  guns,  the  total  loss  for  the  cavalry 
on  the  day  being  1C  officers  and  380  men;  and  it  must  be 
remembered  there  is  strong  reason  for  supposing  that  the 
moral  of  these  troops  thus  beaten  was  of  a  higher  order 
than  that  of  the  French  in  1870.  Many  other  instances 
might  be  quoted,  Kossbach  amongst  others.  But  I  cannot 
help  believing  that  if  in  1870  the  spirit  of  the  Prussian  cav- 
alry lias  not  been  broken  by  the  constant  iteration  of  the 
"cavalry  cannot  charge  unshaken  infantry"  and  the  exag- 
gerated reports  as  to  the  power  of  the  new  weapons,  they 
would  have  gone  for  the  whole  French  division  before  them 
on  this  day  and  exterminated  them  with  a  loss  on  their  side 
which  would  certainly  not  have  exceeded  that  of  ourselves 
and  the  Austrians  alluded  to.  Of  course  the  duty  of  the  4th 
Tavalry  Division  was  to  see,  and  not  to  light,  but  compare 
Ihe  moral  advantages  that  such  a  success  would  have  en 
tailed.  As  it  was.  Hie  French  reported  a  victory,  magnified 
the  weak  Bavarian  battalion  by  10,  did  the  same  for  the  guns 
and  cavalry,  and  thus  succeeded  in  raising  the  spirits  of 
their  new  levies  behind  enormously,  whereas  a  dashing 
charge  would  have  served  the  purpose  of  the  Intelligence 
Staff  as  well,  or  even  better,  and  have  established  such  a  ter- 
ror that  the  French  would  never  have  ventured  into  the  open 
aji'ain.  and  all  the  fighting  round  Artenay.  (Nmlmiers.  I.eau 
gency.  etc.,  with  the  heavy  losses  it  entailed,  have  been 
spared  on  both  sides.  As  it  was,  one  single  charge,  made  by 
a  troop  of  only  say  L'.~i  to  :>()  sabers,  sufficed  to  roll  up  a  whole 
line  of  skirmishers  and  keep  them  quiet  fora  couple  of  hours. 
What  might  not  have  been  expected  from  the  attack  of  eight 
or  twelve  squadrons  appearing  suddenly  on  tin-  French  rear? 
And  there  was  no  reason  why  they  should  not  have  availed 
themselves  of  their  superior  mobility  to  troll  right  round  the 
enemy,  and  thus  cut  him  off  from  all  support,  for  the  ground 
actually  favored  such  an  operation.  But,  with  the  exception 
of  the  1st  (inard  Dragoons,  enterprise  on  the  battle-field  was 
not  a  sin  to  be  laid  to  the  charge  of  the  Prussian  cavalry. 


In  the  above-mentioned  book  an  attempt  has  been  made 
to  present  in  tabular  form  the  performances, losses,  and  aver- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  139 

age  work  and  endurance  of  the  horses  during  the  campaign 
of  1870,  and  in  spite  of  the  dreariness  of  the  figures,  the  data 
thus  afforded  should  be  of  such  value  as  a  standard  for  cav- 
alry officers  and  the  staffs  of  higher  commands  generally  that 
I  venture  to  submit  them  to  my  readers. 

The  regiment  was  present  on  the  field  during  the  follow- 
ing general  actions,  some  of  which  lasted  for  two  days, — viz., 
Worth,  Beaumont,  Sedan,  the  two  battles  round  Orleans, 
and  at  Le  Mans, — and,  including  minor  engagements,  its  de- 
tachments crossed  swords  with  the  enemy  on  71  days,  on  12 
of  which  it  came  under  artillery  fire. 

Its  total  losses  were:  killed  1  officer  and  19  men, 
wounded  '2  officers,  and  23  men  missing,  captured  by  the-ene- 
my  4  officers  and  47  men,  and  died  of  sickness  1  officer  and  29 
men.  Of  horses  it  lost  37  killed,  38  wounded,  51  missing,  and 
138  broke  down  and  had  to  be  destroyed.  The  average 
strength  of  the  squadrons  throughout  the.  campaign  was 
maintained  at  96  sabers  and  the  marching-out  strength  114. 
It  raptured  1  gun,  34  ammunition  and  other  wagons,  9,016 
prisoners,  and  111  horses.  In  all  it  marched  2,072  miles,  its 
average  per  marching  day  being  17  miles.  The  longest  day's 
march  for  the  whole  regiment  was  41  miles,  for  a  single  squad- 
ron 54  miles  and  for  a  patrol  104  miles.  The  average  for  the 
regiment  of  hours  under  saddle  daily  was  9.5,  the  longest 
time  without  unsaddling  was  76  hours,  and  the  total  number 
of  rounds  unaccounted  for — i.  e.,  expended — was  4,080,  of 
which  only  about  T>3  per  cent  were  act nally  fired  in  action. 
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  means  of  estimating  the  losses  it 
inflicted  on  the  enemy  during  the  whole  campaign,  but  since 
they  more  than  once  broke  up  bands  of  Franctireurs,  and 
gave  no  quarter,  the  total  amount  must  have  been  consider- 
able; and  as  regards  their  own  somewhat  high  figure  of  "mis- 
sing,'' this  is  accounted  for  by  the  loss  of  a  very  strong  offi- 
cer's patrol,  which  was  left  behind  and  forgotten  by  the  army, 
and  being  forced  to  take  shelter  in  an  old  castle  by  bands  of 
armed  inhabitants  and  National  Guards,  was  eventually 
for  rod  to  surrender. 

As  to  the  endurance  of  the  horses,  the  following  point 
deserves  to  bo  noticed.  After  the  first  few  weeks  of  the  cam- 


140  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

paigu,  thanks  to  the  ubundaiit  food  and  constant  exercise,, 
they  actually  improved  in  condition,  and  whereas  at:  first 
several  cases  of  sores  on  the  withers  occurred,  indicating 
falling  off  in  condition,  none  were  registered  in  the  latter 
months,  but  several  were  noted  under  the  rear  half  of  the 
right  fan  of  the  saddle;  but  the  curious  thing  is  that  the  car- 
bine was  not  carried  as  with  us,  but  in  the  so-railed  Namaqua 
bucket  in  front  of  the  right  thigh,  so  that  the  usual  explana- 
tion for  a  sore  in  this  position  will  not  apply.  Altogether. 
186  cases  of  sore  back  were  reported  in  the  whole  six-mom  hs 
campaign,  or  33  per  cent  of  all  the  horses,  but  only  9  per  rent 
had  to  be  specially  treated;  the  01  hers  \\CK-  ridden  through- 
out, their  cases  being  met  by  altering  the  folding  of  the 
blanket;  50  per  cent  of  all  the  horses  went  through  the  cam 
paign  without  a  day's  sickness,  and  72  per  cent  of  tin-  Ma  si 
Prussians,  but  the  general  average  was  brought  down  by 
the  horses  under  7  years  old,  and  the  few  horses  bought  or 
captured  in  the  country,  many  of  whom,  particularly  those 
with  a  Percheron  strain,  had  to  be  destroyed  for  IVver  in  ih<- 
feet.  There  were  further,  17  cases  of  debility,  25  of  colic, 
and  7  horses  were  burnt  to  death  by  a  fire  breaking  out  in 
their  stable. 

Only  25  per  cent  of  the  5-year-olds  stood  the  work,  and 
the  best  lot  were  those  rising  11  years,  of  whom  TO  per  rent 
went  through  the  whole  six  months  without  trouble,  and  even 
the  oldest  horses  of  18  years  and  upwards  bore  the  work 
well.  There  were  actually  two  of  22  years  of  age,  one  of 
whom  was  killed  in  action,  but  the  other,  though  ridden  by 
one  of  the  boldest  scouts  in  the  regiment,  never  went  sick  for 
a  day. 


MINOR  TACTICAL  DAY  AT  ALDERSHOT. 

For  some  years  past  it  has  been  the  custom  to  devote  a 
day  each  week  to  exercising  the  commanding  officers  and 
senior  field  officers  in  the  management  of  a  small  body  of 
their  own  or  of  all  three  arms  according  to  their  seniority 
and  skill.  As  I  first  remember  them,  there  used  to  be  a  good 
deal  of  farce  about  them,  but  of  late,  especially  under  Sir 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  141 

Evelyn  Wood,  they  have  coine  to  be  very  searching  examina- 
tions for  the  officer  in  command,  indeed  affording  very  con- 
siderable scope  for  the  display  of  soldierly  talent,  and  for  the 
nervous  and  inefficient  even  better  opportunities  for  them  to 
convict  themselves  of  worthlessness.  Perhaps  a  detail  de- 
scription of  one  of  these  days  will  prove  of  interest  to  my 
readers,  seeing  that  one  by  one  all  officers  of  British  regi- 
ments may  expect  to  come  under  the  same  harrow. 

On  the  2d  of  June  a  force  consisting  of  the  19th  Hussars 
and  a  battery  of  Royal  Horse  Artillery  was  ordered  to  parade 
at  Government  House  at  8:30  a.  m.,  under  the  command  of 
the  senior  major  of  the  regiment.  Here  it  was  met  by  Sir 
Evelyn  Wood  and  the  staff,  the  latter  augmented  for  the 
day  by  some  30  field  officers  to  act  as  umpires,  and  a  number 
of  orderly  officers,  and  the  whole  were  then  taken  out  at  a 
trot  some  miles  into  the  country,  where  they  were  halted,  and 
the  scheme  for  the  day's  work  first  issued.  The  opposing 
force  had  been  moved  off  with  the  same  ignorance  of  its  des- 
tination in  another  direction.  I  had  attached  myself  to  the 
Hussars  and  Horse  Artillery.  We  halted  just  south  of  the 
village  of  Cove,  and  under  cover  of  the  embankment  of  the 
main  line,  Southwestern  Railway — i.  e.,  Basingstoke,  Farn- 
borough.  Here  the  general  and  special  ideas  were  issued, 
and  on  them  the  officer  in  command  of  the  detachmetit  had  to 
issue  his  orders.  The  general  idea  ran  as  follows:  "A 
flanking  column  of  an  invading  army  hearing,  when  biv- 
ouacked near  Farnborough,  that  its  main  body  has  been  de- 
feated and  is  falling  back,  retires  to  the  southward,  and  is 
followed  by  a  cavalry  force  moving  from  Reading."  And  the 
special  idea  for  the  Northern  or  Red  force  ran,  as  near  as  I 
can  recall  it:  aThe  enemy  is  retiring,  under  cover  of  a  line 
of  outposts,  along  the  canal.  A  large  magazine  is  said  to 
exist  about  a  mile  south  of  the  Queen's  Pavilion.  Break 
through,  find  out  what  is  going  on,  and  capture  the  maga- 
zine." Actually  the  line  of  outposts  ran  from  the  gas  works 
bridge  close  to  the  Southwestern  Aldershot  Branch,  to  Pond- 
tail  bridge  to  the  westward;  whether  this  information  was 
given  T  forget,  but,  in  any  case,  the  other  crossings  beyond 
the  above  limits  were  too  far  distant  to  come  within  the 


142  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

scope  of  the  day's  work.  The  canal  throughout  was  consid- 
ered as  uufordable,  though,  as  a  fact,  one  can  ride  through 
it  anywhere. 

The  country  round  Aldershot  is  so  generally  known  in 
the  service  that  much  description  of  it  is  unnecessary.  Tin- 
g-round we  were  to  operate  over  is  traversed  from  north  to 
south  by  the  Kagshot-Farnham  road,  and  from  cast  to  west 
by  the  canal,  over  which  there  are  in  all  six  bridges — viz.. 
the  gas  works  on  the  east,  the  iron  bridge  in  i  he  south  camp, 
Aldershot  wharf  bridge  on  the  main  road,  Kelmoor  bridge  a 
mile  to  the  westward,  Xorris  Hill  bridge  crossing  I  he  canal. 
which  here  runs  in  a  deep  cutting  at  a  height  of  some  I'd  tn-t 
above  the  water  level,  ami  tinally  I'ondtail  bridge,  about 
three  miles  west  of  the  main  road.  East  of  the  Hagshot  road 
the  conditions  for  the  movement  of  mounted  troops  are  so 
unfavorable  that  practically  thai  side  of  the  ground  may  In- 
left  out  of  account,  and  all  interest  centered  on  the  wharf 
bridge  and  to  the  westward.  The  wharf  bridge  can  be  ap- 
proached under  rover  to  within  a  few  yards;  on  the  other 
hand,  being  on  the  main  road,  it  was  the  most  likely  to  be 
best  prepared  for  defence.  Eelmoor  bridge  is  in  a  re-enter 
ing  angle  as  regards  the  enemy,  and  its  approaches  ohVr  very 
little  cover.  Norris  Hill  bridge  can  be  reached  with  a  mini- 
mum of  exposure,  for  a  big  wood  comes  right  down  to  the 
canal,  completely  hiding  all  movements, but  at  the  sametime 
the  length  of  the  bridge  and  the  depth  of  the  cutting  render 
it  very  easy  to  defend;  and  last  of  all,  Pondtail  bridge  is 
about  equally  bad  for  attack  or  defence,  and  is  so  far  on"  the 
main  objective  that  one  would  only  choose  it  as  a  last  resort. 

How  the  matter  actually  presented  itself  to  the  com 
manding  officer  I  have,  of  course,  no  means  of  knowing,  but 
to  me  it  appeared  somewhat  in  the  following  manner:  The 
enemy  is  beaten  and  in  retreat.  Howr  much  beaten  the  indi- 
cations along  the  road  we  are  supposed  to  come  would  have 
enabled  me  to  judge.  My  best  chance  is  to  press  him  hard. 
and,  if  possible,  seize  a  bridge  before  he  has  thought  of  barri- 
cading it.  The  ground  east  of  the  road  is,  from  the  map. 
decidedly  unfavorable;  and  would,  moreover,  lead  to  too 
great  a  dispersion  of  my  force.  I  will  therefore  send  two 
troops  (we  wrere  working  with  four  per  squadron)  to  each  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  143 

the  bridges  westward  of  the  main  road  and  including  the  lat- 
ter, as  fast  as  they  can  travel,  and  with  the  remaining  two 
squadrons  form  up  in  readiness  under  cover  at  the  north  end 
of  Cove  Common,  that  being  the  point  from  wrhich  all  the 
roads  radiate.  As  regards  the  artillery,  two  guns  are 
enough  to  demolish  any  average  barricade,  therefore  two 
shall  go  down  the  main  road,  two  shall  take  Eelmoor  bridge 
under  fire  from  the  ridge  which  divides  Cove  Common 
(range  about  1,200  3rards),  and  two  shall  go  with  the  machine- 
gun  to  the  high  ground  north  of  Morris  bridge,  from  whence 
they  can  either  take  Pondtail  in  reverse,  or,  if  necessary,  be 
used  at  short  range  to  blow  in  the  barricade  wrhich  we  may 
expect  to  find  at  N  orris  bridge.  With  average  luck,  we  ought 
to  rush  one  if  not  two  of  the  four,  and  in  any  case  the  enemy's 
attention  will  be  distracted  all  round,  and  the  reports^  I  re- 
reive  will  enable  me  to  judge  against  which  to  mass  the  bulk 
of  my  force. 

Probably  on  service  the  officer  in  command  would  have 
acted  in  this  manner,  but  umpires  are  more  difficult  to  deal 
with  than  an  enemy,  and  this  scheme  is  a  little  too  unortho- 
dox to  risk  one's  peace-time  reputation  on,  though,  as  far  as 
I  can  judge,  the  chief  umpire,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  would  have 
appreciated  it.  What  actually  happened  was  that  small 
officers'  patrols  were  sent  to  each  bridge,  and  Norris  bridge 
only  was  honored  with  a  whole  troop,  the  main  body  and 
guns  being  drawn  up  in  readiness  at  the  north  end  of  Cove 
Common.  I  rode  writh  the  scouts  up  to  the  wharf  bridge, 
and  could  only  admire  the  way  they  worked;  no  reasonable 
fault  could  be  found  with  them,  and  they  were  keen  and  took 
an  interest  in  what  they  were  doing.  But  some  of  the  dis- 
tances were  considerable,  and  nearly  an  hour  and  a  half 
elapsed  before  all  the  reports  were  in,  and  the  main  body  be- 
gan to  move  in  the  direction  of  Norris  bridge. 

Personally  I  stuck  to  the  umpire  staff,  which  proceeded 
to  gallop  across  the  plain  towards  Eelmoor,  the  general  far 
in  advance  and  the  remainder  spread  out  any  where,  according 
to  the  speed  of  their  horses.  We  were  a  large  body,  but  pre- 
sented no  conceivable  resemblance  to  a  formed  body  of  troops. 
Nevertheless,  the  enemy  mistook  us  for  cavalry,  and  at 
about  000  yards  opened  a  heavy  fire  on  us,  from  which,  how- 


144  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

ever,  had  we  really  been  a  squadron,  we  could  have  got 
ample  shelter  behind  a  low  undulation  that  ran  out  from  the 
canal  about  250  yards  in  front  of  the  bridge.  Part  of  the 
picket  had  been  very  well  placed  in  a  small  copse  which 
gutted  out  of  the  bank  on  our  side  of  the  bridge,  and  its  sup- 
port was  under  cover  close  at  hand,  when-  i  hex  were  entirely 
safe  from  mounted  men;  nevertheless  they  wei-e  so  Hurried 
by  our  approach  that  at  the  critical  moment,  when  we  were 
within  150  yards  or  so  of  them,  they  bolted  out  of  the  copse 
across  the  bridge  and  left  it  completely  open  to  us,  running 
away  up  the  slope  beyond  in  no  sort  of  order  or  formation. 
There  was  a  very  young  officer  in  command,  who  nobly  stuck 
to  his  post,  and  who,  on  being  asked  lor  an  explanation,  said 
we  had  been  taken  for  cavalry.  He  had  orders  to  hold  out 
as  Ipiig  as  his  ammunition  lasted;  that  had  been  expended, 
and  so  he  had  fallen  back.  Pom-  young  chap!  he  was  ihe 
victim  of  circumstances.  Yei.  if  Sandhurst  education  were 
not  a  farce,  he  ought  to  have  known  better  than  this.  But 
one  hardly  knows  what  to  say  of  the  officer  in  command  of 
the  support  for  not  hurrying  up  and  telling  him  of  his  mis- 
take, for  had  he  been  alert  he  must  have  seen  it,  and  the 
support  was  not  200  yards  distant.  As  for  the  men,  I  never 
saw  such  a  disorderly  mob  in  my  life;  they  straggled  away 
by  twos  and  threes  in  no  kind  of  order,  and  finally  stood 
about  on  the  top  of  the  hill  like  so  many  yokels  at  a  country 
chase. 

However,  having  heard  the  explanation,  we  cantered  on 
to  Norris  bridge,  and  here  I  elected  to  stay,  expecting  always 
the  chief  blow  to  be  delivered  here.  When  I  arri  \  ed  the  state 
of  affairs  was  as  follows:  The  bridge  was  held  by  a  com- 
pany of  the  Scottish  Rifles,  who  had  arrived  on  the  spot  sim- 
ultaneously with  the  Hussar  1 1  oops.  No  umpire  being  pres- 
ent, the  two  officers  had  met  amicably  and  had  agreed  to  dif- 
fer. The  infantry  man  declined  to  give  way,  and  under  the 
circumstances  the  cavalry  man  could  not  charge  over  his 
body.  So  he  dismounted  a  portion  of  his  men,  and  the  two 
sides  exchanged  a  lively  fire.  The  trees  here  are  well  grown 
and  come  close  up  to  the  edge  of  the  cutting,  which  is  lined 
on  both  sides  by  banks,  giving  excellent  cover.  The  road, 
after  crossing  the  bridge,  runs  straight  for  about  30  yards 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  145 

on  the  cavalry  side,  and  then  bends  sharp  round  to  the  east- 
ward; and  on  it  there  is  room  to  form  a  whole  regiment  un- 
der cover.  To  the  westward  there  is  a  clearfng  up  to  the 
edge  of  the  high  ground,  affording  ample  room  for  a  batt'ery 
facing  towards  Pondtail,  and  the  fringe  of  trees  bordering 
the  canal  is  sufficiently  thick  to  shelter  any  troops  on  the 
clearing  from  tire  from  the  south  bank  of  the  canal.  A  track 
coming  from  the  north  runs  into  the  main  road  across  the 
bridge  just  at  the  above-mentioned  corner  of  the  main  road, 
and  affords  access  to  the  clearing. 

We  had  hardly  been  at  the  bridge  for  more  than  a  few 
minutes  when  we  heard  a  battery  galloping  down  this  track. 
The  leading  gun  just  came  in  sight  for  a  moment,  and  then 
wheeled  sharp  to  its  right  to  come  into  position,  against 
Pondtail.  In  turning  it  was  under  fire  of  the  infantry  for  per- 
haps 10  seconds,  and  would  probably  at  that,  short  range, 
barely  50  yards,  have  lost  half  its  team.  It  wras  put  out  of 
action  by  the  umpire,  and  I  think  rightly.  But  the  remain- 
ing five  were  not  seen  at  all,  and  came  into  action  taking 
Pondtail  in  reverse  at  most  effective  range.  This  bridge,  I 
may  mention,  stands  up  well  above  the  plain,  and  would  not 
have  been  tenable  for  five  minutes;  the  line  of  retreat  of  the 
infantry  was  also  completely  exposed.  For  the  moment 
the  position  of  the  artillery  seemed  almost  ridiculous,  for 
here  they  were  firing  due  west,  wrhilst  immediately  to  the 
north  and  not  100  yards  distant  a  company  of  infantry  was 
firing  into  their  left  rear,  but  on  dismounting,  and  looking 
along  the  rifle  barrels,  we  found  that  the  aforesaid  screen  of 
trees  was  actually  dense  enough  to  stop  all  but  a  chance  bul- 
let, so  it  was  decided  that  the  guns  could  remain  in  action. 
Meanwhile  we  were  unaware  that  the  officer  commanding 
the  detachment  had  changed  his  plan,  and  was  actually  mov- 
ing with  the  bulk  of  his  force  on  Pondtail,  reinforcing  the 
troop  at  Norris  bridge  only  with^the  remainder  of  its  squad- 
ron. We  had  seen  this  reinforcement  come  up,  but  in  the 
wood  could  not  estimate  its  strength,  and  were  every  mo- 
ment expecting  a  couple  of  guns  to  be  turned  on  the  barri- 
cade, which  was  indicated  by  some  bits  of  furze,  and  then  a 
rush  to  be  made,  either  by  the  dismounted  men,  who  now 
appeared  to  outnumber  the  very  weak  company,  or  by  the 


146  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

leading-  squadron  mounted,  down  the  road,  either  course 
seeming  feasible.  The  cavalry  Him  sent  a  messenger  to  the 
umpire  to  know  whether  ilie  barricade  the  infantry  claimed 
to'have  made  could  be  considered  "jumpable"  or  not,  and 
pointed  out  that  both  sides  had  arrived  simultaneously,  and 
he  had  had  the  road  under  fire  ever  since.  The  infantry,  on 
the  other  hand,  claimed  to  have  cut  down  some  fairly  big 
trees  on  either  si-de  of  the  road  and  to  have  m tangled  them. 
So  they  were  asked  to  produce  their  tools,  and  then  it  turned 
out  that  they  had  nothing  but  their  sword  bayonets,  the  little 
10-inch  things  they  now  carry,  and  they  were  asked  to  show 
how  they  could  chop  down  the  trees  without  exposing  them- 
selves, and  it  was  found  they  could  not  do  so,  so  the  point 
was  given  against  them.  We  then  remained  momentarily 
expecting  the  rush,  which,  however,  did  not  come, and  then,  it 
being  12  noon  and  the  infantry  having  orders  to  retire  at 
that  hour,  their  officer  drew  off  his  little  command  in  the 
neatest  possible  manner  without  showing  a  hand,  and  only 
just  in  time,  for  meanwhile  Pondtail  had  been  forced,  and  the 
cavalry  patrols  were  already  appearing  on  his  flank.  The 
bridge  now  lay  completely  open,  and  still  there  was  no  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  cavalry.  The  situation  was  too  ridic- 
ulous, but  exceedingly  real.  Fully  ten  minutes  must  have 
elapsed  before  they  began  to  suspect  anything,  and  then 
probably  it  was  the  movement  of  the  spectators  which  awoke 
suspicion.  Then  at  last  half  a  dozen  scouts  dashed  over  the 
bridge,  and  began  to  examine  the  coverts,  and  their  aston- 
ished faces,  when  they  found  no  enemy  even  within  sight, 
were  a  most  amusing  study. 

Meanwhile  Pondtail  bridge  had  been  carried,  I  learnt 
afterwards, in  good  style, with  little  exposure  and  much  dash, 
and  the  infantry  were  retreating  towards  <  1ocked  Hat  Wood, 
over  a  stretch  of  marshy  ground,  dry  enough  for  them  to  pass. 
but  impracticable  for  cavalry.  Having  crossed  it,  they 
turned  and  opened  fire  on  the  leading  squadron,  which  at- 
tempted to  follow  over  the  same  ground,  but  with  no  ground 
scouts.  They  were  just  on  the  edge  of  the  bog,  and  in  an- 
other moment  would  have  been  hopelessly  in  it,  when  the 
infantry,  armed  with  magazine  rifles  and  all  the  latest  im- 
provements, turned  tail  suddenly  and  ran,  and  the  chief  urn- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  147 

pire  at  once  put  them  out  of  action.  The  remainder  of  the 
regiment  stuck  to  the  road  leading  to  the  steeplechase  course, 
trying  to  get  right  round  the  infantry  and  cut  them  off. 

The  squadron  at  Norris  bridge  had  now  come  across, 
and  with  it  the  battery.  The  latter  came  into  action  on  the 
southern  edge  of  the  Norris  Hill  plateau,  directing  their  fire 
on  the  retreating  infantry,  who  were  seeking  to  gain  the 
cover  of  the  copses  which  border  the  Long  Valley.  But  the 
enemy's  gunners  had  also  been  on  the  lookout,  and  the 
moment  our  battery  appeared,  they  opened  on  them  with 
shrapnel  from  Jubilee  Hill,  and  at  a  known  range,  and  in  all 
probability  would  have  wiped  out  our  guns  before  they 
could  come  into  action.  At  this  period,  I  regret  to  say,  the 
squadron  immediately  on  the  spot  departed  from  its  cavalry 
traditions,  and  adopted  the  role  of  mounted  infantry,  pursu- 
ing only  writh  fire;  and  this  was  all  the  more  blameworthy, 
for  the  infantry  in  front  of  them  seemed  completely  out  of 
hand.  However,  they  kept  driving  them  back  straight  up 
to  wards  Chestnut  Copse  and  west  of  Long  Hill.  At  the  same 
time  the  main  body  of  the  Hussars  appeared  on  the  two  hills 
in  the  center  of  the  course,  known  respectively  as  Tweedledee 
and  Tweedledum,  converging  also  on  the  western  edge  of 
Chestnut  Copse,  into  which  a  couple  of  companies  of  infantry 
had  thrown  themselves.  The  ground  in  front  was  extremely 
difficult  for  the  cavalry,  as  a  stream  comes  down  from  the 
northwest  edge  of  the  copse  and  is  passable  only  at  three 
bridges,  broad  enough  for  perhaps  a  front  of  fours.  Accord- 
ingly they  dismounted,  and  for  a  few  minutes  a  fine  fight  raged. 
It  seemed  to  me  that  here  they  lost  a  great  opportunity.  It 
wjis  impossible  to  charge  the  western  edge  of  the  copse,  for, 
apart  from  the  difficulty  of  breaking  into  the  wood  itself,  the 
steeplechase  course  here  runs  in  a  10-foot  cutting  right  across 
the  front  of  it;  it  was  equally  impossible  for  the  infantry  to 
break  out  for  any  offensive  movement  worth  speaking  of, 
for  they  were  too  few  in  number,  and  the  edge  of  the  wood 
was  under  the  fire  of  the  Hussars'  machine-gun,  which  was 
cleverly  posted  and  not  liable  to  distant  artillery  fire.  Un- 
der these  circumstances,  it  would  have  been  best  not  to  dis- 
mount at  all,  but  to  move  along  the  reverse  slope  of  Tweedle- 
dee, and  crossing  the  stream  by  one  of  the  bridges,  join  the 


148  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

detached  squadron,  now  rapidly  coming  up  in  a  concentric 
attack  on  the  retreating  right  wing  of  the  enemy,  and  then 
follow  on  into  the  Long  Valley,  towards  the  supposed  maga- 
zine at  the  Pavilion.  What  did  happen,  however,  was  this : 
After  a  few  minutes'  dismounted  fire,  the  main  body  of  the 
regiment  mounted,  and  tried  to  charge  Chestnut  Copse,  but 
only  about  a  squadron  found  sufficient  room,  the  others  be- 
ing crowTded  out  towards  the  stream  and  a  good  deal  delayed ; 
but  the  one  squadron  which  did  charge  forgot  again  to  send 
out  ground  scouts,  and  had  to  pull  up  on  the  edge  of  the 
steeplechase  cutting  under  a  crush  ing  tire  at  100  yards  range 
and  cross  it  singly  as  best  they  could;  they  must  have  been 
utterly  annihilated.  The  detached  squadron,  having  missed 
halt  a  dozen  chances  of  mopping  up  the  infantry  of  the  right 
wing,  and  having  allowed  them  to  get  into  a  reasonable  posi- 
tion, eventually  decided  to  cluu-gr,  ;md.  having  not  more  than 
300  yards  of  open  to  cross,  would  probably  have  succeeded 
very  well,  as  they  had  only  some  80  rifles  to  face,  for*  the  re- 
mainder could  not  be  brought  to  bear  on  them,  and  just  as 
they  had  halted,  the  two  squadrons  of  the  center  which  had 
been  delayed  also  charged  into  the  m&e'e.  The  cavalry 
would  have  succeeded  beyond  a  doubt,  but  at  least  a  whole 
squadron  would  have  been  sacrificed,  and  this  was  also  the 
chief  umpire's  view.  However,  the  day  was  not  over  yet. 
There  yet  remained  the  right  wing  of  the  infantry  and  the 
battery  to  beat,  and  the  officer  commanding  the  detachment 
received  orders  to  go  on  with  three  squadrons  and  do  the 
best  he  could.  The  problem  was  a  very  difficult  one,  for  the 
enemy  held  a  very  strong  position  on  Jubilee  Hill,  and  appar- 
ently there  was  not  a  scrap  of  cover  for  the  cavalry  across 
the  whole  of  the  valley.  But  looking  forward  where  they 
were  drawn  up,  one  could  see  that  the  shoulder  of  the  hill 
projected  beyond  their  alignment  on  their  right,  and  if  this 
could  be  gained  the  last  four  hundred  yards  of  the  advance 
would  be  made  in  a  dead  angle,  but  to  gain  it  the  whole  of 
the  Long  Valley  had  to  be  crossed. 

The  horse  battery,  which  had  meanwhile  trotted  up, 
came  into  action  on  the  neck  of  Long  Hill  between  Chestnut 
Copse  and  Cocked  Hat  Wood,  and  the  regiment  moved  off  to 
the  left  under  cover  of  the  ridge.  Presently  they  emerged 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  149 

from  behind  the  wood  in  column  of  troops,  and,  galloping, 
wheeled  into  line  and  advanced  a  short  distance,  then 
wheeled  into  half-column  to  gain  the  shelter  of  the  above- 
mentioned  shoulder,  then  into  line  again  and  delivered  their 
charge,  i  rode  in  the  rear  rank  for  the  last  half-mile,  and 
uoted  that  the  guns  could  not  see  us  at  all,  and  we  could  only 
see  a  few  of  the  white  helmets  of  the  infantry,  till  we  came 
over  the  brow  not  150  yards  away  from  them.  It  was  the 
sort  of  charge  that  cannot  be  decided  about  in  peace;  it  might 
or  might  not  have  succeeded.  In  the  first  place,  it  would  be 
exceedingly  likely  that,  under  the  strain  of  the  artillery  fire 
on  their  front,  the  appearance  of  the  cavalry  from  behind 
Cocked  Hat  Wood  might  have  passed  unnoticed,  and,  at  any 
rate,  the  guns  could  not  have  changed  front  right  back  with 
sufficient  rapidity,  and  whether  the  infantry  saw  them  or  not, 
the  flank  movement  across  the  valley  was  made  at  too  long 
a  range  and  they  moved  too  fast  for  fire  to  have  had  much 
effect.  Further,  the  infantry  were  by  supposition  part  of  a 
beaten  force,  and  had  just  seen  half  a  battalion  of  their  own 
side  wiped  out,  and,  finally,  the  infantry  actually  were  so 
flurried  that  they  forgot  to  put  down  their  sights,  all  of  which 
points  were  brought  out  by  the  umpires  in  their  reports  to 
Sir  Evelyn. 

But  nothing  throughout  the  day  struck  me  more  than 
the  improvement  in  the  umpiring,  and  particularly  the  fair- 
ness and  thoroughness  of  the  chief  umpire  (Sir  Evelyn).  As 
an  instance,  I  would  quote  what  occurred  at  the  charge  of 
the  left  squadron  on  the  infantry  outside  of  Chestnut  Copse. 
When  Sir  Evelyn  arrived,  two  companies  of  infantry  were  on 
the  edge  of  the  ridge,  again  st  which  the  cavalry  had  advanced 
one  squadron  only;  the  other  two  were  still  crossing  the 
stream  in  the  hollow.  The  infantry  claimed  to  have  out- 
numbered the  cavalry,  but  Sir  Evelyn  pointed  out  that,  in 
the  first  place,  one  company  was  not  facing  the  direction  from 
which  the  cavalry  had  come  at  all,  and,  in  the  second,  that 
he  had  himself  noted  the  company  doubling  up  the  slope  of 
the  hill  at  the  instant  the  cavalry  halted.  Then  he  turned 
to  the  other  company,  and  asked  how  many  rounds  they  had 
fired,  and  they  promptly  answered  "Five.'-  However,  he 
proceeded  to  cross-examine  them,  and  called  attention  to  the 


150  M Hilary  Letters  and  Essays. 

empty  cartridge  rases  at  their  feet,  and  brought  ilie  figure 
down  to  two.  As  the  company  was  about  GO  strong,  this 
gave  about  120  bullets  delivered,  and  he  cannot  be  consid- 
ered as  over-biased  in  favor  of  the  cavalry,  for  he  assigned 
them  a  loss  of  20  horses,  which  would  be  remarkably  good 
shooting  for  broken  troops  on  the  bat  t  le  Held.  Ten  years 
ago  the  cavalry  would  have  been  put  out  of  action  on  the  spot 
without  a  moment's  hesitation,  and  they  have  good  reason 
to  be  thankful  for  the  progress  thus  far  made;  but  1  lie  harm 
done  then  is  still  very  evident,  for  half  the  officers  are  perma- 
nently "funked"bythe  umpires. and  thus  a  half-hearted. daw- 
dling style  of  work  results,  which,  by  leaving  the  troops  63 
posed  to  lire  ten  times  longer  than  is  necessary,  would  lead 
to  far  heavier  losses  in  the  long  run.  <  >nly  a  few  days  before, 
with  another  regiment  at  a  similar  day,  we  had  an  instance 
of  this.  An  outpost  screen  had  also  to  be  broken  through, 
and  this  time  the  line  was  so  weak  in  itself,  and  so  badly 
taken  up, that  the  whole  regiment  might  have  dashed  through 
some  copses  without  incurring  the  lire  of  more  than  a  doxen 
rilles,  and  that  only  momentarily  as  they  moved  from  cover 
to  cover.  Instead  of  doing  so.  whole  squadrons  were  dis- 
mounted to  skirmish  with  them,  and  ample  time  thus  af- 
forded to  the  enemy  to  bring  up  his  supporters,  which,  how- 
ever, he  neglected  to  do. 

Really  to  appreciate  all  that  has  been  done,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  recall  the  state  of  things  that  existed  some  seven  or 
eight  years  ago;  and  I  have  one  recollection  by  me  that  as 
yet  I  have  never  put  on  paper,  h  was  the  occasion  of  a 
grand  rehearsal  for  a  prince,  of  a  divisional  day.  A  north- 
ern army,  represented  by  the  whole  of  the  division,  was  to 
attack  a  skeleton  enemy  furnished  by  the  Royal  Engineers, 
the  depot  battery.  Royal  Horse  Artillery,  and  a  squadron  of 
the  4th  Dragoon  Guards,  who  \\ere  to  take  up  a  position 
across  the  spurs  of  Tatar's  Cam])  from  the  Pavilion  to  Out- 
ridden Copse,  an  annex  of  Chestnut  Copse,  so  often  men- 
tioned above.  Things  were  already  so  far  improved  that  the 
exact  position  to  be  taken  up  was  left  to  the  enemy. 
and  had  to  be  reconnoitered  and  fixed  by  the  cavalry 
first;  and  the  skeletons  made  clever  use  of  the  slight 
latitude  allowed  them,  and  took  up  their  ground  remarkably 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  151 

skillfully,  not  a  man  being  visible  from  the  front.  But  even 
before  the  day  began,  treachery  of  a  very  base  description 
was  at  work.  A  class  of  Army  Signallers,  who  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  operations,  took  up  their  stand  on  Hungry 
Hill,  from  whence  they  could  see  into  our  position  in  reverse, 
and  began  signalling  all  our  detail  arrangements  over  our 
heads  to  confederates  in  the  attacking  force.  But  they  had 
reckoned  without  their  hosts.  A  sergeant  of  the  telegraph 
troop,  happening  to  look  that  way,  read  some  of  their  mes- 
Bages,  and  reported  them  to  one  of  his  officers,  who,  taking 
with  him  some  half-dozen  of  his  mounted  men,  stalked  the 
party  most  skillfully,  and  made  them  all  prisoners,  and,  tak- 
ing their  Hags,  signalled  on  his  own  account  that  we  had  en- 
tirely changed  our  front.  This  somewhat  flabbergasted  the 
enemy,  and  the  cavalry  really  had  to  clear  up  the  matter 
themselves.  For  this  purpose  the  whole  cavalry  brigade 
left  the  shelter  of  the  copses  near  the  club-house,  and  trotted 
ii])  in  line  of  quarter-column  of  squadrons  at  close  interval, 
with  half  a  dozen  fighting  patrols  out  on  their  front  and 
flank,  but  not  more  than  100  yards  distant  from  their  main 
body.  In  this  order  they  trotted  slowly  towards  us,  and 
halted  not  500  yards  from  our  line,  of  which  they  could  see 
nothing  a1  all.  Meanwhile  our  squadron  of  4th  Dragoon 
<!uards  on  our  left  had  been  stalking  them  most  skillfully 
down  a  hollow, and  had  arrived  well  on  their  flank, and  then 
wheeling  into  line1,  charged  straight  at  them,  catching  them  at 
the  halt.  The  brigadier  rode  up  to  the  squadron  leader  per- 
fectly furious,  andasked  him, so  the  story  went,  what  thedevil 
he  meant  by  charging  him  at  the  halt.  To  which  the  officer  re- 
plied by  reminding  him  that  only  a  few  days  before  the  gen- 
eral had  quoted  Frederick  the  (treat's  remark  that  "any 
officer  who  allowed  himself  to  be  attacked  at  the  halt  should 
be  immediately  cashiered."  This  so  annoyed  the  general 
that  he  sounded  "troops  about,"  and  trotted  back  with  his 
whole  command  to  where  he  came  from.  A  long  interval 
now  ensued,  during  which  the  staff,  we  were  afterwards  told, 
endeavored  to  induce  him  to  go  back  and  try  again.  At 
length  they  succeeded  in  mollifying  him,  and  the  brigade 
again  appeared,  this  time  with  their  flank  a  little  better  pro- 
tected. P. ut  again,  when  they  reached  the  same  spot,  they 


152  Military  Lettei  s  and  Essays. 

halted,  and  for  some  never explained  reason  the  regiments 
wheeled  to  their  right,  and  began  to  proceed  at  a  walk  along 
our  front,  and  as  they  did  so,  we  opened  tire  on  them  at  bare- 
ly 400  yards  range.  This  was  too  much  for  them,  and  they 
broke  into  a  trpt,  and  then  into  a  gallop,  pursued  by  volley 
after  volley.  As  they  crossed  the  Long  Valley,  a  squadron 
of  mounted  drivers  of  the  Royal  Engineers  troops  issued  out 
on  their  flank,  and  pursued  them  with  yells  of  derision  over 
Long  Hill  and  out  of  sight.  What  became  of  tlieiu  after- 
wards we  never  knew. 

As  for  the  rest  of  the  day,  there  was  nothing  particularly 
remarkable  about  it,  and  need  not  be  dwelt  on  further,  my 
only  object  being  to  afford  some  standard  by  which  to  judge 
the  progress  the  cavalry  have  made.  Much,  very  much,  yet  re- 
mains to  be  done,  but  at  present  there  is  no  reason  to  fear 
that  things  can  ever  relapse  into  their  former  condition.  <  >ur 
system  is  yet  far  from  perfect,  but,  in  spite  of  its  faults,  it  is 
working  in  the  right  direction,  and  if  once  we  could  get  down 
to  the  root  of  the  matter,  and  by  the  adoption  of  the  company 
and  squadron  system  train  our  young  officers  more  as  practi- 
cal men  than  as  mere  theoreticians,  our  progress  would  be 
ten  times  more  rapid.  Such  as  it  is,  however,  we  owe  it  to- 
book  teaching,  and  cannot  therefore  be  surprised  if  our  prog- 
ress is  slow,  but  once  let  practice  and  theory  go  hand  in 
hand,  and  the  strides  we  should  make  would,  I  firmly  believe, 
render  us  soon  a  match  for  the  best  troops  in  the  world,  for, 
I  repeat  it  again,  our  raw  material,  whether  for  men  or  offi- 
cers, is  superior  in  innate  quickness  and  intelligence  for  war 
to  any  in  Europe. 

For  fear,  however,  lest  we  should  grow  too  confident 
from  the  above  comparison,  I  will  add  first  one  incident  to 
show  what  a  Prussian  crack  regiment  can  yet  do,  and  one,  I 
fancy,  it  will  be  hard  to  beat.  Two  French  officers  of  cav- 
alry went  over  to  Germany  to  see  how  things  were  looking, 
and  were  sent  down  to  the  1.3th  Uhlans,  then  commanded  by 
Von  Rosenberg,  the  most  perfect  horseman  and  horsemaster 
in  the  army,  to  have  their  eyes  opened.  They  were  taken 
dowrn  to  a  bridge  leading  over  a  railway  which  here  crossed 
the  plain.  To  the  south  of  them  and  some  000  yards  distant 
lay  a  dense  pine  wood.  To  the  north  a  skeleton  enemy  was 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  153 

seen  approaching.  A  couple  of  scouts  stood  on  or  near  the 
railway,  which  here  ran  on  an  embankment  enclosed  by  two 
fair  post-and-rails,  the  drop  to  the  northward  being  much  the 
most  considerable,  about  30  feet.  The  scouts  signalled  the 
approach  of  the  enemy,  and  suddenly  out  of  the  wood 
emerged  Von  Rosenberg  with  a  couple  of  his  squadrons,  can- 
tered across  the  intervening  space,  jumped  the  first  post-and- 
rails,  clambered  up  on  the  embankment,  slithered  (excuse 
the  expression)  down  the  other  side  and  took  the  second 
obstacle,  and  then,  after  a  moment's  check  to  steady  his  men, 
delivered  his  charge  within  250  yards  of  the  last-mentioned 
fence.  And  the  Frenchmen  rode  home. sadder  and  wiser 
men.  I  once  saw  the  King's  Dragoon  Guards  cross  a  cut- 
ting of  the  Grand  Trunk  Road  near  Lawrencepore  station 
under  almost  equally  difficult  conditions,  but  I  should  like 
to  see  a  few  more  such  instances  before  I  become  too  cock-a- 
hoop,  and  I  confess  the  19th  Hussars  have  rather  inclined 
me  that  way. 

VOLUNTEER  FIELD  DAY  AT  ALDEE8HOT. 

A  combined  field  day  of  Regulars  and  Volunteers  took 
place  in  the  Long  Valley  on  Wednesday  last.  The  total 
number  of  men  on  parade  must  have  been  nearly  12,000  rifles, 
800  sabers,  and  9  batteries,  and  for  these  the  ground  was  all 
too  small,  so  that  numerous  apparent  mistakes  may  be 
written  off  at  once,  as  not  due  to  the  fault  of  any  one  in  par- 
ticular. There  was  no  particular  strategic  idea.  The  de- 
fenders occupied  the  line  of  Long  Hill,  Bourley,  with  strong 
advanced  posts  and  artillery,  and  had  prepared  behind — i.  e., 
to  the  westward — a  strong  entrenched  position  on  the  slope 
of  Tweedledee  and  Tweedledum,  the  left  flank  resting  on  the 
North  Horns,  and  against  them  the  assailants  advanced  con- 
centrically, the  bulk  of  their  forces  in  the  center  and  right. 

When  I  reached  the  ground,  I  found  the  fight  in  progress. 
On  the  slopes  south  of  the  Pavilion,  the  attacking  artillery 
was  in  action;  and  their  first  line  of  infantry  had  reached 
the  crest  of  Eolmoor  plateau,  overlooking  the  Long  Valley 
and  extending  in  a  semicircle  along  the  edge  of  the  broken 
ground  as  far  as  Miles  Hill.  The  atmospheric  conditions 
were  very  singular,  not  foggy,  but  a  singular  haze  made  the 


154  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

movement  of  troops,  especially  those  in  gray  or  red,  almost 
invisible  at  a  distance  of  a  few  hundred  yards,  and  hence  I 
can  only  speak,  of  what  happened  within  a  narrow  limit 
around  me.  As  1  rode  up  to  the  lighting  line,  which  was 
pretty  dense,  about  a  man  to 'the  pace,  they  were  exchanging 
volleys  with  the  defenders  in  Cocked  Hat  Wood  and  on  Long 
Hill.  The  fire  was  fairly  controlled,  and  the  volleys  fell 
fairly  round — range.  Inn  not  direction,  being  given  by  the 
officers.  The  actual  distance  to  ihe  enemy  was  only  400 
yards,  but  the  order  was,  as  far  down  the  line  as  1  conld  hear, 
invariably  "at  800  yards."  etc.,  but  as  the  men  did  not  adjust 
their  sights,  probably  this  would  not  have  signified;  yet  a 
very  simple  rule  exists  for  ascertaining  the  range  at  this  dis- 
tance approximately — viz.,  that  at  400  yards  the  fore  sight 
of  the  Martini  1 1  (Miry,  when  looked  at  from  the  shoulder,  ex- 
actly covers  Ihe  height  of  an  average  man.  but  no  one  ap- 
peared aware  of  it.  The  supports  were  moving  up  in  ex- 
tended files,  though  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  presently 
halted  and  knelt  down  about  :»00  yards  in  rear.  I  may  men 
tion  that  the  plateau  falls  eastward,  away  from  the  enemy, 
just  about  parallel  with  the  trajectory  of  the  rifle  at  this 
range,  and  consequently  would  have  been  swept  by  a  hail  of 
shot  against  which  nothing  could  live  in  actual  practice,  yet 
there  was  excellent  rover  for  all  within  the  limit  of  my  sight 
not  1.50  yards  further  f o  the  rear.  Further  back  on  my  way 
ii])  T  had  seen  the  woods  about  the  Pavilion  crammed  with 
reserves,  and  further  to  the  right  I  could  see  the  white  hel- 
mets, but  not  the  bodies,  of  a  whole*  regiment  enfilading  the 
position  of  the  defenders,  who  showed  a  reckless  courage  in 
exposing  them  selves  to  our  fire.  "Presently,  to  save  ammuni- 
tion probably,  the  firing  on  our  side  ceased,  while  the  guns 
away  on  the  high  ground  to  the  south  continued  their  work 
of  preparation.  The  fighting  line  about  where  I  stood  was 
entirely  composed  of  Volunteers,  and  these  lay  and  lolled 
about  on  the  ground  without  any  semblance  of  discipline 
whatever;  most  of  them  laid  their  rifles  on  the  ground,  and, 
with  their  backs  turned  to  the  enemy,  refreshed  themselves, 
mostly  with  unwholesome-looking  apples. 

At  length,  after  a  weary  wait,  during  which  I  was  every 
minute  getting  more  and  more  disgusted  with  our  much- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  155 

vaunted  citizen  soldiery,  the  advance  was  ordered,  and  the 
whole  line  rose  and  moved  down  into  the  valley,  followed  by 
.supports  and  a  second  line,  which  was  also  in  extended  order 
of  some  kind.  Thanks  to  the  conformation  of  the  ground, 
about  200  yards  further  would  have  carried  them  into  a  dead 
angle,  in  which  they  could  have  collected  in  numbers  and 
then  rushed  the  opposite  hill — but  instead,  on  reaching  the 
foot  of  the  slope,  they  commenced  an  advance  by  rushes,  fir- 
ing again;  and  then  ensued  a  scene  of  disorder  worse  than 
anything  I  have  ever  witnessed.  Notwithstanding  that  the 
enemy  had  already  given  up  their  position,  the  men  fired  all 
they  could,  1  am  bound  to  admit,  in  an  approach  to  volleys — 
the  idea  was  evidently  there,  but  the  execution  lacked  finish. 
The  small  echelons  rushing  forward  lost  their  direction,  and 
the  rear  fired  into  them,  the  machine-guns  dragged  by  men 
seriously  hampered  and  delayed  the  movement,  causing  the 
line  to  assume  a  still  more  irregular  appearance,  and  the  fol- 
lowing line  assumed  the  most  extraordinary  shapes,  so  that 
at  length  the  whole  looked  like  two  flattened-out  W's,  touch- 
ing each  other  at  the  apices,  with  supports  dotted  in  between. 
Two  companies  immediately  at  my  feet,  in  second  line, 
wheeled  up,  and  threw  themselves  into  a  shallow  nullah,, 
facing  so  that,  had  they  fired,  they  would  have  enfiladed  both 
first  and  second  line  for  about  800  yards;  fortunately,  they 
did  not  put  in  the  last  touch,  by  actually  doing  so.  All  this, 
of  course,  took  time — perhaps  ten  minutes  in  place  of  two,  all 
that  was  necessary — which,  however,  as  no  enemy  wras  in 
sight,  was  not  of  much  consequence.  At  length  they 
reached  the  crest  of  the  hill  and  the  further  edges  of  the  ad- 
jacent copses,  and  brought  a  heavy  fire  on  the  defenders  be- 
yond, and  again  an  interval  occurred.  I  then  rode  over  to 
the  defenders,  whom  I  found  in  an  entrenched  position,  the 
entrenchments  being  indicated  by  screens.  An  obstacle  in 
the  shape  of  a  stream  with  dense  clumps  of  gorse  on  either 
side  defended  the  front,  and  this  was  swept  by  the  fire  of  two, 
and  in  some  cases  even  three,  indicated  tiers  of  trenches, 
which  for  the  most  part  were  exceedingly  badly  placed,  so 
that  the  men  iu  the  rearmost  ones  must  have  infallibly  blown 
off  the  heads  of  the  defenders  of  the  front  ones.  Generally 
speaking,  the  way  in  which  troops,  even  Regulars,  fired  over 


l»">r,  Military  Letters,  and  Essays. 

each  other's  heads  was  something  appalling  to  witness.  It  is 
admittedly  bad  enough  to  have  shells  flying  10  feet  over  one, 
though  the  chance  of  a  premature  burst  is  not  1  in  500, 
but  the  thought  of  thousands  of  jumpy  infantrymen  pulling 
their  triggers  behind  one's  back  is  one  to  make  even  the  bold- 
est tremble.  It  must  also  be  pointed  out  that  to  place  tiers 
of  trenches  one  behind  the  other  and  only  a  few  feet  verti- 
cally above  one  another  is  to  offer  the  opposing  artillery 
the  best  possible  kind  of  target,  one,  in  fan,  that  they  can't 
miss — this  whether  ordinary  or  smokeless  powder  is  used; 
but  with  the  latter,  even  if  the 'trenches  can  be  sufficiently 
separated  to  prevent  one  acting  as  t  lie  stop-butt  for  the  shells 
meant  for  the  other.  The  responsibility  of  placing  troops 
in  the  advanced  one  would  be  almost  too  great  for  pranical 
men  to  contemplate,  for  with  every  movement  behind  them 
clearly  seen,  it  would  be  impossible  to  support  or  relieve 
them,  still  more  so  to  evacuate  them  during  daylight.  But 
their  employment  (i.  e.,  of  their  trenches)  is  bad  in  any  case. 
for  there  is  no  one  denned  line  on  which  to  concentrate  re- 
sistance, and  when  the  assault  comes  on  the  men  fall  back 
on  the  next,  overrunning  its  defenders  and  masking  their 
fire  and  frequently  carrying  them  all  a\vay  in  panic  confu- 
sion. As  will  be  seen,  we  had  an  instance  of  this  sort  of 
thing  this  very  day,  even  though  no  bullets  were  flying. 

Meanwhile  the  second  line  had  closed  under  cover  of 
Long  Hill  on  the  first,  and  presumably  the  gunners  were  snj> 
posed  to  be  at  work,  but  I  could  see  only  one  battery  in  action 
on  the  right  flank  of  the  attacking  force,  from  whence,  too.  a 
battalion  of  Highlanders  were  advancing,  taking  every  rea- 
sonable advantage  of  cover,  but  they  would  probably  have 
been  suffering  unendurably  from  the  long-range  volleys; 
their  supporting  line  was  firing  over  their  heads.  At  last 
the  signal  for  the  assault  was  given,  and  the  second  line  came 
over  the  brow  of  Long  Hill  and  through  the  copses,  leaving 
the  first,  wrho  had  originally  captured  the  advance  position 
lying  down,  and  in  this  there  was  nothing  to  criticise;  the 
assaulting  troops  have  done  their  duty  when  they  have 
reached  the  further  limit  of  the  position  they  have  captured, 
and  all  operations  beyond  should  be  intrusted  to  fresh  bodies. 
The  fresh  line  came  on  two  deep  in  a  tolerably  dense  line; 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  157 

whether  it  was  meant  to  be  "line,"  or  wras  merely  a  crowded 
extending  formation,  was  not  quite  evident.  They  had 
about  450  yards  to  cross,  and  covered  the  first  150  at  the  ordi- 
nary quick  time;  then  they  broke  into  a  double,  and  then 
rushed  forward  as  hard  as  they  could  go,  the  fastest  run- 
ners coming  to  the  front.  When  they  reached  the  obstacle 
which  covered  the  position,  portions  halted  and  opened  fire, 
but  the  bulk  had  instinctively  closed  in  towards  the  few  prac- 
ticable passages,  and  continued  to  race  up  hill,  tailing  off 
more  and  more  as  the  pace  began  to  tell,  but  no  following 
line  appeared  to  back  them  up,  and  the  gunners,  who  ought 
to  have  supported  this  extreme  effort  with  every  available 
gun  at  case-shot  range,  and  for  whose  action  Long  Hill  of- 
fered a  splendid  position,  were  conspicuous  only  by  their  ab- 
sence. The  Highlanders,  too,  dashed  forwrard  on  the  flank, 
and  the  defenders  were  well  nigh  surrounded.  For  a  few 
minutes  a  terrific  fire  raged  all  round,  and  the  smoke  out- 
shrouded  everything,  and  then  the  '"cease  fire"  sounded. 

The  assault  might  or  might  not  have  succeeded.  All 
depended  on  the  extent  and  thoroughness  of  the  artillery 
preparation,  but  of  this  it  was  impossible  to  form  an  opinion, 
because  the  insufficiency  of  the  number  of  blank  rounds 
allowed  them  did  not  admit  of  their  fire  being  .indicated,  and 
owing  to  the  absence  of  the  smoke-clouds  this  fire  would  have 
created,  and  to  the  curious  haze  already  mentioned,  it  was 
impossible  to  say  whether  they  were  or  were  not  in  action 
at  the  time.  But  if  it  had  succeeded,  it  would  have  been  in 
spite  of,  and  not  in  consequence  of,  the  superior  leading. 
Brave  men  may  achieve  the  impossible,  but  only  at  the  cost 
of  heavy  losses,  and  it  is  the  special  purpose  of  the  mechan- 
ism of  attack,  which  is  something  totally  different  to  any  nor- 
mal attack  formation,  to  render  success  with  a  minimum  of 
sacrifice  possible;  but  of  a  true  comprehension  of  this  mech- 
anism there  was  no  trace  apparent 

The  scheme  altogether  appeared  too  ambitious  and  too 
wide-reaching,  the  sort  of  thing  that  when  you  know  before- 
hand exactly  what  force  you  have  opposing  you,  may  be  ven- 
tured on,  but  which  not  even  the  most  reckless  leader  would 
dare  to  attempt  with  the  class  of  information  generally  ob- 
tainable in  actual  war;  and  seeing  what  sacrifices  to  reality 


158  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  limitations  of  time  and  space  entailed,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  opportunity  could  have  been  utilized  to  more  instruc- 
tional advantage  for  the  Volunteers  than  was  actually  the 
case,  by  limiting  the  programme  to  a  direct  frontal  attack  of 
a  division  acting  between  others  in  the  line  of  battle,  and 
therefore  precluded  from  extending  its  front.  You  do  not  in 
war  know  beforehand  deiinitely  that,  yon  will  be  acting  on 
the  offensive,  and  the  enemy  defending;  you  may  both  star! 
with  the  same  intention,  and  even  the  existence  of  an  en- 
trenched line,  which  might  have  been  signalled  from  the  cap- 
tive balloon  which  was  conspicuous  above  the  heads  of  tin- 
assailants  throughout  the  day,  would  not  have  been  quite 
evidence  enough  to  justify  the  assumpt  ion  t  hat  i  he  adversary 
had  definitely  renounced  his  intention  of  attacking.  As  ii 
was,  the  position  when  both  sides  faced  each  other  across 
the  Long  Valley  was  equally  advantageous  to  the  offensive 
of  both,  and  a  dashing  charge  of  cavalry,  for  which  t  here  was 
ample  opportunity  at  the  lime  when,  as  above  described,  the 
advancing  force  was  in  such  confusion,  would  have  been  a 
fitting  prelude  to  an  advance  of  the  whole  of  their  force,  and 
would  probably  have  resulted  in  the  assailants'  army  being 
cut  in  two,  for  they  ultimately  held  a  line  L'.oOO  yards  in  ex- 
tent with  a  force  which  could  hardly  have  exceeded  s.ooo 
rifles,  barely  enough  for  a  decisive  assault  on  about  half  of  it. 
Not  with  standing  the  limitations  of  space  for  act  ual  tight- 
ing,  the  ground  offered  almost  ideal  conditions  for  an  in- 
fantry offensive,  and  the  numbers  available  being  considera- 
bly in  excess  of  what  one  usually  has  to  deal  with  at  Alder 
shot,  was  an  additional  reason  for  giving  the  staff  an  oppor- 
tunity of  handling  them  in  what  is  the  most  dillicult  manner. 
thus  teaching  them  how  to  meet  these  difficulties,  instead  of 
setting  them  an  easier  task  by  allowing  them  to  ignore  1  hem. 
Leaving  the  artillery  to  act  as  best  they  could  from  the  high 
ground  to  southward  on  the  spurs  of  Hungry  Hill,  the  in- 
fantry might  have  been  formed  on  the  parade  of  the  South 
Camp  and  its  roads,  two  brigades  side  by  side  and  the  third 
in  reserve.  The  cavalry  having  established  the  fact  that  1 1n- 
enemy  held  Long  Hill,  the  leading  battalions  should  rapidly 
have  advanced  and  occupied  the  further  edges  of  the  copse> 
east  of  Eelnioor  plateau  and  prepared  them  for  defence  in 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  159 

view  of  possible  eventualties.  Here  they  might  have  re- 
mained for  the  duration  of  the  artillery  duel  and  preparation, 
hidden  from  sight,  but  secure  that,  if  the  result  of  the  artil- 
lery duel  fell  out  against  them,  no  body  of  troops  could  hope 
to  face  their  fire  down  the  slope  of  the  plateau  dipping 
towards  them  at  point-blank  range,  without  preparation  by 
artillery,  and  for  this  the  ground  offered  no  facility.  As  the 
moment  for  the  attack- approached,  picked  skirmishers  at  1- 
paces  interval,  more  in  the  nature  of  ground  scouts  with 
officers  from  the  leading  companies,  might  have  worked  their 
way  up  the  slope  to  the  edge  of  the  plateau  and  marked  the 
best  alignment.  Then,  when  the  signal  to  advance  came,  the 
leading  companies,  crossing  the  marshy  hollow  at  the  foot  of 
the  copses  as  best  they  could,  should  have  front  formed  at 
the  halt  and  then  advanced  in  close-order  line  with  the  utmost 
possible  discipline,  only  extending  to  open  files,  and  dashing 
forward  with  a  rush  to  the  selected  position,  as  they  came 
in  sight  of  the  enemy.  Actually  even  the  supports  moved 
extended  up  this  slope,  though  not  a  man  of  them  could  be 
seen  from  the  front,  and  this  extended  order  used  on  such 
an  occasion  only  shows  how  utterly  its  true  raison  d'etre  is 
misunderstood. 

Within  400  yards  of  one  another  no  troops  with  modern 
arms  can  exist  stationary  for  five  minutes ;  therefore,  as  the 
first  line  opened  fire,  a  second  should  have  been  leaving  the 
copses  in  support,  advancing  likewise  in  close  order  with  ex- 
treme discipline,  but  not  extending  at  all,  as  they  would  not 
be  required  to  fire.  Their  arrival  within  50  yards  of  the 
first  line  should  have  been  the  signal  for  the  former  to  dash 
forward  at  full  speed  to  gain  the  dead  angle  of  Long  Hill, 
and  under  the  circumstances  of  the  ground,  the  second  line 
might  have  followed  at  the  double,  both  lines  leaving  their 
machine-guns  on  the  ridges  to  fire  over  tlreir  heads,  and  a 
couple  of  batteries  should  have  galloped  up  to  support  them, 
more  for  the  moral  effect  than  anything  else,  whilst  the  iv- 
mainder  kept  up  their  shrapnel  fire  to  the  last  moment  possi- 
ble. In  the  dead  angle  so  often  referred  to,  the  assaulting 
troops  could  have  rested  and  regained  their  wind,  whilst  the 
third  followed  up  towards  the  position  they  evacuated,  and 
then,  if  the  ensuing  rush  of  the  first  and  second  failed,  and. 


1 W  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

as  in  that  case  they  should  have  been,  they  wen-  charged 
by  cavalry,  they  would  have  been  in  a  posit  ion  to  receive  both 
them  and  the  cavalry.  It',  as  actually  happened,  the  enemy 
evacuated  the  position,  the  following  lines  should  have 
moved  up,  every  available  battery  galloped  up,  and  the  at- 
tack been  ultimately  delivered  by  as  many  successive  lines 
as  there  were  available.  Such  an  attack  would  have  thor- 
oughly met  the  conditions  of  the  case,  and  would  have  given 
every  one  engaged  in  it,  from  the  highest  to  lowest,  an  idea  of 
what  the  difficulties  of  handling  troops  act  ualh  are.even  with- 
out the  bullets  flying,  and  no  man  engaged  in  it  but  would 
have  left  the  ground  with  a  conviction  of  the  absolute  neces- 
sity for  the  maintenance  of  order,  and  the  certainty  that  in 
close  order  only  is  such  maintenance  possible  in  rear  of  tin- 
actual  fighting  line. 

The  march-past  \\hidi  followed  calls  for  but  little  re- 
mark. The  cavalry  and  Royal  Horse  Artillery  looked  as  they 
always  do  on  these  occasions,  as  long  as.  at  any  rale,  t  In- 
former confine  their pacetoa  walk.  The  4th  Dragoon*  luanls, 
who  have  only  recent  ly  joined  at  t  he  camp. are  a  part  icularly 
fine-looking  set  of  men.  \  have  known  then  now  for  several 
years,  but  never  saw  them  better,  and, as  far  as  can  be  judged, 
when  going  by  in  squadrons  the  horses  are  excellent,  only  I 
will  reserve  niy  final  opinion  on  this  head  till  I  have  seen 
them  rank-past.  In  spite. of  the  undeniable  hard  work  and 
exposure  entailed  by  last  week's  cavalry  campaign  down 
about  Woolmer,  during  which  the  weather  was  very  unfavor- 
able, none  of  the  horses  throughout  looked  any  1he  worse. 
and  indeed  for  the  most  part  were  act  ually  in  better  fighting 
condition  than  in  their  usual  state  of  over-fatness.  Tin- 
mounted  infantry  were  unfortunate  enough  to  give  their 
opponents  an  occasion  for  laughter:  the  iirst  two  companies 
went  by  very  creditably,  but  in  front  of  the  third  an  officer's 
horse  turned  restive,  and  the  troop-horses  immediately  fol- 
lowing him  became  unsteady,  finally  the  whole  of  the  center 
halted,  and  their  riders,  without  spurs  apparently,  could  not 
induce  them  to  move  forward,  so  that  the  wings  swung  for- 
ward crescent-wise,  and  for  a  few  moments  the  disorder  was 
disgraceful,  and  the  whole  column  in  rear  threatened  to  be 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  161 

checked.  Fortunately,  the  animals  yielded  to  a  certain 
amount  of  bad  language,  and  resumed  their  progress  before 
the  check  had  run  back  to  the  saluting  base. 

Of  the  infantry  all  one  can  say  is  that  they  were  evi- 
dently doing  their  best.  In  the  old  days  it  may  have  been 
possible  to  drill  men  to  go  by  like  a  wall  at  the  shoulder,  but 
woll  carried  back;  but  the  task  is  beyond  the  ptfwer  of  our 
ivrruit  battalions  in  England,  and  their  evident  straining  to 
succeed  only  increased  the  painful  impression  of  the  whole. 
The  moment,  however,  they  came  to  the  slope,  their  appear- 
ance changed  wonderfully;  they  recovered  the  normal  bal- 
ance of  men  in  motion  and  swung  along  keeping  better  dress- 
ing than  they  actually  had  done  on  the  passing  line,  in  spite 
of  their  painstaking  efforts  and  niggling  short  steps.  The 
shoulder  both  in  the  "long"  and  "short"  manual  exercise 
should  be  abolished,  and  the  men  allowed  to  march-past  at 
the  slope  instead ;  they  would  then  be  fit  to  compare  with  any 
troops  in  Europe  in  this  respect,  which  at  present  they  cer- 
tainly are  not. 

The  Volunteers  did  not  make  on  me  such  a  favorable  im- 
pression as  at  Wimbledon;  the  truth  is,  they  had  been  out 
under  arms  a  little  too  long,  and  though  physically  the  work 
had  been  light,  they  could  no  longer  keep  their  attention 
fixed  on  the  matter  in  hand.  They  tried,too,  one  could  see 
that,  but  they  did  not  all  try  together,  and  many  of  the 
faces  looked  quite  dazed,  and  mentally  weary.  In  physique 
many  of  the  companies  were  tall,  and  one  or  two  remarkably 
well  set  up,  but  as  a  body  they  were  conspicuously  hollow- 
chested,  and,  man  for  man,  the  "puny  weaklings,"  as  the 
papers  delight  in  calling  our  Regular  battalions,  would  have 
knocked  their  heads  off  in  a  service  of  fist  encounters  with 
perf ect  ease ;  the  Regular  recruit  may  not  be  the  ideal  type 
of  manhood  when  you  first  get  him,  but  a  few  months  of  phys- 
ical drill  and  gymnasium  do  wonders  for  him.  Whilst  on 
this  topic,  I  may  call  attention  to  the  far  too  exalted  ideas  of 
the  physical  development  of  our  race  at  the  age  at  which  we 
take  our  recruits,  that  many  people  appear  to  hold.  ,  Sand- 
hurst cadets,  chosen  from  the  pick  of  the  upper  middle  class, 
ought  to  be  a  fair  type  of  our  best,  yot,  turning  to  the  aver- 


162  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

age  measurements  of  their  seiiior  division,  given  in  last 
month's  number  of  the  Royal  Military  College  Magazine,  I 
find  all  they  can  boast  of  in  average  age — 18  years  11.71 
months;  height,  5  feet  8  inches;  weight,  10  stone;  chest, 
346-8  inches;  forearm,  10£  inches;  upper  arm,  11^  inches. 
If,  after  several  months' gymnastics  and  training  of  all  kinds, 
the  pick  of  the  country  cannot  do  better  than  that,  how  can 
we  expect  a  higher  average  of  chest  measurement  and 
weight,  the  only  two  factors  that  really  signify,  from  the 
classes  from  which  our  recruits  as  a  body  are  mostly  taken? 
Whilst  writing  the  above,  the  August  number  of  the 
Journal  of  the  United  Service  Institution  has  just  corne  to 
hand,  and  I  find  in  it  two  excellent  articles:  one  by  Capt. 
Grierson  on  the  German  maneuvers,  the  other  a  pre'cis  of  the 
last  published  opinions  of  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf  on  the 
modern  infantry  combat,  which  latter  is  of  altogether  excep- 
tional interest  on  account  of  the  part  its  author  has  had  in 
the  evolution  of  the  new  German  infantry  regulations,  and 
his  consistent  opposition  to  the  extreme  school  of  extended- 
order  fanatics.'  Briefly,  liis  views  may  be  summed  up  as  ex- 
tended order  in  the  fighting  line,  not  to  reduce  but  to  inflict 
loss,  and  rigid  discipline,  and  close  order  in  the  rear  and  no 
normal  attack  formation  at  any  price.  A  s  soon  as  I  obtain  a 
copy  of  the  original  I  hope  to  send  a  more  det  ailed  account. 

FIELD  DAY  AT  ALDERSHOT. 

In  order  to  have  as  fresh  an  impression  as  possible  on 
my  mind  of  the  present  state  of  efficiency  of  our  troops  at 
Aldershot,  to  guide  me  in  making  comparisons  with  the 
French  and  German  ones  I  am  just  starting  to  see,  I  attended 
a  big  field  day  of  opposing  forces  held  last  week  on  the  ground 
behind  the  Staff  College  between  the  Windsor  ride  on  the 
north  and  the  Bagshot  Black  water  road  to  the  south.  Every 
Sandhurst  cadet,  still  more  every  Staff  College  eleve^h&s  had 
to  survey  this  tract  of  ground,  so  I  need  waste  but  few  words 
on  description.  Briefly,  the  plateau  of  the  Bagshot  sands 
runs  north  and  south  from  about  the  Jolly  Farmer,  and  throws 
off  two  broad,  flat-topped  spurs  to  the  westward,  between 
which  flow  the  two  arms  of  the  Wish,  which,  within  the  area 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  163 

under  consideration,  are  separated  by  a  projecting  tongue 
of  land,  with  very  steep  sides,  known  as  Saddleback  Ridge. 
To  the  east  the  ground  is  densely  wooded,  and  to  the  west 
it  is  covered  with  heather  and  patches  of  fir  scrub,  whilst 
the  main  arm  of  the  Wish — i.  e.,  the  most  northerly — is 
fringed  with  birch,  beech,  and  osiers  of  about  ten  years' 
growth.  The  heather  is  full  of  holes,  and  the  conditions 
generally  most  unfavorable  for  mounted  troops  or  infantry 
in  close-order  formation.  The  attacking  force,  supposed  to 
have  been  detached  from  the  main  body  of  an  army  moving 
on  London,  consisted  of  2  cavalry  regiments,  1  horse  and  3 
field  batteries,  and  2  brigades  of  infantry,  one  of  3  and  the 
other  of  4  battalions.  The  defenders  had  1  regiment  of  cav- 
alry, 1  mounted  infantry  regiment,  1  horse  and  3  field  bat- 
teries, and  44  battalions  of  infantry  in  2  brigades.  Their 
orders  were  not  to  "precipitate  an  engagement,  but  if  at- 
tacked to  fall  back,  as  slowly  as  possible  consistently  with 
safety,  making  your  final  stand  on  the  danger  flag-staff  hill, 
R.  M.  C.  rifles  range,  where  supports  will  reach  you  at 
12:15  p.m." 

The  outposts  were  being  driven  in  as  I  arrived  on  the 
ground  from  the  southward,  and  reaching  the  edge  of  the 
plateau  looking  northward  I  saw  the  white  helmets  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  lining  the  edge  of  the  slopes  south  of  the 
Windsor  ride,  with  their  batteries  apparently  dispersed 
along  the  whole  front,  and  only  a  few  yards  in  rear  of  their 
infantry. 

Four  batteries  on  the  attacking  side  were  already  in 
action,  at  1,600  yards,  and  at  that  distance  should  have  exter- 
minated their  dispersed  opponent  in  half  an  hour.  On  my 
right  several  battalions  could  be  seen  and  heard  moving  down 
Through  the  wroods  to  the  eastward ;  in  front  of  the  artillery, 
a  single  battalion  with  a  small  detachment,  a  weak  company, 
a  little  in  advance  and  to  the  flank,  perhaps  100  yards  away 
from  its  main  body,  was  moving  obliquely  up  the  reverse 
slope  of  Saddleback  Hill,  and  further  away  to  the  left,  the 
Hussars  of  the  defenders  were  skirmishing  with  our  Dra- 
goons, who  showed  a  considerable  want  of  enterprise  and  go, 
for  the  Hussars  were  south  of  Saddleback  Hill  and  could  see 


164  military  Letters  and  Essays. 

all  that  was  going  on  under  its  cover,  and  presently  took  a 
sharp  advantage  of  it,  bringing  a  troop  up,  under  cover,  10 
the  extreme  westerly  point  of  the  ridge,  and  charging  down 
on  the  battalion  and  detachment  already  referred  to.  The 
cavalry  had  not  100  yards  to  cover,  and  only  received  the 
infantry  tire  in  the  act  of  pulling  up.  No  very  great  result 
could  have  been  expected,  but  its  effect  must  have  seriously 
shaken  the  contidence  of  the  infantry,  who,  in  view  of  the 
proximity  of  their  own  cavalry  in  overwhelming  force,  had  a 
right  almost  to  assume  themselves  secure  from  such  annoy- 
ance. This  episode  led  to  a  short  halt,  whilst  the  umpires 
came  to  a  decision  which  was  favorable  to  the  Hussars,  and 
then  the  latter,  free  again  to  act.  swung  round  the  hill,  and 
charged  right  down  upon  the  ilank  and  rear  of  another  party 
o.f  infantry  belonging  to  the  advance  guard,  which  had  just 
opened  fire  on  the  bulk  of  the  Hussar  regiment,  who  were 
retiring  across  their  front  before  t  he  advance  of  our  cavalry 
brigade,  who  had  at  last  been  stung  into  action.  The 
whole  scene  was  for  a  moment  very  confused  and  hard  to  un- 
ravel, but  it  is  so  instructive  an  instance  of  how  luck  favors 
boldness,  and  want  of  enterprise  is  punished,  that  I  cannot 
help  pursuing  it  further.  The  assailants'  cavalry,  being  in 
great  superiority  of  charging  force, — viz.,  the  Ith  Dragoon 
Guards,  heavies,  and  the  r»Ui  Dragoon  Guards,  Lancers, — 
should  have  pushed  boldly  forward  and  driven  the  Hussars 
in  at  the  very  first ;  the  latter  wTould  then  have  had  no  oppor- 
tunity of  seeing  behind  Saddleback  TTill,  and  under  its  cover 
the  whole  force  might  then  have  been  massed  for  the  attack. 
Their  failure  to  do  this  gave  the  Hussars  their  chance,  and 
had  it  been  real, — after  riding  down  and  dispersing  the  in- 
fantry they  first  came  on, — they  would  have  wheeled  up  to 
retire,  and  have  fallen  on  the  rear  of  the  second  body  some 
ten  minutes  sooner  than  they  actually  did,  and  in  the  confu- 
sion they  created  the  regiment  itself  might  have  trotted 
across  the  front  of  the  infantry  unnoticed.  As  it  was,  the 
halt  for  the  umpires'  decision  made  them  too  late,  and  the 
regiment  would  have  been  half  destroyed  already  before  the 
flank  and  rear  attack  took  effect. 

Meanwhile  the  Dragoons,  who  up  to  this  time  had  been 
justifying  their  origin  by  dismounted  action,  had  been  com- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  165 

ing  cm,  and  I  am  bound  to  admit  that,  considering  the 
infamous  nature  of  the  ground,  their  advance  in  line  of  squad- 
ron columns  was  excellent,  but,  as  is  usually  the  case,  one 
mistake  too  often  entails  another,  and  they  fell  into  a  new 
trap.  Had  they  charged  ten  minutes  sooner,  they  would  have 
had  room  to  do  so  effectually,  and  if  the  Hussars  had  stood, 
would  have  wiped  them  out  by  weight  and  numbers  without 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  infantry  and  artillery  behind, 
for  the  ridge  would  have  hidden  them  from  sight,  and  all 
the  defenders  would  have  seen  would  have  been  the  strag- 
glers and  riderless  horses  tailing  over  the  hill ;  but  as  it  was, 
when  they  reached  the  crest  of  the  ridge  the  Hussars  were 
already  safe  behind  the  Wish,  the  wooded  and  boggy  edges 
of  which  they  had  promptly  lined  with  dismounted  men,  who 
poured  a  heavy  fire  into  the  would-be  pursuers  at  about  250 
yards  range,  whilst  the^nfantry  and  artillery  from  the  main 
position,  by  their  increased  liveliness,  appeared  to  be  over- 
whelming them  with  volleys  and  shrapnel  at  not  more  than 
1,000  yards.  Under  these  circumstances,  nothing  remained 
but  to  halt  and  go  back,  and  this  was  accordingly  done.  How 
many  in  real  warfare  would  have  recrossed  the  hill  it  is  hard 
to  say — very  few,  I  should  imagine.  The  cavalry  scrim- 
mage over,  there  was  time  to  turn  one's  attention  to  the 
other  arms,  and  this  is  about  what  I  saw:  The  original  ad- 
vance guard  had  lined  the  wooded  margin  of  the  Wish,  and 
the  first  supporting  lines  were  being  brought  up  to  strengthen 
it.  One  of  these,  a  red-coated  battalion,  advanced  for  some 
distance  in  excellent  order,  considering  the  ground,  in  two- 
deep  line,  and  I  was  already  congratulating  myself  on  seeing 
common  sense  applied  at  last,  when  at  the  critical  moment, 
and  within  500  yards  of  the  enemy,  it  suddenly  went  "fours 
left"  and  proceeded  across  his  front.  What  is  to  be  hoped 
for  from  commanding  officers  capable  of  such  an  action?  To 
my  left  rear,  a  strong  battalion  of  the  Cameronians  were 
coming  up  the  reverse  slope  of  the  hill  in  excellent  order  in 
quarter-column.  As  they  approached  the  top  they  halted 
by  a  sign  from  their  leader,  and  by  another  deployed  into 
line  without  noise  or  confusion.  They  were  thoroughly  alert 
and  in  hand;  the  deployment  completed,  they  doubled  over 
the  rid  go  and  down  to  the  cover  of  the  copses  below  them. 


166  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

This  was  done  in  excellent  style,  and  actually  would  not 
have  cost  them  a  man,  for  I  found  out  afterwards  that  the 
artillery  and  infantry  on  the  other  side  had  overestimated 
the  range  by  1,000  yards  on  a  total  of  SOU.  The  same  remark 
applies  to  the  advance  of  the  artillery  which  now  took  place. 
With  considerable  difficulty,  but  with  undeniable  skill,  they 
had  been  brought  down  the  almost  precipitous  slopes  of  the 
plateau  on  which  they  were  first  in  action,  and  then,  having 
reestablished  their  order,  had  wheeled  outwards  in  column 
of  subdivisions,  and  attacked  Saddleback  Hill  by  the  two 
roads  leading  to  its  two  ends.  This  entailed  their  galloping 
along  the  top  of  the  ridge  in  full  view  of  the  enemy  to  get 
room  to  come  into  action — a  risky  proceeding,  but  one  which, 
as  it  happened,  would  have  passed  unpunished,  for,  as  above 
mentioned,  the  enemy  were  tiring  far  over  their  heads,  and 
by  good  luck  they  themselves  opened  tire  with  the  correct 
range  to  start  with.  I  may  add  that  my  information  as  to 
what  went  on  on  the  other  side  was  obtained  by  prearrange- 
ment  with  a  friend,  and  that  we  afterwards  checked  the  dis- 
tances by  the  6-inch  ordnance  map.  Two  other  points  struck 
me  with  regard  to  this  artillery  position;  one  was  that  the 
ridge  was  so  narrow  in  one  place  that  one  out  of  the  three 
batteries  that  came  across  could  not  have  tired  more  than  a 
single  round,  as.  even  with  the  brake  on.  the  guns  would 
have  tumbled  backwards  down  the  reverse  slope — and  hence 
the  importance  of  a  (prick-firing  non-recoil  arrangement  : 
and  the  other,  that,  owing  to  the  same  steepness  of  the 
ground,  the  service  of  ammunition  would  have  been  exceed- 
ingly difficult,  for  the  limbers  had  to  halt  at  least  100  feet 
vertically  below  the  guns,  and  one  can  imagine  the  fatigue 
it  would  have  caused  to  the  men  to  have1  had  to  carry  the  am- 
munition that  height  up  a  slope  of  about  1  in  :">.  The  in- 
fantry attack  was  now  beginning  in  earnest,  and  T  rode  down 
to  the  Wish  to  see  beyond  the  screen  of  the  trees  which  bor- 
der it  throughout.  I  found  a  scene  of  confusion  exactly 
similar  to  what  one  reads  of  as  happening  in  the  Franco- 
German  War.  (Vrtainly  our  existing  practice  has  the  ad- 
vantage of  familiarizing  our  subalterns  with  bringing  order 
out  of  disorder,  and  after  a  year  or  so  at  Aldershot  any  one 
of  them  will  at  least  have  had  better  opportunities  of  prac- 


Military  Letters  ana  Essays.  167 

tising  this  sort  of  thing  than  our  grandfathers  had  after 
going  through  the  whole  of  the  Peninsula.  The  advance 
had  already  got  within  150  yards  of  the  enemy — the  whole 
distance  down  to  the  Wish  could  not  have  exceeded  400,  and 
in  places  was  less.  The  line  had  been  heavily  reinforced, 
and,  to  avoid  overcrowding,  the  sections  that  had  been 
squeezed  out,  or  had  found  no  room  in  the  line,  were  lying 
clown  twenty  to  thirty  yards  behind  it,  and,  I  regret  to  say, 
in  more  than  one  instance  firing  gayly  into  their  own  men 
from  behind.  Presently,  for  some  unexplained  reason,  pos- 
sibly an  umpire's  order,  the  whole  of  the  right  wing  turned 
and  bolted  down  the  hill,  and  were  received  and  halted  by 
the  following  line;  and  I  saw  an  energetic  brigadier  and  his 
brigade  major  both  racing  about  on  foot,  trying  to  re-estab- 
lish order,  and  the  advance  was  again  renewed,  and  again 
rame  to  a  stand  about  100  yards  from  the  enemy.  The  con- 
fusion then  became  so  great  that  it  is  impossible  to  give  a 
detailed  idea  of  what  happened.  In  places  the  lines  were 
firing  into  one  another  at  30  yards  range  only.  A  horse  bat- 
tery of  the  defenders  fought  in  line  side  by  side  with  its 
infantry,  and,  though  certainly  not  more  than  50  yards  sep- 
arated it  from  the  assailants,  it  managed  to  limber  up  and 
escape. 

Still,  though  there  was  very  much  to  criticise,  on  the 
whole  the  men  around  me  were  better  in  hand  than  usual, 
and  certainly  took  an  intelligent  interest  in  the  matter,  judg- 
ing by  the  remarks  that  I  heard,  the  spirit  of  which  only  Kip- 
ling could  possibly  reproduce.  The  ground  throughout 
was  most  unfavorable  to  the  maintenance  of  order,  but  the 
tendency  seemed  to  be  to  preserve  it  as  much  as  possible. 
The  main  point  that  really  struck  one  was  that  the  picture 
ultimately  became  far  too  like  the  1870  style  of  warfare, 
which,  though  no  doubt  unavoidable  under  the  circum- 
stances,— viz.,  the  short  range  of  the  German  rifle  as  op- 
posed to  the  French  one, — is  exactly  the  opposite  of  what 
we  nowadays  desire.  With  the  present  range  of  the  weap- 
ons in  use,  the  ground  was  most  favorable  for  the  attack, 
and  all  the  work  could  have  been  done  almost  without  expos- 
ure at  longer  distances. 


168  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

A  dashing  cavalry  would,  as  already  pointed  out,  have 
driven  in  the  enemy's  srouis  and  prevented  his  ascertaining 
what  was  going  on  beyond  the  Saddleback,  behind  which 
then,  whilst  the  gunners  tired  away  from  the  plateau  to  the 
south,  the  bulk  of  the  infantry  could  have  been  brought  up. 
The  first  line  then  being  deployed  under  cover,  and  mov- 
ing up  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge  in  perfect  order,  two  deep. 
there  would  have  followed  the  fire  preparation  by  both  in- 
fantry and  artillery,  and  the  latter  being  at  1,600,  the  for- 
mer at  800  yards  and  at  a  little  lower  level,  their  fire  could 
have  been  safely  combined  on  the  same  object.  Ten  minutes 
of  this  would  have  seriously  damped  the  accuracy  of  the 
defenders'  fire,  and  then,  when  the  second  line  had  been 
brought  up,  similarly  deployed,  to  within  iM)  or  :>0  yards  of 
the  crest  where  they  would  be  entirely  under  cover,  the  first 
would  rise  and  rush  down  the  slope  to  the  stream.  As  a 
rule,  I  do  not  believe  in  tiers  of  infantry  fire,  but  in  this  in- 
stance it  might  possibly  be  safely  employed,  and  then  the 
certainty  of  such  a  fire  superiority  would  be  obtained  that 
the  subsequent  rush  over  the  last  BOO  yards  would  occasion 
but  trifling  loss.  Even  if  the  defender  hung  on  desperately, 
and  beat  off  the  first  attempt,  the  second  line  would  be  close 
at  hand  to  move  down  in  support,  whilst  the  third  took  up 
its  place.  And  all  attempts  to  assume  the  offensive  on  the 
part  of  the  defender  could  only  result  in  failure  against  the 
combined  effect  of  the  artillery  fire,  the  second  line  and  the 
remnants  still  clinging  to  the  edge  of  the  stream.  This  plan 
at  least  utilizes  to  the  utmost  the  capability  of  the  new 
weapons,  and  exposes  the  minimum  number  of  men  requisite 
for  the  acquisition  of  the  necessary  fire-power  for  the  least 
time.  But  to  willfully  throw  away  the  gain  in  range  and 
accuracy,  keeping  a  whole  brigade  in  successive  lines  out  in 
the  fire  whilst  advancing  by  little  niggling  rushes,  promises 
the  maximum  of  loss  for  the  minimum  of  effect,  and  in  real 
warfare  would  entail  a  funereal  catastrophe  of  the  first  order. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  169 

NOTES  ON  THE  FRENCH  MANEUVERS. 

I  feel  too  dazed  by  the  mass  of  men  and  number  of  de- 
tails that  have  come  before  me  during  the  past  week  to  do 
more  than  note,  before  the  mail  goes  out,  a  few  of  the  most 
salient  tactical  facts  that  have  come  before  me,  while  they 
are  still  fresh  in  my  memory.  I  formed  one  of  a  party  of 
six  British  officers  who  met  by  chance  at  Bar  sur  Aube  to  fol- 
low the  maneuvers,  and  as  we  spread  ourselves  about  on  the 
battle-fields  and  afterwards  compared  our  impressions,  we 
managed  to  put  together  a  good  deal  of  information.  At 
the  outset  I  will  state  that  we  were  treated  throughout  witli 
the  greatest  civility,  being  allowed  to  go  pretty  much  where 
we  liked  as  soon  as  the  police  had  satisfied  themselves  that 
we  were  what  we  said  we  were,  a  very  reasonable  precaution 
for  them  to  take.  For  the  first  forty-eight  hours  we  were, 
in  fact,  pretty  closely  followed  by  "mouchards"  of  the  tradi- 
tional type,  about  as  transparently  disguised  as  an  average 
British  plain-clothed  detective  in  the  regulation  ammunition 
boots,  but  when  they  saw  we  were  all  right,  they  ceased  to 
worry  us,  and,  in  fact,  became  quite  friendly.  We  stood 
them  drinks,  gave  thorn  lifts  in  our  carriage,  and  exchanged 
views  on  the  English  and  French  armies  with  great  frank- 
ness, parting  eventually  on  most  cordial  terms.  We  missed 
the  operations  of  the  first  day,  the  3d  September,  but  were 
present  at  the  great  fight  of  the  5th  and  Gth  Corps  at  and 
near  Sesmont.  The  ground  was  of  the  usual  chalk  downs 
type — long,  rolling,  convex  slopes,  the  crests  some  2,000 
yards  apart.  The  way  the  two  jinnies  came  in  contact  on 
this  day  was  extremely  curious.  The  French  have  no  divis- 
ional cavalry,  except  a  squadron  for  orderlies  and  scouting 
purposes,  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  being  either  formed  in 
divisions  for  two  or  more  corps,  or  in  brigades  for  corps  act- 
ing alone.  The  two  brigades  in  this  instance  had  an  en- 
counter in  the  early-  morning  on  the  Hanks,  and  afterwards 
neutralized  each  other  throughout  the  day.  When,  there- 
fore, the  two  main  bodies  started  to  find  one  another,  they 
appear  to  have  been  pretty  badly  informed  as  to  each  other's 
position.  The  question  turned  on  which  side  could  reach  a 
ridge,  which  dominated  the  plain  for  many  miles  round,  first 


170  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

and  hold  it.  The  Gth  Corps  advanced  its  infantry  divisions 
formed  to  tight  anywhere,  lines  of  company  columns  leading, 
preceded  by  only  a  lew  infantry  ground  scouts.  The  5th 
Corps  sent  on  its  artillery  first  to  seize  the  ridge,  and  had 
they  been  ten  minutes  earlier,  their  fire  on  the  columns  de- 
scending the  opposite  slope  would  probably  have  been  anni- 
hilating, for  their  artillery  was  not  in  position  to  cover  the 
advance,  but  marching  some  distance  in  rear,  and  would 
have  had  to  conn-  into  action  under  the  enemy's  fire,  hut 
the  5th  Corps  missed  its  chance,  and  both  sides  reached  Hie 
buimmit  of  the  hill  simultaneously,  and  the  artillery,  caught 
in  the  act  of  unlimbering  by  magazine  tire  at-  1.10  yards,  for 
a  great  part  must  have  been  totally  crushed  before  firing  a 
shot.  The  following  infantry,  too,  must  have  suffered  most 
severely,  and  now  was  the  chance  for  a  divisional  cavalry 
charge,  but  there  was  none  present;  only  the  support  of  a 
few  flankers,  all  that  happened  to  be  at  hand,  made  a  plucky 
dash  at  the  nearest  battery,  and  were  in  it  before  the  first 
round  was  tired. 

I  take  it,  this  <'»ntr<'trnipx  simply  destroyed  the  day. 
and  that  the  subsequent  maneuvers  were  only  to  prevent 
the  time  being  wasted,  for  on  no  other  supposition  ran  1  ac- 
count  for  the  manner  in  which  the  troops  were  now  handled: 
troops  within  500  yards  of  the  enemy  made  processional 
flank  marches  to  rectify  their  positions,  and  finally  a  whole 
brigade  was  moved  slowly  acrossour  front  in  a  solid  mass, and 
not  more  than  :»,500  yards  away  from  some  sixteen  batteries. 
It  was  or  would  have  been  St.  I 'rival  over  again,  and  the 
movement  can  only  have  been  undertaken  as  a  piece  of 
brigade  drill. 

I  noticed  on  my  wax  out  some  attempts  at  shelter 
trenches  of  a  very  weak  and  insufficient  profile,  and  exceed- 
ingly badly  placed  as  regards  the  ground. 

T  was  most  agreeably  surprised  by  the  steadiness  af  the 
men  under  arms  and  the  fire  discipline;  of  actual  smartness 
such  as  one  sees  in  (Jermany  there  was  none,  but  the  men 
were  undeniably  in  the  hands  of  their  leaders  and  did  as 
they  were  ordered,  but  without  any  show  of  keenness.  On 
the  whole,  T  began  to  think  T  had  formed  too  prejudiced  an 
opinion  of  their  merits,  but  what  I  afterwards  saw  convinced 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  171 

me  that  though,  since  I  last  saw  them,  very  great  progress 
indeed  had  been  made,  still  things  were  very  far  short  of 
what  they  should  have  been. 

The  next  day  was  spent  in  changing  quarters,  and  there 
was  little  or  no  fighting,  and  Sunday  following,  there  was 
nothing  to  do  but  to  saunter  round  and  study  the  men  and 
horses.  Of  the  latter  1  can  only  say  that  I  was  astounded. 
The  artillery  teams,  though  not  very  uniform,  were  in  all 
cases  good,  and  in  some  excellent,  far  better  than  any  I  have 
seen  during  the  last  two  years  at  Aldershot.  The  cavalry, 
of  which,  however,  I  only  saw  some  500,  but  stripped  for 
watering,  showed  an  immense  improvement  in  shape  and 
quality,  but  all  were  uniformly  wanting  in  condition  and 
muscle,  and  the  artillery  had  fully  half  of  their  mounts  suf- 
fering from  sore  backs,  girth  and  harness  galls,  all  of  which 
showed  that  the  science  of  keeping  horses  in  condition  is  as 
yet  at  a  very  low  level  in  this  army,  as  compared  with  their 
rivals  across  the  frontier. 

.Monday,  the  7th  September,  was  the  first  day  on  which 
the  whole  four  corps  were  engaged — viz.,  the  5th  and  6th 
under  ( Jalliffet  against  the  7th  and  8th  under  Davoust.  Here 
let  me  describe  the  appearance  of  the  former.  Though  he 
took  part,  in  the  Crimea,  and  cannot  be  under  60  years  of 
age.  he  looks  all  over  a  smart  young  cavalry  subaltern,  a 
small  dapper  little  man,  about  5  feet  8  inches  and  10  stone 
in  weight;  with  a  bronzed  complexion,  and  hardly  a  wrinkle 
on  his  face.  he  looks  as  if  he  had  indeed  discovered  the  elixir 
of  eternal  youth.  A  more  striking  man  it  would  be  hard  to 
find,  and  were  he  permitted  to  exercise  his  full  influence  on 
the  cavalry,  they  would  be  in  a  far  different  state  to  that  in 
which  they  actually  are,  though  indeed,  even  in  this  arm,  a 
most  extraordinary  improvement  is  visible,  not  only  in  the 
horses,  which,  as  above  stated,  compare  more  than  favora- 
bly with  our  own,  but  particularly  in  the  seat  of  the  indi- 
vidual men.  .Owing,  however,  to  the  distinguished  part  he 
took  in  the  suppression  of  the  rommune,  he  has  been  ham- 
pered at  every  turn  by  the  virulent  hatred  of  the  Socialists, 
and  has  suffered  many  and  bitter  disappointments  and  hind- 
rances in  endeavoring  to  do  his  duty  to  his  country,  which 
he  serves  wllolly  and  nndividedly,  without  reference  to  poli- 


17~  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

tics.     There  is  indeed  a  leader  of  men  in  Galliffet,  if  only  he 
is  allowed  the  opportunity.     But  to  return  to  the  day,  the 
fight  took  place  in  a  district  curiously  resembling  South 
Africa — flat-topped  "koppjes"  and  long,  undulating  ridges. 
On  one  of  these  table-topped  hills,  in  the  center  of  the  posi- 
tion of  the  7th  and  8th  Corps,  I  watched  the  proceedings, 
and  could  take  in  pretty  well  all  the  doings  on  a  front  of  bat- 
tle of  at  least  8  miles.     The  latter  two  corps  under  Davoust 
were  taking  up  their  positions  on  a  long  ridge  running  about 
east  and  west,  commanded  near  the  center  by  another  long, 
scarped    plateau,  which  here  approached    to  within  1,800 
yards,  and  then  fell  back  about  northeast,  overlooking  an 
enormous  undulating  plain  many  miles  in  extent.     As  we 
knew  that  Galliffet's  army  lay  with  its  bulk  on  Davoust's 
left  and  within  3  or  4  miles,  our  interest  was  intense  when 
we  saw  the  latter  withdrawing  his  troops  from  left  to  right. 
Pretty  soon  the  balloon,  which  was  a  feature  in  these  opera- 
tions, and  for  the  day  belonged  to  Galliffet,  was  seen  to  rise, 
and  presently  a  long  line  of  guns  opened  from  a  most  com- 
manding position  against  Davousfs  left,  and  shortly  after- 
wards heavy  and  sustained  firing  announced  that  what  we 
expected  had  come  about — viz..  an  at  tempt  to  crush  and  roll 
up  the  exposed  flank  of  the  other  army.  Almost  immediately 
the  stream  of  troops  towards  the  right  stopped,  and  began 
to  flow  in  the  opposite  direction.     We  saw  the  batteries  of 
the  8th  Corps,  which  formed  the  left,  take  up  a  position  fac- 
ing west  and  north,  and  the  reserves  close  up  towards  the 
threatened  point.     The  1irst  village  was  carried  by  the  at- 
tack, and   Davoust's   position   became   perilous  in   the  <  \ 
treme,  for  he  was  in  evident  danger  of  being  crushed  in  de- 
tail and  his  batteries  and  reserves  crowded  together  in  a 
pronounced    salient    and  enveloped  by  a  converging  tire. 
against  which  the  ground  offered  only  concealment  from 
sight,  but  no  security  from  projectiles.     It  seemed  to  me 
almost  hopeless,  and  evidently  the  general  officer  command- 
ing on  the  spot  took  the  same  view  of  it,  for  he  brought  up  a 
cavalry  regiment  and  launched  it  out  on  a  perfectly  hopeless 
attack  against  lines  of  artillery  flanked  by  dense  clouds  of 
skirmishers.     Vionville  must  have  been  a  joke  to  this.     The 
umpires  also  took  the  same  view,  and  the  cavalry  were  com- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  173 

pelled  to  retire,  wheeling  up  to  the  right  by  troops  and  then 
changing  direction  to  the  rear,  and  as  they  came  back  they 
presented  a  pretty  ragged  appearance.  I  was  too  far  oft'  to 
judge  in  what  order  the  actual  charge  was  delivered.  The 
tiring  now  died  away  on  this  flank,  and  for  a  time  there  was 
a  lull  in  the  action,  but  we  now  saw  the  7th  Corps  on  Da- 
voust's  right  forming  for  an  attack  on  the  refused  flank  of 
Galliffet's  army,  which  held  a  position  along  the  plateau 
above  mentioned  as  running  about  northeast.  The  gunners 
now  began  to  take  up  their  positions,  but  there  was  much  in- 
decision in  their  deployment,  and  their  ranges  were  exces- 
sive, 4,000  yards  and  upwards,  and  far  on  the  right  we  saw 
a  cavalry  division  maneuvering,  with  what  object  it  was 
difficult  to  perceive,  but,  in  spite  of  the  distance,  a  want  of 
precision  was  very  apparent  in  their  working.  Then  at  last 
the  whole  infantry  advanced  to  the  attack,  the  first  line  in 
sections  in  extended  order  at  about  two  men  to  three  paces 
in  single  rank,  followed  by  succeeding  lines  all  in  file  or 
fours,  heading  towards  the  enemy.  As  far  as  the  eye  could 
reach,  the  plain  was  covered  with  them,  the  lines  being  not 
more  than  100  yards  npart,  and  the  columns  at  about  the 
same  interval.  More  guns  came  up,  and  with  them  8  of  the 
new  12-centimeter  howitzers  intended  for  firing  melinite 
shells  of  about  60  pounds  weight.  The  whole  artillery  now 
began  to  advance  to  a  second  position,  and  the  roar  of  their 
fire  became  almost  continuous;  all  together  on  this  wing 
theremust  have  been  close  on250gunsin  action.  The  front  to 
be  assaulted  was  even  longer,  steeper,  and  at  least  as  open 
as  the  celebrated  glacis  of  St.  Privat,  and  one  could  see  with 
glasses  that  the  men  were  utterly  done;  the  lines  closed  on 
each  other  and  presented  an  almost  ideal  target  to  the  ene- 
my, and  now  right  in  rear  we  saw  first  two  solid  battalion 
columns,  and  behind  them  a  whole  regiment  in  one  solid 
square  column,  advancing  to  the  assault  with  fixed  bayonets 
and  a  considerable  a  1  tempt  at  close-order  discipline  and 
style,  whilst  in  the  extreme  right  rear  the  cavalry  division 
was  seen  trotting  up.  What  the  result  of  the  assault  might 
have  been  it  is  impossible  to  say,  if  the  guns  of  the  attack 
had  really  overpowered  those  of  the  defence.  After  all, 
though,  the  method  adopted  appeared  the  worst  possible 


174  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

to  insure  success.  Still  such  things  have  happened,  but  one 
would  like  to  know  what  the  result  of  the  defeat  Davoust's 
left  had  already  suffered  would  have  had  on  his  army  as  a 
whole.  At  any  rate,  the  director  general  of  the  proceedings. 
Saussier,  sounded  the  "cease  lire,"  and  up  to  the  present  lias 
published  no  decision,  which  looks  as  if  he  were  of  the  same 
opinion  that  we  all  held. 

To  me  it  seemed  that  Davoust  was  hopelessly  out -gener- 
al led,  his  left  being  exposed  to  attack  by  crushing  numlx-i  > 
before  the  right  could  come  up  in  line.  His  game  evidently 
was  to  withdraw  it  at  once  till  the  two  were  within  support- 
ing distance  of  one  another,  and  this  at  first  he  appears,  by 
the  movement  from  left  to  right  alluded  to  above,  to  have 
intended  doing.  But  his  decision,  if  made,  was  upset  by 
almost  the  first  shot  fired,  and  then  his  artillery  nearest  at 
hand  took  up  a  line  facing  west  against  the  attacking  troops, 
whilst  apparently  six  batteries  slated  him  from  the  north, 
and  the  next  section  of  his  guns,  which  appeared  to  be  the 
corps  artillery  of  the  Sth  Corps,  came  up  against  the  latter 
some  half  an  hour  later.  Of  course,  things  at  a  maneuver  go 
more  rapidly  than  in  actual  war,  but  the  point  must  be  re- 
membered in  one's  plan  as  part  of  the  circumstances  to  In- 
dealt  with,  and  nothing  can  excuse  a  man  for  tight  ing  TWO 
separate  and  distinct  actions,  divided  from  one  another  both 
by  time  and  space,  against  an  enemy  who  opposes  to  him  a 
united  front. 

A  few  of  the  details  of  1he  fight  deserve  notice.  At  ih<- 
close  of  the  action  Davoust's  corps  were  divided  by  a  gap  of 
at  least  2,000  yards  width;  whilst  the  action  on  the  left  was 
at  its  height,  an  infantry  brigade  was  being  moved  from  right 
to  left  at  our  feet;  six  batteries  of  artillery  appeared  trot- 
ting up  on  a  road  crossing  the  line  of  march  of  the  infantry: 
the  leading  battery  commander  signalled  to  the  infantry  to 
let  him  pass,  and  the  third  battalion  halted  together  with  the 
following  three  to  do  so,  and  he  trotted  through,  the  two  first 
battalions  wandering  off  into  a  convenient  gully,  and  we  never 
saw  them  again.  Meanwhile,  whilst  the  guns  were  passing. 
the  commanders  of  the  two  arms  consulted  and  apparently 
arrived  at  a  new  decision,  for  the  infantry  now  wheeled  up 
to  the  front  and  marched  off  down  into  a  hollow,  where  they 


Military  Letters  and  Essays,  175 

formed  by  degrees  as  a  sort  of  escort  or  flank  guard  to  the 
gunners.  Each  battalion  followed  in  succession,  changing 
direction  at  the  point  where  the  gunner  sat  first  checked  their 
march,  but  though  there  was  an  excellent  road  leadingacross 
the  angle  formed  by  the  wheel,  no  one  thought  of  saving  the 
men,  who  appeared  very  much  distressed,  by  cutting  across 
and  thus  saving  some  :>()()  yards  of  ploughed  field.  Also  it 
appeared  that  there  was  no  pressing  urgency  for  the  guns 
after  all,  for  when  the  leading  battery  reached  the  spot  on 
which  line  was  eventually  formed,  it  halted  in  column  of 
route  facing  towards  the  enemy,  who  was  enfilading  it  from 
its  left  front  at  about  3,000  yards,  and  then,  after  some  dis- 
cussion, wheeled  about  and  took  up  a  position  under  cover, 
from  sight  only,  a  little  to  the  rear,  where  it  was  joined  by 
the  remaining  five  batteries.  Then  again  another  battery 
was  moved  to  the  front,  again  in  column  of  route  for  a  couple 
of  hundred  yards,  and  again  halted,  and  finally  another  bat- 
tery was  selected  to  advance,  and  after  fully  25  minutes 
delay  the  line  was  eventually  formed,  about  half  facing 
north-northeast,  the  other  half  north-northwest.  All  com- 
ment on  this  is  unnecessary. 

Many  of  the  gun  teams  have  white  horses  and  proved 
terribly  conspicuous.  As  far  as  the  artillery  is  concerned, 
smokeless  powder  is  no  concealment;  the  flash  is  distinctly 
apparent  and  enables  one  to  define  the  position  of  the  gun 
with  ease,  even  at  extreme  ranges.  Kven  at  0,000  yards,  I 
could  locate  the  guns  easily  with  field-glasses,  and  with 
Scott's  telescopic  sights  their  exact  position  could  have  been 
ma'de  out. 

The  arrangements  for  the  maneuvers  rendered  it  im- 
possible for  (la  11  iff et  to  follow  up  his  success:  he  had  to  be 
at  Vandoeuvre,  some  IS  miles  distant,  on  the  Oth,  and  the 
whole  of  the  8th  was  therefore  spent  in  a  retreat  and  pursuit 
which  called  for  some  hard  marching,  and  the  passage  of 
the  Aube  was  a  very  interesting  movement  to  watch,  the 
chief  point  that  attracted  my  observation  being  the  absence 
of  divisional  cavalry  and  the  want  of  dash  in  the  pursuing 
artillery.  The  great  battle  at  Vandoeuvre  terminated  the 
second  period  of  the  maneuvers,  but  the  nature  of  the  ground 
rendered  it  impossible  to  overlook  the  situation  as  on  the 


176  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

7th,  and  I  can  therefore  only  describe  what  took  place  im- 
mediately under  my  own  eyes. 

The  two  armies  came  into  contact  obliquely.  Davoust 
must  evidently  have  intended  to  outflank  Qalliffet'a  Id i, but, 
apparently  not  knowing  where  the  left  stood,  he  advanced 
with  a  whole  infantry  division  obliquely  across  his  enemy's 
front,  and  would  have  suffered  most  severely  for  the  fault.  I 
may  as  well  describe  how  it  happened.  Driving  up  from  liar 
towards  Vandoeuvre.  we  were  able  to  overlook  the  direction 
the  columns  of  the  7th  Corps  were  taking.  On  reaching 
the  summit  level  from  the  valley  of  the  Aube,  we  came  on  a 
great  rolling  plain,  stretching  lor  miles  away  before  us.  A 
village  lay  about  a  mile  in  front  of  us,  and  we  could  see  mm 
at  work  entrenching  t  hem  selves;  otherwise  not  a  sign  of  the 
120,000  men  about  to  engage  was  to  be  seen.  Presently  we 
saw  long  columns  of  men  and  guns  coming  over  the  brow  of 
the  plain  away  bark  on  our  left  rear — i.  e.,  about  south. 
About  this  time  a  few  of  Hie  enemy's  vedettes  appeared,  and 
behind  them  we  saw  four  batteries  marching  within  a  few 
hundred  yards  of  a  position  from  whence  they  could  have 
taken  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  deployment  under  lire,  but 
the  few  vedettes  never  pressed  far  enough  forward  to  really 
see,  and  besides  were  opposed  by  scouts  from  the  White  ( 'ap 
side.  At  any  rate,  nothing  happened,  and,  as  far  as  I  could 
see,  the  infantry  of  a  whole  division  was  forward  for  action 
facing  west  in  a  hollow  not  1,500  yards  away  from  the  ene- 
my's position.  This  position  was  marked  by  1he  above-men- 
tioned village  on  the  main  road,  and  a  second  one  bearing  a 
little  south  of  west  from  the  first  one,  and  about  1,200  yards 
beyond  it,  called  Niusement;  a  few  entrenchments  were 
dotted  about,  of  no  great  value,  and  it  appeared  to  be  held 
only  by  an  outpost  line.  About  S  a.  m.  a  long  line  of  guns 
opened  on  Niusement,  at  least  is  batteries,  and  at  the  same 
moment  the  infantry  broke  cover  and  began  to  advance 
towards  Nmsement,  not  towards  the  first  village  at  all.  I 
went  with  the  right  flank,  and  expected  the  fire  to  break  out 
every  moment,  for  we  were  passing  within  400  yards  of  it. 
Six  batteries  of  the  enemy  now  came  into  action  on  our  right 
front,  and  immediately  after  six  moie  wheeled  up  on  our 
left,  and  suddenly,  when  we  were  within  say  GOO  yards  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  177 

Niusement,  we  were  being  fired  into  in  front,  and  both  flanks 
•at  once,  and  even  from  the  rear;  the  flank  section  had 
wheeled  up  to  reply,  and  the  extended-order  brigade  had  be- 
come almost  a  solid  square. 

No  one  seemed  to  mind  very  much,  and  as  we  were  in 
immense  numerical  superiority,  no  doubt  we  might  have 
extricated  ourselves  somehow,  but  a  worse  piece  of  rash 
leading  it  has  never  been  my  lot  to  see. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  day  the  progress  of  the 
troops  called  for  no  particular  remark.  I  can  only  note  the 
general  conduct  of  the  men  and  of  each  arm.  The  infantry 
were  evidently  much  knocked  up  by  the  heat,  which  all  the 
week  had  been  very  great,  and  they  had  reached  a  pitch  of 
demoralization  such  as,  with  the  exception  of  the  Militia 
Brigade  at  Aldershot,  which  broke  up  on  one  hot  field  day  on 
the  Fox  Hills  and  went  to  bathe  in  the  canal — this  was  in 
1882 — I  have  never  seen  or  imagined.  The  men  loafed  slowly 
forward,  neither  officers  nor  men  taking  the  smallest  interest 
in  the  proceedings.  Whilst  a  desperate  action  was  raging  in 
front,  I  saw  some  non-commissioned  officers  of  a  company 
lying  down*  in  support,  deliberately  leave  their  arms  on  the 
ground  and  slouch  forward  to  the  edge  of  a  hollow  to  have 
a  general  look  round,  nothing  more.  On  the  word  "rise," 
"advance,"  the  men  raised  themselves  up,  using  their  rifles 
as  a  crutch,  and  after  settling  their  packs,  crawled  slowly  for- 
ward— it  sometimes  took  20  seconds  before  the  last  man  be- 
gan to  move,  and  yet,  judging  by  their  conduct  afterwards, 
they  could  not  have  been  unduly  fatigued. 

The  general  direction  of  the  movements  left  much  to  be 
desired ;  I  saw  again  and  again  firing  lines  lying  down  on  an 
exposed  slope  at  right  angles  to  one  another.  The  artillery, 
of  which  the  French  are  now  particularly  proud,  engaged  at 
exceptional  ranges  and  was  always  on  the  move — never  still 
—here  and,  there  single  batteries  or  groups  of  two  were 
noticeable,  and  even  when  the  batteries  stood  together  they 
diverged  their  fire.  In  one  case  I  saw  a  line  of  about  twelve 
batteries  facing  south  with  two  wheeled  back  on  its  flank, 
facing  east — a  perfectly  appalling  situation. 


178  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

THE  GERMAN   AK.MV. 


'  The  maneuvers  of  the  German  Army  during  1he  past 
few  months  deserve  more  than  passing  attention,  since  they 
mark  the  culminating  point  of  a  cycle  of  military  evolution. 
which  began  with  the  French  Revolution  almost  exactly  a 
century  ago.  That  era  introduced  an  entirely  new  factor 
into  European  warfare — namely,  the  conception  of  a  nation 
in  arms,  as  opposed  to  a  standing  dynastic  army;  and, 
though  Napoleon  the  Great  was  quick  to  realize  the  increase 
of  fighting  power  which  he  thereby  found  placed  at  his  dis- 
posal, he  had  neither  time  mu-  opportunity  to  develop  this 
idea  to  its  logical  conclusion.  Indeed,  judging  by  the  evi- 
dence of  his  own  actions  and  writings,  it  is  doubtful  whether 
he  ever  really  grasped  all  its  ultimate  possibilities,  for.  by 
disregarding  the  main  principles  on  which  its  strength  was 
founded,  he  himself  during  the  latter  years  of  his  reign  was 
the  most  efficient  instrument  in  preparing  the  way  for  his 
own  downfall. 

These  main  principles  did  not,  however,  escape4  the  in- 
sight of  the  German  leaders,  trained1  in  the  school  of  defeat; 
and  those  would-be  reformers  who  believe  thai  an  army  can 
be  created  by  the  stroke  of  a  pen,  and  are  proportionately 
discouraged  when  they  find  that  this  is  not  the  case,  may  per- 
haps derive  encouragement  from  the  fact  that  even  in  Ger- 
many it  has  taken  a  whole  century  to  develop  and  bring  into 
execution  the  full  possibilities  entailed  by  a  single  change 
of  principle,  and  that,  too,  notwithstanding  that  in  that  coun- 
try able  men  have  been  working  incessantly  and  with  entire 
self-abnegation  to  bring  their  ideas  to  fulfilment. 

A  short  sketch  of  the  successive  steps  which  have 
marked  this  evolution  is  all  the  more  necessary  here,  since 
without  it  it  is  wholly  impossible  to  convey  by  a  mere  bald 
enumeration  of  statements  any  idea  of  how  excellent  the 
German  Army  really  is,  or  the  causes  which  have  led  to  this 
excellence.  Fortunately,  the  ideas  involved  are  simple  and 
may  be  rendered  comprehensible  in  the  simplest  possible 
language. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  1 79 

Briefly  stated,  the  French  Revolution  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal of  Napoleon  an  army  far  exceeding  in  intelligence  any 
other  one  then  in  existence,  the  individuals  of  which  fought 
for  personal  motives  primarily,  and  not  by  compulsion.  This 
state  of  things  did  not  last  long,  it  is  true,  but  still  long 
enough  to  enable  the  new  army  to  defeat  under  its  newT  leader 
every  dynastic  army  with  which  it  came  in  contact,  at  any 
rate  until  the  year  1808.  It  was  not  Napoleon  who  defeated 
Austria,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  the  rest,  but  the  armed 
strength  of  the  French  nation  led  by  Napoleon  that  de- 
stroyed the  dynastic  forces  of  these  countries  respectively— 
a  totally  different  conception. 

Previous  to  this  era,  a  king's  power  of  offence  was  de- 
termined primarily  by  the  amount  of  money  he  could  afford 
to  expend  on  the  recruitment  and  maintenance  of  an  army, 
each  man  in  which  represented  a  certain  sum  of  capital  in- 
vested and  time  spent  in  completing,  his  education.  His 
life,  therefore,  became  an  exceedingly  valuable  thing,  to  be 
safeguarded  accordingly,  and  hence  the  main  desire  of  all 
generals,  except  those  of  the  highest  order,  such  as  Marl- 
borough,  Frederick,  and  Wellington,  wras  to  gain  the  object 
of  a  campaign  with  as  little  bloodshed  as  possible,  and  hence 
maneuvering  as  opposed  to  fighting  became  the  ruling  idea 
of  all  strategists. 

But  the  essence  of  the  French  Revolutionary  Army  was 
that  at  first  its  supply  of  men  appeared  practically  inex- 
haustible, and  Napoleon  soon  saw  that  what  he  could  not 
obtain  in  the  recognized  way  he  could  effect  by  a  perfectly 
reckless  expenditure  of  human  life,  not  only  in  action,  but 
on  the  march.  His  method  was  really  an  application  of  the 
survival  of  the  fittest — that  is  to  say,  if  he  wanted  30,000 
men  at  a  given  point,  he  started  100,000,  and  was  perfectly 
satisfied  even  though  the  balance  fell  by  the  roadside.  This 
enabled  him  to  inarch  and  strike  with  a  rapidity  beyond  the 
reach  of  his  opponents,  compelled  to  slowr  movement  to  econ- 
omize their  forces. 

Secondly,  the  individual  intelligence  and  love  of  distinc- 
tion of  his  men  enabled  him  from  the  very  first  to  adopt  a 
method  of  fighting — by  means  of  skirmishers  and  small  col- 
umns— of  greater  universal  adaptability  than  the  system  of 


180  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  line  which  was  opposed  to  it.  The  closed  line  of  the 
Frederick  and  Wellington  era  was  in  itself  the  most  perfect 
and  economical  way  of  employing  the  fire-power  of  an  army 
to  do  a  given  work  which  could  or  can  be  devised,  always 
provided  the  conditions  of  the  ground  and  the  spirit  which 
animates  it  are  favorable,  and,  given  those  conditions,  it 
would  generally  attain  the  desired  object  with  least  expendi- 
ture of  life — the  main  point  the  opposing  generals  had  to 
consider;  but,  as  pointed  out  above,  the  French  could  afford 
to  be  independent  on  this  head,  and,  further,  the  resolute 
offensive  of  Napoleon's  strategy  gnu-rally  gave  the  choice 
of  ground  to  him,  and  not  to  his  opponents. 

These  conditions  led  every  where,  except  in  the  Peninsula 
and  at  Waterloo,  to  the  triumph  of  the  form  of  the  skir- 
misher and  small  column,  but  as  the  spirit  of  the  men 
changed  during  the  course  of  the  long  wars,  when  France 
again  had  to  resort  to  the  most  siringeni  measures  of  con- 
scription (with  substitutes  allowed i.  ami  as  at  the  same  time 
her  enemies  began  to  oppose  her  with  men  lighting  for  re- 
venge and  with  personal  hatred, the  small  column  had  togive 
way,  and  Napoleon  only  retained  his  empire  over  the  battle- 
field by  the  masterly  use  of  his  artillery  and  cavalry,  which 
he  was  the  first  to  perfect.  During  his  last  campaigns  his 
battles  resolved  themselves  into  three  main  acts  fi>e  T>repa- 
ration  by  artillery  at  case-shot  ranges.  ihe  massed  charge  of 
cavalry,  and  the  occupation  of  the  conquered  position  by 
dense  infantry  columns  advancing  with  sloped  arms.  Vari- 
ations, of  course,  occurred,  but  this  was  the  general 
mechanism. 

But  before  1his  stage  was  reached  the  work  of  reforma- 
tion in  the  Prussian  Army  had  already  begun — under  pres- 
sure of  an  outbreak  of  prejudice  and  ignorance  which  most 
seriously  hampered  the  few  men  who  really  did  understand 
the  points  involved.  The  obvious  issue  lay  for  the  moment 
between  the  principles  of  the  line  and  small  columns  writh 
skirmishers.  The  two  systems  had  met  face  to  face  on  the 
fields  of  Jena  and  Auerstadt,  and  the  latter  had  ultimately 
triumphed ;  therefore,  "Away  with  the  old  system  and  copy 
the  victors!"  wasthe  cry.  Actually, the  causes  of  defeat  lay 
far  deeper,  and  were  primarily  traceable  to  the  faults  of  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  181 

staff,  which  had  entailed  on  the  Prussians  the  necessity  of 
attacking  locally  under  most  unfavorable  conditions  of 
ground  and  numbers,  and,  besides,  the  spirit  of  the  line  was 
dead  and  only  the  form  remained.  Nevertheless,  the  line 
had  died  gloriously;  and  because  it  was  essentially  a  forma- 
tion possible  only  to  the  most  highly  trained  long-service 
troops,  its  resurrection  for  the  moment  was  impossible.  The 
reformers  were  all  niad  for  individual-order  formations, and 
the  polemical  warfare  which  raged  round  Von  Billow's  tac- 
tics as  a  central  point  almost  equalled  in  volume  and  in- 
tensity the  similar  discussion  that  has  of  late  years  been 
waged  over  Captain  May's  tactical  retrospect,  and  both  dis- 
cussions in  the  end  have  proved  in  Germany  equally  desti- 
tute of  permanent  fruit.  For  the  idea  involved  in  this  indi- 
vidual order  question  is  based  on  a  misapprehension  of 
human  nature.  Undeniably  individual  order  is  the  ideal 
formation,  but  its  universal  application  is  only  conceivable 
in  an  army  in  which  every  individual  is  not  only  a  hero  for 
the  moment,  but  remains  so  throughout  the  whole  duration 
of  a  bloody  action,  during  which  his  heroism  is  in  a  constant 
state  of  flux  and  reflux,  with  a  downward  tendency.  Scharn- 
horst  opposed  the  reformers  with  all  the  energy  of  his  nature, 
and  a  sentence  he  wrote  as  criticism  on  one  of  the  numerous 
projects  submitted  for  his  consideration — "One  should  teach 
the  soldier  to  know  how  to  die,  and  not  how  to  avoid  dying"- 
contains  in  itself  the  whole  secret  of  modern  German  train- 
ing and  the  explanation  of  its  excellence. 

Line  being  for  the  moment  impracticable,  owing  to  the 
impossibility  of  training  the  soldier  adequately  in  the  short 
time  then  available,  Scharnhorst  struck  for  universal  ser- 
vice without  substitutes,  trusting  to  find  in  the  individuals 
of  higher  education  and  intelligence  thus  rendered  available, 
and  in  the  feelings  of  personal  hatred  and  revenge  which  the 
French  occupation  had  aroused,  a  set-off  for  the  qualities 
which  in  the  French  themselves  had  proved  so  effective  in 
the  skirmishing  line,  and  in  this  endeavor  he  was  successful. 

But  his  death  and  the  termination  of  the  war  put  a  stop 
to  all  further  progress  in  this  direction,  and  in  every  coun- 
try, not  excepting  our  own,  things  began  to  drift  back  into 
the  old  pre-Bcvolutionary  condition  as  regards  the  training 


182  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

of  in  fan  try  for  battle;  indeed,  they  went  bark  ward,  for  Napo- 
leon's latter  battles  having  been  won  principally  by  the  em- 
ployment of  artillery  and  cavalry,  the  tendency  was  rather 
to  exalt  these  arms,  leaving  to  the  infantry  only  the  task  of 
the  passive  endurance  of  losses,  for  which  they  were  pre- 
pared by  stern  discipline,  and  neglecting  to  develop  their 
offensive  lire-power,  which  implies  more  particularly  "edu- 
cation" as  opposed  to  drill.  The  evolution  of  cavalry  took, 
as  it  happens,  a  false  direction,  but  that  at  present  1  have  no 
space  to  pursue. 

The  tendency  towards  passive  discipline  only  was  fur- 
ther influenced  in  all  countries,  except  Prussia,  by  the  exist- 
ence of  the  system  of  paid  substitutes,  which  by  lowering 
i  lie  moral  average  of  the  armies  rendered  a  sterner  code  more 
imperative.  On  the  ot  her  hand,  these  countries  retained  the 
advantage  of  a  comparatively  long  period  of  service,  seven 
to  twelve  years  on  an  average,  against  the  three  years  in 
Prussia  proper. 

It  may  easily  be  imagined,  too.  how  strong  a  reaction 
necessarily  set  in  after  the  strain  of  years  of  warfare,  bring- 
ing with  it  a  gradual  relaxation  of  elVort  in  all  grades.  Men 
had  had  enough  of  war  on  I  he  Continent,  and  the  vast  ma- 
jority were  only  too  anxious  to  take  matters  quietly  for  Un- 
rest of  their  days,  and  the  system  in  Prussia  of  distributing 
the  troops  all  over  the  country  in  small  detachments  made  it 
all  the  more  easy  for  those  disposed  to  indolence  to  follow 
the  bent  of  their  inclinations. 

But  this  much  at  least  had  been  gained  in  Prussia,  and 
has  formed  a  firm  basis  for  further  improvement — namely, 
universal  service  of  all  classes,  which  insured  the  presence 
of  educated  men  in  all  grades,  and  secured  a  far  higher  con- 
ception of  duty  to  the  country,  which  all  owed,  than  was  pos- 
sible where  the  ranks  were  only  recruited  from  the  lowest 
strata  of  the  people,  and  with  this  the  possibility  of  a  more 
humane  treatment  of  the  soldier  and  the  abolition  of  all  de- 
grading punishments. 

Though  all  immediate  interest  was  dead  in  the  vast  mass 
of  the  nation,  the  war  had  brought  to  the  front  a  number  of 
the  most  intellectual  and  able  men  in  the  country,  and  these, 
with  the  memory  of  the  great  catastrophe  and  the  unspeaka- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  183 

ble  humiliation  the  nation  had  endured  vividly  before  them, 
worked  conscientiously  and  thoroughly  to  raise  up  a  higher 
order  of  leaders  in  time  to  come.  They  had  seized  the  point 
which  Napoleon  had  missed — viz.,  that  an  "armed  nation" 
implied  armies  of  such  numerical  proportions  that  no  one 
man  could  lead  them;  and  hence  a  delegation  of  responsi- 
bility downwards  had  become  absolutely  essential,  which 
entailed  the  necessity  of  training  a  staff  and  generals  capa- 
ble of  assuming  these  extended  powers  which  were  now  to 
devolve  on  them.  How  far  they  were  successful  in  this 
direction  the  events  of  1806  and  1870  have  since  proved ;  but 
brilliant  as  these  successes  wrere  in  the  aggregate,  if  is  evi- 
dent from  a  close  study  of  all  information  now  available 
that  there  were  many,  even  amongst  the  superior  leaders, 
in  those  years  who  fell  far  below  the  requirements  of  the 
circumstances,  and  it  will  be  found  that  in  the  main  it  was 
to  the  misconceptions  of  men  of  this  type  that  the  heavy 
losses  which  now  and  again  fell  on  isolated  divisions  and 
brigades  were  primarily  due — far  more  so,  indeed,  than  to 
any  new  factor  of  warfare  introduced  by  the  breech-loader. 

Thai  it  was  so  can  scarcely  excite  surprise  when  the  con- 
dition under  which  these  senior  officers  had  spent  their  ear- 
lier years  is  remembered.  Life  in  those  little  garrisons  on 
the  eastern  frontiers  or  in  the  plains  abutting  on  Holland 
must  have  killed  the  intellect  in  hundreds  of  men  who,  under 
other  circumstances,  might  have  'excelled.  And  there  is 
little  doubt  that  as  a  fact  this  did  happen,  and  during  the 
decade  between  1840  and  1850  things  in  Prussia  had  lapsed 
into  a  very  easy-going  way  indeed;  but  it  was  in  these  and 
the  previous  years  that  the  men  who  in  1870  had  risen  to 
command  battalions  and  regiments  had  served  their  noviti- 
ate, and  how  great  the  influence  of  these  first  years  is  every 
one  knows  from  personal  experience. 

When  i  he  accession  of  the  old  Emperor  supplied  the  nec- 
essary  power  to  back  Von  Moltke  in  his  work,  the  first  task, 
and  one,  too,  which  must  have  absorbed  most  of  his  energies, 
was  the  completion  and  correction  of  the  mobilization  scheme 
— a  scheme  which  was  only  perfected  after  the  experience 
of  186(5;  and  it  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  he  can  have  had 
as  much  time  to  spare  to  devote  to  the  training  of  the  staff 


1 84  Military  Lettei  s  and  Essays. 

as  in  subsequent  years.  At  the  same  time  it  is  certain  from 
the  evidence  of  his  own  writing  in  1804  that  he  was  still  un- 
certain in  his  mind  as  to  the  influence  the  breech-loader  was 
about  to  exercise  on  tactics. 

That  this  influence  in  I860  did  take  every  one  by  sur- 
prise is  undeniable.  The  Prussian  artillery  and  cavalry 
neither  proving  equal  to,  nor,  indeed,  understanding,  their 
duties  in  combination  with  the  infantry,  the  brunt  of  1 1n- 
fighting fell  on  the  latter,  and,  thanks  to  the  power  of  1 1n- 
new  arm,  they  came  out  of  it  successfully.  l>ui  they  exhib- 
ited the  characteristics  that  were  to  be  expected  from  a 
short-service  army  composed  of  very  heterogeneous  ele- 
ments, insufficiently  welded  under  the  hammer  of  discipline. 
and,  just  as  the  French  Revolutionary  armies  before  them 
had  done,  they  dissolved  under  ihe  tire  of  the  muzzle-loader 
into  lines  of  independent  lighters,  each  striving  to  make  the 
most  of  the  power  of  the  new  instrument.  As  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  century,  a  cry  went  up  that  this  individual 
order  was  a  good  thing  in  itself,  and  therefore  to  be  univers- 
ally cultivated,  and,  as  before,  the  older  men  of  the  staff 
met  the  outcry  by  pointing  out  that  there  was  no  absolute 
good  or  bad  in  tactics,  but  that  everything  was  relative,  and 
that,  the  conditions  being  abnormal,  the  results  were  also 
abnormal  and  could  not  be  accepted  as  a  guide.  This  at 
least  appears  to  me  to  be  the  gist  of  Bronsart  von  Schellen- 
dorfs  well-known  reply  to  Captain  May;  but  none  the  less 
every  one  was  convinced  that  there  was  something  still 
amiss  in  the  training  of  the  infantry,  and  when,  two  years 
later,  France  adopted  a  breech-loader  far  superior  ballis- 
tically  to  their  old  needle-gun,  an  uncomfortable  feeling 
spread  through  the  whole  army  that  a  great  change  was  in 
progress,  and  the  exaggerated  accounts  of  this  new  rifle 
which  came  over  to  them  did  not  tend  to  make  matters  any 
simpler. 

The  German  general  staff  works  slowly,  but  very  surely, 
and  above  all  things  avoids  committing  itself  to  any  too 
hasty  interference  with  the  initiative  of  its  subordinates. 
The  regulations  which  were  about  to  be  issued  on  the  eve  of 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  show  that  their  view  of  the  matter 
was  still  in  accordance  with  the  ideas  of  Von  Schellendorf  s 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  185 

pamphlet  above  referred  to — namely,  that  the  conditions  of 
the  moment  can  alone  decide  the  nature  of  the  formation  to 
be  employed;  but  of  the  principle  of  the  "education  of  the 
individual,"  the  essence  of  the  new  system,  I  can  discover  no 
trace  whatever.  Yet  amongst  the  majority  more  particu- 
larly of  the  senior  officers,  no  longer  in  immediate  contact 
with  the  troops  themselves,  the  idea — ^correct  enough  in  it- 
self had  the  primary  point  on  which  its  success  depends  been 
attended  to — largely  prevailed  that  the  best  plan  to  be  pur- 
sued was  the  extension  of  large  bodies  of  skirmishers  and 
immediate  advance  to  decisive  range.  It  was  to  this  ten- 
dency, combined  with  consequences  of  the  failure  of  artillery 
and  cavalry  in  the  previous  campaign,  that  the  special  physi- 
ognomy of  the  early  battles  of  1870  was  directly  due.  And 
in  this  way:  in  1866  the  cavalry  had  been  markedly  deficient 
in  scouting  duties,  hence  the  infantry  had  learned  to  rely, 
mainly  on  their  own  advance  guards  for  information;  and 
this  tendency  was  also  partly  inherited  from  tradition  of 
the  time  when  fighting  began  at  300  to  400  yards,  when  in- 
deed it  was  justifiable  enough,  but  things  were  altogether 
different  when  at  1,500  the  infantry  were  already  liable  to 
be  overwhelmed  by  a  storm  of  bullets,  through  which  they 
had  to  fight  their  way  for  a  thousand  yards  before  they 
reached  the  range  of  effectiveness  of  their  own  weapons. 
Further,  having  learned  to  fight  for  themselves  without 
reference  to  the  artillery — partly  as  a  lesson  from  1866, 
partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  inevitable  curtailment  of  the 
artillery  preparation  in  peace  maneuvers — the  tendency 
was  to  dash  ahead  at  once,  immediately  on  coming  under  fire. 
This  led  again  and  again  to  the  leading  battalions  of  a  col- 
umn being  shot  to  pieces  before  the  advance-guard  batteries 
had  had  time  to  get  the  range,  and  then  began  a  race  against 
time  to  fill  up  the  casualties.  Without  any  prearranged 
idea  of  co-operation,  each  battalion  as  it  reached  the  fight 
formed  up  in  company  columns  and  moved  into  the  fight, 
and  in  a  few  moments  a  scene  of  confusion  ensued  which 
even  the  official  account  of  the  general  staff  admits  to  have 
been  indescribable. 

On  the  actors  and  spectators  this  state  of  affairs  made 
different  impressions  according  to  their  higher  or  lower 


186  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

rank.  The  captain  and  subalterns  accepted  the  confusion 
as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  ne\v  conditions  of  breech- 
loading  fire.  The  higher  ranks  saw  nothing  inevitable 
about  it,  but  only  the  consequences  of  hasty  and  inconsider- 
ate assault,  and  practically  it  was  the  former  only  who  pub- 
lished their  experiences,  and  these  experiences,  being  eagerly 
translated  and  studied  in  this  country,  have  become  the 
recognized  data  on  which  our  tactical  systems  have  been 
built  up. 

Another  point  also  deserves  mention.  As  the  war  went 
on,  the  individual  consciousness  of  superiority  rose  on  the 
Herman  side  in  precise  proportion  as  it  fell  on  the  other 
one;  further,  in  each  successive  action  the  artillery  and  the 
infantry  learned  to  co-operate  more  thoroughly  with  one 
another,  and  thus  not  only  were  the  losses  of  the  lirst  actions 
not  repeated,  but  theapparent  snccessof  the  individual -order 
system  became  more  marked,  and  the  conviction  in  the 
lower  ranks  became  strengthened  that  the  diminution  of 
losses  was  the  consequence  of  the  increased  employment  of 
the  new  order,  and  not,  as  actually  was  the  case,  to  a  better 
thought-out  system  of  co-operation. 

This  idea  once  grasped,  the  extreme  caution  which 
marked  the  next  steps  in  evolution  of  the  German  infantry 
tactics  becomes  easily  explicable. 

These  two  facts  alone  remained  certainly  established 
by  experience.  Isolated  cases  of  exceedingly  heavy  loss,  .">() 
per  cent  and  upwards,  had  indeed  occurred,  and  on  the  whole 
the  discipline  of  the  short  service  army  had  not  proved  equal 
to  meet  the  strain,  a  strain  not  more  severe  than  had  been 
borne  again  and  again  victoriously  by  troops  of  the  same 
race  and  within  the  memory  of  some  of  their  leaders,  and  the 
problem  was,  how  to  decrease  the  strain  by  diminishing  the 
losses  and  at  the  same  time  to  increase  the  discipline  by  an 
altered  system  of  training;  and  for  the  moment  no  one  ap- 
peared ready  with  a  solution. 

That  the  general  staff  was  not  prepared  to  furnish  one 
appears  evident  from  the  extraordinary  latitude  which  dur- 
ing the  next  succeeding  years  was  allowed  to  all  grades  in 
the  interpretation  of  the  existing  regulations.  As  Prince 
Hohenlohe  has  pointed  out,  every  commander  felt  himself 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  187 

bound  iii  honor  to  produce  at  his  annual  inspection  some 
original  plan  or  other  for  attacking-  without  unnecessary 
bloodshed,  and  round  these  so-called  "Tiirken,"  the  slang 
name  given  to  these  eccentricities,  a  tremendous  polemical 
literature  grew  up,  and  for  the  reason  above  given,  two  fal- 
lacies underlay  the  whole  question — first,  the  fire  to  be  faced 
was  assumed  always  as  a  constant  quantity;  and,  secondly, 
the  fire  being  assumed  as  constant  and  the  losses  having  been 
shown  by  statistics  to  have  diminished  as  individual  order 
was  more  and  more  employed,  the  conclusion  was  jumped  at 
that  in  individual  order  alone  lay  a  royal  road  to  victory 
without  bloodshed. 

Since  both  these  fallacies  have  largely  crept  into  our  owrn 
literature,  it  seems  necessary  to  say  a  word  or  two  to  expose 
them.  The  fire  to  be  faced  is  obviously  never  exactly  the 
same  on  any  two  occasions,  but  depends  not  only  on  the  num- 
ber of  rifles  employed,  but  on  the  field  of  fire,  and  more  par- 
ticularly on  the  state  of  the  defenders'  nerves,  which  neces- 
sarily vary  constantly  and  indefinitely  in  a  downward  direc- 
tion under  the  incidence  of  artillery  fire. 

Next,  as  regards  the  losses  of  the  attacking  troops,  as 
concerning  the  units  themselves,  these  only  depend  on  the 
qualify  and  discipline  of  these  troops,  and  the  better  the 
troops  the  heavier  the  losses  they  will  bear  without  flinching. 
If  the  avoidance  of  loss  were  the  sole  object  of  tactical  train- 
ing, then  the  way  to  reduce  it  to  a  minimum  is  obvious;  do 
away  with  all  discipline  whatever,  and  the  troops  will  break 
and  run  at  the  first  shot,  and,  unless  the  pursuing  cavalry 
manage  to  cut  in  on  them,  their  losses  will  be  infinitesimal 
indeed. 

The  great  bulk  of  the  infantry  officers  in  Germany  took 
very  little  interest  in  these  discussions,  for  the  system  on 
which  they  had  been  trained  made  them  too  practical  in 
their  aims  and  allowed  1hem  time  for  thinking;  and  since 
the  whole  possibility  of  the  great  evolution  which  has  taken 
place  in  Germany  depended  on  the  fact  that  such  officers  did 
exist  in  sufficient  number,  it  is  worth  while  inquiring  why 
it  was  that  in  Germany  only  such  men  were  found.  Short 
service  was  here  the  determining  condition.  In  the  old  pre- 
Jena  days,  the  captains  of  companies  or  squadrons  were  ex- 


188  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

actly  what  in  the  majority  of  British  regiments  they  still  are, 
and  for  precisely  the  same  reasons.  Still  further  back  in 
the  history  of  the  German  Army,  the  same  system  as  that  to 
which  we  owed  our  purchase  system  was  still  in  vogue.  The 
captain  either  recruited  and  brought  his  company  complete 
in  men,  receiving  the  patent  of  rank  in  exchange,  or  else,  be- 
ing selected  by  the  "iuhaber" — that  is,  proprietor — of  the 
regiment  for  the  purpose,  he  was  given  a  sum  of  money  with 
which  to  raise  and  equip  a  certain  number  of  men.  This 
done,  he  became  the  "company  father,"  responsible  for  every- 
thing relating  to  his  command.  But  as  the  evolution  of  fire- 
power led,  under  the  old  Dessauer  and  Saldern.  to  the  sub 
stitution  of  line  formations  and  the  battalion  as  unit,  instead 
of  the  deep  formation,  the  company  commander  lost  his  tac- 
tical importance  and  became  only  an  administrative  official. 
To  render  the  new  movements  in  battalion  possible,  the  com- 
panies had  to  be  equalized  on  parade,  and  lost  their  inde- 
pendence completely;  indeed,  they  even  lost  their  names,  the 
battalions  being  divided  into  eight  divisions  only,  irrespect- 
ive of  the  number  of  companies,  and  the  captain's  sole  duty 
was  limited  to  the  giving  of  words  of  nmmiand.  all  responsi- 
bilities remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  battalion  commanders. 
At  the  same  time,  once  regiments  were  raised,  they  wen- 
recruited  by  regiments  and  not  by  companies,  and  the  re- 
cruits, few  in  number  under  the  Ion  ^service  system,  were 
trained  by  specialists — that  is,  by  the  adjutant  and  sergeant- 
major — and,  in  consequence,  the  captains,  being  no  longer 
responsible  for  the  fighting  training  of  their  men,  soon  lost 
the  knowledge  necessary  for  imparting  it. 

But  with  the  introduction  of  short  service  the  number 
of  recruits  which  had  annually  to  be  drilled  vastly  exceeded, 
the  power  of  the  existing  staff,  and  partly  also  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  number  of  small  detachments  and  garrisons 
they  had  to  be  handed  over  to  the  captains  to  drill  and  train. 
This  compelled  the  captains  to  learn  thoroughly,  for  you  can- 
not teach  what  you  do  not  know,  and  under  these  conditions 
the  Prussian  junior  officers  had  been  at  work  when  the  first 
war  broke  out  for  sixty  years,  though,  it  is  true,  actual  high- 
pressure  competition  had  only  set  in  in  the  last  six.  on  the 
accession  of  the  late  Emperor  William. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  189 

Hence,  though  in  the  main  the  system  of  training  in  the 
Prussian  Army  was  drilling  in  the  mass  and  not  training  by 
individuals,  when  on  the  battle-field  all  higher  organizations 
were  disintegrated  by  fire,  the  great  majority  of  the  captains, 
trained  for  years  to  assume  responsibility,  did  so  at  once 
without  any  great  friction,  and  when  the  two  campaigns 
were  at  an  end  there  were  hundreds  who  had  studied  the  sub- 
ject of  military  training  practically  and  knew  exactly  where 
the  difficulties  lay,  and  being  given,  as  above  pointed  out,  a 
comparatively  free  hand,  at  once  supplied  the  solution  to  the 
problem  how  to  combine  the  discijiline  of  closed  bodies  with 
the  necessities  of  individual  fighting  by  introducing  into 
their  companies  the  system  of  individual  education  of  the 
soldiers. 

Their  reasoning  was  this:  Discipline  is  the  product  of 
a  number  of  factors — obedience  under  penalty  of  punish- 
ment, emulation,  patriotism,  honor,  and  so  forth.  Obedience 
under  fear  of  the  stick  utterly  failed  in  1806,  but  the  other 
factors  can  only  be  felt  by  cultivated  minds;  therefore,  we 
must  cultivate  the  individual  mind.  This  was  the  rough 
conception,  and  soon  it  graduated  down  into  a  conviction 
that  each  one  felt,  even  if  he  could  not  express  it  in  words — 
but  he  learnt  it  as  a  practical  fact  in  front  of  his  troops — dis- 
cipline is  the  resultant  will-power  of  many  minds  acting  in 
the  same  direction;  the  more  united  the  thought  and  the 
greater  the  concentration  of  will  in  the  individual,  the  more 
complete  is  its  power.  Therefore,  again  we  must  educate 
the  minds  of  the  indivduals  to  appreciate  facts  alike,  and  at 
the  same  time  train  the  power  of  concentration  by  exacting 
the  performance*  of  every  order  "with  the  complete  exertion 
of  mind  and  body/'  It  is  not  enough  that  an  order  should 
be  obeyed;  how  it  is  obeyed  is  the  real  consideration.. 

As  a  fact,  every  good  drill  in  every  army  has  known 
and  realized  the  necessity  for  instantaneous  obedience  for 
centuries;  it  is  the  justification  of  "smartness."  No  practi- 
cal soldier  ever  thought  for  a  moment  that  the  wall-like  pre- 
cision of  a  march-past,  or  the  lightning-like  rapidity  with 
which  arms  were  shouldered,  had  much  to  do  with  the  science 
of  theoretical  tactics;  but  he  did  know  that  these  were  out- 
ward visible  signs  of  the  knowledge  and  spirit  which  alone 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

rendered  the  execution  of  practical  tactics  on  the  battle-field 
possible.  What  he  did  not  know,  and  what  to  this  day  no 
nation  but  the  Germans  have  thoroughly  realized,  was,  lhat. 
mechanical  obedience  alone  would  not  suffice,  but  that  it 
must  be  combined  with  the  higher  education  of  the  man  him- 
self. Volumes  have  been  written  in  support  of  either  view, 
and  both  sides  have  been  free  with  ridicule,  but,  as  usual. 
truth  lies  between  the  extremes,  and  true  fighting  efficient -y 
can  only  be  obtained  by  a  combination  of  both. 

Some  years  ago  a  hot  discussion  on  this  subject  wa> 
raised  in  Austria,  and  the  Archduke  Johann  published  a 
pamphlet  entitled  "Drill  or  Education/'  a  copy  of  which  was 
sent  to  the  old  German  Emperor,  who  read  it  and  passed  it 
on  to  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  with  the  remark,  "Head 
this,  it  is  excellent;  and  you  will  see  I  have  already  made 
my  comment  on  it  on  the  title-page;"  and,  looking  at  the 
place  indicated,  Von  fechellendorf  saw  that  the  Emperor 
had  merely  passed  his  pencil  through  the  word  "or"  and  sub- 
stituted for  it  "and,"  making  it  read  "Drill  and  Education." 

II. 

In  niy  previous  letter  I  endeavored  to  trace  out  ih»- 
causes  which  have  led  to  the  present  excellence  of  the  Ger- 
man Army.  Summed  up  briefly,  these  are  as  follows: 

First,  the  great  attention  paid  to  the  training  of  general 
officers  and  their  staff.  This  has  been  the  special  work  <>t 
Von  Moltke  and  the  "Krie^s  Akademie"  or  Staff  Colleg«-. 
but  was  only  partly  completed  when  the  wars  of  1866  and 
1870  broke  out. 

Secondly,  the  practical  knowledge  possessed  by  the 
company  officers  of  the  detail  work  of  preparing  troops  for 
war — this  being  a  direct  consequence  of  the  obligation  short 
service  imposed  on  them,  of  being  personally  responsible  for 
the  training  of  their  men. 

And,  thirdly,  the  possibility,  due  only  to  the  existence  of 
this  practical  knowledge,  of  substituting  the  system  of  "indi- 
vidual" for  the  "mass"  training  of  former  days. 

Each  step  in  their  progress  has  thus  grown  out  of  ground 
previously  made  good  by  experience,  and  in  no  case  is  there 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  191 

any  indication  of  the  reform  bjr  "ukase"  which  character- 
izes the  military  evolution  of  other  nations. 

Another  great  advantage  of  the  German  system  of  de- 
centralization is  the  possibility  of  selecting  the  best  men 
for  staff  duties  and  commands,  an  advantage  which  no  other 
system  can  supply.  This,  however,  had  not  come  fully  into 
force  at  the  time  of  the  1870  campaign. 

Further,  in  estimating  the  efficiency  of  the  army  that 
crossed  the  French  frontier  in  the  summer  of  that  year,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  advantages  above  mentioned 
existed  in  Prussia  only,  for  in  Bavaria,  Wtirtemberg,  and 
other  states,  not  only  was  there  no  Von  Moltke,  but  universal 
liability  to  service  had  only  come  into  force  during  1867,  the 
system  of  paid  substitutes  having  hitherto  very  generally 
prevailed;  arid,  in  addition,  the  troops  of  the  old  German 
Confederation  having  only  faced  the  breech-loader,  not  used 
it,  even  more  exaggerated  opinions  as  to  its  power  prevailed 
than  in  Prussia. 

Having  now  cleared  the  ground  sufficiently  to  proceed 
with  the  further  evolution  of  the  army  since  1870,  with  spe- 
cial reference  to  the  incidents  observed  at  the  recent  ma- 
neuvers, I  proceed  to  take  the  three  arms  in  succession,  com- 
mencing with  the  infantry. 

In  addition  to  the  point  relating  to  the  individual  train- 
ing of  the  recruit  already  referred  to  in  my  first  letter,  and  to 
which  I  sftall  have  to  recur  later  on,  the  next  most  important 
provision  of  the  new  regulations  is  the  absolute  prohibition 
they  contain  of  any  attempt  to  systematize  or  formulate  a 
normal  scheme  of  attack.  The  idea  involved  is  that  the  co/i- 
ditions  under  which  collisions  of  armed  forces  occur  are  so 
uncertain — varying  from  a  skirmish  of  outposts  on  all  sorts 
of  ground,  and  passing  through  all  stages  down  to  a  final  effort 
at  the  end  of  a  long  day,  when  the  physical  and  mental  con- 
dition of  both  sides  has  sunk  to  such  a  level  that  it  is  no  longer 
a  question  of  making  them  advance  in  the  best  theoretical 
order,  but  the  one  thing  is  to  get  them  to  fi^ht  at  all — that  no 
one  normal  system  is  conceivable  equally  adapted  to  all; 
and  further,  that,  by  sanctioning  any  such  system  or  systems, 
the  leaders  of  all  grades,  by  bein£  relieved  of  direct  responsi- 
bility and  being  able  to  shelter  themselves  against  all  possi- 


19^  Military  Letters  and  Essays.  • 

ble  ill  success  under  the  wording  of  the  regulations,  are  de- 
prived of  all  incentive  to  learn  how  to  employ  the  means  at 
their  disposal  to  the  best  advantage  under  all  circumstances 
as  they  arise.  An  army  really  efficient  for  wrar  requires  no 
such  cut-and-dried  aids,  but  finds,  in  the  individual  training 
of  each  grade  to  exercise  each  his  own  judgment  by  constant 
practice  in  front  of  the  troops,  supervised  and  corrected  in 
peace-time  by  trained  umpires  and  superior  officers,  its  surest 
guarantee  of  success. 

What  I  am  now  about  to  describe,  therefore,  can  only 
be  taken  as  a  special  instance  of  the  employment,  of  troops 
in  a  particular  case,  but  I  think  it  will  be  of  use  as  an  illus- 
tration of  the  results  of  the  above  mentioned  principles.  It 
was  an  engagement  at  Schlottheim.  in  which  one  division  of 
the  llth  Corps  struck  lair  on  the  Hank  of  the  4th  Corps  and 
was  adjudged  to  have  rolled  the  latter  up.  I  followed  the 
inarch  of  the  outer  brigade  of  thisdivision,six  battalionsand 
three  batteries,  the  latter  belli  nd  the  leading  regimenl :  on  two 
other  parallel  roads,  distant  respect  i\Hy  some  2,000  or  4,000 
yards,  similar  columns  could  also  be  observed,  all  moving 
eastward  and  slightly  converging  on  Schlottheim.  We  wrere 
still  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy's  position  when  the  boom  of 
guns  became  audible,  and  almost  immediately  afterwards 
a  few  shots  fell  from  the  advanced  scouts  in  the  direction  of 
a  mass  of  woods,  which,  in  two  patches,  with  a  gap  between, 
crowned  the  crest  of  a  ridge,  which  fur  the  moment  hid  1he 
enemy  from  sight.  The  firing  ceased  almost  at  once,  the 
head  of  the  column  bent  oft'  from  the  roadway  and  began  to 
form  up,  sending  a  hat  talion  into  each  of  Ihe  1  wo  woods,  and 
further  to  the  rear  the  column  loosened  and  the  batteries 
disengaged  themselves  and  trotted  up  to  the  front,  unlimber- 
ing  under  cover  and  running  the  guns  up  by  hand  into  the 
position  indicated  by  the  aforesaid  gap.  I  hurried  forward 
and,  reaching  the  crest  of  the  hill,  saw  before  me  a  deep  val- 
ley, which  here  bent  off  almost  at  right  angles,  a  towering 
hill  some  1,200  feet  high  forming  the  apex  of  the  angle,  dis- 
tant from  our  guns  some  1,500  yards.  Between  us  the  slopes 
were  very  steep,  but  away  to  the  westward,  whore  the  valley 
bent  back,  the  ground  fell  from  the  position  of  the  enemy, 
indicated  by  the  flashes  of  his  guns,  with  a  uniform  dip  for 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  193 

some  800  yards,  arid  then  the  slopes  became  gently  convex, 
thus  hiding  the  movements  of  troops  in  the  hollow.  On  the 
prolongation  of  the  salient  of  the  angle,  and  deep  in  the  hol- 
low, lay  the  village  of  iSchlottheiin,  into  which  the  head  of 
the  left  column  of  the  division  was  just  entering,  whilst  its 
guns  were  trotting  up  the  slope  covered  by  a  few  Uhlan 
vedettes,  and,  further  to  the  left,  the  fight  appeared  to  have 
been  in  progress  for  some  time,  for  infantry,  as  yet  unseen 
from  the  enemy's  position,  were  moving  up  the  slope  in  lines 
of  coinapny  columns,  and  a  few  minutes  after  I  arrived  I  saw 
the  batteries  already  in  action  limber  up  and  advance  to  the 
front.  I  now  crossed  the  hollow,  and  in  so  doing  lost  sight 
for  the  moment  of  the  progress  of  the  fight,  but  when  I  ar- 
rived at  the  edge  of  the  uniform  slope  above  mentioned,  I 
found  that  the  infantry,  coming  through  Bchlottheim,  had 
preceded  me,  and  were  lining  a  hollow  road  which  here  ran 
across  the  enemy's  front,  and  the  guns  above  mentioned  were 
just  coming  into  action  upon  a  little  roll  of  the  convex  slope, 
which  enabled  them  to  fire  over  the  heads  of  the  infantry, 
though  they  were  scarcely  three  hundred  yards  in  rear.  Six 
batteries  were  here  unlimbered,  and,  as  the  lateral  space  was 
limited,  they  were  crowded  together  at  half  interval;  and 
three  more  batteries  in  a  group  further  to  the  rear,  finding,  I 
suppose,  no  room  in  front,  were  firing  over  the  heads  of 
everybody. 

\\rhat  had  been  going  on  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  guns 
I  have  no  means  of  knowing,  but  at  this  moment  his  infantry 
was  attacking  down-hill  in  a  dense  line  of  skirmishers, 
backed  by  an  almost  continuous  line  of  supports.  His  posi- 
tion appeared  about  desperate,  for  this  movement  must  have 
been  visible,  in  part  at  least,  to  the  guns  on  our  right,  and 
his  flank  batteries  had  been  compelled  to  wheel  up  against 
them  almost  at  right  angles.  The  remainder  of  his  guns 
must,  therefore,  have  been  enfiladed;  and,  deprived  of  their 
support,  his  infantry  had  to  advance  down-hill  under  both 
artillery  and  infantry  fire,  whilst  our  following  masses 
could  move  up  in  company  column  imperceived.  Neverthe- 
less, our  infantry  line  was  itself  outflanked  on  its  left,  and 
it  became  a  race  which  side  could  reach  this  flank  the  soon- 
er. Our  company  columns  were  rapidly  coming  up,  when 


194  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

I  caught  the  sound  of  drums  beating  and  saw  the  enemy's 
supporting  line  moving  up  in  close  order  with  sloped  arm*, 
and  by  the  swing  of  the  right  arm  I  could  tell  it  wras  a  case 
of  "parade  mar sch" — only  resorted  to  under  fire  in  moments 
when  everything  depends  on  the  maintenance  of  the  utmost 
force  of  will-concentration.  They  reached  the  front,  and  the 
fire  now  blazed  out  with  a  scarcely  conceivable  intensity.  I 
looked  round  and  saw7  four  company  columns  just  closing  up 
to  extend  our  left,  when  with  a  real  cheer  the  whole  of  the 
enemy's  line  dashed  forward,  enveloping  our  left.  One  of 
our  company  columns  deployed  instantaneously,  but  the 
others,  still  hidden  from  sight  of  the  coming  danger  by  1 1n- 
rolling  ground,  halted,  ordered  arms  together  as  on  an  in- 
spection parade,  and  stood  until  the  enemy's  heads  showed 
above  the  rise  at  not  more  than  100  paces,  when  ihey  re- 
ceived  them  with  rapid  independent  fire  from  the  leading 
ranks  only. 

The  attack  wras  adjudged  to  have  been  repulsed,  the  fir- 
ing which  had  raged  between  the  lines  at  the  unpleasantly 
close  distance,  for  the  new  cartridges,  of  barely  ten  paces. 
was  stopped  by  whistle  and  command,  and  the  enemy  wen- 
ordered  to  retire.  In  practice,  of  course,  tin*  victors  would 
have  pursued  at  once  and  driven  the  debris  back  right  on  to 
their  remaining  guns  in  rear;  but  as  this  was  impossible  in 
peace,  the  Emperor,  who  had  that  moment  arrived  on  the 
spot,  sounded  the  "cease  fire,"  and  the  whole  battle  came  to 
an  end.  My  attention  had  been,  so  completely  engrossed 
with  the  matter  immediately  under  my  eyes  that  I  have  little 
idea  of  what  occurred  further  to  the  left,  only  catching  a 
momentary  glimpse  of  a  groat  cavalry  charge  far  away  in 
the  distance  and  retaining  a  confused  idea  of  long  and  end- 
less lines  of  infantry  backed  by  masses  of  closed  battalions, 
presumably  under  cover,  and  further  to  the  rear  on  either 
side  long  lines  of  artillery. 

The  fight  being  over,  whilst  the  mounted  officers  were 
gathering  for  the  critique,  I  walked  on  to  find  out  why  the 
companies  on  our  left  had  received  an  infantry  attack  in 
column,  and  luckily  found  an  acquaintance  in  one  of  them, 
who  told  me  that  the  thing  had  been  so  sudden  that  they 
thought  they  had  to  deal  with  cavalry,  and  therefore  stood 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  195 

ready  to  form  company  squares.  I  was  very  much  struck  by 
one  thing :  A  moment  before  the  men  had  been  moving  with 
an  order  and  precision  beyond  praise;  every  order  was 
obeyed  instantaneously,  and  one  would  have  thought  they 
liad  come  fresh  on  parade,  but  actually  these  men  were  weary 
with  four  previous  days'  successive  marching,  on  which  they, 
had  never  been  under  arms  less  than  nine  hours,  and  once 
over  twelve,  and  how  weary  they  wrere  may  be  judged  by 
the  fact  that  within  five  minutes  of  the  "cease  fire"  I  counted 
in  one  company  of  120  men  70  fast  asleep  on  their  knapsacks, 
lying  with  their  faces  to  the  sky.  A  better  example  of  what 
a  complete  conquest  the  will  can  achieve  over  the  body,  when 
trained  on  the  Prussian  method,  I  could  hardly  have  wished 
to  see. 

In  the  main,  the  other  engagements  followed  the  same 
course,  and  became  monotonous  from  their  very  excellence. 
The  whole  thing  worked  automatically.  The  long  columns 
evolved  themselves  into  fighting  order  more  like  some  living 
organism,  always  exactly  adapting  themselves  to  the  con- 
ditions of  the  moment ;  nowhere  a  rigid  adherence  to  forms, 
causing  an  excess  of  strength  at  one  part,  a  deficiency  at 
another,  but  everywhere,  as  one  looked  round,  one  felt  the 
exact  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  this  state  of  affairs  has 
been  reached  without  much  trouble  and  difficulty;  on  the 
contrary,  the  full  consequences  involved  in  the  fundamental 
conceptions  of  the  new  regulations — namely,  individual 
training,  delegation  of  responsibility,  and  the  prohibition 
of  the  "normal  attack  formation" — have  only  been  evolved 
by  incessant  friction. 

The  chief  difficulties  to  be  overcome  were — first,  the  de- 
sire to  monopolize  power,  common  to  all  grades  of  ambitious 
and  energetic  men ;  and  secondly,  the  general  conviction  that 
the  scenes  witnessed  on  the  battle-fields  of  France  (where* 
as  admitted  b}r  the  official  historians  of  the  war  themselves, 
wild  confusion  in  the  fighting  line  was  the  chief  character- 
istic), were  the  inevitable  outcome  of  fighting  under  breech- 
loading  fire,  and  not,  as  actually  was  the  case,  the  direct 


196  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

consequence  of  an  equality  of  armament  such  as  had  never 
before  existed  in  any  campaign. 

The  former  difficulty  led  a  number  of  the  captains,  on 
whom  increased  power  had  now  devolved  both  by  custom 
and  regulation,  to  hamper  the  initiative  of  their  subordi- 
nates by  endeavoring  to  keep  the  conduct  of  the  fight  too 
exclusively  in  their  own  hands,  and  was  only  conquered  by 
the  common  sense  of  t  heniajorityafter  many  yea  rs  of  experi- 
ence. The  latter  difficulty  led  directly  to  the  idea  that  the 
primary  object  of  lariiral  formations  was  to  lessen  the 
chance  of  avoiding  losses,  and  not,  as  it  actually  is,  to  insure 
the  most  rapid  and  complete  extermination  of  the  enemy. 

This  misconception  did  not  long  survive.  Common 
sense  again,  derived  from  practical  knowledge,  soon  killed 
it,  and  only  a  few  cases  occur  now  and  again  sporadically; 
but  the  "epidemic,"  .as  a  German  writer  christened  it,  has 
long  since  passed  away.  Nevertheless,  it  led  during  the 
period  of  its  prevalence  to  every  conceivable  system — even 
such  absurdities  as  ad  van  ring  on  the  enemy  in  file,  or  fours, 
and  dotting  the  men  about  all  over  the  ground  at  equal  in- 
tervals all  round — being  duly  tried  and  condemned;  and 
would-be  inventors  of  Iliese  and  like  tactical  nostrums  in 
this  country  would  save  themselves  and  the  army  much  time 
and  trouble  if,  before  suggesting  fresh  fads,  they  would 
study  the  history  of  similar  experiments  in  Germany. 

But  much  friction  yet  remained  to  be  overcome  in  com- 
bining the  absolute  obedience,  the  old  conception  of  disci- 
pline, with  the  freedom  it  was  held  necessary  to  accord  to 
the  individual  in  the  fighting  line;  while  further  confusion 
was  caused  by  the  use  of  the  term  "schiitze" — i.  e.,  skirmisher 
—to  designate  the  units  of  which  the  fighting  line  consists. 

Originally  the  "skirmisher"  fought  by  his  own  individ- 
ual judgment,  stalking  the  enemy  and  utilizing  every  ad- 
vantage of  cover  the  ground  afforded  him.  In  the  prelimi- 
nary phases  of  an  engagement  such  latitude  of  choice  may 
freely  be  conceded  to  a  few  brave  and  specially  selected  men  ; 
but  when  once  the  attack  has  to  be  pushed  home  such  delib- 
erate action  ceases  to  be  possible,  and  the  safety  of  the  in- 
dividual derived  from  skill  in  the  choice  of  ground  as  cover 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  197 

has  to  be  sacrificed  in  the  interests  of  the  whole.  The  rapid 
infliction  of  overwhelming  loss  on  the  enemy  then  becomes 
the  main  point  to  be  kept  in  view,  and  to  this  end  it  becomes 
necessary  to  place  as  many  men  in  the  front  line  as  can  use 
their  rifles  with  effect — viz.,  about  one  man  to  the  yard ;  and 
with  such  a  dense  line  the  choice  of  cover  by  the  individual 
is  necessarily  an  extremely  limited  one.  Furthermore, 
since  concentration  of  fire  promises  the  most  rapid  and 
speedy  results,  a  limit  had  to  be  placed  on  the  skirmishers' 
right  to  choose  when  and  at  what  to  fire,  and  this  last  limita- 
tion destroyed  the  last  vestige  of  skirmishing  in  its  original 
acceptation. 

A  line  of  men,  however,  of  the  above  density — viz.,  one 
man  to  the  yard — cannot,  in  face  of  the  enemy's  fire,  retain 
for  long  a  sufficient  power  of  offence.  As  the  men  fall  it 
becomes  weaker  and  weaker,  and  has  to  be  supported  by 
fresh  troops  from  the  rear.  These,  being  sent  in  in  similar 
order,  have  to  find  room  by  the  side  of  those  already  in  posi- 
tion or  in  the  gaps  made  by  the  enemy's  fire,  and  hence  each 
successive  reinforcement,  however  welcome,  brings  with  it 
increased  confusion  in  the  fighting  line.  The  question  then 
arose,  Is  such  confusion  unavoidable?  A  very  powerful 
party  maintained  that  it  was  not,  and  that  the  way  out  of  the 
difficulty  lay  in  reverting  to  the  traditions  of  the  past  and 
drilling  the  soldiers  again  to  mechanical  obedience  and  close 
order.  Their  views  found  their  extreme  expression  in  the 
wTell-known  pamphlet  entitled  "The  Midsummer-Night's 
Dream,"  which  advocated  most  powerfully  the  adoption  of 
a  system  of  attack  in  lines  of  sections,  each  section  about 
70  strong,  in  single  rank,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  close  order, 
under  the  command  of  a  commissioned  officer.  Their  fire 
was  to  be  as  that  of  a  machine,  entirely  under  the  control  of 
one  man,  and  as  the  inevitable  casualties  ensued  in  the  fight, 
the  section  closed  on  its  center,  and  made  room  for  following 
sections  to  reinforce. 

It  is  a  point  worthy  of  most  careful  attention  on  our 
part  that  these  views  found  their  warmest  supporters  pre- 
cisely amongst  those  men  who  had  survived  the  bloodiest 
slaughter  of  the  whole  war,  and  about  the  year  1882-83 


198  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

'found  their  fullest  expression  on  the  Tempelhof  drill-ground 
at  Berlin. 

Theavoidance  of  loss  being  the  one  horn  of  thedilemma, 
the  reintroduction  of  mechanical  discipline — the  "massen- 
dressur"  of  the  old  days — was  the  order;  and,  at  the  risk  of 
appearing  tedious  to  those  \vlio  have  not  followed  the  suc- 
cessive steps  of  the  modern  military  e\ olution,  I  must  dwell 
on  it  a  little  longer. 

The  old  system  of  "mass"  training  implied  the  menial 
"degradation  of  every  man  who  passed  through  the  ranks, 
and  involved  the  impossibility  of  recruiting  the  cadres  of  the 
non-commissioned  officers,  for  the  selection  of  the  right  man 
for  the  right  place  became  impracticable.  '  .Mass  training — 
i.  e.,  mechanical  obedience — had  proved  itself,  even  when  ii 
reached  its  utmost  development,  as  before  the  Jena  catas- 
trophe, and  again  in  1870,  when  it  was  less  pronounced  tluin 
in  the  previous  period,  a  rotten  reed  to  trust  to.  Individual 
training  has  its  dangers,  but  it  insures  that  every  man  who 
serves  with  the  colors  is  improved  as  a  cili/en  by  the  process, 
in  so  far  as  he  is  taught  to  act  on  his  own  responsibility, 
and  guarantees  to  a  certain  extent  that  the  non-commis 
sioned  officers  are  recruited  from  the  best  available  men,  by 
securing  for  each  individual  the  opportunity  of  showing 
what  is  really  in  him,  and  not  merely  testing  his  ability  to 
pass  examinations  on  paper.  As  an  extreme  instance,  I 
would  adduce  the  well-known  faculty  of  the  Bengali  Baboo 
to  pass  any  paper  test,  and  his  absolute  incapacity  to  bear 
actual  personal  responsibility  where  that  'responsibility 
entails  the  handling  of  men  directly,  even  where  the  risk  to 
life  and  limb  involved  is  infinitesimal. 

The  framers  of  the  new  (Jerman  regulation  have  man- 
aged to  avoid  both  horns  of  the  dilemma  by  combining  t In- 
strong  points  of  both  extremes,  and  through  it  the  army  lias 
been  made  what  Scharnhorst  wished  it  to  be — a  national 
university  for  the  training  of  character  and  a  means  of  pre- 
venting the  evolution  of  a  "literary  proletariat" — to  use 
Prince  Bismarck's  words — which  is  the  special  danger  to 
which  all  systems  of  free  education  are  exposed. 

The  object  of  "free  education"  in  Prussia  has  been 
overlooked  in  England.  It  was  simply  a  bargain  between 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  199 

king  and  people,  originated  and  practically  carried  through 
by  Scharnhorst,  the  terms  of  which  briefly  were  as  follows : 
—The  king — i.  e.,the  country — requires  intelligent,  educated 
soldiers  as  a  means  to  preserve  the  nation.  The  king — i.  e., 
the  country — will  educate  every  one  practically  free  of 
charge  if,  in  return,  the  boys  so  educated,  or  their  represent- 
atives, agree  to  serv.e  as  soldiers  for  a  space  of  three  years. 
The  system  of  blind  mechanical  obedience,  which  drilled,  or 
attempted  to  drill,  the  soul  but  of  man,  and  which  Scharn- 
horst did  not  live  long  enough  to  prevent,  made  the  army,  if 
not  a  burden  to  the  country,  at  any  rate  a  hindrance  to  its 
development,  but  was  a  fair  set-oft'  for  the  advantages  con- 
ferred. The  system  the  new  regulation  has  initiated,  far 
from  acting  as  a  hindrance  to  its  commercial  prosperity, 
gives  to  every  man  who  undergoes  it  not  only  the  trained 
habit  of  self-reliance,  the  basis  of  all  business  success,  but 
eliminates  one-half  of  that  "literary  proletariat"  which,  in 
Prince  Bismarck's  view,  constituted  so  great  a  danger  to 
the  country;  and  if  it  withdraws  from  reproductive  employ- 
ment an  average  of  450,000  men  per  annum,  it  gives  back 
not  only  more  vigorous  men,  but,  through  the  sanitary 
method  of  life,  the  hard  outdoor  exercise  and  fresh  air,  the 
bettor  food  and  more  healthy  lodgings  which  the  majority 
find  in  barracks,  to  say  nothing  of  the  moral  habits  of  re- 
si  raint  a  sensible  discipline  enforces,  it  extends  each  man's 
usefulness  by  five  years  at  least,  for  each  year  they  spend 
with  the  colors.  Whether  this  deduction  is  or  is  not  correct, 
let  those  who  are  feeling  the  pinch  of  German  competition 
in  trade  answer.  They  felt  it  some  years  ago,  when  corre- 
spondence in  these  columns  showed  that  want  of  power  to  act 
on  1heir  own  responsibility  was  the  one  thing  wanting  to 
prevent  their  swamping. the  market  for  British  clerks  or 
managers.  How  much  more  will  they  feel  it  ten  years 
hence,  when  the  new  regulation  has  been  in  foree  long 
enough  to  bring  the  men  trained  on  the  new  principles  into 
the  labor  market!  Would  it  not  be  well  for  us  now,  wThilst. 
we  still  have  time,  to  alter  our  system  of  military  education, 
so  that  our  discharged  reserve  men  may  be  able  to  compete 
on  equal  terms  with  the  horde  threatening  to  overwhelm  us? 


200  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

III. 

In  my  previous  let  UTS  I  have  referred  to  the  two  main 
points  in  the  Genium  Kegulations  for  Infantry — viz.,  Hie 
individual  training-  of  the  soldier  and  the  delegation  of  re- 
sponsibility— and  it  will  be  at  once  apparent  that  sum" 
counter-check  to  the  extreme  consequences  of  either  is 
necessary  if  the  infantry  fight  of  the  future  is  not  to  degener- 
ate into  a  scene  of  the  wildest  confusion,  culminating  in,  as 
the  Germans  lugubriously  term  it,  "Kin  ISegralmiss  ersier 
elasse" — i.  e.,  a  funeral  of  the  largest  dimensions.  This 
check  is  found  in  Section  B,  £88,  which  practirally  applies 
to  all  grades  in  the  hierarchy — namely,  that  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  fight  must  find  the  command  (in  this  case  1he 
section)  in  the  right  place  with  reference  to  the  other  units 
round  it.  Where  this  place  is  or  will  be  cannot  be  laid  down 
by  regulations,  but  depends  on  circumstances;  and.  further, 
to  prevent  any  possibility  of  a  man  or  a  leader  trying  to  es- 
cape the  consequences  of  action  by  inaction,  he  is  reminded 
in  Section  C,  £121,  that  delay  or  failure  to  act  will  always  be 
judged  as  a  worse  error  than  a  mistake  in  1he  method  of 
action  chosen. 

In  fact,  what  the  new  regulation  does  is,  instead  of  de- 
grading the  soldier  to  the  level  of  an  unthinking  machine, 
to  place  him,  on  Hie  battle-Held,  on  the  level  of  general  intel- 
ligence which  the  British  law  has  long  since  accorded  to  the 
average  civilian  in  case  of  a  street  row  or  riot — namely,  to 
enforce  on  him  the  obligation  to  make  up  his  own  mind,  and 
to  act  in  what  appears  to  him  to  be  the  best  manner  for  pre- 
serving the  public  peace,  and  not  merely  to  stand  as  a  looker- 
on  and  send  for  the  police.  In  dealing  with  civil  riot,  an 
officer  and  every  man  under  him  is  placed  in  the  same  p  >si 
tion — viz.,  he  must  use  his  own  judgment  in  the  choice  of 
means,  but  cannot  shelter  himself  behind  a  superior  or  the 
plea  of  obedience  to  or  absence  of  orders. 

With  regard  to  the  delegation  of  responsibility,  it  is  to 
be  noticed  that,  though  the  principle  is  asserted  throughout, 
the  amount  to  be  accorded  below  the  rank  of  the  company 
commander  varies  with  the  circumstances.  The  captain's 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  'JO  I 

full  independence  is  decreed  by  regulation,  and  cannot  be 
interfered  with;  but  the  captain  must  exercise  his  own  judg- 
ment as  to  how  much  freedom  he  delegates  to  his  subaltern, 
and  the  latter  again  does  not  let  his  group  leaders  out  of 
hand  if  he  can  avoid  it.  This  a  moment's  reflection  will 
show  to  be  a  very  necessary  arrangement,  for  it  is  obvious 
it  would  not  be  advisable  to  allow  a  last-joined  subaltern 
the  same  latitude  of  action  that  can  be  safely  conceded  to  a 
senior  lieutenant  with  eighteen  years'  service.  Nor  will  the 
(iermans  at  any  price  have  the  total  splitting  up  and  slow- 
ness of  action  entailed  by  the  system  of  considering  the 
"group"  as  the  ultimate  unit  of  tactics — a  system  which  finds 
many  advocates  in  our  own  and  other  services.  When  all 
his  officers  have  fallen,  a  group  leader  must  assert  his  direct 
authority,  just  as,  when  the  group  leaders  are  down,  the  sol- 
dier himself  must  use  his  owrn  judgment,  for  which  contin- 
gency he  is  carefully  trained;  but  as  long  as  his  subaltern 
remains  on  his  legs,  the  group  leader  only  acts  as  his  sub- 
ordinate assistant,  seeing  that  the  orders  given  are  obeyed, 
but  not  personally  communicating  them.  Reflection  will 
show  this  to  be  a  very  sound  and  common-sense  arrange- 
ment, for,  as  long  as  a  command  can  be  heard,  time  is  only 
lost  by  its  repetition  through  intermediate  links.  It  is  no 
longer  possible  to  handle  a  battalion  by  direct  word  of  com- 
mand under  fire;  instructions  or  orders  must  therefore  be 
issued,  but  the  section  (i.  e.,  subaltern's  command)  and  the 
company  must  be  kept  in  hand  till  the  last  moment  possible. 

This  marks  well  (he  distinction  between  the  German 
and  the  extreme  open-order  school.  The  latter  say,  "Confu- 
sion in  the  fighting  line  is  ultimately  inevitable,  therefore 
let  us  go  to  meet  it  and  start  with  confusion."  Their  oppo- 
nents point  out  that,  though  ultimately  inevitable,  it  is  the 
work  the  enemy's  bullets  have  to  accomplish,  and,  therefore, 
to  adopt  it  from  the  first  is  simply  to  save  the  enemy  the 
needful  expenditure  of  ammunition  requisite  to  bring  it 
about. 

The  concentrated  will-power  alone  possible  in  close 
order  in  its  highest  form  is  to  the  attack  what  velocity  is  to 
the  projectile.  A  projectile  penetrates  as  far  into  an  iron 


202  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

plate  or  other  obstacle  as  its  •/•/*  viva  1 1  he  product  of  its  mass 
by  the  square  of  its  velocity;  will  carry  it.  \Ve  might  say 
that  an  attack  penetrates  just  as  far  into  and  through  that 
lire-swept  zone  which  forms  an  advanced  shield  or  protec- 
tion for  the  defender  as  its  mass  multiplied  by  the  square  of 
its  discipline  wrill  carry  it.  Voluntarily  to  give  away  the 
cohesion  secured  by  discipline  is  about  as  sensible  as  trying 
to  pierce  an  armor-plate  with  a  charge  of  case  or  small  shot. 

The  expression  the  "square  of  discipline"  may  appear 
fanciful,  but  a  little  consideration  will  show  it  is  far  nearer 
the  truth  than  the  use  of  the  word  "discipline"  alone  would 
be,  for  every  increment  in  discipline  tells  in  two  ways — it 
enables  you  to  bring  a  larger  number  of  men  up  into  the  fight- 
ing line  at  closer  range,  and  under  better  control,  and  their 
fire  will,  therefore,  be  all  the  more  effective;  but  because 
their  fire  is  mo  re  etl'ectivethe  enemy's  power  of  inflicting  loss 
on  the  firing  and  following  lines  is  further  diminished;  the 
firing  line  can  be  trusted  to  hold  out  longer,  and.  therefore. 
the  following  lines  may  be  held  back  at  such  a  distance  that 
they  do  not,  at  first,  incur  loss  from  1lie  bullets  exclusively 
meant  for  the  lines  in  front  of  them. 

In  my  first  letter  I  said  that  this  year's  maneuvers 
marked  the  culmination  of  a  cycle  of  a  century's  evolution, 
and  I  have  step  by  step  endeavored  to  explain  my  meaning. 
Actually,  the  line  of  demarcation  is  not  so  easy  to  define  ex- 
actly. It  is  true  that  these  are  t  he  tirst  maneuvers  in  which 
all  three-years  contingents  of  the  peace  effective  have  under- 
gone the  same  uniform  training;  but  this  does  not  apply  to 
the  reservists  and  landwehr.  who,  in  lime  of  war,  will  In- 
cabled  to  the  colors,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  have  the  non- 
commissioned officers,  still  less  1he  officers,  had  the  advan- 
tage of  working  steadily  on  the  same  lines.  Still  further 
improvement,  therefore,  may  be  looked  for  in  the  future, 
for  the  old  saying,  "It  is  hard  to  leach  an  old  dog  new 
tricks,''  has  much  truth  in  it,  and  each  successive  step  above 
indicated  has  met  with  opposition  in  each  rank  successively. 
But  the  evil  is  not  so  great  as  might  be  imagined,  for,  though 
the  new  system  has  only  been,  officially.  Hiree  years  in  exist- 
ence, practically  it  does  but  formulate  in  precise  terms  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  203 

methods  which  have  been  more  or  less  in  fashion  for  the  last 
ten;  and  the  difference  is  mainly  this,  that,  whereas  for- 
merly each  company  commander  was  working  in  fear  and 
trembling  of  what  new  fad  a  superior  might  spring  on  him, 
now  he  can  give  his  undivided  attention  to  the  work  before 
him.  Possibly  this  may  be  not  so  great  an  advantage  in 
practice  as  it  appears  in  theory,  for,  under  the  old  condi- 
tions, a  man  learnt  independence  of  judgment  and  was 
obliged  to  have  confidence  in  his  own  opinion,  and  the  fads 
of  superiors  preserved  him  from  getting  too  much  in  a 
groove.  In  a  certain  German  garrison  T  knew  well,  each 
battalion  had  to  practice  three  separate  and  distinct  forma- 
tions for  attack, — one  for  the  regimental  inspection,  one  for 
the  brigadier, and  a  third  for  thedivisional  commander, — and 
T  remember  asking  an  old  friend  whether  this  state  of  affairs 
was  not  very  injurious.  He  only  laughed  and  said,  "Well, 
in  action  no  two  cases  are  exactly  similar,  so,  if  we  are  suffi- 
ciently wrell  trained  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  in- 
specting generals,  we  shall  be  all  the  more  likely  to  adapt 
ourselves  to  the  varying  conditions  of  reality" — an  optim- 
istic way  of  looking  at  things,  to  be  commended  to  our  own 
officers  suffering  under  similar  adversities. 

To  come  now  to  questions  of  equipment  and  their  influ- 
ence: The  new  German  rifle,  as  everybody  knows,  is  not 
correctly  described  as  a  "magazine''  weapon,  but  rather  as 
a  "multiple"  loader,  and  is  to  rny  mind  the  simplest  and 
most  practical  military  weapon  yet  put  into  the  hands  of  any 
soldier.  There  is  no  "cut-off"  to  convert  the  magazine  rifle 
to  a  single-loader,  liable  to  jam  from  various  causes,  no 
necessity  of  recharging  the  magazine,  and  no  possibility  of 
finding  it  empty  at  a  critical  moment.  The  soldier  simply 
opons  the  brooch,  thrusts  in  a  little  metal  case  containing 
five  cartridges,  and  fires  them  in  succession,  having  to  work 
tho  brooch-block  to  bring  each  cartridge  into  position  in  suc- 
cession. Tho  fifth  time  he  draws  back  tho  block,  the  empty 
r-aso  is  ojoctod,  and  another  put  in,  so  that  no  time  is  wastod 
in  fumbling  for  single  cartridges.  Further,  the  arrange- 
ment of  tho  expense-pouch — wThich,  however,  has  been  in 
use  si n co  1872 — offers  practically  the  advantage  of  a  maga- 


204  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

zine.  The  pouch  on  the  right-hand  side  is  kept  constantly 
full  from  the  others,  and  its  lid  when  open  falls  outwards, 
possessing  herein  a  greal  advantage  over  all  others  that  I 
know  of.  in  fact,  and  as  a  practical  arrangement,  this  gav« 
to  the  old  Mauser  single-loader  all  the  advantages  of  a  mag 
azine  rifle,  and  enabled  it  to  fire  within  1he  minute  a  greater 
number  of  rounds  without  the  many  disadvantages  of  tin- 
latter — sucli  as  empty  ma/agine  at  the  critical  moment,  etc. 
Indeed,  I  have  often  marvelled  that,  whilst  we  were  willing 
to  copy  "pickelkaubes."  badges  of  rank,  etc.,  such  a  simple 
and  practical  point  should  have  escaped  our  attention;  still 
more,  that  with  such  a.  practical  expedient  ready  to  our 
hands,  we  should  have  wildly  launched  out  into  the  expendi- 
ture of  millions  on  a  magazine  ritle,  which,  as  far  as  concerns 
the  magazine,  and  with  the  existing  pouch,  is  no  better  than 
the  old  rifle  would  have  been  with  the  Prussian  pouch.  An- 
other practical  point  I  noticed  is  the  parking  of  these  cart 
ridges.  Each  little  case  of  five  cartridges  is  parked  with 
two  others  in  a  cardboard  packet  closed  by  a  strip  of  tape. 
which  is  pulled  off  by  a  jerk, and  uncovers  not  only  the  cases. 
but  holes  cut  out  for  the  finger  and  thumb  to  grasp  them  by. 
The!  advantages  of  this  simple  arrangement  are  obvious. 
no  time  is  lost  in  stowing  away  the  separate  cartridges,  1  hex- 
can  be  thrown  down  in  the  shooting  line  without  dust  and 
grit  sticking  to  the  lubricant,  the  distribution  of  ammuni- 
tion is  rendered  more  easy,  and  also  its  collection  from  the 
wounded. 

Fifteen  of  these  packets  go  into  a  larger  and  stronger 
millboard  box,  which  is  closed  in  the  same  manner,  and  to 
which  is  further  attached  a  piece  of  strong  webbing,  by 
which  it  can  be  readily  lifted  out  of  the  ammunition-wagons. 
and  two  of  them  knotted  together  can  be  conveniently  car- 
ried over  the  shoulders  or  by  any  sort  of  a  stick,  their  joint 
weight  being  about  32  pounds  and  their  contents  .V.O  rounds, 
or  225  each.  Five  more  of  those  boxes  go  into  a  regular 
ammunition-box,  which  can  be  readily  opened  and  the  con- 
tents tumbled  out.  The  weight  of  the  new  cartridges  is 
about  three  to  two  of  the  old  ones,  hence  for  the  100  rounds 
formerly  carried  the  man  now  carries  150.  which  are  distrib- 


.,  »-?.*•- -rtv 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

uted  in  the  following  manner:  30  rounds  in  each  of  the 
front  pouches  and  90  rounds  in  a  separate  pouch  behind. 

As  regards  the  supply  of  ammunition  in  action,  the 
fundamental  idea  is  that  you  can  never  have  too  much  of  it, 
and  therefore  every  opportunity  must  be  utilized,  before  go- 
ing into  a  fight,  to  serve  out  as  much  as  the  men  can  carry  in 
their  haversacks,  pockets,  etc. 

On  the  defensive,  of  course,  any  amount  of  cartridges 
can  be  laid  out  in  niches  cut  in  the  parapets  or  other  protec- 
tion, and  whenever  the  offensive  passes  over  into  a  passive 
condition,  ammunition  can  be  brought  up  from  the  wagons 
which  follow  the  battalions  into  action  as  closely  as  possi- 
ble, with  greater  or  less  trouble  according  as  the  way  to 
them  is  more  or  less  under  cover.  But  when  troops  are 
once  definitely  committed  to  a  decisive  advance,  I  find  that 
very  little  faith  is  put  in  any  system  of  supply  from  the  rear. 
It  is  all  very  simple  in  peace-time  and  on  paper  to  send  un- 
armed men  backwards  and  forwards  to  the  wagons,  but  it 
is  quite  another  thing  to  expect  men  to  do  the  work  when 
the  bullets  are  flying,  and  those  wrho  are  brave  enough  to 
attempt  it  would  be  of  more  use  in  the  fighting  line.  Again, 
the  mere  physical  difficulty  for  a  heavily  laden  man  to  over- 
take an  advancing  fighting  line  when  the  latter  has  perhaps 
800  yards  start  out  of  a  total  distance  to  be  traversed  of  1,600 
is  in  itself  insuperable. 

Most  men  with  whom  I  talked  over  the  question  ex- 
pressed a  common-sense  opinion  that  150  rounds  per  man 
was  enough  for  any  one  attack,  and  if  this  number  is  fired 
away  without  result,  then  what  is  wranted  is  fresh  nerves 
for  the  firors.  and  those  can  only  be  supplied  by  fresh  rein- 
forcements. The  long  and  the  short  of  it  is  that  practical 
men  take  every  opportunity  they  can  of  completing  this 
ammunition  from  the  handiest  source,  and  do  not  rely  on  any 
cut-and-dried  regulations. 

The  greatest  possible  stress  is  laid  on  the  maintenance 
of  fire-discipline,  but  this  is  not  well  seen  in  the  maneuvers, 
and  can  only  really  be  judged  on  the  shooting-ground,  where 
the  Germans  now  enjoy  a  great  deal  of  practice.  Still,  even 
what  I  did  see  in  the  maneuvers  left  a  very  favorable  impres- 


^06  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

sion  as  regards  the  complete  control  the  officers  exercised. 
The  value  of  such  discipline  is  based  on  the  assumption  that 
superiority  of  fire  has  always  been  the  condition  on  which 
the  successful  advance  with  the  bayonet  ultimately  turned. 
In  the  old  days  on  equal  fronts  they  (the  Germans)  sought  to 
obtain  this  by  exceptional  rapidity  of  fire,  due  to  better  me- 
chanical drilling.  The  French  met  this  in  1806  with  envel- 
oping tactics  and  better  marksmanship.  In  1866  the  Ger- 
mans again  obtained  the  desired  result  by  mechanical  im- 
provement in  the  weapon,  and  in  1870  by  using  against  the 
French  the  same  tactics  the  latter  had  formerly  so  success- 
fully used  against  them.  But  now  all  weapons  are  mechan- 
ically on  an  equality;  both  sides  are  equally  alive  to  the 
advantage,  where  possible,  of  out-flanking  tactics,  and,  on 
paper  at  least,  equally  skilled  in  marksmanship.  The  supe- 
riority will  again  have  to  be  fought  out  on  equal  and  par- 
allel fronts.  What  further  step  forward  can  be  made?  The 
answer  they  have  found  is  based  on  the  idea  of  handling  the 
fire  of  the  sections  as  units,  like  the  fire  of  a  battery  acting 
with  others  in  brigade.  The  captain  controls  the  fire  of  his 
three  sections,  as  the  officer  commanding  a  brigade  division 
of  artillery  controls  the  fire  of  his  three  batteries,  lie  <-;m 
order  one  section  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  along  the  wiiole 
of  his  front  and  with  his  other  two  converge  a  crushing  su- 
periority on  any  selected  point  of  his  enemy's  line;  but  they 
do  not  allow  this  idea  to  descend  lower  in  the  scale,  to  the 
groups,  as  they  consider  the  fire  of  ten  or  a  dozen  rifles 
too  insignificant  to  exercise  a  decisive  effect. 

This  may  seem  a  counsel  of  perfection,  an  ideal  to  be 
striven  for,  indeed,  but  not  to  be  attained  on  this  side  of  the 
grave;  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  idea  is  sound,  and. 
since  it  involves  the  co-operation  of  only  three  trained  offi- 
cers, more  likely  to  succeed  than  the  rival  schemes  in  other 
countries,  which  hope  to  achieve  a  similar  result  through 
the  co-operation  of  some  twenty  to  thirty  less  responsible  and 
less  trained  group  leaders. 

The  introduction  of  smokeless  powder  has,  however, 
rendered  this  ideal  far  more  attainable  than  when  it  was  first 
proposed,  now  some  years  ago.  In  the  absence  of  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  ~07 

smoke-screen  on  both  sides,  the  company  officers  not  only 
find  it  easier  to  work  together,  but  can  control  their  men  and 
judge  the  effect  of  their  lire  on  the  enemy  to  a  far  greater 
degree  than  was  formerly  possible.  From  their  point  of 
view  this  increased  power  of  control  more  than  compensates 
the  attack  for  the  increased  facility  of  concealment  smoke- 
less powder  confers  on  the  defence.  It  is  true  that  the  lat- 
ter also  profits  by  the  same  increased  power  of  control,  but 
they  argue  that,  from  the  nature  of  things,  the  defence  striv- 
ing only  to  avoid  being  beaten,  whereas  the  attack  fights 
with  the  determination  to  win,  the  latter  is  in  a  position  to 
make  far  better  use  of  this  new  powder  than  the  former.  Put 
in  another  form,  it  comes  to  this — the  heavier  and  more 
accurate  the  fire  whistling  over  a  trench,  the  harder  it  is  to 
make  men  raise  their  heads  over  it,  to  take  steady  aim. 
Smokeless  powrder  makes  it  easier  for  the  attack  to  deliver 
such  a  fire;  hence  the  difficulties  of  the  defence  will  be  in- 
creased. Further,  in  the  absence  of  smoke,  men  stationary 
on  the  defence  cannot  escape  the  depressing  influence  of  the 
dead  and  wounded  lying  round  them,  but  the  attack  leaves 
all  these  evidences  of  the  fight  behind  it.  So  again  the  ad- 
vantage is  on  its  side. 

Generally,  it  is  held  that  the  possibilities  of  conceal- 
ment the  new  powder  affords  have  been  immensely  over- 
rated, and  what  I  have  personally  seen  during  the  past  two 
years  leads  me  to  the  same  conclusion.  If  ordinary  Euro- 
pean short-service  soldiers  possessed  the  skill  of  the  Red 
Indians  as  skirmishers,  no  doubt  the  advantage  would  be 
immense;  but,  as  a  fact,  they  do  not,  and  neither  in  Ger- 
many nor  in  any  other  country  have  I  ever  experienced  any 
difficulty  in  making  out  the  enemy  from  the  infantry  fighting 
line.  The  ordinary  spectator,  looking  at  the  progress  of 
the  battle  generally,  may  often  be  in  doubt  as  to  where  the 
enemy  actually  is,  but  the  company  officer  in  the  front,  with 
his  attention  fixed  on  the  one  hedgerow,  edge  of  the  wood, 
or  whatever  the  point  he  is  ordered  to  carry  may  be,  will 
always  find  indications  enough  to  guide  his  aim.  Just  as 
in  stalking  game  it  is  chiefly  a  question  of  knowing  where 
to  look,  and  not  the  power  of  eyesight^  that  makes  the  differ- 


208  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

ence  between  the  experienced  hand  and  I  he  beginner,  and, 
as  in  game-shooting,  too,  it  is  the  movement  of  I  lie  animal 
that  usually  betrays  its  position,  so  also  in  the  case  of  troops 
engaged  it  is  the  movement  inseparable  from  the  conduct  of 
the  fight  that  renders  their  concealment  impossible. 

One  other  point  in  connection  with  1he  new  riile  remains 
to  be  noticed,  and  that  is  its  extraordinary  power  of  pene- 
tration. Stockades  of  12-inch  baulks  are  perforated  with 
ease,  even  at  extreme  ranges,  and  even  :>0  inches  of  oak  will 
be  penetrated  at  200  yards.  Hanks  of  earth  '2  feet  thick 
are  no  longer  proof,  and  18-inch  brick  walls  are  pierced 
through  and  through.  Its  power  against  this  last  descrip- 
tion of  cover  will  entirely  revolutionize  the  tactics  of  the 
defence  of  villages  and  their  influence  as  points  of  support 
on  the  battle-field  :  for  the  aid  of  artillery  is  no  longer  indis- 
pensable to  breach  any  ordinary  walls.  At  4(H)  yards  a 
company  of  infantry  firing  volleys  will  cut  down  the  wall  of 
a  house  in  a  few  rounds,  and  at  200  even  a  section  of  TO  men 
will  do  the  same.  This  power  will  render  the  interior  de- 
fence of  all  ordinary  villages  impracticable,  for  ihe  attack- 
ing party  can  cut  its  way  through  partition  walls  without 
the  necessity  of  having  recourse  to  any  of  the  old-fashioned 
methods,  such  as  the  explosion  of  dynamite  or  gun-cotton 
slabs  against  the  walls — a  service  often  of  very  great 
danger. 

The  reputation  of  the  (lei-mans  for  marching  has  stood 
high  ever  since  the  last  war.  In  18S:»  I  was  with  a  brigade 
which  averaged  .",2  miles  a  day  for  three  consecutive  days; 
but  though  I  cannot  this  time  reduce  the-  work  done  to  pre- 
cise figures  of  distance — for  the  mountainous  nature  of  the 
ground  and  the  greater  distances  traversed  in  fighting  order 
across  country  would  render  such  figures  valueless — I  can 
assert  that, from  my  owrn  observation  and  from  what  I  learnt 
from  the  same  officers  who  had  been  present:  on  the  occasion 
above  alluded  to,  the  work  done  was  as  hard  again,  for  dur- 
ing the  last  week  it  was  incessant  and  exactly  as  it  would  be 
in  war.  Taking  the  record  of  a  single  battalion,  and  one 
that  got  off  rather  cheaply,  1  find  that  on  ^Monday,  Tuesday, 
and  Wednesday  it  was  under  arms  on  the  inarch  for  eight 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

and  a  half  hours  exactly,  and,  further,  had  to  supply  the  out- 
posts on  Wednesday.  Onxthe  Thursday,  Friday,  and  Satur- 
day it  bivouacked  twice,  fought  in  three  long  actions  over 
difficult  ground,  and  was  under  arms  on  each  day  for  over 
twelve  hours.  Yet  it  marched  back  without  one  single  case 
of  sickness  after  five  weeks'  absence,  and  the  company  to 
which  my  informant  belonged  had  not  one  single  foot-sore 
man.  On  the  Thursday  night  a  whole  division  was  biv- 
ouacked round  and  about  Miihlhausen,  and  I  went  all  round 
the  camps  with  friends  who  could  tell  and  show  me  every- 
thing, and  I  could  not  help  being  struck  by  the  improve- 
ment in  physique  since  the  last  time,  eight  years  ago,  that  I 
had  bivouacked  with  the  same  regiments.  Of  course,  in 
point  of  measurements  one  can  say  nothing;  figures  show 
that  an  annual  improvement  is  perceptible,  but  it  is  far  too 
small  to  be  visible  to  the  naked  eye.  I  could  only  judge  by 
the  cheeriness  and  capacity  for  bearing  exertion.  The  work 
this  year,  as  above  stated,  had  been  distinctly  harder,  but 
there  were  no  signs  of  distress.  On  the  former  occasion  the 
men  in  bivouac  were  very  silent,  no  animal  spirits  about 
them,  and  later  in  the  night,  when  it  came  on  to  rain,  they 
crouched  round  the  fires  and  sang  bits  of  the  "volkslieder" 
in  a  very  subdued  and  melanchoty  fashion — they  were  thor- 
oughly stale.  And  next  day  in  marching  one  saw  signs  of 
great  weariness  and  exhaustion  in  many  faces.  This  time 
I  did  not  see  anything  of  the  kind,  either  on  the  night  in 
question,  which  happened  to  be  fine,  or  on  succeeding  days 
after  wet  and  cold  nights  had  set  in.  The  men  sang  round 
their  fires,  the  bands  played,  and  everything  was  as  animated 
as  a  country  fair.  And  though,  as  I  stated  in  my  last  letter, 
when  they  got  a  rest  next  day,  they  lay  down  and  slept  right 
away,  I  saw  nowhere  that  drawn,  pinched  look  of  extreme 
weariness  that  makes  one's  heart  sorry  for  the  poor 
sufferers. 

Is  this  increased  endurance  a  consequence  of  the  new 
regulations  or  not?  I  think  so,  for  endurance  is  far  more  a 
matter  of  mind  than  people  think,  and  it  seems  to  me  that 
this  cultivation  of  the  individual  will  is  already  bearing 
fruit  in  a  greater  cheeriness  and  sense  of  manliness  than 
was  possible  under  the  old  regime. 


210  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

IV. 

Cavalry. 

The  causes  already  referred  to  in  my  first  letter — viz., 
dispersal  of  troops  iii  small  garrisons,  want  of  interest  in 
tactical  matters,  the  consequence  of  the  reaction  after  the 
prolonged  strain  of  the  great  wars  writh  Napoleon,  and  the 
extreme  financial  exhaustion  of  the  country  which  resulted 
therefrom — reacted  even  more  prejudicially  on  the  mounted 
arms  of  the  service  than  on  the  infantry.  In  addition,  these 
had  special  difficulties  of  their  own  to  contend  with,  of  which 
the  most  injurious  were  the  want  of  an  inspector-general 
of  cavalry,  and  the  false  tactical  traditions  they  inherited 
from  the  campaigns  of  the  War  of  Liberation.  Of  course, 
there  were  not  wanting  many  men  who  worked  heart  and 
soul  for  the  good  of  this  arm  as  for  the  others,  and  the  system 
of  short  service,  entailing  on  the  squadron  officers,  as  it  nec- 
essarily did,  the  duty  of  mastering  the  practical  part  of  their 
profession — i.  e.,  the  training  of  remounts,  education  of  ili<« 
recruit  both  as  a  soldier  and  as  a  horseman,  and,  above  all 
things,  the  care  of  the  horses  and  fitting  of  saddlery — guar- 
anteed the  country  the  possession  of  a  thoroughly  reliable 
body  of  junior  leaders.  But  as  long  as  the  ultimate  respon- 
sibility for  the  efficiency  of  the  whole  arm  wras  dispersed  on 
the  shoulders  of  the  corps  and  division  commanders — most 
of  whom  were  necessarily  infantry  officers — uniformity  of 
training,  the  most  essential  condition  of  good  maneuvering 
with  cavalry,  was  unattainable. 

It  is  not  much  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  if  the  results 
obtained  by  the  cavalry  in  1866  left  very  much  indeed  to  be 
desired ;  but  the  cause  and  its  remedy  were  correctly  appre- 
ciated, and  the  appointment  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  as 
inspector-general  of  cavalry  in  the  autumn  of  that  year 
marked  the  commencement  of  a  new  era. 

The  accumulated  errors  of  sixty  years  of  misdirected 
training  cannot,  however,  be  eliminated  in  one-twentieth  of 
that  time,  and,  great  as  was  the  progress  effected  under  the 
Prince's  guidance  between  1866  and  1870,  the  cavalry  were, 
as  a  body,  far  behind  the  level  of  efficiency  demanded  by  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  211 

altered  conditions,  both  strategic  and  tactical,  under  which 
they  were  about  to  be  employed. 

The  cavalry  experts,  as  a  body,  were  seriously  disap- 
pointed by  the  small  results  obtained  by  the  70,000  and  more 
horsemen  that  invaded  France  in  1870.  But  they  were  in  no 
way  disheartened,  for  the  material,  both  men  and  horses, 
wras  proved  to  be  excellent,  and  it  was  seen  that  all  that  was 
wanted  was  a  sensible  system  to  develop  the  best,  qualities 
of  both,  and  at  the  same  time  to  train  the  superior  officers  in 
the  art  of  handling  the  higher  units — namely,  the  brigades 
and  divisions. 

The  defects  of  the  old  system  were  thus  summed  up  by 
one  of  their  first  authorities  on  this  subject: 

"Our  riding  education  keeps  our  horses  during  the  whole 
of  the  winter,  from  October  to  April,  in  the  man  ege  or  riding- 
school.  Then  follow  the  squadron  training  and  regimental 
drills,  also  on  level  parade-grounds.  Only  during  the  short 
period  of  the  detachment  exercises  and  maneuvers,  which 
last  only  four  weeks,  is  it  necessary  for  cavalry  to  ride 
straight  across  whatever  comes  first.  Is  it  possible  that  the 
soldier  can  feel  full  confidence  that  his  horse  will  carry  him 
as  long  as  he  sits  still  and  does  not  worry  his  mouth?  Is  it 
to  be  expected  that  he  can  keep  his  eyes  on  the  enemy  and 
his  squadron  leader?  Is  it  not  much  more  likely  that  he 
will  be  anxiously  looking  down  at  every  stone  and  cart-rut 
on  the  ground,  pulling  at  his  horse's  head,  and  thereby 
destroying  the  order  of  the  formation?  But  how  can  a 
leader  who  has  grown  up  in  this  groove  feel  confidence  in 
the  ability  of  the  men  following  him  to  reach  the  enemy  knee 
to  knee,  when  he  knows  that  every  potato-field,  every  ridge 
and  furrow  loosens  their  order?" 

To  eliminate  the  defects  indicated  in  the  above  passage 
has  been  the  chief  object  kept  in  view  by  the  cavalry 
reformers  during  the  last  twenty  years,  and  the  steps  they 
have  taken  have  been,  briefly,  as  follows : 

As  far  as  possible,  the  time  spent  in  the  eovered-m 
schools  has  been  curtailed,  and  more  importance  has  been 
attached  to  an  outdoor  training  of  the  men  to  control  their 
horses  on  all  sorts  of  ground  likely  to  be  met  with,  while  at 


212  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  same  time  largely  increased  drum  mis  have  boon  made 
on  the  staying  power  of  the  horses,  and  a  proper  conception 
of  what  "condition"  really  implies  has  been  arrived  at. 

This  last  is  the  essential  point  on  which  everything 
turns.  As  long  as  squadron  commanders  were  judged  by 
the  fatness  of  their  horses,  as  under  the  old  regime,  the 
keener  and  more  ambitions  they  were,  the  more  certain  was 
the  ultimate  ruin  of  the  whole  arm,  for  it  did  not  pay  1o  show 
horses  in  fighting  condition,  and  hence  no  man  who  wished 
to  get  on  in  his  profession  dare  train  his  horses  in  the  long 
gallops  and  fast  work  required  by  the  altered  conditions  of 
warfare. 

As  soon,  however,  as  this  misconception  had  been 
removed,  the  practical  knowledge  acquired  as  a  consequence 
of  short  service  had  full  scope  to  assert  itself,  and  the  squad- 
ron commanders,  being  untrammelled  in  the  exercise  of  their 
responsibility,  soon  evolved  by  competition  a  system  of  train 
ing  which  utilized  every  grain  of  corn  and  every  hour  of  the 
day  to  the  fullest  extent  possible. 

l»y  pract  ical  experience  i  hey  found  how  to  apportion  the 
food  of  the  horses  to  the  work  1<>  be  done,  diminishing  ihe 
ration  in  the  winter  and  increasing  it  in  the  summer,  when 
the  exertion  demanded  was  greater.  And,  further,  each 
officer  had  to  learn,  on  pain  of  rejection  if  he  failed,  how  1o 
exercise  his  powrer  of  demanding  work  and  inflicting  punish- 
ment in  the  best  possible  way.  For,if  lie  asked  too  much,  both 
men  and  horses  became  stale,  and  if  he  failed  to  secure  the 
willing  obedience  of  his  subordinates  through  the  abuse  of 
his  power,  the  failure  was  made  manifest  by  1he  absence  of 
that  cheerful  alertness  in  the  men  that  shows  the  squadron 
to  be  really  in  the  hands  of  the  commander,  and  without 
which  maneuvering  of  the  standard  I  have  seen  in  Germany 
is  impossible. 

I  consider  this  alertness — "appel"  the  (lei-mans  call  it— 
the  salient  characteristic  of  their  whole  army,  but  more 
especially  of  their  cavalry.  Other  cavalries  may  and  do 
show  bolder  riders,  firmer  in  the  saddle,  but  in  none  that  I 
have  ever  seen  is  there  any  approach  to  this  extraordinary 
sympathy  between  the  men  and  their  leader.  The  squadron 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  '^1B 

moves  literally  as  one  man,  obeying  the  slightest  indication 
of  its  leader,  and  seemingly  instinctively  adapting  itself  to 
<'\  cry  variation  of  pace  and  direction,  exactly  as  a  first-rate 
orchestra  obeys  the  baton  of  its  conductor.  Only  those  who 
know  by  practical  experience  the  difficulties  usually  insepa- 
rable from  any  attempt  to  maneuver  ten  or  twenty  squadrons 
in  which  this  union  between  leader  and  squadron  has  not 
been  attained  will  appreciate  fully  all  I  mean  to  convey,  but 
Ihoy.  I  think,  will  fully  agree  with  me  that  without  it  such 
performances  as  I  am  about  to  describe  would  be  practically 
unattainable. 

The  first  encounter  took  place  between  the  cavalries  of 
I  lie  two  armies  in  the  vicinity  of  Miihlhausen,  on  the  17th  of 
Sept ember.  On  this  day  the  cavalry  division  of  the  Xlth 
Corps  issued  from  the  mountainous  district  they  had  been 
marching  through  from  Tassel  and  came  in  contact  with  the 
cava.lry  covering  the  IVth  Corps  advancing  from  Erfurt. 
Close  to  the  village  of  Seebach  I  came  upon  a  brigade  of 
three  regiments  belonging  to  the  latter  force.  Just  as  I 
reached  them  news  of  the  enemy's  approach  came  in,  and  the 
brigade  moved  off  westward  in  rendezvous  formation — that 
is.  with  the  three  regiments  abreast,  in  line  of  squadron  col- 
ums  at  close  intervals.  From  where  I  stood  the  ground  fell 
u  way  to  the  north  and  west  in  gentle  undulations;  there  were 
no  fences  or  hedges,  but  in  the  trough  of  each  undulation 
lay  generally  a  running  stream  a  couple  of  feet  wide,  flow- 
ing between  boggy  banks,  a  few  pollard  willows  indicat- 
ing its  course.  Here  and  there  slight  outcrops  of  rock  and 
some  patches  of  low  scrub  offered  further  impediments  to 
progress. 

Northward  lay  the  town  of  Miihlhausen,  out  of  which  a 
chausse'e,  bordered  with  the  usual  avenue  of  poplars,  ran  al- 
most due  west  along  the  crest  of  a  long  gentle  spur  that  came 
down  from  the  distant  mountains,  and  amongst  the  trees  on 
t  he  cbausse*e  I  could  detect,  by  their  white  cap  covers,  the  en- 
i  niy's  patrols. 

The  brigade1  moved  off  down  the  slope  and  across  the 
first  of  the  hollows  at  a  steady  uniform  trot,  crossing  the 
stream  in  the  bottom  without  losing  for  a  second  its  sharply 


214  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

defined  rectangular  outline,  every  horse  quiet  and  steady  in 
its  place,  uot  a  sign  of  that  useless  expenditure  of  force  in- 
dicated by  plunging,  restive  horses,  which  the  passage  of 
even  the  smallest  obstacle  usually  entails.  Then  tln-y 
brought  up  their  left  shoulders,  and  in  the  distance  I  saw  a 
second  brigade  belonging  to  the  same  division  converging  on 
them.  Presently  they  came  within  supporting  distance  of 
one  another,  and  both  wheeled  up  until  they  fronted  north- 
wards, their  horse  battery  galloped  out  to  the  inner  flank 
and  unlimbered,  and  its  first  round  was  answered  by  the 
enemy's  battery  in  position  along  the  chausse'e. 

The  two  brigades  had  meanwhile  continued  their  ad- 
vance towards  the  enemy  at  the  same  uniform  steady  pace, 
their  outline  as  sharply  defined  as  the  edges  of  the  squares 
on  a  chess-board.  But,  on  hearing  the  first  shot,  they 
opened  out  into  line  of  squadron  column  at  full  interval,  at 
the  same  time  forming  two  lines  in  echelon,  two-thirds  of  the 
whole  strength  being  in  the  leading  echelon. 

Descending  into  another  hollow,  they  were  for  a  mo- 
ment hidden  from  the  defender's  artillery,  but  beyond  that 
their  further  advance  would  be  in  the  full  sweep  of  his  shrap- 
nel fire.  They  crossed  the  brook  in  the  bottom  with  perfect 
steadiness,  and  then,  taking  advantage  of  the  shelter  the 
rise  afforded  them,  they  sounded  "line  to  the  front,"  and  the 
moment  this  was  completed. the"ga11op,"and  swept  over  the 
brow  of  the  hill  in  a  well-closed-up  line  and  in  a  long,  stretch- 
ing gallop.  For  the  moment,  as  they  descended  into  the 
last  hollow  between  them  and  the  enemy,  I  lost  sight  of  them ; 
but  presently  they  reappeared  dashing  up  the  further  slope 
at  the  fullest  speed  of  their  horses,but  I  noticed  that  the  rear 
rank  was  no  longer  quite  as  well  closed  up  as  usual.  The 
inner  flank  was  almost  on  the  road,  it  seemed  to  me,  when 
suddenly  the  two  outer  squadrons  went  "troops  left  wheel," 
and  the  head  of  the  column  thus  formed  changed  direction  to 
the  right.  The  rest  of  the  first  line,  followed  at  a  couple  of 
hundred  yards  by  the  second  ono,  dashed  over  the  road 
ditches,  and  the  whole  disappeared  behind  the  screen  formed 
by  the  trees  and  into  the  valley  bevond. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  215 

The  last  round  of  the  guns  had  been  delivered  at  200 
yards  range,  but  the  counter-charge,  which  was  actually  at- 
tempted, was  masked  from  my  view  by  the  advancing  lines. 
But  less  than  a  minute  after  the  troops  crossed  the  road  I 
saw  two  regiments  of  white  caps  and  their  battery  tearing 
up  the  slope  of  the  hill  beyond,  above  the  line  of  the  trees, 
and  closely  followed  by  three  regiments  of  our  own  side. 
Then  the  "halt"  suddenly  sounded,  the  Emperor  and  staff 
appeared  on  the  scene,  and  from  all  quarters  the  officers  gal- 
loped up  for  the  critique.  I  followed  over  the  ground  the 
charge  had  traversed,  and  in  the  hollow  in  front  of  the  road 
came  upon  the  cause  of  the  unsteadiness  in  the  rear  rank 
noticed  above.  This  was  a  broad  drainage  channel,  about  12 
feet  wide  and  5  feet  deep,  cut  along  the  bottom,  with  slopes  of 
1  by  1 — a  sufficiently  serious  obstacle.  The  horses,  by  the 
marks  of  their  feet,  had  mostly  skated  down  the  first  3  feet 
and  then,  jumped  the  remainder  clear.  Further  on  I  came 
to  the  reason  for  the  break  into  column  above  alluded  to. 
The  road  was  here  scarped  out  of  the  side  of  the  hill,  and 
there  was  a  drop  of  about  13  feet  into  it.  They  had  seen  it 
only  just  in  time,  but,  being  perfectly  in  hand,  had  wheeled 
off  sharp,  and  the  tracks  of  the  outermost  horses  were  not 
10  feet  from  the  edge. 

But  down  in  the  hollow  beyond  a  still  greater  surprise 
awaited  me,  for  here  ran  a  stream  of  water  some  6  feet  broad, 
in  a  trench  40  feet  wide  from  cutting  line  to  cutting  line,  and 
at  least  12  feet  deep,  a  big  "in  and  out,"  with  running  water 
where  one  would  have  wanted  to  take  off.  It  would  have 
scattered  any  ordinary  hunting-field,  but  a  battery  and  five 
regiments  of  cavalry  in  all  had  swept  over  it,  without  a  sin- 
gle man  down,  at  the  fullest  extended  speed  of  their  horses. 

I  was,  unfortunately,  unable  to  see  any  other  of  the 
charges  equally  closely,  but  on  the  following  day  I  saw  in  the 
distance  a  charge  by  the  whole  cavalry  division  of  the  llth 
Corps,  which  caught  twelve  batteries  and  a  brigade  of  infant- 
ry of  the  4th  Corps  in  flank  and  rear,  and,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  umpires,  exterminated  both.  On  the  third  day,  in  the 
fight  near  Schlottheim,  a  similar  charge  was  also  made, 
though  with  less  favorable  results;  and  in  the  final  battle  of 


216  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  whole  campaign,  when  the  t\v<>  corps  united,  under  the 
command  of  the  Kmperor,  attacked  a  marked  enemy  in  the 
country  north  of  Langensal/a,  Yon  der  IManit/,  witli  sixty 
squadrons,  liurled  himself  on  the  right  Hank  of  the  enemy, 
with  results  which  secured  the  warmest  approval  of  the 
Emperor. 

I  was  a  little  nearer  to  this  last  charge,  and  the  sight  was 
one  not  readily  to  be  forgotten — a  long  black  wall,  a  mile  or 
more  in  length,  moving  diagonally  across  the  plain,  eating 
up  the  ground  like  the  swiftly  advancing  shadow  of  an 
eclipse.  Presently,  as  it  struck  the  enemy,  it  broke  forward. 
like  the  surf  of  a  breaker  foaming  over  mcks,  and  then  the 
dust  rose  and  hid  all  subsequent  movements  from  sight. 

I  afterwards  learnt  that  this  attack  was  meant,  in  the 
Napoleonic  style,  as  an  attempt  to  decide  the  action  at  any 
cost,  and  with  this  purpose  the  divisions  were  formed  in  four 
successive  lines,  and  about  r>00  yards  apart, so  that  the  troops 
assailed  had  no  time  to  recover  from  the  confusion  created 
by  the  first  charge  before  another  and  another  were  upon 
them. 

I  was  unable  to  ascertain  exactly  the  distance  covered 
in  the  three  latter  charges  at  full  speed,  but  in  the  last  case  it 
was  very  considerable,  at  least  1,500  yards.  In  the  first 
charge,  cavalry  /v rx^.v  cavalry,  I  was,  however,  able  to  plot 
the  course  almost  exactly,  and  I  found  out  that  from  where 
the  brigade  started  a  t  the  trot  to  where  the  "gallop"  sounded 
was  8,000  yards,  and  thence  to  the  point  the  pursuing  regi- 
ments had  reached  when  the  halt  brought  them  to  a  stand 
was  another  1,000  yards:  and  it  is  worth  while  noting  that 
thirty  years  ago,  in  the  days  when  fatness,  not  "condition," 
was  the  criterion  of  efficiency,  1,500  yards  at  the  trot  and  800 
at  the  gallop  was  thought  to  be  too  much  to  ask  of  the  horses 
— an  ideal  to  be  striven  after,  but  hardly  to  be  attained. 

And  these  distances  wen1  covered,  not  by  troops  fresh 
out  of  barracks,  but  by  horses  which  had  already  under-gone 
five  weeks  of  great  exertion,  which  in  the  last  week  had  ex- 
ceeded anything  asked  of  them  during  the  1870  war.  A 
friend  of  mine  who  had  been  through  the  whole  campaign 

that  hitherto  lie  had  always  considered  the  davs  which 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  2.1  1 

included  the  battles  round  Metz  the  hardest  week's  work  of 
his  life,  but  that  the  last  six  days  of  this  autumn  had  made 
greater  demands  on  both  men  and  officers,  and  they  had,  of 
course,  none  of  the  excitement  of  actual  war  to  keep  them  up. 
The  patrols  had  been  out  and  away  at  2  a.  m.,  riding  often 
seventy  miles  at  a  stretch,  and  the  regiments  themselves 
were  under  arms  for  .twelve  to  fourteen  hours,  and  then 
had  to  take  their  turn  of  outpost  duty,  while  they  rarely 
found  shelter  at  night  for  more  than  half  the  squadrons. 

During  the  days  immediately  succeeding  the  maneu- 
vers I  had  ample  opportunity  of  studying  the  effects  of  this 
long-continued  hard  work  on  the  horses,  and  was  astounded 
to  see  how  well  they  had  stood  it.  They  were  looking  thin 
certainly,  and  perhaps  5  per  cent  really  required  a  few  days' 
rest ;  but,  as  a  body,  they  were  perfectly  fit  to  have  continued 
at  wrork.  In  some  half-dozen  squadrons  that  I  was  able  to 
inspect  more  closely,  and  the  horses  of  which  I  saw  stripped, 
I  found  perhaps  2  per  cent  of  slight  sore-back  cases,  and 
about  the  same  number  of  cases  of  debility;  but  I  neither 
saw  nor  heard  of  a  single  horse  suffering  from  the  former 
that  could  not  have  been  treated  on  the  line  of  march,  and 
ridden  further. 

Compared  with  what  I  remember  to  have  seen  after  the 
maneuvers  of  1874  and  1875,  when  the  work  done  had  not 
been  nearly  so  hard,  the  contrast  was  most  remarkable.  Then 
I  had  seen  squadrons  come  back  into  garrison  almost  as 
emaciated  and  weak  as  our  own  came  back  to  Aldershot  and 
Brighton  after  Egypt,  and  the  general  opinion  of  the  officers 
I  met  agreed  with  mine. 

The  causes  to  which  this  improvement  is  to  be  traced 
are  two — first,  the  increased  knowledge  of  the  care  of  horses, 
which,  as  above  pointed  out,  has  resulted  from  the  substitu- 
tion of  a  true  standard  of  "condition"  for  the  old  fancy  one, 
and  the  emulation  due  to  the  independence  of  the  squadron 
leader;  and,  secondly,  the  immense  improvement  in  the  qual- 
ity of  the  remounts  supplied  from  the  Government  studs. 
Whether  this  is  due  to  better  management  of  these  establish- 
ments or  to  changes  in  the  stamp  of  sire  supplied  I  am  not 
prepared  to  say.  Formerly  Arab  sires  were  almost  exclu- 
sively em  ployed,  and  the  progeny  of  these  with  the  East  Frus- 


218  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

sian  marcs  gave  a  small  but  exceedingly  enduring  stamp  of 
horse,  which  proved  its  value  in  the  campaign  of  ISTd.  lint 
of  late.  I  am  informed,  English  thoroughbred  stallions  have 
been  very  largely  subst  il  uled.  and  the  general  ojtinion  is 
strongly  in  their  favor;  and  1  also  learnt  that  Ihe  Knglish 
thoroughbred  stock,  bred  and  reared  for  a  couple  of  genera- 
tions in  France,  is  considered  1o  be  superior  for  breeding 
purposes  to  sires  directly  imporhMl  from  Kngland. 

Me  this  as  it  may.  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  modern 
Prussian  stud-bred  horse  is  a  better  type  for  cavalry  pur- 
poses than  any  1  have  elsewhere  seen.  He  has  all  the  breed- 
ing of  a  good  Australian,  is  better  coupled  and  more  compact, 
and  is  infinitely  more  hardy  than  tin-  Walers  we  see  in  India. 
The  absence  of  sore  backs  cannot.  I  lake  it.  be  attributed 
either  to  belter  rilling  or  better  saddles.  On  1  he  former 
point  little  need  be  said.  The  (lermans  cannot  afford  to  pick 
their  men.  and  t  lie  men  do  not  lake  as  naturally  to  the  saddle 
as  ours.  lint  the  mailer  of  the  saddles  deserves  at  lent  ion. 
for  it  is  the  only  one  in  which  the  (lermans  seem  1o  be  going 
backward.  For  years  the  Cuirassiers  and  Lancers  rode  in 
Ihe  Danish  saddle,  the  Hussars  and  Dragoons  in  the  Hunga- 
rian. Of  the  former  I  have  no  practical  experience;  it  was 
quite  as  heavy  and  generally  objectionable  as  our  own.  But 
the  Hungarian  saddle,  reduced  to  its  simplest  form,  is  the 
best  and  simplest  type  that  hitherto  has  been,  or  can  be.  de- 
vised. It  consisted  only  of  two  wooden  side-bars,  united 
near  the  extremities  by  strong  front  and  back  arches,  con- 
nected by  a 'stout  piece  of  webbing  laced  down  to  Ihe  side- 
bars. The  horse's  blanket,  folded  in  more  or  less  folds, 
according  to  the  animal's  condition,  was  tirsl  placed  on  the 
back,  {he  saddle  girthed  on,  and  the  man's  blanket  or 
sheepskin  thrown  over  the  whole  and  secured  by  a  surcingle. 
Ordinary  wallets  in  front  and  a  rolled  coat  behind  completed 
the  equipment,  and  the  absolute  dead  weight  carried  was  re- 
duced to  a  minimum.  Year  by  year,  however,  the  original 
idea  of  the  saddle  was  lost  sight  of,  and  it  came  to  be  re- 
garded merely  as  a  convenient  peg  on  which  to  hang  kit, 
which  would  have  been  better  left  in  the  squadron  wagons. 
The  wallets  became  larger,  and  two  large  leathern  pockets. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  219 

in  which  a  whole  change  of  clothing  is  stowed,  and  on  wrhich 
the  rider  actually  sits,  were  placed  over  the  tree,  till  at  length 
the  weight  carried  has  come  to  exceed  even  our  own  march- 
ing-order limit;  and  now,  instead  of  going  back  to  the  origi- 
nal idea,  a  new  saddle  very  similar  to  ours,  with  stuft'ed  pan- 
*els,has  been  issued  for  trial,  which  is,  without  kit, as  heavy  as 
the  one  wre  are  trying  to  do  away  with,  and  seems  to  me  to 
possess  all  the  disadvantages  with  which  wre  are  so  well 
acquainted. 

The  saddle  did  not  appear  popular  with  the  men,  but  I 
rould  trace  no  sore  backs  to  it.  Therefore  it  appears  clear  to 
me  that,  since  all  three  saddles  are  in  their  present  state  de- 
fective, and  yet  the  proportion  of  sore  backs  is  almost  infin- 
itesimal, the  prevalence  of  this  infirmity  in  other  services 
is  far  more  due  to  want  of  condition  than  to  the  saddle  itself. 


The  Artillery. 

The  war  of  1870-71  overtook  the  Prussian  artillery  at 
the  commencement  of  its  reformation.  Its  leaders  were 
united  as  to  the  employment  of  great  masses  of  guns  and 
the  concentration  of  their  fire  against  individual  objects. 
But  the  time  at  their  disposal  had  been  altogether  too  short 
to  admit  of  the  practical  detail  on  which  such  combined 
action  depends  being  adequately  worked  out.  Hence, 
though  the  form  was  frequently  attained,  the  spirit  was 
often  missing,  and  in  those  instances  in  which  the  fire  of 
many  batteries  was  combined  on  one  objective  it  was  as 
often  as  not  due  to  the  trained  tactical  common-sense  of  the 
battery  commanders  leading  them  to  select  the  same  tar- 
gets, and  not  to  any  pro-arranged  system  of  co-operation 
originated  by  the  superior  authorities.  "Fire  discipline" 
and  "ranging"  wore  then,  too,  in  their  infancy.  .V  school 
of  gunnery  on  the  lines  of  our  Okehampton  establishment 
had  been  founded  about  three  years  before,  the  expenses  of 
which.  Prince  Hohenlohe  tells  us,  had  been  met  by  private 
subscription  amongst  the  artillery  officers,  but  it  had  not 
been  in  operation  long  enough  to  supply  even  one  trained 


-220  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

officer  per  three  batteries,  and  exclusively  affected  the  Prus- 
sian batteries,  those  of  the  other  States  being  still  in  an  ex- 
ceedingly backward  condition. 

It  is  not  much  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  if  on  many 
occasions  the  effect  of  the  German  artillery  fire  appeared  to 
such  capable  judges  as  the  late  General  Sheridan,  U.  S.  A., 
exceedingly  email  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  batter  i<-s 
engaged.  To  imagine,  however,  that  these  results  can  be 
taken  as  a  guide  for  the  effect  of  artillery  fire  in  tin-  m-xi 
campaign  would  be  a  terrible  mistake  to  make.  For.  apari 
from  the  technical  improvements  in  the  arm,  which  alone 
render  it,  at  a  low  estimate,  five  times  more  effective  in  man 
killing  power  than  it  was  then,  we  now  have  to  count  on  bat- 
teries every  one  of  which  has  received  a  uniform  training 
many  times  superior  to  \\\\\\\  was  Him  possible,  and  all  these 
batteries  have  been  trained  to  work  together  by  practice  on 
the  ranges  and  in  the  maneuvers. 

I  regret  that  I  am  unable  to  stateat  first  hand  the  results 
of  the  range  practices.  The  Germans  lay  great  importance 
on  preserving'  absolute  secrecy  about  them,  and  I  have  al- 
ways been  asked  to  withdraw  before  practice  commenced, 
as  my  presence  wrould  compromise  my  hosts.  As  rough 
guides  to  forming  an  opinion  as  to  the  progress  made,  it 
may  be  useful  to  note  that  four  minutes  is  considered  ample 
for  ranging  with  the  double-wall  percussion  shell,  a  vei  \ 
effective  man-killing  projectile,  and  it  is  said  that  two  min- 
utes more  is  always  sufficient  to  change  to  shrapnel  and 
time-fuse.  On  the  subject  of  the  high-explosive  shells  1!  • 
strictest  reticence  is  observed;  all  I  know  is  that  they  have 
been  in  regular  use  for  some  years,  and  have  stood  satisfac- 
torily all  tests  as  to  durability  in  store,  safety  in  the  limbers, 
etc.  As  regards  the  accuracy  of  the  practice,  certain  ru- 
mors were  current  in  England  last  summer  thtit  in  this 
respect  much  was  still  desirable.  I  endeavored  to  ascer- 
tain the  truth  of  these  rumors,  and  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  they  were  without  foundation;  that,  on  the  contrary. 
the  men  were  taught  a  uniform  system  of  laying,  and  that 
with  every  year  the  results  were  improving.  What  probably 
gave  rise  to  the  idea  was  I  hat  the  targets  and  conditions  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  221 

practice  were  being  made  more  and  more  difficult  and  more 
in  accordance  with  the  necessities  of  war  service. 

Great  as  is  the  importance  German  gunners  attach  to 
accurate  shooting,  they  are  fully  aware  that  the  best  shoot- 
ing in  the  world  is  of  little  avail  unless  the  batteries  possess 
sufficient  mobility  to  insure  their  coming  into  action  at  the 
right  time  in  the  right  place;  and  the  progress  made  in  this 
direction  since  1870  is  very  great  indeed.  On  this  point 
what  I  saw  at  the  maneuvers  enables  me  to  speak  at  first 
hand. 

In  my  previous  letter,  describing  the  cavalry  encounter 
at  Miihlhausen,  I  called  attention  to  a  horse  battery  clearing 
a  running  stream  some  6  feet  wide,  at  the  bottom  of  a  cut- 
ting some  13  feet  deep,  and,  though  no  other  instance  of 
quite  so  startling  a  nature  came  under  my  eyes,  yet  I  saw 
enough  to  convince  me  that  this  particular  battery  was  in 
no  way  more  efficient  than  the  remainder  of  the  horse  artil- 
lery, and  that  the  field  batteries  ran  them  very  close  as  re- 
gards mobility.  These  latter  make  far  more  use  of  the  gal- 
lop than  is  the  custom  in  other  services,  and  simply  excel  in 
long  advances  in  line  at  full  speed.  The  same  "thrusting" 
idea  is  as  much  a  characteristic  of  this  arm  as  it  is  of  the 
other  two.  The  lasting  impression  the  maneuvers  left  on 
my  mind  in  this  respect  was  that,  though  the  batteries  never 
disdained  cover  where  cover  was  compatible  with  good  fire- 
effect,  they  never  hugged  it,  but  always  sought  to  unlimber 
within  the  limit  of  rapidly  effective  range,  like  the  infantry, 
on  the  ground  that  the  surest  way  to  diminish  one's  owrn  loss 
is  to  inflict  heavier  and  more  rapid  injury  on  the  enemy. 

On  one  occasion  I  was  fortunate  enough  to  see  at  close 
quarters  an  excellent  example  of  these  long  advances.  Some 
six  batteries,  as  nearly  as  I  could  count  them,  had  formed 
line  under  cover,  at  the  edge  of  a  plateau  swept  by  the  ene- 
my's fire.  Whilst  they  were  forming,  a  very  small  party  of 
staff  officers  selected  their  alignment  some  1,200  yards  to 
the  front,  and  sent  word  back  to  the  batteries  to  advance. 
This  they  did,  at  the  fullest  extended  speed  of  their  horses, 
in  line,  their  dressing  nearly  perfect.  A  small  hollow  road 
lay  across  thoir  path,  and  one  or  two  awkward  drainage 


222  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

channels,  but  these  were  crossed  without  disorder,  and  tin* 
guns  reached  their  allotted  position  without  overcrowding 
appreciably,  halted,  unlimbered,  and  opened  lire  simultane- 
ously. This  was  the  only  instance  in  which  1  was  snlti 
ciently  close  at  hand  to  judge  the  driving  and  drill,  both  of 
which  were  excellent,  but  on  two  other  occasions  L  saw  in 
the  distance  similar  long  advances  at  speed  made1  by  several 
batteries  united.  There  was  no  rigid  adherence  to  rule  in 
this  maneuvering  in  the  larger  units,  and  wherever  the 
ground  permitted  the  batteries  found  their  way  into  their 
positions  individually  by  the  shortest  line  and  the  best  way 
they  could. 

In  action  no  special  rule  seemed  to  govern  the  position 
of  the  wagons;  sometimes  1  saw  them  formed  in  column 
immediately  behind  the  outer  Hanks  of  the  battery,  but 
more  generally  those  of  the  first  line  were  brought  up,  one 
in  rear  of  the  interval  between  each  pair  of  guns,  and  at 
some  60  to  80  yards  distance,  and  the  ammunition  served 
out  direct  from  them,  and  not  from  the  limbers,  winch  W«T<- 
always,  when  possible,  withdrawn  under  cover. 

The  fire-discipline  in  moments  of  tactical  important- 
when  rapid  tire  was  called  for  was  excellent,  and  the  guns 
were  served  with  a  smartness  almost  equal  to  what  I  have 
seen  on  the  gun-deck  of  the  Excellent ,  and  nowhere  else. 
During  the  long  periods  of  preparation  and  of  the  artillery 
duel,  when  shortness  of  ammunition  supply  compels  the  tire 
to  be  merely  indicated  by  an  occasional  round,  it  is  almost 
needless  to  say.  this  high  tension  was  relaxed,  but  even  then 
each  gun  was  properly  laid  before  being  tired,  and  never 
once  did  I  see  any  of  the  fictitious  smartness  so  dear  to  the 
old  school  of  general  officers,  which  consisted  in  galloping 
up  with  loaded  guns  and  firing  the  first  round  almost  before 
the  trail  touched  the  ground. 

The  number  of  roads  generally  available  and  the  com- 
paratively small  number  of  troops  engaged  rendered  it  un- 
necessary to  call  on  the  artillery  for  any  long  movements  in 
columns  of  route  at  the  trot.  At  any  rate,  there  were  no 
cases  of  ten  and  fifteen  miles  being  covered  on  end  at  that 
speed.  The  preparation  of  the  horses  far  such  distance-. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  22  3 

and  even  longer  ones,  lias,  however,  been  by  no  means  neg- 
lected, and  the  arm  is  in  a  position  to  satisfy  even  greater 
demands  than  were  made  on  it  in  this  respect  in  1870. 

In  those  days  the  idea  that  such  long  marches  at  a  high 
iate  of  speed  were  absolutely  necessary  to  insure  the  timely 
formation  of  the  great  artillery  lines  was  still  ne>v,  even  in 
Prussia,  and  unknown  in  the  smaller  States.  Further,  the 
small  number  of  guns  horsed  in  peace,  only  four  per  battery, 
necessarily  prevented  a  uniform  condition  of  training  in 
the  horses,  the  time  between  the  declaration  of  the  wrar  and 
the  first  engagements  being  altogether  too  short  to  admit 
of  its  attainment.  The  "cult  of  the  fat  horse,"  too,  was  as 
rife  and  as  prejudicial  here  as  it  was  in  the  cavalry,  and  the 
horses  themselves  were  of  an  inferior  stamp  to  those  which, 
thanks  to  the  money  sunk  years  ago  in  the  Government 
studs,  are  now  available. 

All  these  drawbacks  have  since  been  minimized,  if  not 
altogether  swept  away.  The  horses,  though  still  looking 
very  light  for  draught  purposes,  are  well  bred  and  possess 
great  endurance.  Six  guns  and  a  variable  number  of  wag- 
ons being  fully  horsed,  fewer  augmentation  horses  are  re- 
quired on  mobilization  than  formerly,  and  a  battery  com- 
mander who  dared  to  show  his  horses  in  the  old-fashioned 
condition  of  sleekness  would  certainly  be  relieved  of  his 
responsibilities  next  morning. 

It  is  important,  too,  to  note  that  the  system  of  pole 
draught  is  still  adhered  to.  It  is  admitted  that,  theoret- 
ically, where  sufficiently  powerful  wheelers  are  available, 
shaft  draught  may  be  preferable,  but,  practically,  it  is  held 
that  in  action  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  interchange 
the  horses  from  the  wheel  to  lead  or  center  rapidly  is  of  far- 
greater  importance,  whilst,  as  a  fact,  pole  draught  gives  as 
high  a  degree  of  mobility  as  is  required.  I  wish  to  draw  no 
comparison  between  our  own  and  the  German  artillery  in 
this  respect;  but  it  is  worth  while  remembering  that  our  old 
Indian  artillery  also  adhered  to  the  pole  draught,  which 
had  been  tested  in  action  times  innumerable,  and  were  fully 
equal  in  rapidity  of  movement  over  difficult  ground  to  their 
comrades  of  the  Royal  Horse  Artillery,  and,  further,  that 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  shaft  draught  lias  never  been  tested  under  conditions  at 
all  approaching  those  of  a  modern  engagement  since  its 
introduction. 

With  reference  to  I  he  question  of  the  use  of  smokeless 
powder  by  the  artillery,  J  found  the  general  idea  to  be  that  it 
was  all  a  gain  to  the  side  which  thought  more  of  killing  its 
enemy  than  of  avoiding  being  killed  itself.  It  enormously 
facilitates  the  maintenance  of  tire-discipline  within  the  bat- 
tery, permits  of  continuous  lire  even  at  the  most  rapid  rate, 
for  no  smoke  interferes  with  the  laying,  and  above  all  things 
cheers  the  hearts  of  the  men  by  enabling  them  to  see  the  re- 
sults of  their  lire.  As  a  means  of  concealment  it  is  of  n<> 
value  at  all,  for,  even  at  extreme  ranges  tit  5,000  yards  and 
upwards,  the  llash  of  discharge  is  always  distinctly  visible, 
and  at  fighting  ranges  the  llash  enables  one  to  note  exactly 
the  position  of  th<' enemy's  gun,  which  was  not  always  possi- 
ble with  the  old  powder,  for  the  smoke  obscured  the  object, 
'and  prevented  one's  picking  up  an  exact  point  to  aim  at. 
Indirect  laying  may,  indeed,  be  resorted  to,  and  then  the  con- 
cealment would  be  perfect,  but  1  found  it  little  in  favor,  and 
the  new  howitzers  are  expected  to  deal  with  it  when  it  oc- 
curs. As  regards  the  cooperation  of  the  artillery  with  the 
infantry,  nothing  was  left  to  be  desired.  One  common  in- 
stinct seemed  to  guide  the  two.  In  the  earlier  stages  of  an 
action  the  infantry  always  waited  for  the  guns  to  do  their 
work,  and  during  this  period  the  infantry  were  almost  in- 
visible on  either  side — nothing  but  long  lines  of  batteries 
w;ere  to  be  seen  by  the  spectator  trying  to  take  in  the  gen 
eral  situation.  Once,  however,  the  infantry  commenced 
their  attack  and  it  was  the  guns  that  waited  on  them. 
Never  once  did  I  see  an  occasion  on  which  the  support  of 
artillery  was  called  for,  without  it  being  already  at  hand, 
either  in  action  or  moving  up.  If  their  lire  was  called  for, 
the  artillery  shirked  no  losses  to  render  it  effective,  and 
crowded  the  guns  together  at  even  less  than  half  interval, 
to  bring  the  maximum  possible  number  to  bear;  and  with 
the  same  object  in  view  they  fired  over  each  other,  and  over 
the  infantry,  up  to  the  last  moment  possible. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

The  General  Staff. 

The  General  Staff  of  the  German  Army  is  too  wide  a 
theme  to  discuss  here.  All  that  space  permits  me  to  do  is  to 
point  out  the  principal  causes  which  have  led  to  its  efficiency. 
It  is  a  point  of  honor  in  the  regiments  concerned  only  to 
submit  the  names  of  such  officers  for  examination  to  the 
corps  commanders  as  are  likely  to  make  thoroughly  sound 
staff  officers,  and  be  a  credit  to  the  regiments  themselves. 
The  officers  thus  selected  undergo  an  examination  carefully 
framed  to  elicit  what  the  candidate  does  know,  and  whether 
he  can  really  think,  or  is  merely  gifted  with  a  retentive  mem- 
ory. The  best  men  are  then  selected  by  the  chief  of  the  gen- 
eral staff  himself.  The  principle,  therefore,  is  selective,  not 
competitive.  The  fortunate  candidates  then  attend  the 
*'Kriegs  Akademie,"  or  Staff  College,  for  three  years,  during 
which  they  pass  through  a  course  of  practical  training  which 
differs  from  that  in  vogue  in  other  countries  much  as  the 
education  of  a  man  who  wishes  to  become  a  senior  wrangler 
differs  from  that  of  an  engineer — the  former  devoting  him- 
self specially  to  pure  mathematics,  ignoring  friction  and  the 
strength  of  materials  in  his  calculations;  the  latter  know- 
ing that  to  him  these  are  the  very  essence  of  his  practical 
success.  What  friction  and  strength  of  materials  are  to  the 
engineer,  knowledge  of  men  and  all  that  relates  to  their 
fare,  movement,  and  supply  is  to  the  staff  officer;  and  to 
prevent  his  losing  touch  with  the  men  and  degenerating 
into  an  office  man  or  pedant,  each  officer  who  eventually 
secures  appointment  has  to  return  to  the  troops  for  two  or 
more  years  after  each  tour  of  staff  duty. 

Office  work  throughout  the  whole  army  being  decen- 
tralized to  the  utmost  extent  possible,  a  staff  officer  has  time 
to  devote  himself  to  the  practical  side  of  his  business,  and 
as  a  consequence  a  very  high  degree  of  excellence  has  been 
attained  in  all  that  relates  to  the  combatant  duties  of  the 
staff,  and  of  these  the  writing  of  orders  for  tactical  pur- 
poses stands  first.  I  have  had  many  opportunities  of  exam- 
ining these,  both  on  this  and  on  previous  occasions,  and  what 
cannot  fail  to  strike  one  about  them  is  their  businesslike 
precision.  Never  a  word  +o0  much,  and  rarely  one  that 


226  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

could  be  altered  with  advantage,  and  never  is  the  sphere  of 
command  of  the  next  grade  of  the  order  interfered  with. 
The  quickness  and  rapidity  with  which  they  arc  given  is 
equally  noteworthy.  Where  the  ordinary  start'  officer,  ac- 
customed only  to  the  formulas  of  "The  troops  will  parade 
for  divine  service  as  follows,"  or  "A  district  court-martial 
will  assemble,"  etc.,  would  require  to  return  to  his  quarters 
and  refer  to  the  text-books,  laid  aside  since  he  passed  his 
last  examination,  the  German  start  officer  will  receive  his 
outpost  reports,  and  on  the  strength  of  them  dictate  his 
orders  for  his  chief's  signature  from  the  saddle. 

The  test  put  on  them  this  year  is  admitted  to  have  been 
the  most  severe  ever  yet  exacted  of  them  in  peace-time,  for 
in  no  previous  maneuvers  have  the  conditions  approached 
those  of  active  service  more  closely.  Beyond  fixing  the  dis- 
trict in  which  the  operations  were  to  take  place,  there  was 
no  prearrangement  whatever,  but  every  night  the  orders 
were  issued  on  the  basis  of  the  outpost  reports  received,  the 
umpire  staff  only  introducing  reports  of  imaginary  events 
necessary  to  keep  them  within  the  limits  of  the  ground. 
The  reports  were  rarely  all  in  before  midnight,  and  hence 
the  divisions  only  received  their  orders  bet  ween  1  and  li  a.m., 
the  brigades  perhaps  an  hour  later.  Obviously  complaints 
would  have  been  numerous  had  not  each  start'  been  thor- 
oughly tip  to  its  work.  Such  complaints,  however,  did  not 
occur,  and  since  the  divisions  worked  like  clockwork  to- 
gether, it  is  pretty  evident  that  there  was  no  cause  for 
them. 

No  maneuvers,  however  great  the  latitude  allowed  to 
commanders,  or  however  extended  the  area  of  ground  avail- 
able, are  of  any  real  value  unless  the  duties  of  the  umpire 
staff  are  thoroughly  well  performed;  hence  the  greatest 
care  is  exercised  in  the  selection  of  officers  for  this  purpose, 
and  the  Kmperor  himself  officiated  as  chief  umpire.  Of  the 
less  exalted  members  of  this  branch  T  can  only  say  that  they 
were  always  on  the  spot  when  required,  and  their  decisions 
were  clear  and  at  once 'obeyed.  Of  the  chief  umpire's  crit- 
iques, of  course,  I  can  only  speak  from  hearsay,  but  I  had 
many  opportunities  of  hearing  them  discussed  by  competent 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  JCT 

nieii  of  considerable  rank,  and  they  were  universally  consid- 
ered to  have  been  admirable  —  even  the  beaten  side 
admitted  it. 

In  no  instance  was  there  any  possibility  for  suspecting 
prearrangements.  The  Emperor  dealt  with  the  things  as 
they  happened  from  the  saddle,  and  so  immediately  after 
the  event  itself  that  there  could  be  no  question  as  to  the 
originality  of  the  opinions  he  expressed.  The  impression 
produced  on  the  two  corps  which  maneuvered  before  him 
W7as  excellent — for  these  had  not  previously  been  inspected 
by  him — and,  needless  to  say,  there  had  been  many  an 
anxious  doubt  expressed,  even  by  men  in  high  position,  in 
strictest  confidence  of  course,  as  to  whether  this  exceedingly 
young  leader,  who  had  never  seen  a  shot  fired  in  anger,  \vas 
really  a  serious  and  capable  judge  of  tactics  or  not;  but 
that  he  is  both,  his  conduct  of  the  recent  maneuvers  has 
settled  beyond  dispute. 

In  the  foregoing  columns  1  have  endeavored  to  present 
as  clear  a  picture  as  possible  of  the  progress  made  by  the 
three  arms  since  1870.  Limits  of  space  alone  have  com- 
pelled me  to  pass  over  the  equal  advance  made  in  the  sub- 
sidiary services,  the  engineers,  the  railway  battalions  and 
fortress  troops,  telegraphs,  supply,  and  sanitary  services; 
and  in  making  the  comparison  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  efficiency  of  an  army  as  a  whole  is  the  product  of  the 
efficiency  of  all  the  above  factors,  and  not  merely  their  sum, 
for  all  are  so  closely  interwoven,  and  touch  each  other  at 
so  many  different  points,  that  failure  in  one  may  entail  the 
collapse  of  the  whole. 

In  1870  the  German  Army  was  still  a  very  heterogene- 
ous assemblage  of  units;  now  it  is  a  homogeneous  one. 
Then  not  one  single  arm  was  really  on  a. level  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  arms  then  in  use:  the  infantry  were  mark- 
edly inferior  to  their  enemy  in  armament,  and  had  not  dis- 
covered the  true  secret  of  discipline — viz.,  the  individual 
education  of  the  soldier:  the  cavalry  was  still  in  a  back- 
ward condition — they  neither  knew  the  limits  of  the  endur- 
ance of  their  horses,  nor  were  they  trained  to  move  in  the 
larger  bodies,  such  as  brigades  and  divisions,  and,  worst  of 


228  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

all,  they  were  still  under  the  influence  of  the  old  Napoleonic 
dogma  that  "cavalry  cannot  charge  unshaken  infantry"; 
the  artillery,  though  they  were  better  armed  than  their  ad- 
versary, had  only  grasped  the  idea  which  was  to  guide  their 
employment,  arid  had  not  mastered  the  details;  and,  finally, 
the  staff  as  a  body  was  only  really  efficient  in  its  highest 
ranks.  Now  all  this  is  changed:  the  infantry  are  equally 
well  armed,  and  have  tapped  a  new  source  of  strength  no 
other  nation  has  yet  discovered;  the  cavalry  know  what 
they  can  do  as  regards  endurance,  and  have  learnt  by  experi- 
ence that  the  question  whether  infantry  arc  unshaken  or 
not  can  only  be  decided  by  the  event,  not  judged  by  appear- 
ances, and  they  know  now  how  to  report  and  whom  to  report 
to;  the  artillery  can  now  rely  on  executing  what  was  for- 
merly only  a  pious  wish  on  the  pan  of  i  lu-ir  leaders;  and  the 
excellence  of  the  staff  has  had  time  to  pem-irair  rvm  into 
the  lowest  grades  of  the  institution. 

As  the  German  Army  now  stands,  I  believe  it  to  be  the 
most  perfect  engine  of  war  ever  yet  put  together.  The  parts 
are  better  balanced;  the  material  in  its  ultimate  molecules, 
the  men,  is  better;  each  man  is  thoroughly  forged,  and  the 
friction  in  the  moving  parts,  thanks  to  the  staff,  is  reduced 
to  as  low  a  limit  as  is  possible  as  long  as  human  nature  re- 
mains what  it  is. 

The  question  only  rejuains,  Why  has  it  been  possible 
to  produce  these  results  in  Germany  alone?  For,  with  a 
considerable  knowledge  of  the  other  armies  of  Europe,  I 
assert  that  it  nowhere  else  exists.  And  the  only  answer  I 
can  find  is  this:  The  German  Army  is  exactly  suitable  to 
the  conditions  of  its  environment.  No  copy  of  it  can  ever 
be  the  same,  for  the  same  conditions  nowhere  else  exist. 
These  conditions  are — first,  an  extraordinary  sense  of  duty 
to  the  country  in  all  ranks,  the  lesson  taught  them  by  the 
events  of  1806,  and  exceedingly  well  learnt;  secondly,  an 
aristocracy  sufficient  in  number  to  supply  a  nearly  homo- 
geneous class  of  junior  officers  from  men  born  to  command; 
thirdly,  the  possibility,  due  to  tho  existence  of  this  aristoc- 
racy, of  delegating  responsibility  to  all  ranks,  which  insures 
the  existence  of  practical  soldiers,  thoroughly  acquainted 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  229 

with  every  detail  of  their  service — the  first  guarantee  for 
excellence  in  the  staff,  and  the  most  thorough  check  conceiv- 
able on  the  propagation  of  faddists;  fourthly  and  last,  the 
entire  absence  of  cliques  amongst  the  officers,  and  their  thor- 
ough loyalty  and  confidence  in  the  fairness  and  military 
judgment  of  the  ''War  Lord." 

The  last  is  the  most  important  of  all,  and  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  danger  three  years  ago  was  very  imminent, 
for,  if  confidence  in  the  capacity  and  justice  of  the  Emperor 
were  once  shaken,  the  keystone  on  which  the  whole  struct- 
ure depends  would  be  withdrawn.  Favoritism  and  self- 
interest  would  then  have  crept  in,  and  with  them  would 
have  vanished  the  very  conception  of  duty  for  duty's  sake. 
This  point  can  never  be  too  frequently  reiterated.  Within 
the  limits  prescribed  by  the  material  of  which  the  Army  is 
built  up,  efficiency  depends  absolutely  on  the  strength  of 
the  sentiment  of  loyalty  amongst  the  officers  to  the  Crown; 
for  the  work  demanded  of  them  can  never  be  obtained  for 
money,  even  if  nations  were  prepared  to  pay  the  market 
value  of  the  officers'  services. 

Civilians  may  demur  to  this  reasoning,  but  let  them  try 
the  work  and  see.  They  may  argue  that  our  great  railways 
obtain  the  best  that  men  can  give  them  for  their  services, 
and  at  the  market  rate;  but  they  forget. that  the  railway  is 
always,  so  to  speak,  on  active  service,  and  men  are  dealing 
with  conditions  as  they  actually  are,  and  not  training  to 
meet  emergencies  which  may  never  arise  within  their  own 
lifetime.  Imagine  the  Northwestern  Kailway  running  only 
three  trains  a  day  out  of  Euston,  but  maintaining  half  its 
present  staff  and  passing  them  on  to  a  reserve,  on  the  chance 
that  some  day  they* would  suddenly  be  called  on  to  deal  with 
a  traffic  equal  to  that  of  August.  Would  they  be  able  to  get 
the  same  work  out  of  their  men  that  they  now  do?  I  fancy 
not ;  for  practical  men  paid  at  a  practical  rate  would  take  a 
common-sense  view  of  the  matter,  and  decline  to  overwork 
themselves  accordingly.  What  cannot  be  effected  bypracti- 
cal  common-sense  can  be  carried  through  by  sentiment,  and 
in  peace-time  the  only  sentiment  which  can  be  relied  on  to 
unite  men  in  one  aim  is  lovaltv  to  the  Crown. 


*J30  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

MARrillXG  THROUGH   TIU'RIMMA. 

Perhaps  the  pleasantest  part  of  the  whole  period  of  the 
maneuvers  was  the  march  home  through  the  Thuringian 
Forest.  I  was  offered,  and  accepted,  a  horse  and  quart  ITS 
if  I  would  join  a  squadron  and  accompany  them  on  their 
homeward  march,  of  course  I  was  warned  that  my  quarters 
were  not  likely  to  be  equal  to  those  in  Ilie  best  hotels,  and 
that  I  must  expect  1o  rough  it,  but  I  thought  I  had  had  as 
much  experience  under  that  head  as  most  men,  and  was  not 
at  all  appalled  at  the  prospect,  and  willingly  agreed  to  come 
with  them.  We  marched  on  the  morning  of  the  Monday  fol- 
lowing the  close  of  tin- active  operations  from  Sonneborn,  a 
little  place  near  Gotha,  where  the  squadron  had  lain  over 
Sunday.  I  had  gone  out  to  join  them  over  night,  and  came 
in  for  a  village  ball  given  to  the  men  by  the  inhabitants, 
and  in  its  way  it  was  about  the  most  amusing  thing  T  ever 
saw.  T  may  mention  that  nearly  every  village  in  these  parts 
has  a  large  public  hall  for  dancing  or  music,  and  in  propor- 
tion to  the  size  of  the  villages  and  apparent  well-to-dom-ss 
of  the  inhabitants,  these  rooms  are  really  excellent,  many 
of  them  with  first-rate  boarded  floors,  good  enough  for  any 
dancers,  and  the  one  in  which  was  the  dance  I  am  about  to 
describe  was  very  spacious,  capable  of  holding  200  couples 
with  ease.  \Ve  ourselves  had  tumbled  on  excellent  quar- 
ters with  an  old  Hanoverian  baron,  who.  when  he  heard  that 
nn  Englishman  who  spoke  (ierman  was  going  to  march  with 
the  party  next  day.  had  at  once  sent  in  a  carriage  and  a 
pressing  invitation  tn  come  out  and  .join  them  at  once,  and 
he  received  me  with  the  kindest  and  most  courteous  hospi- 
tality, and  after  supper  we  all  went  down  to  see  the  ball- 
room. It  was  pretty  well  crammed,  every  peasant  within 
reach,  and  of  course  all  the  women,  having  come  in  for  the 
fun.  The  latter  all  wore  their  costumes,  and  as  the  stamp  of 
features  which  characterizes  the  district,  though  not  ex- 
actly pretty,  is  good,  honest,  and  above  all  things  healthy, 
the  effect  of  the  whole  was  most  excellent.  The  squadron 
commander  said  he  really  must  present  his  squadron  prop- 
erly to  his  host  and  me,  and  so  called  his  sergeant-major. 


Military  Letters  ana  Essays,  231 

who,  of  course,  was  master  of  the  ceremonies,  and  ordered 
a  "kaiser  parade,"  an  order  which  was  received  with  much 
cheering  and  applause.  The  squadron  took  their  partners 
and  formed  up  for  marching  past,  two  couples  abreast,  the 
band  played  their  "walk-past,"  and  the  whole  then  ranked 
past  in  "parade  marsch,"  the  men  saluting  and  the  girls 
kissing  their  hands;  this  last -.was  de  rigueur,  and  was  the 
greatest  fun  imaginable,  the  girls  giggling  and  blushing, 
and  some  hiding  their  faces  with  confusion  when  the  critical 
moment  approached,  but  it  all  went  off  in  the  best  manner, 
and  I  did  not  see  a  single  bold  or  vulgar-looking  girl  in  the 
room.  Then  they  trotted  and  cantered  past,  the  last  being 
done  by  a  "chassee"  step,  and  when  they  reached  the  further 
wheeling-point,  they  walked  off  down  the  room,  forming  a 
"melee";  then  the  "rally"  was  sounded,  they  re-formed  in 
line  across  the  room,  and  then,  the  captain  taking  the  stout 
young  landlady  as  his  partner,  the  whole  advanced  in  re- 
view  order,  halted,  saluted  or  kissed  hands  according  to  sex, 
and  the  whole  broke  up  into  a  waltzing  mass  amidst  roars 
of  applause.  Nothing  could  have  gone  off  with  more  spirit 
or  laughter,  and  nowhere  could  one  see  officers,  non-com- 
missioned officers,  and  men  on  better  terms  with  one  another. 
To  say  the  German  discipline  is  soul-killing,  degrading,  etc., 
is  a  uiosi  ridiculous  libel.  I  can  speak  with  some  experi- 
ence now,  and  can  only  reiterate  that  nowhere  have  I  seen 
in  >i-e  universal  mutual  kindliness  between  the  ranks  than 
everywhere  in  Germany  where  I  have  been.  After  this  we 
withdrew  for  a  bit,  and  nearly  came  in  for  witnessing  about 
the  only  sort  of  misconduct  that  ever  upsets  the  German 
soldier — not  drunkenness,  T  am  happy  to  say,  but  the  in- 
evitable consequence  of  the  female  preference  for  uniform 
to  plain  clothes.  A  number  of  the  young  village  dogs  felt 
aggrieved  at  the  undisguised  admiration  their  young  women 
bestowed  on  the  dragoons,  and  the  consequence  was  very 
near  being  a  genuine  street  row.  However,  the  non-com- 
missioned officers  and  village  police  stepped  in,  the  latter 
running  the  plain-clothes  contingent  in  very  promptly,  re- 
minding them  that  their  conduct  was  most  impolite  to  the 
soldiers,  who  were  the  guests  of  the  village,  and  the  crowd 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

was  brokeu.  up  without  serious  consequences.  No  notice 
was  afterwards  taken  of  the  affair  by  either  police  or  the 
soldiers,  and  the  matter  quietly  dropped.  Human  nature  is 
much  the  same  even  \\  here,  and  the  cause  is  as  old  as  the 
hills. 

Next  morning  we  marched  to  a  little  village  at  the  foot 
of  the  mountains,  the  men  so  overladen  with  good  things 
given  them  by  their  hosts  of  the  night  before  that  they  were 
eating  all  the  way,  and  probably  they  had  a  good  deal  of 
lost  time  to  make  up,  as  the  work  had  been  so  hard  the  pre  vi- 
ous  week,  fourteen  to  sixteen  hours  under  arms,  if  not  all 
the  time  in  the  saddle,  and  the  country  so  overcrowded 
with  men  that  they  must  have  got  considerably  in  urn-Mrs 
with  their  food  supply.  [  know  I  had  myself  done  so.  Our 
new  quarters  were  in  a  large,  straggling,  and  very  primi- 
tive village,  and  there  wras  abundance  of  room  for  the  men— 
so  much  so  that  many  houses  got  off  with  no  soldiers  at  all, 
whilst  the  others  only  received  two  or  three  apiece,  and  the 
people  (not  all  of  them,  but  still  some  who  had  no  soldiers 
to  entertain)  came  and  complained  that  they  had  been  ex- 
empted. "Last  time,"  they  said,  ''that  troops  came  through, 
we  had  some  to  look  after,  and  we  treated  them  well :  what 
have  we  done  that  we  should  be  forgotten  this  time?  \Ve 
have  boys  in  the  army  too,  and  would  like  to  return  the  kind- 
ness they  say  they  have  elsewhere  received.  It  is  our  duty 
and  we  like  it."  And  looking  at  their  faces,  there  could  be 
no  doubt  as  to  the  genuineness  of  their  wish,  for  these  vil- 
lagers are  as  straight  as  they  make  them,  and  speak  the 
truth  without  any  circumlocution.  My  friend  and  I  found 
quarters-at  the  village  schoolmaster's, an  old  soldier  of  1870, 
wounded  twice  at  Worth  and  once  on  the  Loire;  he  was  an 
exceedingly  interesting,  well-informed  man,  and  the  books 
in  his  room  showed  a  very  high  standard  of  culture,  political 
and  literary.  His  hospitality  was  boundless,  and  he  hon- 
estly gave  the  best  the  place  afforded,  and  it  was  very  good 
indeed;  and  next  morning  he  refused  to  accept  a  brass  far- 
thing, even  the  Government  allowance  to  which  he  was  en- 
titled, for  one  of  us.  Next  day's  march  was  a  glorious  one, 
over  a  mountain  ridge  rising  3,500  feet  above  our  starling- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  233 

point.  First  we  passed  through  magnificent  beech  forests, 
the  trees  growing  straight  up  some  80  feet  without  a  branch, 
and  running  some  2  feet  6  inches  in  diameter.  Then  we  got 
among  tlie  pines,  and  into  an  atmosphere  like  an  October 
morning  at  Simla;  indeed,  the  big  pines  reminded  one  so  of 
the  deodars  that  I  almost  fancied  myself  back  there  again, 
and  found  myself  wondering  what  I  should  do  when  I  ar- 
rived. We  were  marching  by  the  road  which  Luther  took 
when  he  returned  from  Warms,  and  half  way  we  passed 
near  a  stone  set  up  to  mark  the  spot  where  he  was  waylaid 
and  carried  a  prisoner  to  the  Wajrtburg  near  Eisenach,  a  few 
miles  north  of  our  path.  We  halted  here  for  breakfast,  and 
as  we  had  part  of  the  band  with  us,  it  played  to  us  for  a  bit, 
and  then  those  who  wished  wrere  allowed  to  go  and  look  at 
the  monument,  about  which  all  seemed  interested.  Again 
the  men  were  so  overladen  with  good  things  that  the -halt 
had  to  be  prolonged  to  give  them  a  chance  of  getting  through 
them  all,  and  when  at  length  we  moved  on,  I  never  saw  men 
look  more  thoroughly  happy  and  contented. 

We  passed  by  some  lovely  old  castles,  and  at  Altenstein 
one  of  the  subalterns  took  me  to  see  a  hunting-lodge  of  the 
Duke  of  Weimar,  and  a  lovelier  spot  I  have  seldom  seen, 
not  the  least  attractive  point  about  it  being  the  ^exquisite 
turf  and  lawns  by  which  it  was  surrounded,  a  thing  the 
absence  of  which  spoils,  as  a  rule,  the  best  of  German  coun- 
try houses;  but  the  secret  of  this  was,  I  learnt,  a  Scotch 
gardener.  From  here  we  descended  an  almost  precipitous 
slope,  with  gray  rock  cropping  out  through  breaks  in  the 
forest,  by  a  most  perfectly  graded  and  maintained  road; 
indeed,  throughout  the  march  I  was  struck  by  the  excellence 
and  ingenuity  of  their  road  engineers,  and  I  wished  the  idiot 
who  laid  out  the  Murree-Pindi  cart  road  had  previously 
studied  under  one  of  their  number;  much  needless  suffering 
to "tonga<M ponies  and  the  poor  old  "byles" might  thereby  have 
been  spared,  and  the  sum  of  animal  misery  largely  dimin- 
ished. Our  next  quarters  looked  at  first  forbidding,  but 
again  we  fell  on  our  feet,  for  we  found  on  our  arrival  an 
invitation  to  lunch  and  dinner  at  the  house  of  a  gentleman 
in  the  neighborhood,  and  on  my  friend  riding  on  to  explain 


284  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

« 

my  presence,  lie  found  his  host's  wife  was  an  Irish  lady, 
who  sent  me  the  warmest  welcome.  Our  host,  though  a 
native  of  the  district,  had  been  in  the  Austrian  service  for 
some  years,  and  remembered  an  old  friend  of  mine,  Colonel 
Xeville,  of  Hyderabad,  very  well.  The  former  had  left  the 
Austrian  service  in  1860,  and  afterwards  held  a  high  position 
at  the  court  at  Meiningen.  In  1870  he  had  gone  to  the  war  as 
a  "Johanniter"  to  look  after  the  wounded  and  had  then  been 
appointed  as  preset  to  one  of  the  occupied  districts  of  France, 
and  as  an  instance  of  the  mildness  and  tact  with  which  in 
some  places  the  conquerors  ruled,  I  may  mention  that  during 
the  year  or  more  he  held  office,  not  one  single  Frenchman 
was  arrested  by  the  police  or  otherwise  harassed  for  political 
reasons;  of  course,  the  average  number  of  criminals  had  to 
be  dealt  with, but  the  French  looked  after  them  by  their  own 
tribunals.  But  his  .reminiscences  of  tin*  Austrian  cavalry 
were  to  me  the  most  interesting,  and  he  told  mi*  that,  excel- 
lent as  the  old  Austrian  cavalry  were  in  all  drills  and  move- 
ments, the  improvement  in  the  Prussian  ami  Herman  caval- 
ries has  put  the  latter  far  ahead  of  the  former  in  all-round 
efficiency.  The  old  Austrian  cavalry,  it  will  be  remembered, 
maneuvered  without  squadron  intervals,  with  all  officers  in 
the  ranks,  had  no  "base"  in  our  sense  of  the  word,  and  it  an- 
swered admirably;  yet  he  considered  the  Herman  system  of 
dressing  from  the  troop  leaders  (equally  without  a  "base")  to 
be  far  better  adapted  to  present  requirements. 

Next  day  I  left  the  squadron  to  pay  a  visit  by  rail  to 
Eisenach,  intending  to  rejoin  it  the  following  day  by  the 
same  means  of  communication.  I  found  an  excellent  hotel, 
and  being  favored  by  weather,  enjoyed  my  trip  amazingly. 
To  people  who  want  to  find  a  pleasant  and  economical 
summer  retreat  whilst  home  on  furlough  in  England,  I  can- 
not do  better  than  recommend  either  Eisenach  itself  or  some 
of  the  numerous  mineral  wratering-places  in  its  vicinity.  Of 
these  I  visited  Fredericksroda  and  Liebenstein,  two  beauti- 
fully situated  places  with  springs  warranted  to  cure  any- 
thing; the  accommodation  is  equal  to  the  best  in  Homburg 
or  Wiesbaden,  the  sanitary  arrangements  thoroughly  sound, 
and  the  prices  just  about  half  what  one  has  to  pay  in  these 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  235 

more  fashionable  places.  At  Eisenach  itself  I  found  a  real- 
ly excellent  "kuranstatt,"  newly  built,  large  and  roomy,  fur- 
nished as  civilized  places  should  be,  which  is  by  no  means  al- 
ways the  case  even  in  such  well-known  places  as  those  above 
mentioned,  and  situated  in  such  exquisite  scenery,  moun- 
tains, castles,  rocks,  forests,  etc,,  that  one  could  hardly  de- 
sire more.  As  for  the  historic  and  legendary  interest  of 
the  country,  it  is  wide  enough  to  meet  all  tastes,  from  those 
who  wish  to  see  the  room  where  Luther  translated  the  Bible 
to  those  who  prefer  expeditions  to  the  Venusberg  in  search 
of  the  enchanted  cave  that  Tannhauser  wearied  of.  The 
mention  of  the  last-named  place  need  cause  mothers  no  anx- 
iety, for  if  the  goddess  ever  did  live  there,  she  has  left  little 
trace  of  her  loveliness  on  the  inhabitants. 

When  I  rejoined  the  squadron  next  day,  wThich  for  them 
had  been  a  day  of  rest,  I  found  my  quarters  fixed  at  a  neigh- 
boring chateau  which  belonged  to  a  "graf,"  a  soldier  of 
course.  The  house  was  full  for  a  shooting-party,  but  they 
would  not  hear  of  my  going  to  the  village  inn,  but  took  me 
in  with  almost  Arab  hospitality.  At  dinner  I  met  an  old  gen- 
eral, who  for  many  years  had  been  in  the  historic  section  of 
the  general  staff,  and  who  is  at  present  engaged  in  further 
researches  into  the  Waterloo  campaign.  From  him  I  learnt 
a  great  deal  in  confirmation  of  the  views  as  to  the  evolution 
of  the  German  Army  that  I  have  endeavored  to  bring  out  in 
those  columns,  more  particularly  with  regard  to  the  gradual, 
growth  of  the  independence  of  the  company  leader.  A  s  with 
us,  in  the  days  when  the  purchase  system  originated,  the  cap- 
tains had  been  fully  responsible  for  the  administration 
and  fighting  training  of  their  companies,  but  the  introduc- 
tion of  battalion  line  tactics  had  disestablished  them.  The 
battalion  was  told  off  on  parade  into  eight  or  more  divisions, 
irrespective  of  the  strength  or  number  of  the  companies,  and 
the  captains  no  longer  necessarily  commanded  the  same  men 
as  they  did  when  in  quarters.  The  consequence  was  that  all 
responsibility  for  the  fighting  efficiency  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  colonel  and  sergeant-major.  What  broke  this 
system, which  still  partially  obtains  with  us,was  the  introduc- 
tion of  short  sevice,  which,  by  inundating  the  battalion  with 


236  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

recruits,  rendered  the  old  plan  of  training  them  by  specialist  > 
i.  e.,  adjutants,  riding-masters  for  the  cavalry,  etc. — abso- 
lutely unworkable,and  the  captains  had  again  to  be  called  on 
to  do  their  share  of  the  work.  This  entailed  on  them  the  obli- 
gation of  learning  themselves  in  order  to  teach  others,  and  it 
was  this  system  which  gave  to  Germany  the  number  of 
sound  common-sense,  practical  regimental  officers  who  form 
the  strength  of  her  army,  and  whose  absence  in  our  own 
army  Lord  Wolseley  is  so  constantly  deploring.  Why  not. 
therefore,  extend  the  same  system  in  our  own  service?  Tin- 
example  of  the  19th  Hussars  proves  its  adaptability  to  our 
conditions. 

Our  party  comprised  several  ladies,  ami  when,  after  din- 
ner,!! turned  out  that  the  stranger  within  their  gates  was  not 
unsympathetic  to  German  music,  we  had  a  very  good  time  in- 
deed, and  eventually  fell  back  on  the  old  collection  of  Ger- 
man "volkslieder,"  and  sang  it  through  from  cover  to  cover. 
Next  morning  the  inmates  of  the  chateau  and  of  the  village. 
the  female  sex  predominating,  turned  out  to  see  us  off,  and 
we  marched  away,  our  band  playing  the  German  equivalent 
of  "The  Girl  I  Left  Behind  Me,"  which,  on  the  whole,  if  less 
rollicking  in  tone,  is  more  sentimental  and  better  adapted  to 
the  circumstances. 

I  may  here  mention  a  custom  of  the  German  service 
that  struck  me  as  peculiarly  pleasant  and  soldierly.  Every 
morning  when  the  captain  rode  down  to  take  over  the  squad 
ron,  he  greeted  them  with  "Good  morning,  Dragoons,"  to 
which  they  all  replied  with  a  shout,  "Good  morning,  Herr 
Rittineister."  The  same  custom  applies  in  all  superior 
grades,  and  in  addition  to  the  kindness  of  sentiment  it  ex- 
presses, it  has  a  distinct  practical  value  in  enabling  one  to 
gauge  the  men's  feelings.  There  is  all  the  difference  in  1  lie- 
world  between  the  response  evoked  by  a  good  man  whose 
men  are  cheery  and  contented,  and  the  perfunctory,  by-order 
sort  of  answer  an  unpopular  man  receives. 

This  was  my  last  day's  march  with  the  squadron,  for  it 
was  to  bring  us  to  Fulda,  on  the  main  line  back  to  England, 
and  it  was  a  day  I  shall  not  readily  forget.  The  weather  was 
glorious  and  the  country  enchanting,  and  the  men  in  even 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  237 

better  spirits  than  before,  and  they  sang  their  good  old  sol- 
dierly songs  with  a  will  that  went  to  one's  heart.  I  had  got 
quite  attached  to  them,  and  felt  quite  sorry  to  leave  them. 
Their  straightforward  independence  of  character,  and  the 
way  they  looked  you  straight  in  the  face,  answering  any 
question  with  perfect  self-assurance  and  not  a  trace  of  servil- 
ity, went  straight  to  my  heart.  To  say  they  are  crushed 
under  the  iron  rod  of  discipline  is  the  greatest  lie  ever  pub- 
lished; the  exact  opposite  is  the  case.  They  are  good  sol- 
diers because  they  are  treated  and  trusted  like  men,  and 
have  become  self-reliant,  independent  agents — disciplined, 
because  common  sense  and  education  teaches  them  that 
combined  action  is  a  necessity  in  all  conditions  of  life,  and 
only  a  fool  kicks  against  necessary  restraint. 

It  is  equally  wide  from  the  truth  to  assert  that  the  iron 
hrel  of  a  military  despotism  is  turning  them  into  socialists. 
Socialists  many  old  soldiers,  in  Germany  may  be,  in  the 
sense  that  they  will  support  the  party  with  their  votes  that 
promises  them  the  same  freedom  that  British  labor  has  long 
enjoyed,  and  which,  provided  the  law  is  strong  enough  to  en- 
force fair  play  between  both  parties,  is  in  itself  an  excellent 
thing.  In  that  sense  the  Emperor  himself  is  a  socialist,  but 
both  Emperor  and  soldiers  know  the  value  of  a  strong 
Government  and  disciplined  obedience  too  well  to  listen  for 
a  moment  to  the  rabid  howl  of  the  proletariat  press,  princi- 
pally recruited  from  the  ranks  of  those  whose  defective  phys- 
ique and  superabundant  imbecility  have  prevented  their  pas- 
sage through  the  great  national  university;  and,  if  the  occa- 
sion should  arise,  I  have  not  the  least  doubt  in  my  mind  that 
every  one  of  those  amongst  the  soldiers  who  for  their  imme- 
diate interest  may  now  be  voting  for  socialist  candidates 
would  fall  in  with  their  old  steadiness  and  shoot  the  anarch- 
ists and  their  followers  down  without  the  slightest  moment- 
ary hesitation.  But  Fulda  was  reached  in  due  course, 
and  I  said  good-bye  to  my  friends  and  took  my  seat  in  the 
train  to  Mainz,  and  on  the  way  made  the  acquaintance  of  an 
old  German  gentleman,  who  confirmed  in  conversation  the 
views  I  have  expressed  above. 

I  staid  a  night  in  Mainz  to  meet  an  old  friend,  an  infant- 
ry officer  and  an  Englishman,  from  whom  I  received  many 


238  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

useful  facts  as  to  the  performances  during-  the  five-weeks 
campaign.  They  were  indeed  extraordinary.  Day  after  day 
the  men  had  been  under  arms  for  nine  hours  at  a  stretch, 
and  on  the  last  three,  which  wound  up  the  business,  had 
every  morning  paraded  at  5:30  a.  in.,  and  not  got  back  to 
quarters  till  G  p.  in.  The  heat  had  IMMMI  very  great  and  i  he 
mountainous  country  most  trying.  One  action  in  pursuit 
was  exceptionally  trying,  and  the  conduct  of  the  oppos 
ing  rear  guard  most  excellent,  and  again  and  again  they 
came  up  with  him;  the  lotteries  on  both  sides  came  into  ac- 
tion, the  heads  of  the  columns  closed  up,  but  each  time  as  t  he 
advance  was  about  to  commence  the  ninny  slipped  away 
and  the  weary  pursuit  began  again.  Measured  as  nearly  as 
wre  could  by  the  map,  the  distance  traversed  in  full  marching 
order,  on  a  hot  day,  up  and  down  steep  hills  and  through  for- 
ests, was  fully  twenty-five  miles,  and  to  this  six  more  should 
be  added  for  the  mere  distance  involved  in  the  tactical  ma- 
neuvers which  could  not  be  measured  exactly. 

Of  the  changes  due  to  the  new  powder,  or  which  were 
prophesied  as  its  consequence,  I  saw  little,  both  in  France 
and  Germany.  Batteries  in  action  were  clearly  discernible 
by  the  flash  up  to  ten  thousand  yards,  and  as  regards  1  he  in- 
fantry, though  only  on  one  occasion  did  I  notice  the  scin- 
tillating sparkle  of  the  flashes  which  had  struck  me  so  much 
last  year  at  Metz,  still,  as  long  as  European  troops  remain 
what  they  are,  and  fail  to  come  up  to  the  ideal  of  the  Red  In 
dian  skirmisher,  they  will  practically  always  be  sufficient  1\ 
visible  to  men  with  decent  eyesight.  Your  tactical  training 
and  common  sense  tell  you  where  to  look,  and  the  thin  blue 
haze  or  occasional  flash  then  soon  clears  up  the  mystery.  A  s 
to  the  advantage  it  confers  on  the  side  which  means  1<>  kill. 
and  not  merely  to  avoid  killing,  the  gain  is  incalculable,  for 
you  see  your  target  before  you  and  your  men  around  you. 
and  the  maintenance  of  fire-discipline  is  many  times  more 
easy  than  formerly. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  239 

THE  PANICS  AT  GRAVELOTTE. 
I. 

Those  who  remember  the  original  correspondent's  re- 
ports of  the  war  of  1870  will  recall  numerous  references  to 
a  condition  of  panic  prevailing  in  the  German  Army  during 
the  battle  of  Gravelotte  (18th  August),  which  it  is  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  official  history  subse- 
quently published  by  the  stall' — a  work  which,  to  our  mis- 
fortune, it  has  been  somewhat  the  custom  of  our  tactical 
teachers  to  accept  as  a  species  of  revelation,  no  word  of  which 
is  to  be  questioned.  A  new  work  by  Captain  Hoenig,  one 
of  the  ablest  military  writers  of  his  country,  entitled  "Twenty- 
four  Hours  Of  Moltke's  Strategy,"  has  recently  been  brought 
out,  which  sheds  considerable  light  not  only  on  the  question 
of  the  panics,  but  also  on  the  whole  subject  of  the  method  of 
fighting  or  tactics  of  the  Germans  during  this  war.  It  has 
been  a  great  hindrance  to  our  tactical  evolution  that  we  have 
always  assumed  that  the  Germans  fought  in  a  certain  man- 
ner becauseduereflectiou  had  convinced  their  ablest  thinkers 
that  this  manner  was  the  right  one,  whereas  the  truth  really 
was  they  assumed  this  form  because  want  of  tactical  train- 
ing (particularly  in  their  leaders)  and  a  markedly  inferior 
armament  compelled  them  to  fight  the  best  way  they  could, 
and  not  as  they  would  have  wished  to;  and  since  the  war, 
whilst  we  have  been  endeavoring  to  copy  their  system — or, 
rather,  want  of  system — on  the  grounds  of  practical  experi- 
ence on  the  Franco-German  battle-fields,  ever  since  the  first 
flush  of  enthusiasm  spent  itself,  their  leading  thinkers, 
Meckel,  Von  Scherff,  etc.,  as  publicists,  and  their  generals  as  . 
practical  instructors  on  the  parade-grounds,  have  been  going 
on  the  opposite  tack.  "We  won  in  1870,"  they  say,  "in  spite 
of  our  want  of  skill  in  handling  troops,  not  by  reason  of  it; 
let  us  make  clear  to  ourselves  the  causes  which  led  to  our 
severe  losses,  and  work  to  eradicate  them." 

As  long  as  the  senior  officers  who  conducted  that  cam- 
paign were1  alive,  the  criticism  needed  to  bring  out  these 
causes  was  very  difficult  to  exercise;  it  is  still  difficult  to 
state  in  plain  language  what  actually  happened  on  many 


240  Military  Letters  and  Essays 

battle-fields — witness  the  storm  raised  by  Meckel's  now  well- 
known  "Midsummer-Night's  Dream."  Hoenig,  however, 
who  is  a  reserve  officer,  and  has  already  done  good  service 
in  this  cause  by  his  study,  "The  Two  Brigades/'  is  absolutely 
fearless,  and  speaks  his  view  of  the  truth  in  the  most  vigor- 
ous manner,  tearing  and  rending  the  unfortunate  official 
history  till  it  has  hardly  a  rag  left  to  cover  its  nakedness,  at 
least  with  regard  to  this  particular  battle. 

He  was  not  a  spectator  of  the  fight,  it  is  true  (he  was 
badly  wounded  at  Vionville  two  days  previously),  but  he  has 
studied  the  ground  with  the  utmost  care,  and  has  collected 
avast  mass  of  information  from  eye-witnesses  and  regimental 
histories,  and  uses  this  evidence  with,  to  my  mind,  great  care 
and  judgment.  It  is  frequently  objected  to  his  work  that  it 
is  very  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event,  and  Hoenig  would  ha  \  <• 
done  no  better  himself  under  the  circumstances,  but  this 
objection  is  entirely  beside  the  point  in  this  class  of  military 
work,  the  purpose  of  which  is  simply  to  find  out  the  truth, 
state  the  causes  of  the  incidents,  and  by  study  learn  to  avoid 
them  in  future.  And  this  he  has  done  in  a  masterly  manner. 
The  title  of  the  work  seems  to  me  misleading, — it  is  in  a  far 
greater  degree  a  tactjcal  rather  than  a  strategic  study, — but 
some  of  the  lights  he  gives  us  are  invaluable  for  understand- 
ing the  strategical  movements  of  the  17th  and  18th  of 
August.  Chief  amongst  these  I  should  place  the  influence 
the  great  age  of  the  King  had  in  the  choice  of  headquarters, 
and  how  this  choice  reacted  on  the  conduct  of  operations.  It 
must  have  struck  many  readers  of  the  official  account  as 
curious  that  the  preliminary  orders  for  the  18th  were  issued 
at  2  p.  m.  on  the  17th  from  Flavigny,  at  an  hour  when  little 
was  known  of  the  French  position,  and  the  outpost  reports 
could  not  possibly  be  in.  This  Hoenig  shows  was  entirely 
due  to  the  anxiety  of  headquarters  to  get  the  King  back 
under  cover  in  Pont  a  Mousson  for  the  night,  and  generally 
to  prevent  his  over-fatiguing  himself,  and  under  the  circum- 
stances one  can  only  wonder  at  the  skill  with  which  Von 
Moltke  framed  the  order,  leaving  it  open  to  alteration  for  all 
contingencies.  He,  however,  does  not  clear  up  the  extraor- 
dinary apathy  of  the  German  cavalry  throughout  the  whole 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  241 

day.  It  is  true  the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  were  so  ex- 
hausted by  their  previous  day's  work  that  nothing  could  in 
reason  have  been  expected  of  them  further;  but  other  squad- 
rons were  coming  up,  and  a  five-mile  ride  to  the  front  would 
have  cleared  up  all  difficulties.  Hoenig  suggests  that  a 
younger  man,  say  Napoleon,  under  the  circumstances  would 
have  ridden  f.orward,  seen  with  his  own  eyes  and  slept  on  the 
field,  not  a  severe  trial  on  a  warm,  fine  night  in  August;  but 
even  this  would  not  have  relieved  the  cavalry  of  their  respon- 
sibility, and,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  nothing  ever  will  do  so. 

Space  prevents  me  following  him  throughout  the  whole 
of  his  book ;  it  numbers  some  240  pages,  and  every  one  con- 
tains many  facts  of  exceptional  interest.  I  can  only  pick 
out  here  and  there  points  of  particular  moment. 

One  of  the  first  of  these  is  the  small  headway  that  had 
then  been  made  amongst  the  senior  officers  in  grasping  the 
full  scope  of  what  is  implied  by  decentralization  of  responsi- 
bility. The  7th  Corps,  Von  Zastrow,  lay  to  the  south  and 
west  of  the  plateau  held  by  the  French,  and  separated  from 
them  by  a  deep  rocky  ravine,  the  bottom  and  sides  of  which 
were  for  the  most  part  clad  with  thicket  and  forest. 

From  actual  observation  I  can  agree  with  Hoenig.  '  All 
this  ground  is  by  no  means  impassable  for  infantry,  and  it 
would  have  been  an  easy  task  to  reconnoiter  and  make  good 
tracks  practicable  for  guns  in  the  time  at  their  disposal. 
Napoleon  executed  a  much  more  difficult  task  when  he 
brought  guns  on  the  Langrafenberg  at  Jena.  But  to  do  this 
the  staff  of  the  corps  should  at  once  have  reconnoitered  the 
ground  thoroughly,  or  caused.it  to  be  done.  They,  however, 
did  nothing  of  the  kind;  and  since,  further,  none  of  them, 
more  particularly  Steinmetz,  commanding  the  1st  Army, 
seem  to  have  been  accustomed  to  operating  in  difficult 
ground,  they  were  frightened  at  the  sight  of  the  mountains, 
and  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  the  heights  could  only 
be  approached  by  the  great  chausse'e  from  Metz  to  Verdun, 
which  crosses  the  ravine  on  an  embankment  40  feet  in  height 
at  least,  approached  on  either  hand  by  deep  rock  cutting, 
forming,  therefore,  a  defile  of  the  worst  character,  and  per- 
haps 1,200  yards  long. 


24"2  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

Now  this  road  ran  along  the  line  separating  the  8th  and 
7th  Corps,  the  whole  of  the  latter  lying  well  to  the  south. 
The  8th  Corps,  which  belonged  to  the  1st  Army,  Steinmetz, 
had  been  withdrawn  from  his  command  by  Von  Moltke's 
order  that  morning,  and  though  the  2d  Corps  following  in 
rear  had  been  assigned  him  instead,  Steinmetz  was  hurt  and 
annoyed,  and  his  loss  of  mental  balance  had  a  most  sinister 
influence  on  the  course  of  the  day's  fighting. 

His  orders  received  from  Von  Moltke  about  10 :30  a.  in. 
indicated  his  course  for  the  day — viz.,  an  attack  against  the 
enemy's  left  flank  from  the  direction  of  the  Bois  de  Vaux  (i.  e., 
from  the  southward),  and  cautioned  him  meanwhile  only  to 
use  his  artillery.  At  the  time  the  infantry  of  the  7th  Corps 
was  scattered  about  without  any  cohesion  at  all  over  a  larjje 
space  of  ground,  and  the  first  duty  of  the  corps  commander 
should  have  been  to  get  them  in  hand — a  duty  which  Hoenig 
shows  was  perfectly  practical.  Within  two  hours  nineteen 
battalions  might  easily  have  been  concentrated  along  the 
rear  edge  of  the  above-mentioned  wood,  but  nothing  of  the 
kind  was  attempted.  When  about  noon  the  firing  began, 
the  whole  artillery  available  unlimbered  south  of  Gravelotte, 
and  a  number  of  isolated  battalions  were  launched  straight 
at  the  French  position,  and  there  was  no  unity  in  their  efforts 
whatever.  Nevertheless,  by  degrees  they  conquered  some 
very  important  quarries  by  the  edge  of  the  plat  ran,  and  fur- 
ther north,  in  conjunction  with  Goeben's  corps  (the  8th),  car- 
ried St.  Hubert,  a  farm  to  the  east  of  the  defile,  the  enemy 
having  been  driven  out  of  the  buildings  by  artillery  fire. 
Goeben's  handling  Hoenig  praises  throughout,  and  St.  Hu- 
bert having  been  won,  and  tfie  edge  of  1be  plateau  also 
reached,  Steimnetz  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  eneiny 
was  beaten,  and  nothing  remained  but  to  pursue.  Now, 
exactly  at  the  same  time,  Goeben,  and  the  artillery  officers 
of  the  7th  Corps,  who  had  a  good  view  of  the  enemy's  position, 
and  could  see  that  only  the  outposts  had  been  carried,  the 
main  line  being  still  untouched,  noticed  movements  on  the 
other  side  which  led  them  to  believe  that  a  storm  was  brew- 
ing, and  Goeben  ordered  a  brigade  across  the  ravine  to  sup- 
port the  troops  at  St.  Hubert. 


V^         o*    ^ 

Military  Letters  and  Essays.  243 

At  this  moment  Steinnietz  had  just  issued  his  orders  for 
the  "pursuit."  "The  1st  Cavalry  Division  crosses  the  defile 
of  Gravelotte;  the  advance  guard,  supported  by  the  fire  of 
the  batteries  of  the  7th  Corps,  will  attack,  leaving  St.  Hubert 
on  its  left,  in  the  direction  of  the  Moscow  farm,  and  will  not 
draw  rein  till  it  reaches  the  glacis  of  Metz;  all  other  regi- 
ments to  follow  it."  Metz,  1  would  here  point  out,  is  at 
least  seven  miles  from  St.  Hubert,  and  the  ground  between 
perfectly  impracticable  for  cavalry;  further,  as  the  direction 
indicated  points  to  Thionville,  not  Metz,  it  is  very  evident  the 
old  general  had  not  consulted  his  map.  Again,  if  the  enemy 
was  retiring,  the  cavalry  must  trot  to  overtake  them,  and 
this  would  bring  them  in  six  minutes  or  so  alongside  of 
Goeben's  infantry  already  occupying  the  defile,  at  a  spot 
where  the  embankment  is  twenty  feet  high  or  more,  in  full 
fire  of  the  enemy.  But  this  was  only  the  beginning.  Von 
Zastrow  at  the  same  moment  ordered  the  whole  artillery  of 
his  corps  at  hand  to  cross  the  defile  and  come  into  action 
beyond  it.  The  commander  of  the  artillery  could  hardly 
believe  his  ears  as  he  received  this  order.  Seeing  clearly 
what  was  coming,  but  compelled  to  obey,  he  sent  his  gal- 
lopers down  the  line  to  transmit  it,  with  the  caution  not  to 
go  too  fast,  and  to  tell  the  battery  commanders  to  be  as  slow 
about  limbering  up  as  they  reasonably  could  be. 

Unfortunately, three  batteries,  not  having  found  room  to 
come  into  action,  were  standing  ready  at  the  western  exit  of 
Gravelotte,  and  nothing  could  save  these,  even  though  the 
staff  officer  did  his  best  not  to  find  them;  they  trotted  off, 
and  being  nearer  to  the  road  than  the  cavalry,  took  the  lead 
of  them. 

"Now,"  to  quote  Hoenig,  "let  us  use  our  imagination : 

"1.  The  eastern  exit  of  Gravelotte  had  been  obstructed 
by  wires  only  partially  removed  by  infantry. 

"2.  St.  Hubert  had  just  been  carried,  and  hundreds 
of  wounded  stragglers,  etc.,  were  dragging  themselves  back 
along  the  road. 

"3.  To  meet  them  comes — first  an  infantry  regiment 
(tfce  29th) ;  one  squeezes  by  as  best  one  can. 


244  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

"4.  But  this  infantry  did  not  know  cavalry  and  artillery 
were  following. 

"5.  The  latter  also  were  ignorant  that  they  would  find 
infantry  in  front  of  them. 

"6.     None  of  the  three  expected  the  crowds  of  stragglers. 

"7.     All  three  were  full  of  zeal  for  action. 

"Presently  all  of  them  were  chock-a-blork. 

"What  a  picture,  and  what  leading  J  There  was  only 
one  road,  and  into  it  one  threw  troops  from  five  different 
commands,  without  any  mutual  understanding,  any  order  of 
march :  left  to  themselves  to  get  through  as  best  they  could, 
then  some  to  pursue,  some  to  reinforce,  etc.  Now,  add  to 
this  a  wall  of  smoke  in  front  out  of  which  the  flames  of  burn- 
ing St.  Hubert  shot  up,  the  shells  from  144  guns  in  action 
screaming  overhead,  men  crowding  together  crushing  the 
wounded,  the  cries  of  the  latter,  the  shouting,  the  echoes  of 
bursting  shells  in  the  wood,  and  lowering  dense  over  all  a 
dust-cloud  that  made  dark  the  burning  sun  above.  Imagine 
all  this,  and  try  to  realize  the  mental  condition  of  the  men 
struggling  to  fulfill  their  orders." 

Needless  to  say  that  this  mighty  pillar  of  dust  was  not 
long  in  attracting  the  enemy's  attention;  what  it  was  caused 
by  they  could  not  tell,  but  it  was  evidently  something  very 
unusual,  and  they  prepared  to  meet  it.  The  dust  on  the  road 
grew  denser,  men  fairly  groped  in  it,  and  they  began  to  re- 
member that,  as  they  descended,  the  enemy's  fire,  both  of 
artillery  and  foot,  had  almost  ceased.  Each  felt  something 
was  brewing,  and  a  queer  feeling  of  anxiety  as  to  what  it 
might  be  arose. 

In  front  were  the  4th  and  3d  Light,  then  the  3d  Horse 
and  the  4th  Heavy  Battery,  who  crushed  past  the  29th  Foot 
as  best  they  might.  Seizing  the  opportunity,  the  1st  Cavalry 
Division  pressed  in  close  behind  in  the  following  order :  4th 
Uhlans,  2d  Cuirassiers,  9th  Uhlans,  another  horse  battery, 
and  then  the  2d  Brigade  (viz.,  8th  Uhlans,  3d  Cuirassiers, 
12th  Uhlans),  and  to  these  attached  themselves  the  two 
divisional  regiments,  the  9th  and  13th  Hussars,  who,  not 
belonging  to  the  cavalry  division^  tried  to  push  past  the 
former.  They  had  originally  all  moved  off  in  column  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  245 

troops,  but  had  been  compelled  to  diminish  the  front  to 
"threes,"  and  this  not  being  carried  out  quite  as  on  parade, 
had  brought  the  following  regiments  to  a  dead  halt.  Thirty- 
two  squadrons  were  thus  jammed  up  on  this  narrow  dyke  or 
between  walls  of  rock,  fortunately  for  themselves,  the 
batteries  of  the  14th  Division  had  been  cut  off  by  the  stream, 
and  remained  limbered  up  awaiting  their  turn,  but  this  was, 
nevertheless,  prejudicial  to  the  whole,  in  so  far  that  they 
were  deprived  of  their  fire  just  at  the  moment  it  was  most 
wanted  (from  the  Gravel otte  side)  to  cover  their  debouch 
from  the  further  end  of  the  gully.  The  leading  batteries 
got  through  and  unlimbered,  the  4th  Uhlans  also.  Both 
were  received  with  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell;  two  limber 
trains,  maddened  by  the  noise  and  pain  of  wounds,  bolted 
back  into  the  mass,  crushing  many;  the  situation  was  in- 
tolerable; then  suddenly  from  over  the  valley  they  caught 
the  notes  of  the  "retire,"  and,  except  the  first  four  batteries 
and  the  4th  Uhlans,  they  did;  how,  Hoenig  does  not  say,  but 
I  doubt  if  they  did  it  at  a  walk. 

Hoenig  does  not  excuse  Hartmann,  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  cavalry  division,  from  blame.  His  orders  were 
precise,  but  he  should  have  satisfied  himself  that  they  were 
possible  of  execution,  and  that  seems  a  fair  comment.  The 
batteries  of  the  14th  Division  also  returned  to  their  old  place, 
and  had  again  to  "range"  them  selves.  Had  they  remained  in 
action,  their  covering  fire  might  have  done  much  to  reduce  the 
losses  of  their  comrades  on  the  other  side.  The  fate  of  these 
merits  a  few  lines  of  description.  The  artillery  commander  had 
ridden  on  in  front  to  reconnoiter  a  position,  but,  in  their 
eagerness,  the  batteries  had  crowded  on  him  too  rapidly, 
and  had  given  him  no  time  to  look  round.  Actually  the 
position  is  so  bad  for  artillery  that,  going  over  the  ground 
two  years  ago  with  several  decidedly  capable  British  gun- 
ners, we  simply  could  not  believe  that  four  batteries  had  ever 
unlimbered  there.  With  the  books  and  maps  in  our  hands, 
we  tried  to  identify  the  spot,  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
either  they  never  got  there  at  all,  or  the  distribution  of  the 
troops  as  shown  on  the  map  was  utterly  incorrect.  The 
books  (Hofbauer  and  the  official  history)  state  that  only  the 


246  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

knee-high  wall  extending  along  the  road  from  St.  Hubert 
offered  any  cover.  Gniigge's  battery,  the  3d,  took  advantage 
of  it ;  the  others  extended  the  line  to  the  east,  front  to  the 
north  (i.  e.,  Moscow  farm),  and  this  brought  their  flank 
within  300  yards  of  French  infantry  in  numbers  in  Point 
du  Jour.  We  felt  certain  there  must  be  some  mistake,  and 
at  this  hour  Point  du  Jour  must  have  been  in  German  hands, 
but  it  was  not;  and  with  the  fire  from  this  point  on  their 
flank,  and  an  overpowering  enemy  in  front,  these  batteries 
held  their  ground  and  served  their  guns.  The  1st,  which 
was  the  first  on  the  right  (i.  e.,  exposed)  flank,  was  soon  shot 
to  pieces,  but  as  long  as  a  gun  could  be  manned  its  captain, 
Trautmann,  lying  mortally  wounded  on  the  ground,  having 
dragged  himself  in  torture  till  he  could  prop  himself  up 
against  a  shattered  carriage,  directed  its  fire  till  his  life 
ebbed  out,  and  he  sank — a  hero  if  ever  there  was  one.  The 
same  fate  overtook  the  2d  Battery,  Oapfain  ITnssc.  Orders 
were  sent  to  him  to  retire,  but  seeing  1h<«  importance  of 
standing  by  his  comrade  on  the  left,  lie  sent  back  word  he 
would  rather  die  than  give  way.  He  actually  maintained 
his  position  for  two  hours.  Then  fresh  teams  were  brought 
up,  and  as  he  had  fired  his  last  round  and  those  of  Traut- 
mann's  guns  also  (it  appears  they  had  only  their  limbers  with 
them),  he  at  length  gave  the  orders  to  limber  up,  but  all  the 
fresh  horses  were  killed  except  two,  and  these  eventually 
brought  off  a  single  gun  heavily  laden  with  wounded. 

Gntigge  held  out  all  day, and  he,  too, lost  very  hoavily :  it 
was  some  minutes  before  his  first  round  was  delivered,  but 
then  his  guns  shot  so  straight  that  with  his  comrade  Hasso 
they  beat  down  the  enemy's  fire,  range  about  700  yards.  A 
more  extraordinary  instance  of  the  power  of  guns,  as  guns 
were  then,  it  would  be  hard  to  discover:  it  more  than  equals 
the  case  of  the  8  guns  on  the  Spicherenberg,  which  in  a  half- 
hour's  duel  beat  off  and  compelled  a  whole  French  battalion 
to  retreat  from  their  trenches  at  GOO  yards  distance  only. 

The  4th  Heavy  Battery  never  unlimbered  at  all.  Had 
its  commander  got  to  the  south  of  the  road,  its  fire  against 
Point  du  Jour  would  have  been  invaluable  in  relieving  the 
pressure  on  the  flank  of  the  others,  but  he  lost  his  head  and 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  247 

retired  his  guns.  The  experience  of  the  4th  Uhlans  is  per- 
haps the  most  remarkable  of  all.  They  had  to  halt,  as  the 
4th  Heavy  Battery  prevented  their  deployment,  but  they 
moved  olf  the  road  to  the  southward  to  clear  the  way  for  the 
following  regiment,  and  whilst  there  the  colonel  heard  the 
"retire''  from  over  the  valley,  an  order  he  felt  it  impractica- 
ble, under  the  circumstances,  to  carry  out ;  so,  the  regiment 
being  then  in  column  of  troops,  he  sounded  the  "gallop,"  and 
led  straight  for  the  quarries  to  the  southward,  where  he 
halted  and  wheeled  up  in  line,  facing  the  enemy  about  Point 
du  Jour  at  400  yards  only.  A  small  wave  of  the  ground 
partially  covered  the  cavalry,  and  here  for  a  whole  hour  this 
regiment  held  out  whilst  the  rapid-fire,  flat-trajectoried 
weapon  of  the  French  poured  out  bullets  towards  them; 
then  he  retired,  having  reconnoitered  practicable  paths  and 
taking  his  wounded  with  him.  In  the  whole  day,  this  regi- 
ment lost  3  officers,  49  men,  and  101  horses. 

Those  who  still  doubt  the  possibility  of  well-led  cavalry 
breaking  infantry  had  better  work  out  the  following  rule-of- 
three  sum:  assuming  two-thirds  of  the  loss  to  have  been 
suffered  in  position,  the  remainder  going  and  coming,  then  if 
a  line  of  infantry  firing  for  an  hour  against  a  stationary  tar- 
get and  at  point-blank  range  can  kill  66  horses,  how  many 
would  the  same  line  kill  in  four  minutes  against  a  rapidly 
moving  one?  Double  the  rapidity  of  fire  .of  the  rifle,  and  the 
prospect  is  even  then  not  so  very  terrible,  even  if  accuracy 
remained  constant,  and  did  not,  as  we  know  it  does,  vary 
inversely  writh  the  square  of  the  rapidity.  Such  things  hap- 
pened in  1870,  and  will  happen  again.  It  is  not  improved 
weapons  that  the  infantry  require,  but  a  new  kind  of  men, 
and  it  is  easier  to  get  a  patent  for  the  former  than  for  the 
latter.  1  would  also  call  particular  attention  to  the  fact  that 
tlio  Fivneh  about  Point  du  Jour  were  by  no  means  beaten, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  it  took  the  Prussians  a  couple  of  hours 
iri ore  of  hard  fighting  to  turn  them  out. 


248  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

IL 

In  the  last  article  on  Hoenig's  new  work  I  brought  the 
relation  of  events  down  to  the  moment  when  Steinmei/.'.s 
attempt  at  pursuit  had  utterly  collapsed.  The  4th  Uhlans 
were  retiring  into  the  ravine,  Trautmann's  battery  had  cc  ased 
to  exist,  Hasse  had  succeeded  in  withdrawing  his  last  re- 
maining gun,  and  Gniigge  alone,  sheltered  by  a  knee-high 
wall,  remained  in  action.  Some  15,000  infantry,  densely 
crowded  together,  still  lay  to  the  south  of  the  road  and  St. 
Hubert  in  such  appalling  confusion  that  all  efforts  to  rally 
them  proved  hopeless,  and  as  the  bullets  and  an  occasional 
shell  plunged  into  them,  their  pluck  died  out,  and  they  began 
to  dribble  away  into  the  woods  in  the  ravine  by  hundreds. 
All  this  took  some  time,  about  two  hours,  and  mean  while 
other  events  were  taking  place  in  rear,  to  whirh  we- must 
return. 

The  2d  Corps,  Von  Fransecky,  was  forming  up  near 
Kezonville,  the  3d  Division  already  on  the  ground,  the  4th 
in  the  act  of  arrival.  This  corps  was  now  assigned  to  the 
1st  Army  by  Headquarters.  The  latter  had  ridden  forward 
to  the  right  rear  of  the  7th  Corps  close  to  Gravelotte,  and 
here  the  meeting  between  the  Kingand  Steinmetz  took  place. 
What  words  passed  between  them  will  never  be  known,  1he 
two  staffs  remaining  a  couple  of  hundred  yards  away;  but, 
to  judge  by  the  king's  gestures,  Steinmetz  had  rather  an 
unpleasant  five  minutes.  If  he  had  been  difficult  to  get  on 
with  before,  he  became  ten  times  worse  afterwards,  and 
refused  to  do  more  than  merely  transmit  1  he  orders  received, 
without  adding  the  details  of  execution  which  it  was  his 
province  to  supply. 

The  3d  Division  was  now  rapidly  approaching,  brigades 
in  rendezvous  formation,  bands  playing,  colors  flying.  As 
they  descended  the  gentle  slope  towards  the  enemy's  position 
just  above  the  cleft  of  the  ravine,  the  sinking  sun  (it  was 
about  6  p.  m.)  caught  their  burnished  helmet  spikes  till  the 
masses  glowed  like  a  sea  of  fire,  an  apparition  not  lost  on 
the  French.  Le  Boeuf  and  Frossard  met  at  this  moment; 
they  were  entirely  unable  to  guess  at  the  number  approach- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  249 

ing,  and  Frossard  considered  these  newcomers  must  be  the 
"Reserve  Army  under  the  King  of  Prussia,"  really  meaning 
the  ;M  Army  under  the  Crown  Prince.  Both  agreed  that 
something  must  be  done,  and  that  to  break  and  defeat  the 
troops  immediately  before  them,  if  only  to  save  the  honor 
of  their  arms  and  gain  time  for  retreat.  Both  had  caused 
the  time  which  had  elapsed  since  the  "pursuit"  fiasco  to  be 
utilized  to  good  purpose;  new  reserves  had  been  organized, 
cartridges  served  out,  etc.,  and  guns,  which  had  been  driven 
off  the  field  by  the  Prussian  artillery,  were  waiting  under 
cover,  loaded  and  limbered  up,  ready  to  gallop  forward  into 
their  old  position,  from  whence  they  knew  the  ranges.  Fros- 
sard's  corps  was  the  first  ready,  and,  unfortunately  for  the 
French,  he  moved  off  independently.  Suddenly  the  front 
of  his  line  was  wrapped  in  a  smoke-cloud,  a  storm  of  bullets 
swept  through  the  air,  and  the  French  dashed  forward  with 
all  their  old  gallantry  and  elan  from  Point  du  Jour.  The 
exhausted  fighting  line  immediately  to  their  front  gave 
way;  the  French  followed,  skirting  Gniigge's  battery  , at 
about  100  yards;  the  latter  threw7  round  the  trails  of  his 
three  flank  guns  and  poured  case  into  them  as  they  passed. 
The  Prussian  artillery  on  the  ridge  south  of  Gravelotte  woke 
up,  and  their  shells  visibly  shook  the  order  of  the*  charge, 
but  still  to  the  spectators  at  Gravelotte  it  seemed  that  they 
reached  and  entered  the  eastern  boundary  of  the  wood  in 
the  ravine.  Then  suddenly  out  of  the  western  edge  of  the 
same  wood  there  burst  forth  a  perfect  torrent  of  stragglers, 
the  thousands  literally  who  for  hours  had  been  collecting  in 
it.  In  a  wild  nccess  of  panic  they  dashed  up  the  steep  slope, 
and  on  to  the  front  of  their  batteries;  in  vain  the  jrunners 
yelled  at  them  and  threatened  to  fire  on  them  (but  did  not), 
in  vain  mounted  officers  threw7  themselves  upon  them  sword 
in  hand ;  the  mob  was  mad  with  terror,  not  to  be  denied,  and 
swept  through  the  batteries,  demoralizing  all  they  came  in 
contact  with.  But  here  one  of  the  strong  points  of  the 
artillery  came  out:  the  guns  could  not  move  without  horses, 
and  their  detachments  stuck  to  them,  and  in  a  few  moments 
resumed  their  fire,  and  as  at  this  moment  some  fresh  troops 
from  Goeben's  corps  (the  8th)  cut  in  on  the  French  flank  from 

17 


•  250  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

St.  Hubert,  the  latter  were  compelled  to  retreat.  As  a  fact, 
they  hud  not  really  ever  readied  the  wood;  the  artillery  tire, 
supplemented  by  that  of  the  really  brave  men  who  had  ral- 
lied at  the  edge  of  it,  had  stopped  the  rush,  and  a  very  slight 
pressure  on  the  flank  had  induced  their  rearward  movement. 

This  was  the  second  panic  of  the  day,  but  a  third  one 
was  at  this  very  moment  brewing,  and,  curiously,  as  a  result 
of  Goeben's  order  which  had  brought  this  above-mentioned 
and  sorely  needed  support  to  the*  flank,  (loeben,  seeing  the 
2d  Corps  approach,  knew  that  he  had  no  further  need  for  a 
reserve,  and  had  sent  in  his  lust-Hosed  troops  towards  St. 
Hubert  some  minutes  before  the  French  counter-stroke. 
The  direction  in  which  they  were  sent  is  open  to  question  on 
tactical  grounds;  there  were  far  too  many  troops  at  St. 
Hubert  as  it  was,  and  with  the  I'd  Corps  on  the  ridge  at 
Gravelotte.  a  limit  was  actually  placed  to  the  French  attack 
in  any  case;  his  reserve  was  more  required  on  his  outer  Hank, 
where  for  hours  a  most  extraordinary  gap  existed,  offering 
a  chance  to  Le  ISoeuf  such  as  in  the  hands  of  a  Napoleon  must 
have  given  the  victory  to  the  French  arms,  but  of  which,  un- 
fortunately for  them.  Le  Uoeuf  did  not  avail  himself. 

]>ut,  right  or  wrong,  Goeben  could  not  conceivably  have 
anticipated  what  actually  did  occur,  for  it  simply  passes  the 
mind  of  man  to  conceive  such  a  concatenation  of  blunders. 
The  Dili  Hussars,  the  divisional  regiment,  had  remained 
with  tin1  reserve — i.  e..  the  last -mentioned  brigade  ('the  :>lMi— 
and  when  this  moved  off.  either  with  or  without  orders,  it 
followed  in  its  track,  along  the  great  road,  of  course.  The 
deployment  and  action  of  the  leading  troops  of  the  brigade 
against  the  flank  of  the  French  counter-stroke  checked  the 
movement  of  the  following  infantry,  and  the  cavalry  regi- 
ment, as  usual,  tried  to  force  its  way  past.  They  were  in 
column  of  threes;  soon  the  block  became  absolute,  and  to 
reduce  the  height  of  the  target,  the  officer  commanding  the 
Oth  Hussars  ordered  the  men  1o  dismount,  which  they  did. 
As  if  tilings  were  not  already  bad  enough  for  the  Germans, 
fortune  ordained  yet  another  cause  of  perplexity.  At  this 
very  moment,  the  reserve  men  and  horses  of  the  regiment, 
coming  straight  from  Germany,  arrived  on  the  scene.  They 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  251 

had  found  the  halting-place  of  their  command,  had  there  been 
rapidly  told  oft'  into  a  fifth  squadron,  and  immediately  moved 
off  iii  its  wake.  Their  horses  were  half-broken  to  fire,  the 
men  even  less  trained,  and  in  a  few  minutes  they  became  ex- 
ceedingly unsteady  in  the  roar  of  the  tire  re-echoing  from  the 
woods  and  the  crash  of  the  bursting  shells.  The  colonel  in 
front  knew  nothing  of  this  reinforcement,  and  presently, 
finding  all  possibility  of  advance  at  an  end,  he  decided  to 
gel  out  of  it  far  enough  to  give  the  infantry  room.  Having 
mounted  the  men,  he  sounded  "threes  about,"  that  fatal  sig- 
nal, and  then  "walk,  march."  "Threes  about"  was  obeyed 
with  unanimity,  but  the  untrained  horses,  being  now  at  the 
head  of  the  column,  quickened  the  pace.  The  colonel, having 
retired  as  far  as  lie  wanted  to,  then  sounded  "front,"  and  was 
obeyed  by  the  first  three  and  part  of  the  fourth  squadron; 
but  the  fifth  never  heard  the  "front"  at  all,  or,  if  they  did, 
mistook  it  for  the  "gallop,"  for  at  that  moment  they  broke 
dean  away  and  dashed  back  in  wildest  confusion  up  the  road. 
The  led  horses  and  teams  in  the  street  of  Gravelotte  took 
fright.  Panic  seized  on  most  of  the  men,  and  the  next  mo- 
ment a  horde  of  men,  horses,  teams,  etc.,  dashed  out  of  the 
west  ward  end  of  the  village  and  made  off  for  the  setting  sun. 
Officers  of  every  rank  rode  at  them  with  their  swords  and 
used  them,  but  were  swept  away  too,  and,  not  two  hundred 
yards  away,  the  King  and  staff  were  spectators  of  the 
disaster. 

Fortunately  for  the  <  lermans,  the  French  were  in  no  con- 
dition to  take  advantage  of  this  disorder,  even  if  they  saw  it. 
The  Prussian  gunners  were  still  in  action,  and  fairly  swept 
everything  away  before  them,  even  with  their  old-fashioned 
common  shell,  and  what  chance  would  any  existing  troops* 
have  against  modern  shrapnel  under  similar  circumstance's? 
A  lull  now  took  place  for  a  while,  but  the  King's  blood  was 
up.  as  was  every  one's  else  except  Von  Moltke's.  The  King 
now  ordered  Steinmet/.  to  attack  with  everything  he  could 
lay  hands  on;  Von  Moltke  endeavored  to  dissuade  him,  but 
in  vain.  Having  said  all  he  could,  Von  Moltke  fell  away 
a  couple  of  hundred  yards  or  so  and  found  some  other  busi- 
ness to  attend  to.  This  is  historical,  and  deserves  to  be  re- 


252  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

membered,  for  You  Moltke  iu  his  recent  work  has  deliber- 
ately taken  the  blame  .on  his  own  shoulders  to  save  the  King's 
prestige,  but  there  were  many  witnesses  to  the  scene,  and 
Hoenig  vows  they  can  corroborate  his  statement.  Stein- 
metz,  as  we  have  seen,  had  lost  both  his  head  and  his  tem- 
per; he  passed  on  the  order  as  he  n -reived  it  to  Von  Zastrow 
(8th  Corps)  and  Von  Fransecky  iiM  Corps).  The  former  had 
never  for  a  moment  had  his  command  in  hand  during  the 
whole  day,  and  now  all  he  could  do  was  to  send  gallopers  tu 
order  anyone  they  could  find  to  advance,  simply,  no  direction 
or  method  being  assigned  them.  Von  Fransecky,  who  was 
a  first-class  man,  but  perfectly  strange  to  the  ground,  dared 
not  risk  a  movement  through  the  woods  direct  against  the 
enemy  in  the  fast-growing  darkness  (it  was  now  past  seven 
and  in  the  ravine  the  light  was  rapidly  failing),  lie  accord- 
ingly chose  the  good  old  road,  the  defile  so  often  fatal  on 
this  unlucky  day,  though  doing  so  meant,  with  regard  to  the 
position  of  his  corps  at  the  moment,  moving  round  the  an- 
of  a  circle  instead  of  by  its  chord.  The  order  was  given,  the 
troops  took  ground  to  their  left,  wheeled  into  column  of  sec 
tions  down  the  road,  and  with  bands  playing.  King  and  stall' 
waiting  to  receive  the  officers'  salutes  as  they  passed,  the 
unfortunate  corps  moved  forward  to  what  should  have  been. 
and  narrowly  escaped  being,  its  doom. 

St.  Hubert  had  remained  in  the  Prussians'  hands  all 
this  time,  and  the  ground  immediately  on  either  side  of  it, 
but  Von  Fransecky  and  the  officers  with  the  leading  regi- 
ments, new  to  the  ground,  appear  to  have  been  unaware  of 
this.  As  the  leading  regiment  approached  I  he  unlucky  gar- 
rison of  this  their  bridge  head,  unable  to  distinguish  tin- 
uniforms  in  the  twilight,  but  receiving  the  bullets  meant  for 
their  comrades,  they  "front  formed"  as  best  they  c!>nld,  and 
opened  a  violent  fire  into  the  backs  of  their  own  men,  many 
of  whom  broke  back,  overran  the  head  of  the  column,  and 
confusion  worse  confounded  ensued.  The  bravest  men  held 
on  to  the  post,  which  was  never  relinquished,  and  under  1  heir 
protection  order  was  ultimately  re-established,  but  not  till 
after  a  long  delay. 

We  must  return  for  a  moment  to  the  events  which  had 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  253 

been  taking  place  south  of  the  road  about  the  great  quarries 
just  before  the  2d  Corps  began  its  advance.  These  quarries, 
properly  utilized,  were  the  key  to  the  French  position,  lying 
as  they  did,  but  some  400  yards  in  front  of  Point  du  Jour, 
and  affording  ready-made  cover  for  a  whole  division  to  form 
under.  They  had  been  captured  once  by  the  Germans  some 
hours  before,  but  the  French  counter-stroke  had  forced  them 
out  again,  and  the  latter  had  held  on  to  them  with  grim  de- 
termination. Shortly  before  the  2d  Corps  moved  off,  the 
isolated  companies,  on  the  initiative  of  the  leaders  on  the 
spot,  had  again  succeeded  in  rushing  them,  and  again  ;the 
French  from  Point  du  Jour  made  desperate  and  repeated 
efforts  to  reconquer  them,  with  all  the  better  chance  of  suc- 
cess, for  the  darkness  had  now  deprived  the  Germans  of  the 
support  of  their  artillery.  Von  Zastrow  meanwhile,  as 
already  stated,  had  been  sending  officers  to  order  whatever 
they  could  find  to  advance,  and,  fortunately,  they  only  found 
four  out  of  ten  battalions.  These  were  just  now  emerging 
from  the  wood  in  rear  of  the  defenders  of  the  quarries,  when 
the  French  made  an  unusually  vigorous  rush  for  their  front. 
The  supporting  battalions,  receiving  a  heavy  fire  and  know- 
ing nothing  of  the  presence  of  their  own  men  in  front  of 
them,  rushed  forward  and  poured  a  heavy  fire  into  the  backs 
of  the  latter,  and  one  must  do  honor  to  the  courage  these 
displayed.  They  were  the  survivors  of  the  fittest,  weeded 
out  by  a  process  of  selection  that  had  endured  for  hours,  and 
no  man  left  his  post,  but  hung  on  and  mowed  down  the 
French  at  their  very  muzzles.  Then,  as  the  fire  from  the 
rear  still  continued,  officers  and  volunteers  walked  bravely 
back  in  the  teeth  of  their  own  men's  fire,  and'  at  length  suc- 
ceeded in  stopping  it.  It  was  now  pitch  dark,  the  "cease 
fire"  had  been  sounded  all  along  the  Prussian  line,  and 
accepted,  curiously  and  very  fortunately  for  the  Germans, 
by  the  French  (it  is  the  same  in  both  armies  and  our  own), 
for  the  former  were  now  about  to  put  the  finishing  stroke  to 
their  day's  work  of  blunders,  and  expose  themselves  to  what 
should  have  been  absolute  destruction.  It  is  difficult  to  dis- 
entangle what  actually  took  place  within  my  space.  Hoenig 
takes  pages  to  narrate  it,  and  I  have  but  sentences  to  dispose 


254  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

of  it  in.  Briefly,  when  the  troops  coming  up  the  road  tired 
into  the  bucks  of  their  comrades,  and  a  part  of  the  latter 
broke  back,  hopeless  confusion  ensued  at  the  head  of  the 
column.  The  troops  in  rear,  mad  to  get  forward,  pressed 
hard  oil  those  in  front,  and  actually,  thanks  to  their  Hosi- 
er der  and  excellent  discipline,  managed  to  force  their  way 
through  as  formed  bodies,  and  then  attacked  "outwards  in 
all  directions,  only  to  be  beaten  back  again." 

Again  there  was  a  lull  in  the  tight,  and  it  seems  to  have 
been  about  this  time  that  the  "cease  tire"  was  sounded.  Von 
Fransecky,  his  two  divisional  commanders,  and  their  stall's 
were  at  St.  Hubert.  They  derided  that  something  more  was 
to  be  done1,  and  ordered  the  4th  Division  forward.  At  the 
time  it  was  so  dark  that  the  troops  had  literally  to  grope 
their  way  across.  The  leading  battalions,  in  fact,  were 
Brought  to  a  stand  by  the  darkness,  and  formed  in  Hose  col- 
umn, and  by  decrees  the  others  formed  on  them,  so  that  by 
about  10::>0  p.  m.  :M  fresh  battalions  were  massed  beyond 
St.  Hubert  on  a  space  of  1,:',00  yards  front,  !M!0  yards  depth. 
"How,  nobody  can  now  say, "and  about  t  liese  had  aggregated 
thede'bris  of  ."V.lcompaniesof  the  Sth  rorpsandL'l'of  thelth.so 
that  towards  11  p.  m.  4S  battalions  stood  like  sheep  in  a  pen 
on  a  space  of  about  l.UoO  yards  front  by  1,100  deep,  and  not 
300  yards  from  the  enemy's  mux/les.  "Surely,"  as  ILoenig 
says,  "military  history  contains  no  parallel  case.  Why  had 
one  brought  these  masses  together?  To  attack;  but  ihen. 
in  the  name  of  all  things  reasonable,  why  did  they  not  attack? 
The  answer  may  perhaps  be  given  by  those  who  understand 
the  'moral  •'  of  Iroops.  Why  did  not  at  least  these 

twenty-four  fresh  Pomeranian  battalions  go  straight  for  ihe 
enemy  without  a  shot?  One  hears  so  much  of  'dash'  and 
'resolution,'  of  'an  advance  with  1he  bayonet.'  of  'the  ad  van- 
tages of  a  night  attack.'  Here  lay  all  the  conditions  for  suc- 
cess in  such  adventures  ready  to  hand,  the  enemy  not  :»00 
yards  away.  The  troops  were  'massed'  and  the  dreaded  tire 
/one  lay  behind.  Tf.  as  the  troops  actually  did,  it  was  possi- 
ble to  remain  in  Ihis  dense  mass  from  11  p.  in.  to  K  next 
morning,  and  always  under  a  certain  amount  of  fire,  for  from 
time  to  time  the  musketry  blazed  up  anew,  ihen  why  could 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  255 

not  we  go  forward  with  drums  beating,  aiid  overrun  the 
enemy  with  cold  steel?  Three  minutes  were  all  that  were 
required,  and  we  should  have  lost  fewer  in  those  three  min- 
utes than  we  actually  did  in  the  seven  hours.  Why?  The 
answer  is  plain,  and  I  will  give  it:  Simply  because  we  did 
not  understand  what  fighting  means;  the  whole  course  of 
the  day  shows  it.  \Ye  did  not  understand  either  skirmish- 
ing tactics  or  the  employment  of  lines  and  columns,  and  the 
climax  of  the  day  was  the  bankruptcy  declaration  of  our 
tactical  experts.  The  spirit  was  there,— that  is  proved  by 
our  seven  hours'  endurance  in  this  position, — but  it  is  not 
enough  merely  that  the  spirit  should  be  there;  one  must 
also  know  how  to  use  it." 

Mind,  these  are  the  words  of  a  (Herman  critic,  not  mine, 
and,  as  far  as  can  be  judged  by  comparison  with  official  re- 
ports, regimental  histories,  and  the  stories  which  from  time 
to  time  have  reached  my  ears  in  messes  and  elsewhere,  they 
are  by  no  means  exaggerated.  Indeed,  Hoenig  is  not  at  all. 
the  man  to  do  so  willfully,  for  it  was  Hoenig  who  stood  up 
for  the  infantry,  and  proved  that  this  picture  was  at  any  rate 
not  of  universal  application  throughout  the  war,  when,  some 
three1  summers  ago,  Meckel  showed  up  in  very  unfavorable 
colors  what  happened  in  the  (ierman  ranks  on  the  battle- 
fields of  1S70  in  his  "Midsummer-Night's  Dream,"  a  work 
that  may  be  summarized  in  a  few  words  from  his  classic 
work  on  tactics:  "The  beat  of  the  drum  went  before  the 
thunder  of  artillery,  and  our  power  shattered  to  pieces  be- 
fore1 the  fire  of  his  unshaken  infantry.  Woods,  hollows,  and 
villages  were  filled  with  stragglers,  and  the  open  field  lay 
tenanted  only  by  the  dead  and  dying  victims  of  our  prema- 
ture violence."  Yet  these  are  the  tactics  which  our  modern 
wiseacres  would  have  us  copy,  and  now  at  a  time  when 
ample  evidence  of  their  futility  lies  to  our  hand — for  those, 
at  least,  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  use  it. 

To  return  to  our  "muttons,"  whilst  tin1  lM  Corps  occu- 
pied this  unheard-of  position,  the  debris  of  the  7th  and  8th 
were  withdrawn  as  best  they  could  be,  and  the  massed  bands, 
many  of  which  had  been  left  behind  on  the  other  side  of  the 
ravine,  struck  up  "ITeil  dir  im  Siegers  Kran/"  and  uXun 


256  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

danket  alle  Gott."     Surely  "All  we  like  sheep  have  gone 
astray"  would  have  suited  the  circumstances  better. 

It  is  only  fair  to  give  Hoenig's  opinion  as  to  how  the 
whole  fight  of  Gravelotte  should  have  been  conducted.  Von 
Moltke's  first  order  indicated  distinctly  an  attack  against 
the  enemy's  extreme  left  from  the  Bois  <ie  Vaux  as  t  he  main 
point  to  be  kept  in  view,  and  while  that  was  preparing,  the 
deployment  of  artillery  only.  This  order  was  received  about 
eleven,  and  Von  Zastrow,  warned  in  this  sense  by  Steinmetz, 
should  at  once  have  proceeded  to  get  his  corps  in  hand,  a 
proceeding  he  omitted,  and,  as  a  consequence,  from  first  to 
last  he  never  had  a  really  formed  reserve  in  his  hands  from 
beginning  to  end  of  the  battle.  His  stall'  should  have 
already  reconnoitered  all  available  approaches,  and  made 
arrangements  for  improving  them  for  the  passage  of  guns, 
and  cutting  paths  through  the  forest  and  undergrowth. 
Markers  should  have  been  placed  from  point  \to  point  as  re- 
. quired.  -Now  wrould  have  come  in  the  action  of  real  light 
infantry  troops  as  I  would  see  them.  Hoenig  has  not  caught 
on  to  this  idea  yet,  but  Yon  der  Goltz  is  its  originator. 
Picked  and  highly  trained  men  i seven  about)  from  every 
company,  under  a  non-commissioned  officer,  should  have 
skirmished  towards  the  heights,  gradually  reconnoitered, 
and  formed  a  first  fire  position  at  the  break  of  the  slope. 
Then,  whilst  the  guns  poured  in  a  hail  of  shell  upon  St. 
Hubert  and  Point  du  Jour,  the  infantry  formed  in  com- 
pany columns  in  the  ravine  should  have  worked  up  by  the 
reconnoitered  paths,  and  suddenly  occupied  in  a  dense  fight- 
ing line  the  whole  of  the  front  indicated  by  the  true  skir- 
mishers all  along,  from  north  of  the  main  road  to  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  Bois  de  Vaux.  Behind  these  the  second  and 
third  lines  form  for  attack;  then,  when  this  is  completed,  say 
in  perhaps  half  an  hour  or  a  little  more,  from  all  points  of 
the  arc  surrounding  them  the  troops  break  forward  for  the 
assault  of  St.  Hubert  and  Point  du  Jour.  Judging  by  what 
actually  happened,  by  the  fact  that  throughout  the  day  only 
once  did  even  two  battalions,  as  such,  attack  together,  can 
any  doubt  exist  that  the  result  of  this  combined  onset,  pre- 
pared by  both  artillery  and  infantry,  would  have  been  the 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  '^57 

capture  of  this  wing  of  the  position  at  the  first  rush?  Even 
allowing  for  the  inferiority  of  the  Prussian  infantry  weapon, 
I  think  not,  and  assuming  equal  armament,  I  feel  no  doubt 
whatever. 

To  a  lesser  extent  the  same  criticism  applies,  according 
to  Hoenig,  to  the  action  of  the  8th  Corps,  of  which,  on  the 
whole,  and  under  the  circumstances  as  they  occurred,  he 
liiids  little  fault.  The  want  of  a  fire-position  for  infantry 
preparation  was  the  chief  deficiency,  but,  looking  at  the 
ground  and  the  nature  of  the  Prussian  armament,  I  can 
hardly  see  how  this  could  be  avoided,  though  it  might  well 
be  in  the  future. 

Now  turn  to  the  losses,  remembering  it  is  "the  terrible 
losses  due  to  the  new  arms  which  caused  the  Prussian  col- 
umns to  melt  away,  etc.,"  and  that  it  is  on  the  assumed 
reality  of  these  losses  that  our  modern  school  of  attack  form- 
ations depends.  We  find  the  2d  French  Corps,  Frossard, 
the  beaten  debris  of  Spicheren  and  Vionville,  and  the  3d,  Le 
Boeuf,  opposed  to,  in  all,  three  full  German  corps — in  round 
numbers,  40,000  against  90,000 — the  latter  with  an  enor- 
mously superior  artillery  armament,  though  with  an  inferior 
infantry  one.  The  French  lost  in  both  corps  2,034  men,  and 
the  Germans,  as  nearly  as  possible,  267  officers  and  5,128 
men,  or  about  5.5  per  cent.  Of  course  these  losses  were  very 
unequally  divided.  I  have  not  the  official  lists  by  me  for  com- 
parison, but  I  take  the  figures  as  Hoenig  gives  them.  The 
four  battalions  of  the  32d  Brigade,  the  only  ones  who  carried 
out  a  united  attack  together,  lost  in  the  whole  fight  7  officers 
and  104  men,  say  2^  per  cent.  In  the  7th  Corps  only  two 
regiments,  the  39th  and  73d,  had  losses  worth  speaking  of— 
viz.,  the  former  4  officers  and  124  men,  the  latter  3  officers 
and  164  men,  out  of  3,000  each;  but,  to  the  best  of  my  recol- 
lection, some  companies,  particularly  in  the  7th  Corps,  suf- 
fered out  of  all  proportion  to  these  figures.  Still,  follow  the 
course  of  the  action  as  above  depicted,  make  all  due  allow- 
ance for  panics,  for  men — not  a  few — shot  by  their  own  side, 
etc.,  and  where  are  the  terrific  losses  before  which  the  old- 
fashioned  "line"  is  to  melt  away.  It  took  more  than  this 
to  make  it  melt  in  the  old  days  any  way.  If  it  is  urged  that 


258  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

modern  weapons  are  more  perfect  than  those  of  twenty  years 
ago,  here  and  throughout  the  war  I  should  be  content  to 
halve  the  iiumber  of  rifles  and  double  the  rale  of  tire,  or 
double  the  rate  of  tire  throughout.  Still  I  see  nothing  half 
as  terrible  as  the  storm  of  tire  that  destroyed  ihe  Imperial 
Guard  in  a  few  moments  at  Waterloo,  or  the  tire  that  again 
and  again  failed  to  slop  the  rush  of  our  troops  in  the  Penin- 
sula. What  comparison  can  there  be  between  this  lire  and 
1he  case  that  greeted  our  troops  in  the  Crimea,  or  from  the 
fourteen  guns  that  swept  the  breach  at  P»adajos?  yet  neither 
sufficed  to  stop  us,  though  subsequent  events,  and  passive 
obstacles,  forced  us  to  retire. 

It  is  that  blessed  word  breech-loader  which  has  wrought 
the  evil,  and,  curiously  enough,  it  has  been  amongst  I  lie  men 
who  are  personally  notorious  for  exceptional  personal  cour- 
age under  fire  that  it  has  worked  the  greatest  havoc.  They 
have  gone  on  the  WMM  '><jn<>t  ti  i,»  j>r<>  nuujnijiw  theory,  and 
fallen  down  and  worshiped  it;  it  has  become  iheir  fetish, 
and  they  have  immolated  in  their  lectures  thousands  of  un- 
fortunate Prussians  (notably  of  the  (luardi  before  it.  Yet. 
had  they  been  actually  on  the  spot,  they  would  personally 
hardly  have  noticed  it.  but  have  said  pretty  hard  tilings  of 
the  troops  who  failed  to  stand  up  to  it. 

The  more  one  studies  this  war.  the  more  one  becomes 
convinced  of  these  truths.  The  (lermans  were  tactically 
disgracefully  handled;  want  of  artillery  preparation,  the 
fatal  system  of  attacking  with  a  line  of  skirmishers  only  a 
couple  of  hundred  yards  in  front  of  their  company  columns. 
and  a  marked  inferiority  in  their  weapons,  in  themselves 
were  the  causes  of  their  disasters.  As  a  consequence,  wild 
confusion  resulted;  individual  training  of  the  soldiers  was 
yet  in  its  infancy,  and  the  short  service  it  wo  and  a  half  years 
at  the  outside)  was  not  enough  to  render  them  proof  against 
the  trouble  around  them.  Out  of  10,000  put  in  on  a  given 
front,  frequently  not  more  than  I'. 000  actually  fought  in  1 1n- 
fighting line,  but  these  were  the  survivors  of  the  til  lest,  and 
their  conduct  deserves  all  the  praise  lavished  on  the  avmy  as 
a  whole. 

The  German  officers  as  a  body  are  perfectly  aware  of 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  259 

these  facts,  though,  for  obvious  reasons,  they  rarely  speak 
of  them,  and  for  the  past  twenty  years  have  been  endeavoring 
to  correct  them.  Their  progress  has  been  slow,  because  they 
had  a  world  of  preconceived  ideas  to  conquer,  but  it  has  been 
sure  and  on  lines  almost  exactly  the  opposite  to  those  indi- 
cated in  our  new  drill-book,  as  an  hour's  visit  to  the  Tempel- 
liof  tields  here  would  demonstrate  to  anyone  who  knows 
what  to  look  for.  The  French  in  their  drill  tactics  were 
ahead  of  the  Germans  in  1870,  but  since  then  have  gone 
backwards,  and  are  now  years  behind  them.  We  alone  were 
then  in  a  position  to  make  a  jump  forward,  basing 
our  ideas  on  the  old  Peninsula  traditions  and  the  ex- 
periences of  the  American  war,  imparting  only  the  princi- 
ple of  individual  instruction  and  the  same  decentralization 
of  command  which  obtains  in  a  polo  team — viz.,  every  man 
(i.  e.,  captain  or  other  commander)  to  be  held  responsible 
that  at  every  moment  of  the  game  he  occupies  the  correct 
position  relatively  to  the  other  members  of  the  team,  and 
that,  too,  without  being  shouted  at. 

This  may  appear  an  extreme  assumption,  but  let  us 
apply  it  to  the  celebrated  glacis  of  St.  Privat.  The  gunners 
already  in  line,  at  say  12,000  yards,  have  prepared  the  way. 
The  Light  Division  as  real  skirmishers  have  crept  up  to  and 
marked  the  first  fire  position.  Our  first  line  follows.  De- 
ployed two  deep,  say  <>  paces  between  companies,  they  would 
have  presented  a  target  of  far  less  depth  than  the  skirmish- 
ers' supports  and  reserves  constituting  the  first  line  of  the 
Prussians, and  suffered  correspondingly  less  loss.  As  a  fact. 
Von  Kessel,  commanding  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  Guards. 
says  in  his  report  that  from  the  moment  they  broke  cover  it 
was  evident  that  all  ideas  of  avoiding  losses  based  on  dis- 
tances between  supports  and  skirmishers,  etc.,  was  entirely 
illusory,  and  other  eye-witnesses  confirm  his  statement;  and 
that  our  single  line  presents  a  less  favorable  target  than 
three  following  ones  in  the  conventional  formation  any  one 
can  convince  himself  by  looking  at  troops  thus  formed  on  a 
parade-ground.  Tf  more  practical  proof  is  wanted,  place 
dummies  in  the  corresponding  orders,  and  fire  at  them  at  the 
next  field-firing  experiments.  The  first  rush  of  the  Prussians 


260  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

took  them  in  to  600  yards;  three  battalions  that  actually 
did  go  in  line,  three  deep,  got  even  further,  but  then  they  had 
to  stop,  because  the  elan  of  the  others  on  either  flank,  in  ex- 
tended order,  had  given  out  sooner,  and  then  came  the  mis- 
fortune for  the  Prussians  that  they  had  halted  practically 
beyond  the  effective  range  of  their  weapons.  With  equal 
arms  this  would  not  have  occurred,  but  the  moment  the  line 
opened  effective  fire,  and  the  bullets  sang  about  the  heads 
of  the  enemy,  their  aim  would  have  been  deranged,  and  a  fol- 
lowing line  would  have  reinforced  the  first  with  far  more  in 
hand  than  the  former:  athirdand  fourthmight  follow, at  time 
intervals  of  perhaps  ten  minutes.  Ultimately  the  whole  must 
have  broke  through  to  the  front,  just  as  the  Prussians 
actually  did,«but  the  whole  affair  would  not  have  lasted  fifty 
minutes,  and  the  losses  would  have  boon  correspondingly 
reduced.  The  Prussians  advanced,  offering  a  most  favora- 
ble target — they  were  for  two  hours  under  a  heavy  fire  to 
which  they  could  make  no  effective  reply.  Ultimately  they 
stormed  the  posit  ion,  got  into  the  wildest  confusion,  and  con- 
tinued to  fight  till  long  into  the  night,  losing  men  every  min- 
ute. With  the  old  drill-book,  distance  only  being  altered, 
our  skirmishers  would  have  effectually  prepared  the  way, 
we  should  have  exposed  a  far  less  favorable  taruH .  and  -»een 
under  fire  say  one  hour  against  six.  The  Prussians  lost  30 
per  cent  in  the  whole  day;  would  we,  in  the  assault  carried 
out  as  indicated,  have  lost  10  per  cent,  and,  with  the  old  dis- 
cipline, would  that  have  sufficed  to  stop  us?  I  think  not; 
but  my  readers  can  afford  to  draw  their  own  conclusions. 


VON  MOLTKE'S  WORK. 

We  shall  probably  never  know  the  precise  extent  to 
which  the  credit  for  the  resurrection  of  the  (jorman  nation 
is  to  be  divided  amongst  the  three  great  men  to  whom  it  is 
due.  Probably  the  old  Emperor  has  never  b<  en  and  never 
will  be  sufficiently  recognized  as  the  ultimately  responsible 
individual,  but,  nevertheless,  it  is  certain  that  on  Von  Moltke 
rested  by  far  the  larger  share  of  the  load.  He  was  so  abso- 
lutely trusted  by  his  chief  that,  though  the  responsibility 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  261 

of  actually  signing  the  orders  as  drafted  by  the  chief  of  the 
staff  finally  rested  on  the  King,  the  mere  fact  of  their  being- 
put  in  writing  by  his  staff  officer  decided  the  signature,  and 
the  latter  was  perfectly  aware  that  this  was  so. 

The  difficulty  is  to  find  somevkind  of  a  standard  by  which 
to  judge  him.  The  greatest  characteristic  of  a  successful 
leader  is  primarily  and  undeniably  the  power  of  coming  to  a 
definite  decision  in  face  of  the  most  contradictory  evidence, 
and  staking  the  lives  of  thousands  on  its  correctness,  but  the 
greatness  of  character  evinced  in  so  doing  depends  primarily 
on  the  nature  of  the  man  himself  and  the  absolute  purity  of 
his  motives.  In  the  case  of  a  man  entirely  egotistical,  care- 
less of  human  suffering,  and  playing  only  for  his  own  hand, 
the  decision  of  character  which  sends  thousands  to;  their 
death  and  for  itself  remains  absolutely  unmoved  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  most  appalling  aggregation  of  human  suffering 
the  mind  of  man  can  conceive — Napoleon  at  Aspern  the 
night  before  Wagram,  for  instance — excites  horror  only, 
and  where  the  man  arrives  at  his  decision,  not  in  presence 
of  the  suffering,  but  comfortably  at  his  ease  in  Downing 
Street,  for  instance,  as  our  great  and  good  Mr.  G—  -  has 
done  several  times  in  the  course  of  his  career,  the  horror  is 
changed  only  to  disgust  and  revulsion.  Even  with  the  latter 
the  feeling  of  disgust  may  be  modified,  for,  after  all,  the  man 
may  have  convinced  himself  that  his  decision  was  for  the 
good  of  his  country,  and  was  arrived  at  as  a  matter  of  duty 
only. 

The  Chicago  merchant  wTho  simply  and  solely  for  his  own 
personal  profit  attempts  to  corner  the  grain  market,  and 
thereby  put  up  the  price  of  bread  50  per  cent  in  England, 
probably  would  create,  if  successful,  a  greater  aggregate  of 
suffering  than  Napoleon  or  Gladstone  at  their  worst  have 
ever  done,  but  for  him  no  excuse  is  possible  and  no  respect 
can  be  felt.  We  cannot  respect  the  latter ;  it  is  possible  still 
to  respect  Napoleon,  but  wre  absolutely  must  respect  and 
admire  men  like  our  own  Iron  Duke  and  Von  Moltke,  who, 
in  spite  of  their  extreme  gentleness  and  humaneness  in  ordi- 
nary life,  could  resolve  and  execute  for  duty  only,  even 


262  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

Avhen  tare  to  face  with  the  siilVering  their  resolutions 
entailed. 

All  this  the  critics  of  Von  Myltke  and  his  life  have 
hitherto  missed.  To  them  he  was  more  the  chess-phi yer, 
moving  his  pieces  about  on  the  ground,  hardly  indeed  intel- 
lectually as  great,  for  the  ultimate  combinations  in  war  are 
far  more  simple  and  resolve  themselves  into  three  at  most  — 
to  turn  the  right,  the  left,  or  pierce  the  center — no  more 
difficult  to  choose  the  right  one  than  to  play  the  three  little 
thimbles  and  one  small  pea  of  the  race-course,  and  indeed,  if 
t  he  fate  of  an  empire,  one's  own  life,  and  the  lives  and  happi- 
ness of  thousands  depended  on  the  decision,  the  resolution 
required  to  play  the  latter  would  be  almost  as  great. 

To  my  mind,  the  attitude  of  a  mind  like  Von  Molt  ke's  in 
presence  of  an  impending  battle  has  been  best  described  by 
the  Sanskrit  author  of  the  Khagaved  (Jita,  and  is  contained 
in  the  tirst  and  second  chapters  of  that  book,  to  which  I 
would  refer  my  readers,  not  in  the  original,  but  in  Kdwin 
Arnold's  translation.  For  those  who  have  it  not  at  hand. 
I  add  the  following: 

When  the  two  armies — viz.,  that  of  the  Pandaos  and 
Rajah  Duryodhana — stood  face  io  face  with  each  other. 
Arjnna,  who  appears  to  have  been  commanding  the  forces  of 
the  latter  in  chief,  directed  his  charioteer,  \vh:>  happened 
to  be  Krishna  in  disguise,  to  drive  him  out  into  the  open 
space  between  them  for  a  last  reconnaissance,  and 

"Seeinir  those  opposed. 

Such  kith  .urown  enemies— Arjimjfs  heart 
Melted  with  pity,  while  he  uttered  this." 

I  need  not  quote  his  utterance.  Briefly,  such  thoughts  must 
necessarily  arise  in  the  mind  of  any  thinking  man.  called  on 
to  kill  or  superintend  and  direct  the  killing  of  beings  with 
whom  he  has  no  personal  quarrel.  Finally  he  decided  that 
killing  is  murder,  quite  in  the  style  of  our  peace-at-any-price 
humanitarians,  and  then  Krishna  turns  on  him  with  these 
words,  which  embody  the  whole  conception  of  a  soldier's 
dutv: 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  263 

'Thou  grieves!  where  no  grief  should  be!  thou  speakest 
Words  lacking-  wisdom!  for  the  wise  in  heart 
Mourn  not  for  those  that  live,  nor  those  that  die: 
Nor  I,  nor  thou,  nor  any  one  of  these, 
Ever  was  not,  nor  ever  will  not  be, 
For  ever  and  for  ever  afterwards 
All  that  doth  live,  lives  always!    To  man's  frame, 
As  there  come  infancy  and  youth  and  age 
So  come  there  raisings  up  and  layings  down 
Of  other  and  of  other  life  abodes. 
Which  the  wise  know  and  fear  not.    This  that  irks 
Thy  sense  life,  thrilling  to  the  element, 
Bringing  the  heat  and  cold.  sorroAvs  and  joys, 
'T  is  brief  and  mutable!    Bear  with  it,  Prince, 
As  the  wise  bear.    The  soul  that  is  not  moved, 
The  soul  that  with  a  strong  and  constant  calm 
Takes  sorrow  and  takes  joy  indifferently, 
Lives  in  the  undying!    That  which  is 
Can  never  cease  to  be.     That  which  is  not 
Will  not  exist.    To  sec  This  truth  of  both 
Is  theirs  who  part  essence  from  accident, 
'Substance  from  shadow.    Indestructible. 
Learn  thou!    The  life  is.  spreading  life  through  all. 
It  cannot  anywhere,  by  any  means. 
Be  any  wise  diminished,  stayed,  or  changed. 
But  for  these  fleeting  frames  which  it  informs. 
With  spirit  deathless,  endless,  infinite. 
They  perish.    Let  them  perish.  Prince,  and  fight. 
Tie  who  shall  say.  'Lo!    I  have  killed  a  man!' 
He  who  shall  think.  'Lo!    I  am  slain!'  those  both 
Know  naught!    Life  cannot  slay— Life  is  not  slain. 

*  *  *  * 
1  say  to  thee.  weapons  reach  not  the  Life. 
Flame  burns  it  not.  waters  cannot  o'er  whelm, 
Or  dry  winds  wither  it. 

*  *  *  '  * 
This  Life  within  all  living  things,  my  Prince. 
Hides  beyond  harm:   scorn  thou  to  suffer  then 
For  that,  which  cannot  suffer.    Do  thy  part. 
Be  mindful  of  thy  name,  and  tremble  not: 
Nought  better  can  befall  a  martial  soul 
Than  lawful  war:  happy  the  warrior 

To  whom  comes  joy  of  battle. 


/<*>r    o*  TOT 

prr^^iruifi.STTT1 

i  V   A  *V  x-j>  ,(i  Jr   J 


264  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

But  if  thou  shimn'st 
This  honorable  field— a  Kshattriya. 
If,  knowing  aiy  duty  and  thy  task,  thou  bidd'st 
Duty  and  task  go  by— that  shall  bo  sin! 
And  those  to  conie  shall  speak  thee  infamy. 
From  age  to  age;  but  infamy  is  worse 
For  men  of  noble  birth  to  bear  than  death: 


So  minded,  gird  thee  to  the  fight,  for  so 

Thou  shalt  not  sin!" 

/ 

And,  as  far  as  it  is  possible  to  reconstruct  his  personal 
faith  from  his  action,  the  following  words  seem  to  cover  his. 
case  exactly: 

"No  man  shall  scape  from  act 
By  shunning  action;  nay,  and  none  shall  eome 
By  mere  renouncements  unto  perfectness: 
Nay,  and  no  jot  of  time,  at  any  time 
Rests  any  actionless;  his  nature's  law 
Compels  him,  even  unwilling,  into  act; 
(For  Thought  is  act  in  fancy.)    He  who  sits 
Suppressing  all  the  instruments  of  flesh, 
Yet  in  his  idle  heart  thinking  on  them, 
Plays  the  inept  and  guilty  hypocrite; 
But  he  who,  with  si  rnng  body  serving  mind. 
Gives  up  his  mortal  powers  to  worthy  work 
Not  seeking  gain,  Brjima!    Such  an  one 
Is  honorable.    Do  thine  allotted  task  1 
Work  is  more  excellent  than  idleness. 

*  *  *  * 

Finally,  this  is  better,  that  one  do 

His  own  task  as  lie  may.  even  though  he  fail. 

Than  take  tasks  not  his  own,  though  they  seem  good. 

To  die  performing  duty  is  no  ill: 

But  who  seeks  other  roads  shall  wander  still." 

To  seek,  as  otir  newspaper  writers  have  done,  to  estab- 
lish Von  Moltke's  claim  to  greatness  on  the  ingenuity  he 
showed  in  his  strategical  acts  or  in  his  astounding  knowl- 
edge of  the  elementary  arithmetic  he  required  in  order  to 
solve  the  questions  of  time  and  space  with  which  he  had  to 
deal,  is  merely  to  confess  one's  own  ignorance  of  the  nature 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

of  war,  which  would  not  signify,  and  to  belittle  the  hero  one 
would  praise,  which  does  matter — very  much  indeed. 

The  truth  is,  in  England  the  art  of  war  is  very  dimly 
grasped  as  yet.  It  is  an  art,  not  a  profession  or  a  trade,  and 
the  men  who  have  excelled  in  it  have,  as  a  rule,  been  "artists" 
in  the  highest  sense.  They  have  brought  something  higher 
than  talent  and  industry  to  bear  on  it,  and  have  succeeded 
because  they  possessed  "genius."  But  who  can  understand 
or  explain  in  set  rules  what  genius  accomplishes?  You  may 
found  schools  of  art  criticism,  and  lay  down  hard-and-fast 
conventional  rules,  but  the  true  artist,  whether  painter, 
musician,  or  soldier,  will  walk  through  them. 

Up  to  the  era  of  Napoleon,  war  as  a  science  had  been 
in  the  hands  of  a  limited  clique  in  all  countries.  From  time 
to  time  a  "genius"  arose  amongst  them,  but,  as  a  rule,  the 
genius  himself  had  neither  time  nor  sometimes  education  to 
explain  his  methods,  nor  would  his  followers  have  under- 
stood what  he  meant  had  he  been  able  to  do  so.  His  fol- 
lowers and  disciples  attempted  to  do  so  for  him,  and  as  their 
limited  faculties  were  not  able  to  follow  the  constant  varia- 
tions in  the  many  factors  of  the  complex  problem  with  which 
he  dealt,  they  fixed  their  attention  on  one  of  them  only  and 
eliminated  all  the  rest.  In  this  way  arose  what  one  may 
call  the  chess-board  school  of  strategists,  in  whose  miscon- 
ceptions we  in  England  are  still  deeply  involved.  But, 
under  the  terrible  pressure  which  Napoleon's  occupation 
brought  to  bear  on  Germany,  the  highest  intellects  were 
forced  to  bring  their  minds  to  bear  on  the  problem.  Philos- 
ophy in  Germany  was  just  then  at  its  zenith,  and  Kant,Fichte, 
and  Hegel  were  founding  what,  I  think  I  am  correct  in  stat- 
ing, has  since  been  the  most  prolific  and  important  school  of 
modern  thought.  This  philosophy  was  taught  in  the  origi- 
nal (i.  e.,  pre-Jena)  Kriegs-Akademie  (or  Staff  College)  at 
Berlin,  and  Clausewitz  was  one  of  Kant's  best  pupils. 
Whether  Scharnhorst  ever  gave  much  time  to  the  subject  I 
have  been  unable  to  discover,  but  he  supplied  Clausewitz 
with  an  immense  amount  of  practical  data  in  addition  to 
what  the  latter  could  himself  contribute,  and,  after  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war  for  freedom'  in  1815,  Clausewitz  sat  him- 

18 


266  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

self  down  to  study  and  elaborate  a  system  of  war  ethics,  if 
such  a  term  be  permissible,  in  which  was  invest  igated  for  1  he 
first  time  the  action  and  reaction  of  the  many  constantly 
varying  factors  on  which  success  in  war  ultimately  depends, 
and  in  so  doing  first  made  clear  wherein  the  great  talent  of 
a  leader  actually  lay.  The  old-fashioned  school  of  writers, 
by  eliminating  all  factors  but  one,  brought  down  the  concep- 
tion of  a  commander's  intellectual  achievements  to  the  low- 
est possible  level.  Clausewitz  raised  it  to  its  highest,  and 
the  wrhole  result  of  his  system  is  finally  concentrated  in  his 
well-known  phrase,  "In  war  everything  is  simple,  but  to 
secure  this  simplicity  is  difficult."  Speaking  generally,  and 
apart  from  the  education  of  his  own  will-power  on  the  lines 
already  indicated  in  the  extracts  from  the  Hhagaved  (lit a 
quoted  above.  Von  Moltke's  great  work  in  the  Prussian 
Army  was  the  reduction  of  everything  connected  with  war 
to  the  condition  of  simplicity  1o  which  Clausewit/'s  saying 
referred.  Instead  of  eliminating  the  factors  of  danger,  pri- 
vation, fatigue,  etc..  in  which  warlike  action  has  its  being, 
from  his  mental  field  of  vision,  by  simply  ignoring  them,  as 
Hamley  does,  he  accepted  them  as  concrete  facts  to  be  dealt 
with,  and  devoted  his  whole  energy  to  reducing  them  to  the 
lowest  possible  level  by  careful  organization.  Like  a  care- 
ful mechanical  engineer,  he  reduced  the  friction  in  the  mov- 
ing parts  of  the  great  machine  to  its  lowest  possible  limit, 
and  then  went  a  step  beyond  what  the  engineer  can  do.  and 
by  the  creation  of  a  specially  trained  stall'  made  the  machine 
into  a  sentient  organism  which  under  normal  conditions 
could  work  itself.  The  present  German  Army  mobilized 
for  war,  and  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  can  best  be  compared 
to  a  gigantic  octopus.  Let  the  prey  once  come  within  reach 
of  its  feelers,  and  the  whole  organism  settles  to  work,  and, 
unless  choked  off  by  superior  orders,  does  not  desist  till  its 
utmost  fighting  power  has  been  brought  to  bear.  The  life 
blood,  which  animates  the  whole,  which  causes  it  tr>  perform 
this  purely  animal  function,  is  the  system  of  delegated  re- 
sponsibility which  entails  on  each  link  in  its  constitution  the 
obligation  of  acting  on  its  own  judgment.  When  the  com- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  267 

mander-in-chief ,  through  the  medium  of  his  staff,  interposes, 
its  action  ceases  to  be  automatic  and  becomes  intelligent. 

In  this  respect,  thanks  to  Von  Moltke,  the  German  Army 
is  far  ahead  of  any  other  in  the  world.  Probably  we  come 
next,  but  if  we  do,  it  is  in  spite  of,  and  not  by  means  of,  our 
traditional  system.  France  and  Eussia  are  still  far  behind 
in  the  race.  But  if  under  this  head  less  than  justice  has 
been  done  to  him  by  our  English  critics,  this  is  even  more 
the  case  with  regard  to  his  actual  achievements  in  the  field, 
for  they  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  neither  in  1866  nor 
1870  was  his  work  completed,  but  really  only  just  begun.  It 
takes  time  to  carry  through  such  a  vast  plan  of  reorgani- 
zation, and  in  1866  it  was  only  just  beginning.  The  higher 
commands  up  to  and  including  the  divisions  were  filled  by 
selected  men,  but  below  these  grades  it  had  not  been  possi- 
ble to  find  a  sufficient  number  of  really  trained  men  for  the 
posts ;  for  those  who  had  entered  the  army  during  and  about 
the  thirties  had  grown  up  in  the  old  school,  and  were  too  old 
to  be  taught  new  lessons.  Military  service  was  a  very  differ- 
ent thing  then  to  what  it  has  since  become,  and  the  slowness 
of  promotion  and  want  of  all  interest  in  life,  particularly  in 
the  smaller  garrisons,  could  not  have  been  without  their 
effect.  The  cavalry  was  at  a  very  low  ebb;  by  the  confes- 
sion of  its  own  men,  it  could  not  even  ride,  and  as  for  scout- 
ing duties,  of  them  it  knew  little,  if  anything;  in  fact,  as  a 
general  rule,  it  moved  behind,  and  not  in  front  of,  its  army. 
The  artillery  was  only  partially  armed  with  rifled  guns,  and 
did  not  know  how  to  use  these,  and  the  infantry  had  only  the 
breech-loader,  as  then  untried,  to  rely  on ;  and  were  almost 
entirely  without  war  experience;  and  this  army  was  to  be 
pitted  against  a  thoroughly  war-seasoned  one  writh  an  ad- 
mirable artillery,  and  a  caAralry  in  many  respects  superior  to 
anything  in  Europe  to-day — numerically,  too,  almost  equal 
to  its  opponent.  But  its  organization  was  that  of  a  machine, 
and  its  principles  of  strategy  those  of  the  old  school;  and 
Von  Moltke  staked  everything  on  his  estimate  of  the  hopeless 
slowness  which  must  result,  and  the  want  of  co-operation 
certain  to  exist  between  the  officers  in  high  command,  from 
the  attempt  to  lead  a  force  of  its  numerical  magnitude  on 


268  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

the  old  lines  of  over-centralization.  How  far  he  counted 
on  the  breech-loader  it  is  impossible  to  say;  no  doubt  it  went 
for  vefy  much,  but  the  essence  of  his  strategy  was  based 
without  question  on  the  superior  mobility  Which  his  higher 
organization  promised  him.  He  won,  and  ever  since  critics 
of  the  old  school  have  been  endeavoring  to  prove  that,  ac- 
cording to  all  rules  of  the  game,  he  ought  to  have  failed,  not 
recognizing  that  he  had  changed  these  rules. 

Even  in  1870  his  work  was  still  far  short  of  completion. 
The  staff  was  nearly  perfect ;  the  leaders  of  the  higher  grades 
in  the  infantry  much  improved,  both  by  experience  and  selec- 
tion; the  cavalry  understood  its  role  as  a  covering  force, 
though  it  had  forgotten  its  duty  on  the  battle-field;  the  artil- 
lery had  improved  enormously,  but  the  infantry  were  at  an 
enormous  disadvantage  as  regards  their  armament,  and 
were  deficient  in  length  of  service  and  war  experience  to 
those  they  w^ere  about  to  meet.  Besides,  a  point  generally 
overlooked,  the  new  armament  and  the  extended-order 
method  of  employing  it  suited  the  French  nature  far  more 
than  that  of  the  German,  for  it  was  they  who  first  brought 
it  into  vogue  in  Europe,  and  for  three-quarters  of  a  century 
it  had  been  traditional  with  them. 

To  the  ordinary  student  of  the  war,  who  goes  only  by 
the  printed  official  accounts,  and  is  unable  to  read  between 
the  lines  for  want  of  the  key,  which  can  only  be  obtained 
from  the  actors  and  eye-witnesses  of  the  scenes  described, 
everything  appears  to  have  gone  like  clockwork;  and  to  a 
certain  extent  it  did,  but  at  a  cost  of  enormous  friction,  due 
to  inexperience  of  what  was  before  them.  The  outposts  en- 
countered the  enemy,  and  automatically  every  unit  within 
reach  closed  in  and  surrounded  him;  the  organization  was 
so  simple  that  even  the  grossest  blunders  could  not  cause  it 
to  fail  ultimately,  however  bloody  local  repulses  may  have 
been.  What  really  strained  the  mental  endurance  of  Von 
Moltke  was  not  the  intellectual  effort  needed  to  decide  which 
flank  of  the  enemy  to  turn,  but  the  knowledge  of  the  weak- 
ness of  many  of  the  links  to  wThich  he  was  compelled  to  trust, 
and  what  we  should  admire  in  him  was  the  strength  of  char- 
acter which  assumed  the  responsibility  with  full  knowledge 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

of  the  risks  he  ran.  His  conduct  of  the  campaign  would 
have  been  impossible  to  a  leader,  directing  similar  numbers, 
but  who  had  not  previously  by  organization  and  training 
eliminated  the  chief  causes  of  friction  in  the  execution  of 
his  orders.  Even  Napoleon  could  not  have  handled  such  an 
army,  for  the  reason  that  he  had  neither  staff  nor  corps  com- 
manders to  do  it  with,  and  it  is  in  this  point  that  the  true 
bearing  of  Von  Moltke's  life  on  the  conduct  of  war  is  most 
conspicuous,  for  he  has  made  of  it  an  art  impossible  for  any 
hastily  organized  forces  to  undertake  with  success,  even  if 
commanded  by  men  of  undoubted  courage  and  personal  ex- 
perience, but  not  trained  to  act  together  in  the  same  school 
on  sound  principles.  But  as  yet  this  lesson  has  not  even 
been  perceived  out  of  his  own  country,  and  nations  are  still 
preparing  to  go  to  war  with  one  another  under  conditions 
which  render  the  very  vastness  of  their  numbers  an  addi- 
tional drawback  to  them. 

How  the  German  armies  would  have  worked  in  the  next 
campaign  had  it  been  possible  for  them  to  be  commanded  by 
Von  Moltke  himself,  in  the  full  vigor  of  his  intellect,  can  be 
only  matter  of  conjecture;  but,  from  the  war  till  his  retire- 
ment, it  had  made  enormous  strides,  and  he  would  have  had 
a  very  different  weapon  to  handle  from  what  he  ever  had 
before.  But,  even  as  it  is,  the  main  portion  of  his  work  re- 
mains, and  the  leading  of  large  bodies  is  now  so  simplified  in 
that  country  that  no  leader  of  moderate  ability  and  resolu- 
tion can  well  go  wrong  with  it.  The  attention  of  the  world 
has  been  so  exclusively  directed  to  the  more  visible  changes 
which  have  taken  place  in  the  armament  and  the  training  of 
the  troops  themselves  that  the  silent  and  secret  labors  of  the 
general  staff  have  passed  unnoticed,  and  it  is  quite  clear 
from  the  recent  writings  and  utterances  of  some  of  the  lead- 
ing French  and  Russian  generals  that  the  very  outline  of 
the  idea  has  barely  dawned  on  them;  and,  unfortunately, 
things  are  not  much  better  in  our  own  case. 


270  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

THE    SPIRIT    OF    THE    NEW    GERMAN    INFANTRY 
REGULATIONS. 

I  have  received  from  Berlin,  accompanied  by  the  wann- 
est recommendations,  a  copy  of  a  short  pamphlet  by  a 
Captain  Moller,  of  the  German  Infantry,  containing  an  ad- 
mirable study  of  their  new  regulations  for  the  training  of 
infantry  and  the  spirit  in  which  these  regulations  are  to  be 
interpreted.  To  those  in  our  own  service  wrho  wTish  to  under- 
stand the  method  pursued  in  the  making  of  their  soldiers 
in  Germany  such  a  study  is  peculiarly  valuable,  because  the 
regulations  are  so  short,  and  so  very  general  in  the  terms 
and  expressions  used,  that  it  would  be  possible  to  put  any 
construction  one  liked  on  them  to  suit  one's  particular  fads. 
and  hence  one  is  liable  to  think  one  has  found  something 
entirely  in  harmony  with  one's  own  idea,  when  it  is  really 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  spirit  in  which  the  phrase  or 
paragraph  is  actually  interpreted  in  the  German  Army. 
This  sort  of  misfortune  has  overtaken  a  great  many  of 
our  Volunteer  colonels  and  tactical  nostrum-mongers  in 
England. 

The  three  booklets  which  contain  all  that  is  necessary 
for  the  instruction  of  the  complete  German  soldier  of  what- 
ever rank  within  the  battalion  are  the  "Exercir  Reglement," 
the  "Schiesz  Vorschrift,"  and  the  "Feld  Dienst  Ordnung," 
the  first  and  last  corresponding  to  our  "Field  Exercises,"  and 
the  second  to  our  "Musketry  Regulation" ;  and  to  get  a  com- 
plete grasp  of  the  subject  it  is  necessary  to  study  the  three 
together  and  discover  how  each  fits  into  and  supplements 
the  other,  which  is  difficult  enough  for  even  a  German  officer 
and  almost  impossible  without  guidance  for  a  foreigner. 
It  is  this  task  which  the  writer  has  undertaken  to  execute ; 
and,  in  the  opinion  of  German  officers  likely  to  knowT,  he  has 
made  a  brilliant  success  of  it. 

His  first  task  is  to  define  distinctly  the  sphere  of  action 
of  the  company  commander : 

"The  company  is  now  for  all  tactical  purposes  what  the 
battalion  formerly  was  (and  still  is  in  England):  a  body  of 
men  drilled  under  fire  by  the  verbal  command  of  its  com- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

maiiding  officer.  Nowadays  the  latter  only^ssu^^&tHfc 
company  leader  the  duty  to  be  caiejiedlp^l^akd  leaves  k)LhimQ^$l] 
the  choice  of  the  words  of  commami  and  tJ^driJ^na)S:mranoy 
which  this  duty  is  to  be  performed  ;\JjlV4tnen  the  company 
is  acting  as  part  of  the  battalion,  the  company  com- 
mander is  responsible  that  its  action  is  subordinated  to 
that  of  the  remaining  companies.  He  has  therefore  not  only 
to  keep  his  attention  on  his  own  command,  but  to  see  what 
other  companies  are  doing  on  either  side  of  him,  and  to 
bring  his  own  movements  into  harmony  with  theirs ;  and  he 
must  always  remember  that  neglect  or  delay  to  act  on  his 
own  responsibility  will  be  a  heavier  aspersion  upon  hi& 
character  as  a  soldier  than  a  mistake  in  the  choice  of  the 
method  in  which  to  act;  and  the  conclusion  of  a  fight  or 
exercise  must  always  find  him  and  his  company  in  the  right 
place,  even  when  no  further  orders  have  reached  him  during' 
its  course." 

"The  independence  accorded  him  within  these  limits 
may  under  no  circumstances  be  taken  from  him,  for  'the 
independence  of  all  subordinate  leaders  (in  the  choice  of 
means  implied)  is  the  foundation  of  all  great  results  in  war.-' 
(Exercir  Eeglement  54,  Sec.  3.)  The  obvious  danger  to  be 
guarded  against  here  is  lest  the  company  leader,  in  conse- 
quence of  a  want  of  tactical  intelligence,  fails  to  grasp  the 
scope  of  the  movement  as  a  whole,  and  so  passes  out  of 'the 
hand  of  the  battalion  commander." 

"On  the  other  hand,  just  as  it  is  his  own  duty  to  avoid 
this  pitfall,  the  company  commander  must  check  any  tendency 
on  the  part  of  his  subordinates  to  get  out  of  hand.  It  is  his 
duty  to  keep  his  command  firm  within  his  own  grasp." 

"In  order  to  carr}r  out  this  part  of  his  duty,  he  must 
choose  his  position  with  judgment.  If  the  company  is  fight- 
ing alone,  he  will  generally  be  able  to  direct  its  action  best 
from  the  supports;  where,  however,  he  is  acting  as  part  of 
the  battalion  or  larger  command,  he  will,  as  a  rule,  be  better 
in  the  fighting  line." 

"His  instructions  to  his  subordinates  will  be  given  in 
the  form  of  orders,  short  and  clear,  and  he  must  specially 
guard  against  ordering  more  than  he  must  or  than  he  can." 


212  Military  Letters  and  Essays 

"Above  all  things,  he  must  strive  to  keep  the  flre-eft'ect 
of  his  three  <zugs'  in  his  own  hands.  Just  as  the  commander 
of  an  artillery  'abtheilung'  (brigade  division)  disposes  of  the 
fire  of  his  batteries,  just  so  must  the  company  commander 
be  able  to  control  the  fire-action  of  his  three  'zugs/  either 
concentrating  their  whole  power  on  one  point  of  the  enemy's 
line,  or  occupying  the  enemy  along  the  whole  of  his  front 
with  the  fire  of  one  'zug'  while  the  other  two  concentrate 
the  whole  of  their  power  on  some  other  target  which  may  for 
the  moment  appear  to  be  tactically  more  important." 

"Of  course,  this  fire-control  is  only  possible  in  the  intro- 
ductory stages  of  an  action,  but  the  better  the  captain  under- 
stands his  work,  the  longer  will  he  be  able  to  maintain  his 
control.  But  even  when  the  course  of  the  fight  has  deprived 
him  of  this  power,  his  influence  on  the  course  of  the  action  is 
far  from  exhausted.  It  is  his  duty  to  arrange  with  all  avail- 
able means  at  his  disposal  for  the  supply  of  ammunition  to 
the  fighting  line;  he  must  act  as  a  directing  link  in  the  chain 
of  command  between  the  superior  leaders  in  rear  and  ihe 
fighting  line,  whose  attention  is  necessarily  exclusively  di- 
rected towards  the  front  only,' and  see  that  the'  three  'zugs' 
act  in  harmony  with  the  troops  on  either  flank;  and,  MS  far 
as  lies  in  his  power,  mu^t  make  his  greater  experience  and 
better-trained  tactical  knowledge  tell  in  the  conduct  of  the 
fight,  particularly  when,  as  must  often  happen,  his  subordi- 
nates are  reserve  officers  or  even  only  non-commissioned 
officers*" 

"Finally,  he  must  ever  remember  that  it  is  both  his  duty, 
and  especially  lies  in  his  power,  to  impress  on  the  whole  of 
his  command  the  stamp  of  his  own  individuality;  and  that 
his  personal  bearing  and  example  has  more  influence  in 
determining  the  result  of  a.  fight  than  that  of  any  other  officer 
in  the  whole  militarv  hierarch  v." 


The  "Zug"  Leader — /.  r.,  the  tivlxiUcrn 

The  "zug,"  which  corresponds  most  nearly  with  our 
half-company,  is  the  smallest  body  commanded  by  a  commis- 
sioned officer,  and  it  is  his  duty  to  keep  his  "zug"  thoroughly 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  273 

in  hand,  even  in  the  most  difficult  conditions  of  ground,  and 
under  the  disintegrating  influences  of  the  combat.  His 
example,  therefore,  is  of  the  utmost  importance. 

His  most  difficult  duty  is  the  maintenance  of  fire-disci- 
pline. The  "zug"  is  the  ultimate  fire-unit,  Hot  the  group  or 
half -section,  for  it  alone  possesses  the  requisite  fire-power 
to  obtain  a  perceptible  effect  against  all  the  ordinary  targets 
likely  to  present  themselves  in  war.  Every  man  in  it  is 
directly  under  the  hand  of  the  leader,  for  the  group  leaders 
are  only  his  assistants,  and  he  should  be  allowed  as  much 
independence  in  the  exercise  of  his  power  as  the  captain  can 
grant  him,  taking  into  account  his  length  of  service  and 
personal  qualifications. 

He  must  thoroughly  understand  the  amount  of  fire-power 
at  his  disposal  and  its  suitable  application.  The  control 
of  this  power  is  not  a  science,  to  be  learnt  from  the  regula- 
tions, but  rather  an  art,  which  by  practice  can  be  developed 
in  an  extraordinary  degree.  There  is  all  the  difference  in 
this  respect  between  a  good  and  a  bad  "zug"  leader,  as  be- 
tween an  average  band  sergeant  and  the  leader  of  a  crack 
orchestra;  and  a  good  leader  will  have  his  fire  so  completely 
in  hand  that  he  can  regulate  it  from  the  slowest  and  most 
deliberate  dropping  fire  to  the  full  crash  of  rapid  independ- 
ent fire;  and  at  the  same  time  be  able  to  change  it  from  one 
objective  to  another,  as  may  become  necessary. 

But  even  apart  from  this  fire-control,  his  responsibility 
is  still  a  very  great  one.  When  the  first  extension  takes 
place,  he  receives  his  orders  from  the  captain,  but  as  the 
fight  progresses,  both  time  and  means  often  fail  the  latter 
to  communicate  his  further  intentions,  and  then  he  must  act 
on  his  own  initiative  in  choosing  the  proper  forms  to  suit 
the  momentary  circumstances;  remembering  always  that 
"any  delay  or  failure  to  act  will  reflect  on  his  character  more 
than  a  mistake  in  the  choice  of  the  method  employed." 

He  is  responsible  also  that  in  each  rush  his  men  are 
halted  in  the  most  suitable  position  within  the  limits  as- 
signed him,  first,  so  as  to  make  the  fullest  use  of  his  fire ;  and 
secondly,  to  be  as  little  exposed  as  possible.  If  he  finds  him- 
self on  ground  on  which  he  can  no  longer  act,  he  closes  his 


274  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

command  himself  and  joins  the  rest  of  the  company  ;  and  in 
any  case,  the  close  of  the  movement  must  find  his  "zug"  in 
^he  right  place  and  front,  whether  in  close  or  in  open  order. 

The  "group  leaders"  are  not  link's  in  the  chain  between 
the  "zug"  leader  and  his  men,  but  only  assistants  to  help 
him  to  control  them;  orders  only  pass  through  them  when 
the  sound  of  the  firing  overpowers  the  leader's  voice.  He 
(the  group  leader)  controls  the  position  of  every  man  under 
him,  and  sees  that  all  orders  with  regard  to  sights,  object  to 
be  fired  at,  etc.,  are  carried  out,  and  if  the  fire  becomes  too 
hasty,  he  takes  steps  to  put  a  stop  to  it.  He  regulates  the 
distribution  of  ammunition  brought  up  from  the  rear,  coin^ 
municates  the  range  to  any  other  group  arriving  on  his  flank, 
and  if  another  becomes  doubled  up,  on  reinforceing,  with  his 
own,  he  redivides  the  two  into  fresh  con imands,  with  the 
leader  of  the  reinforcement,  without  waiting  for  orders  from 
his  superior. 

Just  as  the  "zug''  leader  is  bound  not  to  let  any  oppor- 
tunity pass  of  taking  advantage  of  any  mistake  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  and  yet  is  held  responsible  that  he  does  not 
pass  out  of  the  hands  of  the  captain,  so  also  is  the  group 
leader  responsible  in  both!  directions  to  his  "zug"  leader, 
and  the  close  of  any  maneuver  or  fight  must  find  him  in  his 
right  place,  with  reference  to  the  rest  of  the  "zug." 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  position  of  the  group  leader 
is  very  different  from  that  held  by  him  in  most  armies,  our 
own  included,  in  which  he  is  supposed  to  command  the 
men  of  his  section  or  squad,  and  not  merely  to  act  as  an 
assistant  to  the  lieutenant  in  command,  and  the  reason  above 
given  will,  on  examination,  I  think,  commend  itself  as  a 
sound  one. 

Besides  the  group  leaders,  each  section  is  supplied  with 
two  or  three  picked  judges  of  distance,  who  are  specially 
selected  and  trained,  and  has  also  from  four  to  six  men 
specially  selected  to  act  as  scouts  on  the  battle-field;  and 
further,  a  special  non-commissioned  officer  to  act  as  serrefile, 
to  follow  the  line  in  action  and  see  that  no  straggling  takes 
place. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  275 

Extended  Order. 

"Troops  principally  fight  in  this  order;  the  action  is. 
commenced  in  this  form,  and  in  most  cases  carried  through 
to  the  decision  in  it."  (Exercir  Regleinent  II.,  Sec.  19.)  The 
difficulty  of  leading  troops  when  extended  varies  with  the 
nature  of  the  ground,  the  cover  it  does  or  does  not  afford, 
the  noise,  and  other  demoralizing  influences  of  the  fight. 
The  actual  value  of  a  body  of  troops — i.  e.,  the  degree  of  edu- 
cation the  soldiers  have  received  and  their  discipline — can 
therefore  be  best  judged  by  seeing  them  in  extended  order; 
for  since  they  are  then  withdrawn  from  the  immediate  super- 
vision of  their  leaders,  greater  demands  are  made  on  their 
own  individual  judgment  and  intelligence.  But  though  con- 
siderable freedom  and  independence  must  thus  be  left  to  the 
individual,  still  he  must  be  distinctly  given  to  understand 
that,  as  long  as  his  leaders  can  make  their  influence  felt,  he 
is  bound  to  the  strictest  obedience,  and  may  only  take  the 
law  into  his  own  hands  when  the  leaders  are  no  longer  there 
to  give  him  orders.  "The  strictest  discipline  is  even  more 
essential  in  extended  order  than  in  close" ;  and  it  is  no  longer 
the  dashing  enterprise  of  the  individual,  which  was  formerly 
the  special  mark  of  good  skirmishing,  but  the  resolute  stead- 
fastness of  all  resting  on  a  strong  sense  of  duty  as  a  founda- 
tion, which  is  decisive.  This  sense  of  duty  is  stronger  than 
fear  of  punishment,  and  lasts  longer  in  presence  of  danger. 
It  can  principally  be  developed  in  the  men  by  the  thorough 
education  of  the  individual,  and  by  the  maintenance  of  ex- 
treme smartness  in  the  execution  of  all  commands,  not  only 
on  the  drill-ground,  but  in  field  maneuvers  also.  This  does 
not,  of  course,  mean  that  these  maneuvers  are  always  to  be 
carried  out  at  attention ;  on  the  contrary,  the  Germans  are 
very  particular  to  spare  their  men  all  unnecessary  exertion, 
only  calling  them  to  "attention"  for  movements  which  have 
to  be  made  under  the  enemy's  fire ;  but  they  demand,  never- 
theless, that,  when  a  word  of  command  is  given,  it  shall  be 
obeyed  with  the  utmost  rapidity  and  precision.  For  in- 
stance, one  may  meet  a  company  shuffling  along  the  road, 
smoking,  laughing,  and  joking,  as  it  executes  some  portion 
of  a  large  change  of  front,  but  when  it  reaches  its  ground. 


276  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

and  receives  the  commands  to  halt,  order  arms,  lie  or  kneel 
down,  each  one  is  obeyed  with  the  same  instantaneous  pre- 
cision with  which  it  would  be  done  on  an  inspection  parade. 
At  least  as  much  attention  should  be  given  to  securing 
the  exact  and  punctual  obedience  of  all  movements  and 
orders  required  for  the  maintenance  of  fire-discipline  and 
the  advance  under  fire  as  is  devoted  to  the  smart  execution 
of  the  manual.  Such  movements  are  rapid  loading,  fixing 
the  sights  at  the  correct  elevation,  fixing  side-arms,  particu- 
larly when  lying  down.  The  instantaneous  obedience  to  the 
command  "Rise!"  previous  to  an  advance  should  be  partic- 
ularly insisted  on,  so  that  even  under  fire  it  may  be  obeyed 
mechanically;  similarly  also  the  greatest  care  should  be 
devoted  to  seeing  that  the  individual  men  learn  how  to  direct 
their  fire  to  both  right  and  left,  so  that  it  may  be  concen- 
trated on  any  particular  point  as  desired,  and  finally  the  im- 
mediate cessation  of  all  fire  on  the  sound  of  the  whistle. 
Smart  execution  of  these  things  can  only  be  obtained  by 
officers  who  know7  how  to  command  smartly,  and  sleepy  or 
drawly  words  of  command  will  only  be  obeyed  in  a  sleepy 
and  slovenly  fashion. 

Movements  of  the  Fighting  JAnc. 

The  great  difficulties  connected  with  the  movement  of 
long  lines  of  men  in  extended  order  demand  that  this  subject 
should!  be  particularly  practised  in  peace-time,  under  all 
sorts  of  varying  conditions.  The  greater  the  extent  of  the 
line,  the  less  attention  can  be  paid  to  the  cover  of  the  individ- 
uals, as  soon  as  this  consideration  clashes  with  the  unity  and 
maintenance  of  direction  by  the  whole.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  large  bodies  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  superior  leading 
to  choose  a  line  of  advance  which  will  afford  as  much  COV<T 
as  possible  for  its  troops. 

In  the  advance  the  "zug"  and  group  leaders  march  in 
front,  the  center  group  leader  being  responsible  for  the  direc- 
tion, unless  otherwise  ordered,  and  the  remainder  judging 
their  intervals  froni  him.  When  the  line  halts  to  open  fire, 
each  section  and  group  is  not  bound  to  halt  on  the  spot  it 
occupies  at  the  moment,  but  may  run  forward  a  few  yards 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  277 

if  by  so  doing  it  obtains  a  better  field  of  fire  than  it  other- 
wise would,  without,  however,  interfering  with  its  neighbors 
alongside.  (It  is  obvious  that  to  conform  to  both  these  con- 
ditions a  very  high  degree  of  training,  and  even  of  talent, 
is  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  group  leaders.)  The  position 
of  the  following  support  depends  primarily  on  its  being  able 
always  to  reinforce  at  the  right  time.  As  the  fighting  line 
closes  on  the  enmy,  the  necessity  for  prompt  reinforcement 
becomes  greater,  and  hence  the  support  must  be  nearer. 
Similarly  the  more  obstinate  the  fight,  the  greater  becomes 
the  urgency  for  backing  up  the  fighting  line.  But  in  both 
cases  proximity  to  the  fighting  line  entails  heavier  loss,  and 
the  problem  is  to  balance  the  two,  bearing  in  mind  that  the 
infliction  of  injury  on  the  enemy,  and  not  the  avoidance  of 
loss,  is  the  primary  consideration. 

The  support  may  join  the  fighting  line  either  on  the 
flanks  or  directly  from  the  rear,  by  doubling  up  with  the  men 
already  there.  The  former  has  the  advantage  of  keeping 
the  sections  distinct,  but  is  rarely  possible  where  the  com- 
pany is  acting  with  others,  and  the  latter  has  distinctly  the 
advantage  of  acting  as  a  stimulus  and  encouragement  to  the 
men  already  in  the  front  line.  In  this  case  the  group  leaders 
must  re-divide  the  line  between  them,  without  waiting  for 
any  commands. 

As  regards  formation :  any  formation  may  be  employed 
w7hich  tends  to  diminish  loss  without,  however,  detracting 
from  its  unity  and  handiness — in  open  ground  line  will  be 
the  most  suitable;  in  undulating  or  intersected  ground  some 
form  of  column — and  it  will  move  so  as  to  occupy  always 
a  relatively  correct  position  with  reference  to  the  fighting 
line — i.  e.,  it  is  not  bound  to  conform  strictly  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  latter,  but  may,  within  the  limits  fixed  for  it 
by  neighboring  troops  and  the  necessity  of  conforming  to 
the  above-mentioned  conditions  with  regard  to  distance, 
choose  its  own  time  and  way  of  carrying  out  its  duties.  As 
a  general  rule,  it  will  move  in  quick  time  and  strictly  at 
"attention";  it  may,  however,  be  compelled  to  move  at  the 
"double." 


278  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

The  Control  of  the  Fire  of  the  Fighting  Line. 

The  order  to  open  fire,  by  the  "zug"  leader,  must  convey 
the  following  information  —  viz.,  the  direction  of  the  object 
to  be  fired  at,  the  particular  portion  of  the  object  to  be  la  km 
under  tire,  the  elevation,  and  finally,  the  nature  of  the  fire 
•*X)  be  employed  —  thus: 

Half  left  on  the  low  hill  —  artillery  two  right-hand  guns 
-at  1,000  yards,  ready,  etc. 

The  choice  of  the  object  is  a  very  important  point,  which 
usually  has  to  be  decided  by  the  section  leader  on  his  own 
responsibility.  A  company  in  fire  will  usually  be  a  more 
important  body  for  the  time  than  a  distant  battery,  and  an 
advancing  line  of  skirmishers  better  deserving  of  attention 
than  the  support  following  them.  Where  several  targets 
are  all  equally  important,  the  best  plan  is  to  choose  the  deep 
<est  and  densest;  and  against  skirmishers,  to  direct  the  fire 
at  that  portion  of  the  line  behind  which  advancing  supports 
are  observed;  and  when  lire  has  been  opened  against  any  par- 
ticular object,  it  should  be  continued  till  that  object  has  been 
destroyed. 


Volli'i/N  nr  f  ii<lrjH')i</<'iit  Fire. 

The  nature  of  the  fire  employed  will  vary  with  the  tar- 
gets and  the  conditions  under  which  these  expose  themselves. 
The  volley  is,  of  course,  excluded  as  soon  as  the  noise  of  the 
firing  on  either  flank,  or  the  heaviness  of  the  enemy's  lire. 
renders  it  doubtful  whether  the  executive  word  can  be  either 
heard  or  obeyed,  and  this  will  generally  be  the  case.  C'mi- 
sequently  it  can  only  be  used  in  the  introductory  phases  of 
an  action,  to  obtain  the  correct  range,  or  against  cavalry,  or 
in  ambuscades.  Otherwise  independent  fire  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred, as  it  allowrs  of  better  aiming  and  consequently  more 
hits.  Independent  fire  may  be  either  slow,  brisk,  or  rapid; 
brisk  and,  still  more,  rapid  firing  leads  only  too  often  to  badly 
aimed  fire.  This  want  of  fire-discipline1  can  only  be  kept 
in  check  by  continual  practice  and  the  greatest  strictness  of 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  It  is  not  the  number 
of  shots  fired,  but  the  number  of  hits,  which  decides.  But 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  279 

though  a  steady,  well-aimed  fire  generally  obtains  a  better 
percentage  of  hits,  it  does  not  follow  that  a  slow  fire  is 
always  to  be  preferred  to  a  rapid  one;  that  would  be  to  mis- 
take altogether  the  nature  of  the  advantage  conferred  on  us 
by  the  new  rapid-firing  arm.  Except  when  the  necessity 
exists  of  saving  ammunition,  or  where  one  is  particularly 
well  covered  from  the  enemy's  fire,  a  slow  rate  of  fire  can 
only  be  blamed,  for  though  a  higher  percentage  of  hits  may 
be  obtained  by  this  means,  it  takes  very  much  longer  to  do 
so,  and  consequently  entails  heavier  losses  on  one's  own 
side;  for  instance,  if  a  line  of  skirmishers  advancing  across 
the  open  against  a  line  of  well-covered  defenders  went  in 
for  slow  fire  only,  it  would  suffer  a  double  drawback — viz., 
heavier  losses  and  develop  less  fire-power  than  its  adver- 
sary, who  would,  therefore,  soon  obtain  the  fire-superiority; 
and  that,  too,  even  if  the  assailant  was  originally  numer- 
ically stronger,  for  in  that  case,  his  men  being  more  closely 
packed  in  the  fighting  line,  they  would  be  easier  to  hit. 
Hence  it  follows  that,  as  a  principle,  in  action,  one  should 
shoot  as  rapidly  as  possible  consistently  with  careful  aiming, 
and  if  an  access  of  fire-power  is  suddenly  required  at  any  por- 
tion of  the  line,  it  should  be  developed  by  bringing  fresh 
rifles  into  the  fighting  line,  and  not  by  increasing  the  rate 
of  fire.  It  is  very  difficult  to  hit  the  right  mean  between  an 
overcareful  husbanding  of  ammunition  and  its  reckless  ex- 
penditure— niggardliness  at  the  wrong  time  may  entail  de- 
feat, whereas  the  opposite  course  may  of  itself  suffice  to 
bring  about  a  fortunate  decision ;  the  best  practical  rule  to 
follow  is  to  reserve  one's  fire  as  long  as  possible,  and  then 
to  confine  its  greatest  rapidity  to  those  moments  in  which 
the  targets  exposed  offer  the  most  favorable  chances  of  ob- 
taining a  high  percentage  of  hits. 


Th(    OlwrrutJoii    of    the    Fire-Effect. 

The  chief  advantage  derived  from  the  introduction  of 
the  smokeless  powder  has  been  to  facilitate  the  observation 
of  the  fire-effect.  Before,  this  was  generally  impossible; 
now,  however,  with  good  field-glasses,  the  effect  of  the  bul- 


280  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

lets  striking  either  on  the  ground  in  front  or  amongst  the 
enemy  can  be  seen  at  great  distances,  and  the  lire  of  a  sec- 
tion "ranged,"  except  under  very  unfavorable  conditions^ 
almost  as  well  as  a  battery.  (This  is  the  author's  view,  not 
mine;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  even  writh  the  old 
black  powder,  it  very  often  was  possible  to  find  the  range 
from  trial  volleys;  and  without  the  smoke  to  interfere  with 
the  operation,  it  must  obviously  be  far  more  easy  now7  than 
it  was  then,  and  particularly  so  at  short  ranges,  where  the 
enemy's  smoke  hid  the  effect  of  one's  shot,  wrhich  will  have 
a  decidedly  exhilarating  effect  on  the  shooter.) 

"Though  the  fire  should,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  re- 
main as  long  as  possible  in  the  hands  of  the  'zug'  leader,  it  is 
obvious  that  in  the  latter  stages  of  the  fight  his  presence 
cannot  be  counted  on  or  his  voice  heard,  even  if  he  is  still 
there  to  command,  and  similarly,  too,  with  the  group  leaders ; 
the  men  will  then  be  left  to  their  own  resources,  and  it  is 
therefore  imperative  that  their  training  should  have  fitted 
them  to  face  such  exigencies,  and  if  necessary?  once  set  in 
the  right  direction,  to  fight  the  battle  out  automatically.  It 
is  for  this  reason  that  so  much  stress  is  laid  on  the  musketry 
instruction  of  the  individual  man,  who  must  know  not  only 
the  best  targets  to  fire  at,  but  the  importance  of  reserving 
his  fire,  and  the  difficulties  of  replenishing  his  ammunition 
when  once  it  is  expended." 


The  Supply  of  Ammunition. 

une  of  the  chief  advantages  of  the  new  magazine  rifle 
consists  in  the  reduction  of  the  weight  of  the  cartridges, 
which  is,  relatively  to  that  of  the  old  Mauser  pattern,  in  tin- 
proportion  of  27  to  43,  and  hence  the  150  rounds  now  carried 
weigh  actually  1  pound  less  than  the  100  rounds  the  man 
used  to  be  loaded  with;  the  method  of  packing  them  is  also 
a  very  practical  one,  favoring  particularly  their  rapid  dis- 
tribution in  action.  Five  cartridges  are  made  up  in  a  small 
metal  frame,  and  are  placed  in  the  magazine  simultaneously. 
Every  three  of  these  frames  are  made  up  into  a  small  paste- 
board packet,  in  the  sides  of  which  holes  are  made  to  enable 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  281 

the  forefinger  and  thumb  to  catch  hold  of  the  frames  readily. 
The  packet  is  opened  by  tearing  off  the  pasteboard  lid.  The 
advantages  of  this  method  of  packing  are  that  all  fumbling 
for  cartridges  is  done  away  with  and  the  actual  time  of  load- 
ing is  reduced  by  four-fifths.  The  packets  can  be  laid  down 
on  the  ground  alongside  of  the  firer  without  risk  of  the  bul- 
lets becoming  covered  with  sand  or  grit,  their  distribution 
is  easier,  and  their  collection  from  the  dead  and  wrounded 
much  simplified. 

Fifteen  of  these  packets,  in  three  layers  of  five  each,  are 
made  up  in  a  larger  pasteboard  case,  weighing  when  full  15 
pounds,  and  furnished  with  straps,  which  enable  two  such 
cases  to  be  slung  on  a  yoke  or  a  simple  stick,  and  brought  up 
over  the  shoulders.  Five  of  the  cases  go  into  one  cartridge^ 
box,  which  is  of  the  same  cubic  contents  as  the  old  one,  but 
which  holds  1,125  rounds  as  against  900,  and  weighs  12 
pounds  less. 

The  150  rounds  carried  by  the  man  are  thus  distributed: 
the  two  front  pouches  on  the  belt  contain  2  packets  or  30 
rounds  each;  a  larger  pouch,  also  on  the  belt,  but  carried 
behind,  carries  90  rounds;  and  all  the  pouches  are  fitted  with 
strips  of  leather  or  webbing  by  putting  on  which  the  packets 
are  raised  so  that  they  may  be  readily  grasped  and  pulled 
out.  The  pouch  ammunition  is  to  be  considered  more  as  a 
reserve  stock  for  sudden  emergencies;  otherwise,  whenever 
a  fight  is  in  prospect,  additional  rounds  are  to  be  issued  and 
carried  in  the  pockets,  haversacks,  or  between  the  buttons 
of  the  coat,  and  these  are  to  be  used  up  first.  The  man  must 
further  be  taught  always  to  keep  the  right-hand  pouch  full 
for  occasions  when  rapid  firing  is  required,  and  if  it  has  been 
drawn  on,  then  to  complete  it  again  as  soon  as  possible. 
When  fighting  on  the  defensive,  packets  of  cartridges  are  to 
be  laid  alongside  of  each  individual  soldier. 

During  the  progress  of  the  fight,  the  cartridges  are  to  be 
replaced  from  the  small-arm  ammunition-wagons,  each  com- 
pany commander  detailing  a  sufficient  number  of  ammuni- 
tion-carriers. The  small-arm  ammunition-wagons  will  be 
drawn  up  as  close  to  the  fighting  line  as  conditions  of  cover, 
etc.,  permit,  and  will  supply  ammunition  to  any  body  of  troops 

19 


282  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

* 

who  may  require  it,  without  reference  to  the  regiment  to 
which  they  belong.  In  critical  moments,  they  must  not 
shirk  driving  right  up  into  the  lighting  line.  All  supports 
advancing  into  the  front  line  will  bring  up  with  them  as 
many  rounds  as  possible. 


Infantry  rrrxH*  /nfantr//. 

In  a  contest  of  infantry  versus  infantry,  lire -eiVect  de- 
cides, and  this  condition  can  be  satisfied  either  by  engaging 
a  larger  number  of  rifles,  by  concentrating  the  fire  against 
a  decisive  point,  by  better  shooting  and  fire-discipline,  or, 
lastly,  by  utilizing  cover  more  skillfully.  Each  or  all  may 
be  employed,  according  to  circumstance*. 

Fire-effect  is  best  developed  in  extended  order,  and 
therefore  have  as  many  skirmishers  as  possible — every  body 
of  troops  kept  back  is  in  itself  an  evil.  But  the  difficulties 
of  recognizing  from  the  first  the  proper  point  against  which 
to  put  them  in,  together  with  the  necessity  of  protecting  the 
flanks  and  generally  for  providing  for  eventualities,  render 
it  impossible  to  extend  the  whole  fire-power  of  the  company 
from  the  first,  and  hence  a  formation  in  depth  is  a  necessity 
(and,  it  is  implied,  an  evil). 

\Vliere  the  company  is  fighting  alone,  in  broken  ground, 
and  the  situation  not  yet  clear,  caution  must  prevail,  and 
but  few  men  be  extended;  but  where  the  conditions  are 
reversed,  and  where  prompt  support  may  be  counted  on, 
the  whole  company  may  be  broken  up.  There  is,  therefore, 
no  absolute  best  or  worst.  Each  case  must  be  decided  on 
its  merits  only. 

Too  weak  a  support  implies  over-daring;  too  strong  an 
one,  a  dispersal  of  force.  The  evil  of  retaining  too  great  a 
reserve  of  power  in  hand  reaches  its  culminating  point  when 
soldiers  are  thus  saved  up  only  to  be  used  in  case  of  a  repulse. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  support  well  placed  under  cover  pre- 
serves its  full  power,  and  can  thus  be  employed  with  all  thf 
greater  vigor  at  the  decisive  time. 

Bearing  these  principles  in  mind,  the  company  coin- 
man^er  will  in  most  cases  do  well  to  keep,  during  the  intro- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  283 

ductory  phase  of  a  combat,  the  fighting  line  as,  weak  as  possi- 
ble consistent  with  the  development  of  the  absolutely  essen- 
tial minimum  of  fire,  in  order  to  be  able  to  employ  the  un- 
shaken remainder  of  his  command  to  the  best  possible  ad- 
vantage in  the  later  stages  of  the  combat.  Though,  as  a 
general  rule,  it  is  customary  to  extend  a  whole  "£ug"  at  once, 
yet  in  the  earlier  stages  the  object  of  the  extension  is  only 
to  gain  touch  with  the  enemy  and  to  guard  against  surprises, 
and  to  retain  full  freedom  of  action  with  the  bulk  of  one's 
striking-power,  and  for  these  purposes  even  a  group  may 
suffice.  On  the  other  hand,  the  simultaneous  extension  of 
several  "zugs"  is  by  no  means  excluded;  at  times,  in  fact, 
it  is  absolutely  necessary.  In  order  to  attain  the  Requisite 
degree  of  fire-superiority,  it  is,  as  a  rule,  necessary  to  bring 
into  action  a  greater  number  of  rifles  than  the  enemy,  and  all 
at  one  moment  of  time,  and  not  by  driblets,  because  a  grad- 
ual reinforcement  of  the  fighting  line  often  dges  not  lead  to 
the  attainment  of  a  superiority,  but  barely  suffices  to  fill  up 
the  gaps  caused  by  the  enemy's  fire.  Therefore,  if  possible, 
double  the  number  of  men  should  be  extended  from  the  first 
as  the  enemy  shows  against  one ;  and  this  particularly  in  the 
rase  of  a  company  forming  part  of  a  battalion,  as  the  re- 
maining companies  can  be  trusted  to  act  in  its  support.  Still, 
as  a  rule,  even  when  in  battalion,  the  companies  should  each 
keep  their  own  cl'osed  support  in  hand. 

The  company  fighting  alone  should  only  in  the  very 
rarest  cases  be  entirely  extended.  From  the  first  it  should 
strive  to  maintain  at  least  one  closed  support,  and  even  a 
second  one  further  to  the  rear  or  behind  an  unsupported 
wing  is  not  excluded,  but  in  the  actual  execution  of  an 
attack  the  leader  must  not  hesitate  to  employ,  if  necessary, 
every  available  rifle  in  the  front  line;  it  may  be  just  the  last 
half-dozen  extra  ones  that  turn  the  scale. 


Concentration  of  Fire  <m  the  Dccisire  Point. 

Fire-superiority  does  not  altogether  depend  on  the  rela- 
tive proportion  of  rifles  engaged,  but  better  control  of  the 
fire  may  give  the  superiority  to  the  side  which  is  actually 


284  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

numerically  inferior.  But  tlie  first  condition  necessary  to 
fulfill  in  the  latter  case  is  to  be  able  to  concentrate  the  whole 
fire-power  under  one's  command  on  the  decisive  point  of  the 
enemy's  position,  and  there,  on  that  point,  obtain  the  de- 
sired result;  in  most  cases  the  rest  of  the  line  will  fall  back 
without  waiting  for  more.  The  advantages  of  a  convergent 
fire  are  obvious,  but,  from  the  nature  of  things,  the  possi- 
bility of  developing  this  convergency  belongs  specially  to 
the  assailant,  who  possesses  the  power  of  freedom  of  motion 
by  which  he  can  envelop  the  point  of  attack;  and  in  propor- 
tion as  he  exerts  this  power,  the  effect  of  his  own  fm»  is  in- 
creased and  that  of  his  adversary  lessened. 


.]/  nxketry  Tniiiiiiit/  nn<l 

To  utilize  the  full  power  of  the  weapon,  coolness,  indi- 
vidual skill,  and  fire-discipline  are  the  chief  requisites.  The 
introduction  of  the  small-bore  rifle  with  its  flat  trajectory 
has  reduced  the  value  of  individual  marksmanship,  as  the 
flat  trajectory  has  lessened  the  importance  of  correct  dis- 
tance-judging. Consequently,  we  must  rely  more  on  the 
superior  coolness  of  our  men,  and  use  our  utmost  endeavors 
to  develop  their  fire-discipline  to  the  highest  possible  pitch, 
for  without  such  discipline  the  control  of  the  fire  and  its  con- 
centration on  the  decisive  points  would  be  an  impossibility. 
Fire-discipline  comprises  the  conscientious  execution  of  all 
orders  received  during  the  fight,  and  the  most  minute  atten- 
tion to  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  musketry  instruction. 
Further,  it  demands  steadiness  under  fire;  even  when  the 
latter  may  not  be  returned,  care  in  the  delivery  of  every  shot, 
constant  watchfulness  by  the  leader  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
immediate  cessation  of  fire  the  moment  the  target  disappears 
or  the  sound  of  th^  whistle  is  heard. 

Cover. 

Good  cover  helps  much  to  the  attainment  of  the  desired 
fire-superiority,  because  it  lessens  losses,  and  hence  gives, 
even  to  a  numerically  weaker  detachment,  the  power  of  in- 
flicting a  proportionately  higher  degree  of  loss;  and  the  in- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  285- 

troduction  of  smokeless  powder  lias  added  to  its  importance, 
for  formerly  the  puff  of  smoke  betrayed  the  position  of  the 
enemy,  and  hence  only  cover  thick  enough  to  stop  the  bullets 
was  of  any  avail,  whereas  now  any  bush  or  tuft  of  grass 
which  conceals  the  individual  renders  it  impossible  to  aim 
directly  at  him.  Invisibility  is  therefore  of  the  first  impor- 
tance; a  sharply  defined  trench  of  freshly  turned  earth,  by 
attracting  attention  and  drawing  a  convergent  fire,  may 
nowadays  prove  worse  than  useless.  But,  owing  to  the 
increased  penetration  of  the  new  bullets,  earth  parapets, 
when  intended  as  actual  cover  and  not  merely  as  a  screen 
against  sight,  will  require  a  thickness  at  the  crest  of  at  least 
4  feet  6  inches,  and  against  long-range  fire  shallow  trenches 
are  of  little  value. 

Masonry  screens,  such  as  houses,  walls,  etc.,  give  danger- 
ous splinters  when  struck  by  the  new  bullets,  and  the  thin 
walls  of  modern  "jerry"  built  structures  are  no  longer  secure 
against  penetration;  under  artillery  fire  they  should  be 
avoided,  as  they  not  only  afford  conspicuous  marks  for  the 
gunners  to  lay  on,  but  they  are  no  longer  shell-proof,  and 
further,  the  poisonous  gases  evolved  by  the  high  explosives 
now  in  use  for  bursters  will  render  any  closed  rooms  untena- 
ble. (In  1870  a  2-feet-6-irich  brick  or  stone  wall  proved  gen- 
erally sufficient  to  stop  either  French  or  German  shells,  the 
velocities  being  low,  and  the  shells,  bursting  instantaneously 
on  impact,  only  scarred  them  slightly.  Going  over  the  battle- 
fields last  summer,  I  saw  many  instances — notably  at  the 
Geisberg  at  Weissenburg — in  which  buildings,  though  bear- 
ing numerous  marks  of  direct  hits,  had,  nevertheless, 
scarcely  suffered  at  all.) 

Wooden  shelters  require  to  be  at  least  2  feet  6  inches 
thick  to  stop  a  bullet,  and  hence  the  cover  formerly  afforded 
by  trees  in  wood  fighting  will  now  generally  prove  illusory. 
Fn  occupying  a  wood,  therefore,  trenches  should  be  made 
some  little  distance  to  the  frojit,  as  the  crashing  of  the  bul- 
lets through  the  brandies  above  tends  to  unsteady  the 
troops  by  giving  them  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the  enemy's 
fire. 


286  Military  Letters  and  Essay 6. 

J  tifantry  versus  Cacalry. 

Smokeless  powder  will  have  a  most  detrimental  eflect 
on  the  cavalry.  Formerly  the  infantry  only  saw  the  ap- 
proaching horsemen  up  to  the  moment  they  themselves 
opened  fire,  for  the  smoke,  as  a  rule,  at  once  hid  them  from 
sight,  and  it  happened  occasionally  that  excited  infantry 
blazed  away  into  their  own  smoke  long  after  the  squadrons 
they  had  opened  on  had  ridden  away.  This  can  never  hap- 
pen again.  But,  in  spite  of  the  immense  increase  of  fire- 
power, cavalry  will  still  attack  infantry  that  it  has  reason  to 
believe  to  be  shaken,  and  infantry  should  stand  to  receive 
such  attacks  in  the  formation  they  happen  to  be  in  at  the 
moment,  never  running  into  groups.  Squares  arc  only  justi- 
fiable when,  owing  to  want  of  ammunition,  the  infantry  are 
defenceless. 

The  writer  makes  a  calculation  of  the  number  of  rounds 
that  can  be  delivered  by  a  company  of  200  men  in  the  time 
the  cavalry  would  take  to  close  from  440  yards, — viz.,  half 
a  minute — and  gives  it  at  10  rounds  per  man,  or  2,000  in  all ; 
but  a  battery  in  line  would  deliver  a  larger  number  of  bullets 
on  the  same  front  and  in  the  same  time — and  yet  batteries 
have  been  ridden  down  before  now,  even  with  a  couple  of 
thousand  vards  of  clear  field  of  fire  before  them. 


J-nfautry  versus  Art-iHrry. 

The  author  considers  the  relative  power  of  the  two  arms 
much  the  same  as  formerly,  but  the  smokeless  powder  will 
prove  much  more  advantageous  to  the  infantry.  Up  to  1,500 
yards  th£  artillery  can  still  hold  their  own  against  infant  ry, 
but  within  1,000  yards,  since  they  require  three  to  four  min- 
utes to  find  the  range,  it  ought,  generally  speaking,  to  be  im- 
possible for  them  to  come  into  action  at  all  with  any  pros- 
pect of  success.  If  the  infantry  can  get  within  800  yards, 
they  should  establish  their  fire-superiority  very  rapidly,  and 
within  400  yards  it  ought  to  be  altogether  impossible  for  the 
gunners  to  limber  up.  But  these  deductions  only  apply  as 
long  as  the  fire-discipline  of  the  company  remains  intact. 


oar 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  287 

I  think  it  will  be  useful  to  give  the  statement  of  the  num- 
ber of  rounds  at  different  ranges  which  the  writer  considers 
necessary  to  put  a  battery  out  of  action,  as  it  affords  a  basis 
to  guide  an  umpire  in  his  decisions,  and  at  any  rate  marks 
the  limit  beyond  which  even  an  extreme  partisan  of  the  foot 
soldier  can  hardly  go. 

At  060  yards  1,600  rounds  should  silence  a  battery  of 
U  pieces. 

At  880  yards  5,000  rounds  should  silence  a  battery  of 
0  pieces. 

At  1,100  yards  8,000  rounds  should  silence  a  battery  of 
6  pieces. 

At  1,320  yards  19,000  rounds  should  silence  a  battery  of 
0  pieces. 

At  1,050  yards  30,000  rounds  should  silence  a  battery  of 
6  pieces. 

But  this  number  of  rounds  must  be  fired  within  a  cer- 
tain time,  otherwise  the  artillery  fire  will  seriously  diminish 
the  number  of  rifles  available.  If,  for  instance,  a  group  of 
10  men,  with  1,000  cartridges  available,  were  to  tackle  a 
battery  at  1,100  yards,  then  each  man  would  have  to  fire  800 
rounds;  and  at  even  25  rounds  a  minute  the  operation  would 
take  :>2  minutes  —  an  obvious  impossibility,  yet  it  is  the  sort 
of  decision  that  umpires  sometimes  give.  The  best  chance 
infantry  have  is  that  afforded  them  when  the  guns  are 
caught  in  the  act  of  unlimbering,  for  during  the  three  to  four 
minutes  available,  during  which  the  gunners  are  ranging, 
no  return  fire  is  to  be  feared.  If,  therefore,  during  those 
minutes  a  sufficient  number  of  rifles  is  at  hand  to  deliver  the 
requisite  number  of  rounds  steadily  and  without  hurry,  the 
battery  may  be  safely  tackled;  if  not,  it  should  be  let  alone. 
Hence  at  1,100  yards  not  less  than  a  company  should  be 
available  against  each  battery,  and  at  1,050  a  whole  bat- 
talion at  least  would  be  required,  and  the  expenditure  of 
ammunition  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  possible  results. 
Of  course,  if  the  battery  is  under  cover,  the  number  of  rounds 
required  may  be  indefinitely  increased. 

Movements  under  artillery  fire  should  be  carried  out 
in  line,  and  no  closed  bodies  of  infantry  can  remain  halted 


288  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

within  2,000  yards  of  artillery,  if  the  latter  are  actually  tir- 
ing at  them;  within  1,500  yards  no  lateral  movements  in 
close  order  of  any  kind  can  be  carried  out. 

The  more  all  the  guns  of  a  battery  are  annoyed  by  fire 
at  the  same  time,  the  less  accurately  will  they  shoot;  on  llu» 
other  hand,  such  dispersion  of  fire  does  not  promise  the  best 
Results  except  at  short  ranges;  hence  at  long  distances  UK* 
fire  of  a  whole  company  should  be  directed  on  one  gun  at  a 
time,  for  choice  the  windward  one,  and  at  ordinary  ranges— 
i.  e.,  within  1,000  yards — each  "zug"  can  devote  itself  to  a 
single  gun,  either  the  odd  or  even  ones. 

Attack  or  J)<-frn<v. 

Then  follows  a  very  thorough  examination  of  the  old 
question  of  anvil  or  hammer  iiinln-  the  new  conditions  of 
smokeless  powder  and  small-bore,  flat-trajectory  weapons, 
in  which  the  author,  whilst  admitting  the  many  points  in 
which  the  defence  gains,  such  as  concealment  and  increased 
depth  of  fire-zone  to  be  passed  over,  nevertheless  conies  to 
the  conclusion  that,  on  the  whole,  the  balance  of  advantages 
remains  with  the  assailant,  and  principally  because  the  de- 
fender is  bound  to  hold  a  line  and  be  equally  strong  at  all 
points,  whereas  his  opponent  requires  only  to  make  his 
superiority  felt  at  a  particular  point,  the  .choice  of  which 
must  always  remain  in  his  hands;  and  further,  the  power  of 
concentrating  the  fire  of  a  superior  number  of  rifles  against 
this  point  is  immensely  increased  by  th<-  range  of  the  n<-\\ 
weapons.  It  is,  however,  obvious  that  the  application  of 
this  principle  of  concentration  makes  far  higher  demands 
on  the  excellence  of  the  troops  and  their  fire-discipline  than 
the  "straight  to  the  front"  method  of  fighting  formerly. 
Still  it  is  the  object  of  the  new  regulations  to  ensure  this 
higher  discipline,  and  practical  men  in  Germany  do  not  con- 
sider the  standard,  to  be  unattainable,  but  say  the  smoke- 
less powder  will  distinctly  aid  the  maintenance  of  this  fire- 
discipline,  and  that,  by  enabling  not  only  the  leaders  but  the 
individual  men  to  see  their  objective  before  them,  the  whole 
act  will  be  carried  out  with  a  greater  degree  of  harmony  and 
a  higher  energy. 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  ^89 

As  a  general  rule,  the  defender  has  the  advantage  due 
to  his  knowledge  of  the  distances  at  the  longer  ranges; 
hence  it  is  not  to  the  interest  of  the  assailant  to  attempt 
to  tackle  him  on  this,  his  strongest  ground.  He  must  strive 
at  once  to  get  in  to  closer  ranges  at  which  the  tlat  trajec- 
tory of  his  weapon  puts  him  on  equal  terms  with  his  enemy. 
In  doing  so  heavy  losses  are  to  be  expected,  but  the  only 
way  to  reduce  them  is  to  shorten  the  time  of  exposure,  and 
every  man  must  in  peace  be  convinced  of  this  truth.  It  will 
rarely,  if  ever,  be  possible  to  advance  uninterruptedly  to 
decisive  ranges  with  the  dense  line  of  skirmishers  on  which 
the  execution  of  the  attack  actually  devolves.  But  this  line, 
whatever  its  formation  may  be  at  the  moment,  must  be 
covered  by  a  light  line  of  true  skirmishers  to  annoy  the  ene- 
my and  generally  to  act  like  the  ground  scouts  of  the  cav- 
alry. Eight  to  twelve  paces  between  the  files  is  recom- 
mended, and  then  he  proceeds  to  describe  in  considerable 
detail  what  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  an  attack  conducted 
in  the  true  spirit  of  the  British  line,  the  point  of  which,  it 
must  be  remembered,  did  not  lie  originally  in  the  bayonet 
attack,  but  in  the  bringing  up  of  the  maximum  possible  num- 
ber of  muskets  to  decisive  range.  It  was  the  fire  which  was 
meant  to  do  the  work,  and  not  the  cold  steel,  and  it  was  pre- 
cisely because  the  point  came  to  be  overlooked  that  it  be- 
came possible  for  our  would-be  reformers  to  bring  about 
the  state  of  confusion  and  muddle  in  which  our  present  ideas 
on  infantry  fighting  are  involved.  It  is  really  immaterial 
whether  the  line  is  formed  two  deep  or  in  single  rank,  the 
object  to  be  borne  in  mind  being  only  the  maximum  possible 
development  of  fire.  But  what  differentiates  the  line  from 
skirmishing  or  independent-order  fighting  is,  whether  the 
choice  of  where  to  die  is  left  in  the  hands  of  the  individual 
or  of  his  leader.  And  from  the  above  it  will  be  very  evident 
that,  in  Germany  at  any  rate,  the  man  has  very  little  say  in 
the  matter.  His  military  qualifications,  his  character,  etc., 
are  all  developed  up  to  the  highest  possible  degree  to  enable 
him  to  act  in  case  his  leader  should  fall,  but  till  that  event 
happens,  the  discipline  is  as  rigid  as  ever  it  was  in  the  days 
of  Frederick  the  Great.  The  whole  end  and  aim  of  the 


290  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

modern  German  training,  as  it  appears  to  ine,  not  only  after 
reading  the  above  pamphlet,  but  after  watching  the  practice 
of  the  new  regulations  on  the  parade-  and  maneuver-grounds 
last  autumn,  is  to  introduce  into  the  fighting  line  the  same 
absolute  concentration  of  the  will  on  the  instantaneous  exe- 
cution of  the  word  of  command  as  was  formerly  considered 
only  necessary  in  the  close-order  school. 

Certainly  this  idea  has  not  yet  stood  the  test  of  experi- 
ence, and  there  are  in  Germany  many  who  hold  that  the  two 
opposite  qualities — viz.,  individuality  and  absolute  obedi- 
ence are  absolutely  irreconcilable.  The  ''Midsummer- 
Night's  Dream"  was  an  effort  in  this  direction.  But  there 
seems  no  real  reason  in  the  nature  of  things  why  this  irrecon- 
cilability should  exist,  and  in  fact,  as  has  been  frequent  ly 
urged  in  these  columns,  the  example  of  the  navy  actually 
proves  that  it  does  not  do  so,  for  the  smartest  drill  to  be  seen 
in  the  German  Army  is  a  joke  by  the  side  of  gun  drill  on  1  he 
Excellent.  The  main  point  in  which  the  execution  of  the 
modern  attack  differs  from  the  old  one  of  a  century  ago  is 
that,  as  the  limit  of  effective  range  has  been  extended  up  1o 
between  600  to  800  yards  from  the  enemy's  muzzle,  the  oper- 
ation of  obtaining  the  fire-superiority  has  nowadays  to  be 
repeated  perhaps  three  or  four  times  in  succession  before 
the  position  can  be  actually  entered.  The  immediate  effect 
of  a  heavy  fire  is  only  momentm-y;  and  troops  recover  their 
power  of  resistance  very  rapidly  if  the  fire  directed  against 
them  ceases,  as  it  must  necessarily  do  when  the  assailant 
begins  to  advance,  and  fresh  supports  may  reach  them  and 
thus  reestablish  the  balance.  When  this  lakes  place,  the 
assailant  will  be  compelled  to  halt  and  to  repeat  the  process, 
and  for  this  purpose  a  second,  third,  and  even  a  fourth  line 
must  follow  behind  the  fighting  line.  The  provision  of  these 
following  lines  in  sufficient  number  being  the  duty  of  the 
superior  commander,  and  since  he  has  all  along  known 
where  he  means  to  put  in  the  bulk  of  his  force,  whereas  his 
adversary  has  had  to  keep  his  reserves  distributed  to  meet 
all  possible  eventualities,  it  is  evident  that  in  this  game 
of  successive  reinforcements  the  ultimate  advantage  must 
always  be  on  the  side  of  the  assailant.  Smokeless  powder 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  291 

and  flat-trajectoried  rifles  make  no  difference  here;  but, 
since  it  is  admitted  that  the  sight  of  the  killed  and  wounded 
lying  around  has  always  affected  the  defender  more  than 
the  assailant,  for  the  latter  in  his  forward  movement  leaves 
the  victims  of  the  fight  behind  him,  it  is  evident  that  in  this 
respect  the  absence  of  the  smoke-veil  will  have  a  very  detri- 
mental effect  on  the  former.  Now  the  backward  and  for- 
ward movement  of  lines  of  troops,  when  once  hotly  engaged, 
appears  to  obey  an  instinctive  impulse  in  the  air,  so  to  speak. 
Every  body  of  troops  possesses  a  certain  power  of  resist- 
ance, depending  on  its  discipline  and  its  nationality.  On 
the  troops  of  one  nation  the  loss  of  10  per  cent  will  create 
such  an  impression  of  terror  that  it  will  bolt  at  once;  those 
of  another  may  fight  on  with  50  per  cent  down.  Certainly 
the  rapidity  with  which  such  loss  is  inflicted  counts  for  very 
much,  and  the  youth  and  inexperience  of  the  troops  for  yet 
more.  The  losses  troops  suffer  in  the  attack  depends  pri- 
marily on  the  length  of  time  they  are  out  in  ttie  rain,  but 
since  the  new  rifle  and  the  absence  of  the  smoke-screen  en- 
able them  to  inflict  not  only  a  greater  but  a  more  demoraliz- 
ing loss  on  their  adversary  in  the  same  time,  it  is  obvious 
that  they  themselves  need  not  be  so  long  exposed  to  fire  as 
formerly.  The  decision  will,  therefore,  be  brought  on  more 
rapidity,  and  the  difficulty  of  guarding  against  it  by  timely 
reinforcement  on  the  part  of  the  defender  will  be  even  more 
insuperable  than  it  used  to  be.  At  any  rate,  this  is  the  line 
of  thought  pursued  in  the  German  Army,  and  it  appears  to 
me  to  be  in  consonance  with  the  traditions  of  our  army  and 
the  nation  at  large;  and  I  can  only  trust  that  this  article 
may  be  of  use  in  removing  some  of  the  terrors  with  which, 
to  judge  from  contemporary  military  literature  in  England, 
the  introduction  of  the  new  arms  has  invaded  us. 


NOTES  IN  GERMANY  IN  1889. 

Contrary  to  all  one  heard  last  year  relative  to  the  new 
German  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  the  old  Prussian  "pa- 
rade marsch"  still  lives,  and  long  may  it  continue  to  do  so, 
for  I  am  confident  that  it  actually  has  counted  for  more 


292  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

in  the  victories  of  the  German  Army  than  our  apostles  of 
the  new  school  of  tactics  appear  to  realize. 

Ultimately  I  believe  it  will  be  found,  by  those  who  pur- 
sue the  subject  far  enough,  that  the  disciples  of  passive  en- 
durance, which  is  still  the  essential  point  to  some  four-fifths 
of  the  troops  engaged,  at  any  rate  during  its  introductory 
phases,  is  the  outcome  of  continuous  exercises  of  the  sim 
plest  description;  but  which,  being  carried  out,  in  the  words 
of  the  German  drill-book,  "with  the  utmost  concentrated 
effort  of  mind  and  body/'  by  degrees  enable  the  will  to  en- 
tirely master  the  natural  weakness  of  the  man  himself,  and 
thus  to  render  him  capable  of  facing  death  itself  unmoved. 

It  is  in  the  "parade  marsch"  that  this  "concentrated 
effort"  finds  its  highest  expression.  No  soldier  can  look 
on  entirely  unmoved  at  a  German  battalion  marching  past. 
In  spite  of  the  unfavorable  impression  their  somewhat 
clumsy  acoouterments,  the  average  youthfulness  and  boy 
ish  appearance  of  the  men  themselves,  and  their  habit  of 
marching  out  of  step  when  at  ease  is  calculated  to  create, 
no  sooner  does  the  band  strike  up,  and  they  are  called  to 
attention,  than  they  become  transformed,  and  sweep  by  with 
a  proud,  confident  bearing  that  makes  one  feel  one  might  do 
anything  with  such  men.  Now  it  cannot  be  honestly  main- 
tained that  the  march-past  of  the  average  British  or  native 
battalion  inspires  one  with  any  similar  feeling.  Now  and 
again  an  exception  occurs,  but  they  are  few  and  far  between. 
More  generally  the  effect  on  the  spectator  is  one  of  pure 
boredom,  mitigated  only  by  the  amusement  one  derives  from 
the  mounted  officers'  attempts  to  salute.  Why  is  it  that  on 
these  occasions  both  men  and  officers  give  one  the  impres- 
sion of  being  overcome  with  bashfulness?  Off  parade,  as  a 
rule,  no  one  can  accuse  them  of  it;  but  just  in  that  one  act 
of  military  pomp,  in  which  every  man  should  feel  as  if  his 
regiment  first  and  himself  next  were  the  only  things  in  the 
world  worth  thinking  about,  they  are  all  seized  with  a  ten- 
dency to  hang  their  heads  like  modest  maidens,  and  to  look 
at  the  toes  of  their  boots.  Of  course  there  are  battalions 
and  battalions.  The  Guards,  Sikhs,  Ghoorkhas,  all  still 
fill  one  with  the  thrill  of  soldierly  pride;  but,  as  regards^ 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  293 

the  vast  majority,  the  impression  the  ordinary  march-past 
conveys  to  the  observer  is  that  both  men  and  officers  are 
bored,  and  that  neither  care  a  straw  for  themselves,  the 
regiment,  or  each  other.  Our  forefathers  were  perfectly 
right  when  they  settled  on  the  march-past  as  the  test  by 
which  a  commander  can  best  judge  of  the  spirit  of  a  regi- 
ment in  a  short  space  of  time,  for  in  no  other  way  is  it  prac- 
ticable to  concentrate  the  whole  of  the  wills  of  the  men  on 
one  effort  to  excel,  and  the  more  every  man  looks  on  himself 
as  the  best  in  the  best  regiment  in  the  world,  the  more  over- 
powering will  be  the  impression  conveyed  to  the  reviewing 
officers'  mind.  Cleanliness  and  smart  turn-out,  due  to  pun- 
ishments and  harassing,  are  absolutely  useless  to  blind  the 
eyes  of  the  true  soldier,  and  one  can  never  help  smiling  at 
the  way  some  commanding  officers  seek  to  impose  this  trans- 
parent eye-wash  on  generals  and  inspecting  officers  who 
have  all  been  through  the  same  mill  before  them,  and  know 
every  dodge  in  the  game;  but  when  cleanliness  and  smart- 
ness are  there  as  the  result  of  the  pride  of  the  men  in  them- 
selves and  in  the  regiment,  their  influence  again  reacts  on 
the  feeling  of  the  men  in  the  march-past,  and  contributes  to 
the  force  of  the  impression  made  upon  the  reviewing  officer. 
It  is  necessary  to  insist  on  this  view  of  the  matter,  for 
there  is  an  increased  tendency  in  the  Infantry  to  believe 
that,  because  the  fighting  line  no  longer  maneuvers  in  close 
order  under  fire — a  change,  by  the  way,  which  really  was 
made  by  the  French  in  the  Revolution,  and  not  by  the  Ger- 
mans in  I860 — therefore  marching  past,  smartness  under 
arms,  etc.,  are  all  a  useless  waste  of  time,  ,and  to  point  to  the 
new  German  drill-book  in  confirmation  of  this.  In  reality 
no  greater  mistake  could  be  made.  It  is  granted  that  to  the 
casual  reader  the  book  in  question  may  seem  to  sanction  a 
departure  from  the  former  standard  of  smartness,  but  those 
who  are  bound  to  read  it  the  most  carefully — viz.,  the  officers 
themselves — don't  interpret  it  in  that  spirit  at  all.  The 
fact  is,  that  practically  the  new  book  is  merely  the  final 
sanctioning  by  regulation  of  the  then  existing  interpreta- 
tion of  the  old  one,  which  had  established  itself  on  a  sort 
of  "survival  of  the  fittest"  principle  by  a  system  of  trial  and 


294  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

error  experiments  since  the  last  war.  For  years  past  the 
greater  part  of  the  old  book  had  been  as  extinct  as  the  dodo, 
and  all  drills  and  tactical  exercises  and  maneuvers  had  been 
conducted  in  very  close  accordance  with  the  new  prescription, 
though  no  official  sanction  for  the  custom  existed,  and  there- 
fore a  man  was  always  liable  to  be  pulled  up  by  some  be- 
fogged old  pedant  who  might  not  have  assimilated  the 
theory  of  modern  fighting — a  condition  whirh,  though  it 
rarely  occurred,  still  rendered  the  subordinates  a  little  ner- 
vous, and  led  to  a  certain  amount  of  time  being  wasted  on 
non-essentials.  Otherwise  nothing  has  been  changed  in 
the  spirit  of  the  training  at  all. 

One  point  which  strikes  one  very  forcibly  indeed  after 
watching  our  own  Infantry  drill  is  the  excellence  with  whirh 
the  words  of  command  are  given,  and  the  general  attention 
paid  to  the  bearing  of  the  officer  who  gives  it.  The  new 
regulation  lays  particular  stress  on  this  point,  and  insists 
that,  except  in  cases  where  a  loud  command  might  betray 
the  presence  of  an  ambuscade  or  generally  defeat  the  idea 
of  a  surprise,  the  word  of  command  is  to  be  given  with  the 
utmost  precision  and  distinctness,  and  the  intention  of  1h«- 
regulation  is  consistently  and  'thoroughly  carried  out.  Of 
course,  the  same  idea  exists  in  our  own  service,  on  paper — 
but  on  paper  only;  too  often  one  can  see  an  officer  who  con- 
siders he  has  done  all  that  is  necessary  in  raising  his  voice 
sufficiently  to  be  heard  by  the  men  under  his  immediate  com- 
mand, and  if  they  happen  to  be  only  a  single  man  detach- 
ment or  an  officer's  guard,  he  speaks  to  them  only  in  his 
ordinary  voice,  and  at  the  same  time  does  not  trouble  to 
come  to  "attention"  himself.  The  result  necessarily  is,  that 
as  he  himself  does  not  take  the  trouble  to  put  himself  out, 
the  men  don't  see  the  necessity  of  exerting  themselves 
either,  and  the  order  is  obeyed  in  a  casual  sort  of  manner, 
most  subversive  of  the  idea  of  discipline.  One  can  see  this 
on  any  guard-mounting  or  church  parade,  where  the  num- 
bers to  be  controlled  are  insignificant.  As  I  write,  I  can 
recall  five  instances  in  point,  all  of  them  guards  of  honor  for 
the  commander-in-chief  or  a  lieutenant-governor,  and  the 
officers  in  command  of  which  were  all  rather  above  than 


Military  Letters  ana  Essays.  295 

below  the  average  of  smartness;  yet,  with  the  cominander- 
in-chief,  all  his  staff,  and  a  host  of  spectators  looking  on, 
not  one  thought  it  worth  his  while  to  make  his  men  jump  to 
his  word.  Just  across  the  road  here  lives  the  officer  command- 
ing the  battalion  quartered  in  this  place,  and  twice  a  day 
under  my  windows  the  ceremony  of  fetching  the  colors  and 
bringing  them  back  is  gone  through,  of  course  by  a  different 
officer  and  guard  on  each  occasion.  Yet  every  time  the 
officer  halts  his  command,  steps  out  in  front  of  it,  standing 
strictly  at  "attention,"  and  gives  the  necessary  words  with 
the  same  energy  and  life  as  if  he  were  drilling  a  battalion. 
I  can  only  say  that  even  the  Guards  in  London,  who  are  un- 
questionably far  smarter  in  these  and  similar  duties — in 
fact,  in  all  drills — than  anything  else  in  the  army,  can  show 
us  nothing  like  it. 

Now  let  any  one  who  cares  about  these  things  go  down 
to  a  company  instruction  parade  or  any  similar  duty  and  see 
whether  officers,  even  the  smartest,  give  their  commands 
with  this  concentrated  vim,  or  as  if  they  really  meant  to  be 
obeyed.  In  fact,  if,  as  I  believe,  obeying  does  not  merely 
imply  a  leisurely  doing  of  a  thing,  but  rather  a  sort  of  jump- 
ing into  the  collar,  an  instantaneous  simultaneous  move- 
ment of  all,  as  if  an  electric  shock  had  struck  them,  no  real 
obedience  is  ever  seen  with  us  except  on  a  battalion  parade; 
and  I  fear  that,  till  the  idea  of  company  officers  commanding 
their  own  men  is  fairly  adopted  in  our  service,  it  never  will 
be,  for  neither  men  nor  officers  feel  that  they  belong  to  one 
another.  The  company  officers  do  not  really  command  their 
men,  but,  through  the  courtesy  of  the  colonel  and  adjutant, 
the  men  are  lent  to  the  officers  to  play  with.  But  it  is  quite 
different  in  the  Artillery  and  Engineers;  there  both  men 
and  officers  belong  to  each  other,  and  they  know  it;  and 
though  in  neither  service  is  it  possible,  as  a  rule,  to  insist 
on  the  simultaneous  execution  of  a  command — for,  gener- 
ally speaking,  each  number  has  a  different  duty  to  perform 
— yet  one  can  see  in  a  moment  the  immense  difference  of  the 
influence  the  officers  of  the  scientific  branches  (so  called) 
exercise  over  the  men  under  them.  Possibly  this  statement 
will  be  objected  to  by  many  who  have  not  thought  about  the 


296  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

matter  much;  if  so,  I  can  only  ask  them  if  they  have  ever 
galloped  for  a  general,  or  if  not,  the  first  time  they  do,  to 
notice  the  difference  between  the  way  an  order  is  received 
and  obeyed  by  a  Gunner  subaltern  and  an  Infantry  one.  I, 
for  one,  do  not  believe,  or,  at  any  rate,  believe  only  to  a  very 
limited  degree,  in  the  system  of  selection  for  commissions 
by  examination,  and  can  myself  find  but  very  little  to  choose 
between  the  raw  material  at  Woolwich  and  at  Sandhurst; 
but  compare  the  finished  product  after  about  five  or  seven 
years'  service,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  superi- 
ority of  the  system  of  delegated  responsibility  by  which  the 
Artillery  man  is  trained,  and  that  in  vogue  in  the  rest  of  the 
army. 

To  those  who  are  too  proud  to  learn  from  either  the 
Germans  or  another  arm  of  our  own  service,  let  me  recom- 
mend the  study  of  our  own  navy,  in  which  again  Hie 
system  of  delegated  responsibility  is  the  motive  at  work. 
No  man's  pride  can  be  hurt  by  being  compared  with  \\ 
national  service  which  is  excellence  itself,  and  no  one  who 
objects  to  the  German  system  of  command  as  inapplicable 
to  English  conditions  can  maintain  his  objection  when  he 
sees  the  results  which  the  very  same  system  worked  by 
Englishmen  afloat  is  capable  of  turning  out. 

BLANK  VERSUS  BALL  CARTRIDGE  TACTICS. 

A  tactical  work  of  more  than  usual  importance  has 
just  appeared  in  Berlin.  It  is  from  the  pen  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  von  Malachowski,  a  well-known  authority  of  the 
general  staff.  As  far  as  I  have  had  time  to  read  it,  it  seems 
to  be  the  very  thing  tacticians  have  been  searching  after 
for  the  last  twenty  to  thirty  years.  The  title  I  have  freely 
rendered  above,  and  in  the  main  the  book  may  be  described 
as  an  historical  unraveling  of  the  alternate  influence  peace 
and  war,  together  with  improvement  in  armaments,  have 
had  on  the  evolution  of  tactics  since  1742,  the  era  of  the 
first  Silesian  war.  It  is  specially  devoted,  of  course,  to  the 
German  armies,  but  the  French  also  come  in  for  their  share 
of  criticism,  and  the  chief  point  to  notice  is,  how  time  and 
again  an  admirable  system  evolved  on  war  service  has  been 


Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

ruined  by  the  pedantry  of  the  parade-ground  and  the  zeal 
of  tactical  "drill-book  mongers."  It  is  a  sizable  work  (some 
400  pages)  and  would  have  been  more  valuable,  if  less  reada- 
ble, with  a  larger  allowance  of  references.  What  the  ulti- 
mate conclusions  will  be  I  do  not  yet  know,  but  it  is  a  book 
which  can  be  studied  with  profit  by  all,  and  to  avoid  waste 
of  time  in  ordering  it,  I  take  a  special  chapter  out  of  the 
middle,  partly  as  illustrating  the  tendency  of  the  work, 
partly  as  giving  us  the  opinion  of  a  well-known  Russian  tac- 
tical authority,  Dragomirow,on  the  Prussian  Army  as  it  was 
in  1860,  a  point  of  departure  very  essential  for  all  who  would 
study  the  development  of  modern  breech-loading  tactics. 
Malachowski  says,  speaking  of  the  moral  of  the  troops  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war: 

"Of  special  enthusiasm  in  the  men  there  was  no  ques- 
tion; the  object  of  the  war  was  not  understood  by  the  lower 
classes,  and  the  loAver  middle  ones  did  not  sympathize  with 
it.  But  the  want  of  this  enthusiasm  was  replaced  by  loy- 
alty to  king  and  country  and  the  feeling  of  duty  and  honor 
inherent  in  the  nation.  It  was  better  with  the  officers;  they 
were  animated  with  a  degree  of  personal  incentive  to  dis- 
tinction and  intelligence  hitherto  unknown  amongst  them. 
As  regards  the  drill-book,  all  that  was  of  value  was  to  be 
found  on  the  four  pages  devoted  to  the  company  column; 
excluding  these,  probably  no  infantry  ever  took  the  field  with 
a  less  practical  regulation.  As  the  event  proved,  \t  was  for- 
tunate that  it  was  so,  for  with  the  then  prevailing  pedantic 
tendency  on  the  drill-ground  a  revision  could  hardly  have 
failed  to  bring  in  much  that  was  evil." 

In  explanation  I  may  add  that  in  the  main  the  drill- 
book  was  Scharnhorst,  original  1809-12,  one  with  concre- 
tions more  or  less  detrimental  appended. 

"From  Kessel's  work  we  may  learn  that  we  had  about 
grasped  the  idea  of  small  in  preference  to  battalion  columns, 
but  these  were  still  in  the  bonds  of  hard-and-fast  adherence 
to  prescribed  distances  and  intervals  within  the  limits  of 
the  battalion  and  brigade  drill.  It  was  this  very  tendency 
which  proved  so  disastrous  to  the  Austrians.  The  infantry 
was  thus  practically  thrown  on  its  own  resources;  thanks 

20 


298  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

to  its  officers,  this  was  about  the  best  thing  that  could  have 
happened  to  it. 

"On  mobilization,  at  latest  on  the  passage  of  the  fron- 
tier, we  stripped  off  our  figurative  regulation  clothing  and 
the  most  diverse  forms  came  to  light.  In  one  corps  the  two- 
deep  formation  was  accepted  as  fundamental;  in  another 
one  would  not  hear  of  company  columns,  and  formed  half- 
battalions  and  half -companies;  in  a  third  the  two  flank  com- 
panies were  sent  forward,  the  two  center  ones  following 
as  a  half-battalion  in  rear;  in  a  fourth  companies  always 
formed  in  column  right  in  front.  It  is  a  pity  no  one  lias 
ever  collected  all  the  variations  indulged  in  both  in  1866  and 
1870."  *  *  "And  the  King  looked  on  with  a  laugh  at  all, 
wusely  leaving  every  man  to  win  in  his  own  way;  only  being 
strict  against  neglect  of  duty  and  want  of  zeal.  It  is  won- 
derful the  effect  this  steady  confidence  of  his  in  the  troops* 
exercised  on  our  officers  in  both  wars." 

The  picture  the  new  national  army  presented  applies 
well  also  to  the  conditions  of  1870.  To  get  an  impart  ial  idea 
of  it,  let  us  see  what  an  able  Russian  general,  Dragomirow, 
who  followed  the  war  on  Steinuietz's  staff,  has  to  say  of  it. 
His  book  appeared  in  1868,  when  the  impression  of  his  ex- 
perience must  still  have  been  fresh  in  his  mind.  He  first 
treats  of  the  "spirit  of  the  army  and  character  of  its 
training" : 

"Duty  for  duty's  sake  in  all,  even  the  smallest  details, 
is  the  most  characteristic  trait  in  the  Prussian  Army.  At 
first  it  might  seem  this  devotion  to  minor  details  of  duty 
would  result  in  pedantry,  yet  the  facts  show  this  is  not  the 
case.  The  Prussian  soldier  is  not  of  an  excitable  tempera- 
ment; his  love  of  order,  obstinacy,  and  steadiness,  however, 
deserve  high  praise.  What  is  very  remarkable  is  the  extra- 
ordinary unity  of  opinion  and  similarity  in  the  way  of  grasp- 
ing a  question  of  military  importance  in  the  officers,  and 
their  inexhaustible  zeal.  The  essential  points  are  not  lost 
sight  of  in  this  care  for  the  small  formalities;  the  letter 
does  not  kill  the  spirit,  for  this  letter  is  a  characteristic  of 
the  race.  Every  Prussian  is  in  a  sense  a  pedant,  but  a 
pedant  who  acts;  consequentially  pedantic  not  only  in  his 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  299 

relation  to  others,  but  equally  to  himself,  even  against  his 
own  interests.  No  one  seeks  his  own  ends  at  the  expense 
of  others,  or  allows  either  himself  or  others  license." 

As  an  example  of  this  strictness,  he  quotes  General 
Steinmetz  daily  letting  the  corps  defile  before  him,  passing 
over  little  irregularities  which  pleased  or  cheered  the  men, — 
a  rose  in  their  coats  or  leaves  in  their  helmets, — but  re- 
morselessly down  on  anything  betokening  real  slackness, — 
an  unbuttoned  shoulder-strap,  for  instance.  Malachowski 
agrees  to  all  this,  only  he  points  out  that  if  pedantry  had  not 
in  I860  killed  the  spirit,  it  was  due  to  deeper  causes  since 
1806,  and  not  to  anything  essential  in  the  character  of  Prus- 
sian pedantry,  for  Prussian  pedantry  had  brought  about 
the  disasters  of  that  fatal  year.  Those  causes  were  the  in- 
troduction of  short  service,  the  education  of  the  nation  (?), 
and  what  he,  as  far  as  I  have  read,  has  not  alluded  to — the 
growing  tendency  to  decentralization,  the  necessary  conse- 
quence in  Prussia  of  the  short  service.  Dragomirow  then 
goes  on  to  the  training  of  the  troops  for  war,  first  amongst 
the  officers.  With  them  the  "similarity  of  appreciation  of 
military  problems"  is  a  chief  factor,  and  the  "nature  of  his 
surroundings,  which  compel  every  officer  to  improve  his 
knowledge."  Theoretical  and  historical  knowledge  of  war 
he  finds  in  all,  and  therein  he  sees  "the  chief  counterpoise 
against  the  soul-destroying  influence  of  the  cult  of  the  drill- 
book."  The  officers  of  the  general  staff  he  finds  completely 
free  from  the  tendency  to  systematize,  so  common  amongst 
civilian  Germans.  They  recognize  that  practical  ability  is 
not  so  much  a  matter  of  deep  or  extensive  knowledge  as  of 
the  capacity  to  adapt  this  knowledge  to  the  object  in  view. 
The  efficiency  of  the  general  staff  is  the  special  work  of  Yon 
Moltke.  He  then  proceeds  to  analyze  Prince  Frederick 
Charles's  "instructions  (literally  hints)  for  the  troops  taking 
the  field  under  my  command  in  1866."  To  the  best  of  my 
belief,  it  is  unknown  in  England.  After  pointing  out  that 
though  in  its  broad  features  the  campaign  is  intended  to  be 
conducted  in  an  offensive  form,  yet  it  may  happen  that 
locally  troops  may  be  thrown  on  the  defensive  when  their 
fire-power  as  against  the  Austrians  should  decide  every- 


300  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

thing.  He  then  recommends  precisely  the  same  style  of 
fighting-  which  won  for  us  our  fume  in  the  Peninsula — a  few 
skirmishers  to  hang  on  the  Hanks  of  the  approaching  col- 
umns and  then  at  point-blank  range  half  a  dozen  volleys  and 
the  bayonet.  One  point  he  insists  on:  "The  first  line  is 
never  to  be  relieved  by  the  second;  troops  once  sent  in  to 
the  fight  must  stay  there  to  the  last.  The  relief  of  the  1  wo 
lines  as  practised  on  the  parade-ground  docs  not  and  never 
has  taken  place,  as  it  was  intended  to  in  war,  and  it  is  not 
to  be  attempted."  As  to  formation,  Dragomirow  says: 
"The  Prince  seems  to  be  in  contradiction:  first,  with  the 
regulation,  by  proposing  his  own  forms;  and  secondly,  with 
himself,  in  allowing  the  troops  to  choose  whatever  forms 
they  are  best  accustomed  to.  But  behind  t  his  apparent  con- 
tradiction lies  sound  principle — viz.,  to  allow  the  greatest 
possible  moral  and  intellectual  freedom  to  the  individual; 
for  only  under  these  conditions  can  the  individual  develop 
his  full  powers  and  knowledge  to  the  greatest  good  of  ihe 
whole." . 

Here  the  author  (Malachowski)  digresses  and  asks  the 
parade-ground  tacticians,  who  also  cite  the  Prince  as  on 
their  side,  "Do  they  really  believe  we  owe  our  victories  in 
1866  to  the  fact  that  the  regulations  contained  prescribed 
forms  for  the  attack  of  a  battalion  or  brigade?  Is  it  not 
rather  the  case  that  we  won  because  our  officers  were  suffi- 
ciently well  trained  and  intelligent  to  modify  the  regula- 
tions to  fit  the  circumstances,  and  to  the  developed  charac- 
ter which  enabled  them  to  act  on  their  own  responsibility?" 
Of  General  Steinmetz,  Dragomirow  relates  that  he  saw  him 
daily,  on  marches  which  did  not  lead  to  an  encounter,  in- 
spect the  baggage-wagons,  and  ask  every  man  with  them 
why  he  w7as  there,  sending  him  back  to  the  front  if  he  was 
not  duly  authorized.  In  other  corps  men  often  crawled  like 
bees  over  the  wagons.  Such  thoroughness  on  his  part  had 
a  great  effect  on  the  discipline  of  his  command.  With  re- 
gard to  the  attack  on  Skalitz,  Dragomirow  asked  Steinmetz 
for  details  of  his  dispositions.  Steinmetz  replied:  "OhT* 
the  thing  is  very  simple.  One  simply  attacks,  and  if  beaten 
off,  attacks  again,  and  so  on  till  one  succeeds."  "But,"^ 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  301 

said  his  interlocutor,  "do  you  uot  relieve  the  troops?"  "Re- 
lieve them?"  replied  the  general  in  a  puzzled  sort  of  tone. 
"Yes;  with  fresh  ones  when  the  leading  companies  have 
become  dispersed?"  "Oh  no,"  returned  the  general. 
"Troops  once  under  fire  must  stay  there  till  the  end."  The 
idea  of  reliev ing  troops  has  at  last  died  out  pretty  generally, 
but  at  that  time  in  most  other  armies  it  was  almost  a  matter 
of  faith,  and  one  must  appreciate  it  to  understand  the  pecul- 
iar form  the  battles  on  the  Continent  during  the  previous 
twenty  years  had  assumed.  It  is  a  point  that  at  the  time 
was  much  overlooked  by  our  own  authors,  particularly  in 
criticisms  on  the  Solferino  campaign.  The  position  of  the 
Prussians  at  Nachod  Dragomirow  considers  to  have  been 
very  precarious,  and  in  discussing  it  comes  to  the  common- 
sense  conclusion,  but  one  which  differs  entirely  from  that 
usually  assumed  by  battle  critics,  that  "The  theoretically 
deduced  demonstrations  of  the  better  plan,  however,  usually 
fail  to  grasp  all  the  factors  actually  in  play  at  the  moment. 
This  is  what  students  of  war  usually  overlook — in  practice 
the  immediate  point  is  not  what  is  best,  but  what  is  possi- 
ble." On  the  evening  of  the  28th  June,  when  Benedek  learnt 
of  the  combat  of  Soor  and  its  prejudicial  result  for  the 
Austrians,  he  turned  on  Henikstein  and  Krismanic  with  the 
words :  "I  told  you  they  would  beat  us  if  we  employed  our 
forces  in  detail,"  and  from  this  remark  and  the  history  of  the 
day  he  deduces  that  a  commander-in-chief  can  never  learn 
the  art  of  war  by  practice  alone.  If  he  has  not  prepared 
his  mind  by  careful  and  thorough  study  of  military  history, 
he  falls  helplessly  into  the  hands  of  any  aWeyrother." 
Weyrother,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  the  unfortunate 
chief  of  the  staff  who  devised  the  beautiful  parade  maneuver 
which  was  to  have  destroyed  Napoleon  at  Austerlitz,  but 
which  the  latter  tore  asunder.  The  name  has  since  become 
a  generic  term  to  describe  the  product  of  the  parade-ground, 
a  closet  student  who  without  personal  responsibility  pre- 
pares plans  for  soldiers  to  execute.  Dragomirow  does  not 
make  his  meaning  quite  clear  here,  for  Von  Moltke  too  was 
but  a  closet  student,  and  the  fact  that  he  had  never  even  com- 
manded a  battalion  was  hardly  an  advantage  to  him.  What 


302  Military  Letters  and  Essays. 

it  all  conies  to  is  the  guidance  under  which  a  iium  studies 
war,  or,  in  the  absence  of  guidance,  the  genius  he  brings  to 
bear  on  it.  One  or  the  other  he  must  have;  without  either, 
neither  practice  nor  study,  nor  both  together,  will  avail. 
With  reference  to  Koniggratz,  he  (Dragomirow)  admires  the 
conception  of  the  battle  as  a  whole,  still  more  the  initiative 
of  the  commanders  who  dared  to  assume  the  responsibility 
of  modifying  their  orders  to  suit  the  changed  circumstances. 
This  was  specially  noticeable  in  the  case  of  the  advance  of 
the  1st  Guard  Division  on  Chlum,  for  the  orders  could  not 
have  been  based  on  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  circum- 
stances, no  such  knowledge  being  conceivably  possible  at 
the  time  they  were  issued.  Finally  he  says: 

"All  the  world  wonders  at  the  emYieiu-y  of  the  new 
Prussian  weapon,  but  it  occurs  to  but  few  to  notice  the  cool- 
ness, intelligence,  self-denial,  and  sense  of  duty  of  the  men 
who  held  these  weapons.  Are  these  factors  really  only 
secondary?  Are  they  not,  perhaps,  the  decisive  ones?  In 
war  that  side  will  be  defeated  that  was  already  beaten  in 
peace.  In  war  mutual  self  confidence,  the  root  of  discipline, 
cannot  exist  when  in  the  individual  the  feeling  of  duty  lias 
not  been  developed, or  perhaps  the  soil  from  which  it  springs 
does  not  exist.  Each  man  must  at  least  be  sufficiently  car- 
ried away  by  the  cause  for  which  he  is  fighting,  which  may, 
for  the  moment,  be  only  the  credit  of  the  body  of  troops,  ihe 
company  or  regiment  to  which  he  belongs,  to  die  for  it  cheer- 
fully. In  a  way,  the  truth  of  this  is  universally  admitted; 
we  are  never  tired  of  repeating,  'In  war  moral  counts  for 
three-quarters,'  etc.,  but  when  we  come  to  investigate  a  par- 
ticular point,  this  is  forgotten,  and  one  endeavors  to  deduce 
the  result  from  the  weapons,  the  hair-powder,  or  the  length 
of  the  pigtails.  The  effect  of  the  Prussian  fire  was  not  in 
itself  particularly  remarkable,  and  if  as  a  fact  it  did  spread 
universal  consternation,  the  reason  is  only  because  people 
forget  too  easily  former  experiences.  To  whom  is  the  terri- 
ble effect  of  British  volleys  in  Spain  unknown  (remember  it 
is  a  Russian  who  speaks)?  In  those  days  the  armament  on 
either  side  was  equal,  but  there  were  other  points  of  differ- 


Military  Letters  and  Essays.  303 

ence — viz.,  national  skill  in  the  use  of  arms,  coolness,  and 
steadiness. 

"With  weak  or  insufficient  development  of  the  moral 
quality  of  the  troops,  no  improvement  either  in  weapons  or 
in  drill  will  avail  anything.  Both  no  doubt  help  to  over- 
come the  obstacles  between  us  and  the  attainment  of  our 
ends,  but  do  not  teach  how  to  pursue  these  ends  with  deter- 
mination and  energy.  This  cannot  be  taught,  it  can  only  be 
evolved  from  the  personal  energy  of  the  men  and  their 
leaders;  without  this  energy,  indeed,  better  weapons  only 
do  harm,  for  they  lead  to  waste  of  ammunition.  An  improve- 
ment in  the  method  of  employing  troops  will  then  also  be  of 
evil,  for  though  it  teaches  the  way  to  overcome  obstacles,  at 
the  same  time  it  reveals  their  full  strength,  and  thereby 
affords  undecided  characters  excuses  and  justification  for 
their  want  of  determination.  The  Prussians  now  and  again 
formed  unskillful  plans,  but  they  formed  them  with  resolu- 
tion, and,  thanks  to  this  quality  of  resolution,  in  the  end 
they  remained  victors." 

I  have  reproduced  Dragomirow's  ideas  at  length,  partly 
for  their  intrinsic  interest,  and  partly  because  these  extracts 
show  Malachowski's  fairness  of  mind  in  accepting  a  foreign- 
er's judgment  of  his  own  army,  and  still  more  his  confidence 
in  the  fairness  of  his  brother  officers  who  will  read  the  book. 


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